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## ***Olgu Sunumu/ Case Report***

### **Tourism Researchery in a State of Turbulence: Time for Great Repair and Renewal?**

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#### **Abstract**

Is tourism research at a standstill, or is it progressing or regressing? The answer is not so simple because of the strong neurosis surrounding tourism research, which requires immediate action. There are a number of false truths (i.e. research traditions and practices that are continued even though they are controversial) that are only visible to those who can bother to notice them. One of the things that surprises me most in this academic turmoil is those who un/knowingly and un/willingly perpetuate the false truths, even though they know they are controversial. As far as tourism research is concerned, I think that if we want to understand tourism research and advance it, these current apathetic behaviours towards widespread misconduct and false truths should also be part of the sub-theme of the tourism discipline. This case report aims to discuss both the nature and causes of the neurosis, and how to respond to it or, at best, overcome it, focusing on potential and actual issues directly relevant to the research world in turbulence. For a variety of reasons, tourism researchers, like their counterparts in other disciplines are very, if not entirely, concerned about publishing, but less concerned about their social or educational influence. All that seems to matter is the score of publication, citation, fame and prestige. As researchers, we are more concerned with the impact factor of journals and articles than with analysing basic educational problems or social injustices in our field. Yet, despite all this bravado, research-related problems in our field continue to grow rapidly (see reports on accelerating rates of research misconduct, article retractions, and the proportion of meaningless research and its costs to the economy in general and the environment in particular). There is no doubt that producing more publications does not advance science or solve problems. (While 90% of research has focused on business-related issues, nothing seems to have changed as tourism business continues to face similar problems.) This is a significant dilemma, but not one that most researchers are concerned about. Tourism researchers, again like their counterparts in other disciplines, are still more likely to research topics that have publication potential than those that do not. Frankly, are we making a research decision on the basis of altruism or egoism? There is a major problem with tourism academia in that researchers are more concerned with publishing than with doing meaningful science. Until the frenzy of

meaningless research and lust for publication ends, all these efforts will only serve to expand the garbage dump on the surface of the knowledge base. Finally, science is drowned in orthodox rules or how to publish in SSCI journals at the cost of losing academic freedom, authentic self and the research spirit. The vital questions that remain are: what does the researcher want to achieve internally not just externally, what is it worth doing, and for whom? Just as it is different to have food casually and to enjoy having it with enthusiasm, so it will be different to do research casually and to enjoy research with wise pleasure and enthusiasm, giving one's whole authentic self.

## 1. Introduction

According to Ioannides (2005, 2007), most existing research claims are false rather than true. Ioannides (2005, 2007) suggests that this finding may be due to a variety of operational, technical and procedural controversial issues in mainstream research, including: (i) The validity of original discoveries or datasets is reduced by highly unreplicated experiments. (ii) Research observations may be inaccurate depending on the accuracy of previous work. (iii) Results may be biased. (iv) Omission or failure to report all observations may introduce bias. (v) It is more likely that observations will not reflect reality if fewer studies are conducted (for example, with smaller sample sizes). (vi) The smaller the effects, the less likely it is that observations will be accurate. (vii) If not enough relationships are examined, inaccurate generalisations will be made because the whole picture is not seen (see Trevors et al., 2012 for more details).

Although I agree with much of Ioannides' (2005, 2007) criticism, I must add that social science researchers in general, and tourism researchers in particular, (i) fail to treat actans (e.g., Following Latour, I prefer to refer to human beings not as participants or subjects but as actans, since with a question (or questions) and an answer (or answers), action is not driven by a single individual) as a microcosm of a larger world, but as a product of random mechanical force, and (ii) fail to seek new knowledge, but are committed to promoting their own exclusive version of reality in a kind of self-confirming bias. Despite the varied but uncreative research methods employed, the practice of tourism research is trapped by the mechanistic philosophy in which tourism subjects can only passively respond to external actions. That is, mainstream tourism research does not seem to grasp the fact that the heart of social reality in tourism is creative life rather than some kind of mechanism. As a result, a thick cloud of crisis and controversy hangs over the field of tourism research. Specifically, there is no agreement on (i) what scientific framework would be most effective for studying tourism phenomena; (ii) there is a noticeable lack of scientific progress, as most published research consists of stating the obvious; (iii) facts and results in tourism are not discovered, but mostly invented in the modelled world by the researcher, if not fabricated; (iv) description and explanation in tourism research are as thin as ice, as they focus only on explaining behaviour, not the context in which that behaviour takes place, and surveying (looking) and researching are often confused (e.g. if you want to find something, there is nothing like looking. When you look, you usually find something, but it is not always what you are looking for (Tolkien, J. R. R)).

Tourism research, like many other scientific fields, is in a state of flux (see Poland and Tekin, 2017) and is increasingly focused on responding to the managerial challenges faced by organisations and destination authorities, as well as developing new, but often controversial, ways of understanding tourism and hospitality. I personally think that much more needs to be done at a deeper level in response to the current crisis. All solution-oriented approaches are commendable (though I do not think that the role of researcher is not to solve problems but to analyse their close and

distant causes), but they need to be complemented by more detailed actions. In my personal view, tourism research suffers from several controversial and under-recognised problems related to plutocracy, managerialism, tribalism, scientism, incrementalism, instrumentalism, careerism, templateism, metricism, ceterus-paribusism, sophistry and so on. Although my intention is to articulate both the nature and sources of these problems in tourism research, and how to respond to them or, at best, overcome them, by focusing on potential and actual issues directly relevant to the research world in crisis, due to space limitations I will only briefly introduce them and try to draw attention to the need for great repair and great renewal in tourism research and the concept of becoming a researcher. Before proceeding with the discussion, I must note that the researcher is the epistemological and ontological link on which the research process is based, so not only "being" but also "becoming" a researcher requires close scrutiny (Spry, 2001, p. 711).

## 2. Great repairs and renewals

Based on Francis Bacon's theory of 'great repair-great renewal', the 'reconstruction of the sciences, arts and all knowledge from top to bottom on the right foundations' is a cyclical process. This suggests that any canonical approach to research is destined to lose its validity and integrity, just as nothing man-made can be eternal. Therefore, its cycle naturally ends. In science, it is not an exaggeration to say that major repairs and major renovations are almost commonplace. For example, repair and renewal took place in the very past, thanks to the contributions of Aristotle and Plato. Newton, Francis Bacon, Descartes and Comte contributed to a similar cycle of repair and renovation. It happened again in the last century with the discoveries of Plunck, Heisenberg, Bohm and Einstein. It is about to happen again, or is already happening.

The process of repair and renewal is preceded by sociological 'stages' of resistance, including denial, anger and acceptance (Traverson et al., 2012). According to Arthur Schopenhauer, all truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident". As a result, if we look back over the history of scientific progress, what we consider "clear and certain" today would have been considered "ridiculous" yesterday and "false beliefs" tomorrow (Claxton, 1991). Established research frameworks cannot last forever, they fade and lose their integrity and validity, as history shows. There are signs that the world of research needs to be repaired and renewed, as criticisms of mainstream research intensify and counter-arguments grow stronger by the day. When criticisms of the dominant view are made, it may take some time for their effects to be felt.

As I mentioned earlier, it is dialectically inevitable that the old will be demolished and the new will emerge. For example, as a result of his strong criticism of Plato's idealistic perspective, Aristotle developed his own philosophy. On the basis of his criticism of scholastic philosophy, Descartes (2010) developed his modern philosophy. Kant criticised empiricism with rationality and thus established his transcendental philosophy. Marx developed his materialist philosophy by criticising idealism. Newtonian physics was replaced by quantum theory. Plunck's quantum theory was replaced by Einstein's theory of relativity. Newtonian physics and the positivist paradigm were both based on the principle of causality, but Heisenberg's uncertainty principle deconstructed it (Cevizci, 2012). Regardless of how powerful or prevalent a research paradigm is, history is full of examples that show that every paradigm has a life cycle and a lifespan. A very simple mechanism governs what happens in the epistemic universe. I call that mechanism as *epistemic motion*. This motion causes constant formation and deformation, and therefore constant change and

transformation. As a result, the epistemic universe and all its matter are constantly in motion as a result of this fundamental mechanism. Logos and the inquisitive mind are prerequisites for constant epistemic movement. Motion is everywhere (in the form of vibration and resonation) even if it appears motionless from the outside, but there is movement at the atomic or subatomic level, invisible to the naked eye. The mind is not a vessel to be filled, but a fire to be kindled, a tool to organise the formations and deformations that take place in our epistemic universe (Timuçin, 2002).

Social sciences in general, and tourism in particular, are dominated by mainstream research paradigms, traditional methods and established theories that are controversial in some respects. Due to their growing inadequacy in the face of current challenges, unprecedented circumstances and anomalies in the world, mainstream approaches have come under severe criticism. This is a sign of structural change in the world of research, as Kuhn (1962-1996) noted. When anomalies arise that cannot be adequately addressed by the existing paradigm of science, a revolution occurs that provides a new way of addressing these intractable problems. According to Kuhn (1962/1996), it is during such periods of crisis that exceptional science emerges. In the light of Kuhn's view, I believe that extraordinary science plays an important role in tourism research today. In addition to defending and supporting a dominant paradigm, there are attempts to isolate and examine anomalous results encountered in the research process, to relax standard forms of research practice, and to explore alternative research frameworks. In addition, this extraordinary state of science is characterised by a turn to philosophical analysis in identifying and evaluating research programmes and examining their basic assumptions (Kuhn, 1962-1996).

Contrary to Kuhn's view, I would argue that a change of paradigm is not sufficient to repair and renew science. Drawing on Gallison (1997), I agree that scientific progress is both idea- and tool-driven (Dyson, 2006). For science to progress, both tools and ideas must be present. Neither is effective without the other. Furthermore, the view of ontology that dominates Western philosophy, and by extension tourism studies, also needs careful attention. According to the dominant view, the most basic things in the world are things or, in technical philosophical terms, substances (Dupre, 2006). Others, however, argue that change is the most fundamental aspect of the world. Our perceptions of things that appear stable and only change their random properties are in fact nothing more than partial stabilisations within the flow of the environment, or eddies within the flow of processes (Dupre, 2006). There is a competition between substance and process ontologies. In short, it is important to decide whether researchers, the researched and tourism should be seen as "substances with fundamental properties" or as "processes causally linked to a specific set of activities" (Bueno et al., 2006). Incidentally, not only famous people whose names we know, but also the nameless masses, the ordinary people, have contributed significantly to scientific repairs, renewals, discoveries, dissemination, repairs or renewals. Newton was not able to "see the unseen" because he sat "on the shoulders of giants", as he himself claimed. His ability to see was the result of riding on the backs of thousands of unknown, uneducated artisans (and thousands more) (Conner, 2005). Science was a communal activity to which many people contributed. Conner (2005) suggests that because we admire great thinkers, we rarely consider the social worlds in which people live.

Incidentally, I believe that in the obsession with methodological rigour and technical perfectionism, the spirit of research is increasingly vanishing. What matters is not the mere fact of research, but the spirit of research (Truscot, 1943). It is the research spirit of the curious, of those who question the truth, of those who want to

know if things are really as they are known to be, who persevere through a difficult and painstaking process of creating new knowledge or reapplying existing knowledge to generate new concepts, methods and insights has contributed to the development of mankind. The spirit of research is the separation from the herd. It is the patient and stubborn pursuit of truth, without surrendering one's mind and will to others, without being someone else's loudspeaker (being true self). Research, especially field research, takes time, it takes effort, and to bear this burden requires a strong spirit of research. The reward is the feeling of having really done something meaningful, the feeling of being certain of some reality, or of knowing that some realities are not what they seem. Neither the word "research" nor the word "researcher" is found sufficient to describe the spirit and art of research. Generally speaking, the word "research" is used to describe the action performed; and the word "researcher" is used to describe the person who performs the action. Therefore, I used "researchery" to refer to the spirit of being an altruistic researcher with a passion for finding and sharing knowledge to help others, and to the researcher's self-development and transformation through research. Overall, 'researchery' is coined to refer to the state of being an altruistic researcher not a reporter and the art of developing and transforming the researcher's self through research. (The word *-ery* is derived from the Latin word *arius*, meaning "place for, art of, condition of".)

### 3. Signs: Time for change?

Although Kuhn has provided some helpful pointers, the timing of change and the indicators of change vary widely. However, there is a life cycle for any scientific framework (e.g. approach, perspective, paradigm, etc.) that includes birth, infancy, growth, maturity and decline. If a framework is initially seen as flimsy, it may take some time before it becomes widely used. Frameworks can be born, but they can remain dormant and ineffective for many years. It is like seeds that need the right conditions in the soil before they can germinate and grow. New frameworks can only grow and flourish under the right conditions and at the right time, much like seeds in soil. As a result, critiques of today's mainstream research traditions need to reach a critical mass before they can have a meaningful impact. No matter when it is born, if the external environment is unfavourable for germination, it may take some time before its true nature, potential usefulness and validity are realised. According to Watson (2005, p. 678), Copernicus' idea refuted the notion that the Earth was the centre of the universe, but was simply a repetition of Archimedes' statement 2000 years earlier. Two thousand years before Newton, Democritus had said that matter was made up of atoms, but society and colleagues at the time did not take him seriously. In Montaigne's method of doubt, which claimed that all doctrines were man-made, or in Descartes' method of doubt, which predated Montaigne by almost seventeen centuries (Watson, 2005), the classical defence of the *Sexus Empiricus* was modelled. As with mysticism, which was replaced by theology, and theology by science, the present dominant view is to be replaced by the next.

Although flaws and controversies are inherent in all relevant frameworks, methods, paradigms, etc., they often lie dormant until a framework in question fails to address or solve newly identified problems. Whenever science needs to undergo intellectual change or reorganisation, the predecessors (e.g. previous frameworks) are subject to much more criticism and even outright abandonment. This process is largely the result of the iconoclasts who appear in all scientific periods. In general, the successor is built as a synthesis of what has gone before, in accordance with this antagonist-successor dialectic. In other words, it is often born out of the ashes of its

predecessors. In order to be recognised by others, a successor must reject old truths, stereotypes, the status quo, etc. Incidentally, many of the problems facing science today are similar to those voiced by Francis Bacon in the 1600s. As we do today, Bacon criticised the constant search for funding, the competing claims for the scientist's attention, the delegation of practical work to assistants, disagreements with predecessors, the recording of negative results, and the need to keep proper records and reports (Bell, 2000). Change indicators and drivers have remained relatively the same.

Even though the successor (e.g. new method, technique, approach, etc.) is based on its predecessor, this does not mean that the predecessor is useless. On the contrary, the predecessor was once revolutionary. It is important to remember that the predecessor superseded its own predecessor as an outstandingly revolutionary vision in its own time. It is therefore not speculative to suggest that the dominant perspectives of today's scientific world will be replaced by others in the not too distant future. Among the many substitutes that have led to scientific breakthroughs in the past are the rise of secularism, the spread of Protestantism, the invention of the printing press, the widespread accessibility of education, and the simple act of a single individual, such as the Sicilian manuscript dealer (Giovanni Aurispa) who brought 238 manuscripts from Constantinople to Europe during the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire, introducing Plato, Sophocles and Aeschylus to the West. A similar breakthrough is Locke's bold assertion that the soul is the mind rather than a mystical entity (see Watson, 2005, p. 676). Similarly, the difficulties of the pandemic, the political, economic, cultural, social and scientific crises facing modern society and science are indicators and propellants of an impending scientific restructuring and/or revolution. In short, science is not static, as evidenced by the many cases in which the successor has built on its predecessor. Rather than being static, science is dynamic, constantly changing, renewing itself. The episteme itself is dynamic, so when and how it will be repaired, renewed or revolutionised is a matter of time; a new view will emerge from the hive of ideas over time, but the first step is to approach it independently and boldly.

#### **4. Tourism Research: Multifaceted Crises and the Roots**

There is an apparent neurosis in academia (Maxwell 2003, 2004), which is fuelled with the lust for publication, that requires immediate action. As shown in Table 1, anecdotal and preliminary research evidence can provide a description of the state of research in the social sciences in general and tourism research in particular. As can be seen, there are several undeniable and ongoing challenges, demoralising incidents and increasing problems related to dissatisfaction among fellow researchers. There are growing concerns about the external validity of research findings, the dominance of business perspectives in research (this is the dominant research perspective), failures in replication attempts, an increase in misconduct and retraction rates, the spread of citation cartels and questionable citation behaviour, a lack of criticism and publication bias, among others. As F. Bacon long ago pointed out, among the many other problematic areas in academia today are the ongoing mudslinging between different epistemic colonies, the degradation of the real meaning of real science, widespread scientific repression and fraud, plagiarism, almost partisan disputes, conflicts and competition for research positions, funding and incentives. There is a growing need for "responsible research" throughout the scientific community (SwaffS, Horizon 2020) and critical turn in how to conduct a research inquiry.

While researchers are well equipped, trained to be objective, methodical and precise, yet the social sciences are in a tailspin (see Table 1). The preponderance of turbulence (false truths, biased interpretations, dubious results, misconduct, etc.) contradicts the years of training and education that researchers receive as Ph.Ds., where they are trained to apply rigorous and conservative methodology with precision and to remain objective (Justim et al., 2019). Among many possible causes, it is clear that the turbulence has been caused by (i) the severing of ties with the wider society through the reduction of scientific research to so-called rigorous methods and techniques and publication in high-impact journals full of academic jargon, (ii) the severing of ties with philosophy, (iii) the existence of a false consciousness cultivated during the PhD, (iv) the proliferation and acceptance of research memes as gospel truth, and (v) the severing of ties with other academic fields where new developments force a rewriting of what we know.

**Table 1: Current State of Social Sciences**

<b><i>Rising Discontent</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Young scientists are leaving academia at an unprecedented rate (Milovic et al., 2018; Wood &amp; Townsend, 2013);</li> <li>ii. A large proportion of professors (40%) are considering leaving their positions (Sanderson, Phua, &amp; Herda, 2000);</li> <li>iii. Over 60% of professors report feeling stressed by the demands of research and committee work, and 74% are frustrated by the lack of personal time (Bok, 2015);</li> <li>iv. Satisfaction with academic endeavours dropped from 67 percent to 51 percent, while stress level with academic occupation has increased from 52 percent to 56 percent (McInnis, 2000 cf. Bechert 2001). Academics are now overextended, under focused, overstressed and underfunded than ever.</li> <li>v. It is almost impossible to remain 'sane' in the face of repeated rejection, peer hostility, the dark side of academia, impostor syndrome and burnout (Brown, 2013; Jaremca et al., 2020; Stubb et al., 2012);</li> <li>vi. Young academics are twice as likely to experience mental health problems (Levecque et al, 2017).</li> <li>vii. According to the US Department of Education, almost half of PhD students suffer from depression, and 10% commit suicide each year (Walker, 2015).</li> </ul>
<b><i>Rise in immature and meaningless articles</i></b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>viii. Despite the unprecedented increase in the number of publications over the decades, there are serious warnings that most (95%) of published findings may be invalid (Ioannidis, 2005).</li> <li>ix. According to Rossitter, "all findings in the social sciences based on the Likert scale and the semantic difference scale are suspect!" (Rossiter, 2011, p. 79).</li> <li>x. Similarly, Kollat et al. warn that if published papers were re-examined (i.e. replicated), "it would not be surprising if 90% of the published findings turned out to be wrong" (Kollat, Blackwell and Engel 1972, p. 577).</li> <li>xi. Similarly, many leading researchers believe that "half of</li> </ul>

	<p>the scientific literature, not only in medicine but also in psychology and other fields, may be wrong" (Smaldino &amp; Mcelreath, 2016, p. 2).</p>
<b>External Validity Problems</b>	<p>xii. Some see scientific endeavour as a vast wasteland, recognising that little solid work has been done in science, that scientists have failed to make a significant impact on practice, and that what has been produced is nothing more than esoteric trivia (Bennis &amp; O'Toole, 2005; November, 2004; Ormerod, 2003).</p> <p>xiii. Very few theories or findings go beyond the current level of common sense and practical/tactical knowledge in society. November (2004) warns practitioners to ignore academic research.</p> <p>xiv. Similarly, Bennis and O'Toole (2005) note that "statistical and methodological wizardry can blind rather than illuminate when applied to the business world, where decisions are made with scattered and incomplete data" (Bennis &amp; O'Toole, 2005, p. 6).</p> <p>xv. Science lives in ivory tower and studies the exaggerated problems it is concerned with and is therefore disconnected from real life. For example, according to Wilner's (1985) research, only 6.4% of publications in the US between 1936 and 1941 were about the economic depression, and only 1% of publications between 1947 and 1956 were about McCarthyism, despite the severe effects of McCarthyism and the Cold War.</p>
<b>Dominance of single research perspective (Business perspective only)</b>	<p>xvi. It is interesting to note that although the society we study is made up of many different stakeholders, almost all published research suffers from a perspective bias. That is, 90% of publications have been conducted from a business perspective to shape and serve business objectives (Clarke and Davidson, 2018).</p> <p>xvii. As Freud argued long ago, 'science has failed to make people significantly happier or freer, because each new scientific discovery and each new technological advance creates new dependencies, risks and fears' (see Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 25).</p> <p>xviii. It seems that instead of 'helping' society and social life, the social sciences are accused of being a 'hindrance' and largely responsible for the emergence and growth of most, if not all, of our current global problems (see Maxwell, 2003, 2004).</p> <p>xix. While the number of publications is increasing, is this consistent with public trust in scientists? Unfortunately, the answer is no. That is, scientists may be competent by virtue of their publications, but they are not trusted by the public (Fiske and Dupree, 2014).</p>
<b>Rising Misconducts</b>	<p>xx. Fanelli (2009) found that 34% of researchers reported engaging in 'questionable research practices', including 'dropping data points on a gut feeling' and 'changing the design, methodology and results of a study in response to pressure from a funding source', while 72% of respondents knew colleagues who had done so (Fanelli,</p>



	<p>2009).</p> <p>xxi. According to the findings presented in Fiedler and Schwarz's (2015) study, almost half (47%) of the respondents (academics) admitted to fabricating their hypotheses after evaluating their findings.</p> <p>xxii. A review of 250 papers published in psychology found that 12% of authors deliberately presented incorrect p-values (Bakker and Wicherts, 2011); 22% of 2155 researchers at US universities included in a study admitted to rounding p-values (John et al., 2012).</p> <p>xxiii. The results of a meta-analysis showed that "a pooled weighted average of 1.97% (N = 7, 95% CI: 0.86-4.45) of scientists had at least once fabricated, falsified or altered data or results - a serious form of misconduct by any standard - and up to 33.7% admitted to other questionable research practices.</p> <p>xxiv. In surveys asking about the behaviour of colleagues, 14.12% (N = 12, 95% CI: 9.91-19.72) admitted to fabrication and up to 72% admitted to other questionable research practices" (Fanelli &amp; Tregenza, 2009).</p>
<p><b>Rise in citation games</b></p>	<p>xxv. The use of citation as a criterion for success is questionable. About 90 percent of all published papers go uncited within two years. According to Thomson Reuters' Web of Science, 84 percent go uncited over a five-year citation interval. In the social sciences as a whole, about half of all published articles go uncited within the two-year citation interval that determines a journal's impact factor. Over the five-year period, 32 percent are uncited. (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 7).</p> <p>xxvi. Fire and Guestrin's (2019) analysis of 120 million articles shows that the practice of citation as an indicator of success is compromised, its validity as an external metric is at risk, and its usefulness is diminishing.</p> <p>xxvii. There is a growing body of research that highlights the existence of reciprocal/compulsory citation from journal to journal, from editor to author, from referee to referee and from author to author. Some studies show that in at least one in five papers, at least one referee does not hesitate to politely press for the inclusion of his paper (20%), and at least 50% of authors inappropriately cite the journal for publication in that journal (see Wilhite and Fong (2012), Fister et al. (2016), and Fong and Wilhite (2017) for more on cartels).</p> <p>xxviii. The Simkin and Roychowdhury (2003) study provides further evidence that only 20% of citees read the original paper they cite.</p> <p>xxix. False, incomplete, careless and functionalist citations are not limited to these cases. Wang et al. (2016), who examined 4200 citations to the 'Life Cycle Model of Habitats' developed by Butler (1980), found that one in ten citations was incorrect.</p> <p>xxx. Almost 88% of published articles are in beauty sleep, meaning that they have not been cited even once in the</p>

		<p>ten years since publication (Robinson-Garcia et al., 2015).</p> <p>xxxi. "98 per cent of all articles published in the arts and humanities are never cited, and the corresponding figure for articles in the social sciences is 75 per cent, a figure only slightly less appalling (Shoemaker, 2008). Articles in scientific journals fare better, with only 25 per cent reported to be never cited (Pearce &amp; Huang, 2012). However, the average number of citations per article is only between one and two". Equally interesting, according to sociologists Jonathan and Stephen Cole, "almost all of the most frequently cited and considered most important scientific papers are written by members of a handful of leading departments, while the large accumulation of other published papers has little or no impact on the progress of the field" (Ghoshal, 2005, inBok 2015, p. 330).</p> <p>xxxii. Even more tragic is the fact that many researchers continue to use and cite articles long after they have been retracted. Fewer and fewer articles in management journals provide "actionable conclusions", i.e. conclusions that could lead management to change its behaviour.</p>
<b>Problems in Replication</b>	<p>xxxiii. Several landmark studies have found that original results can be reproduced only 11% and 25% of the time, respectively (Begley &amp; Ellis, 2012).</p> <p>xxxiv. "Scientific claims should be trusted by the reproducibility of their supporting evidence, not by the status or authority of the person making them" (OSC, 2015, p. 943).</p> <p>xxxv. However, while 97 per cent of one hundred studies initially reported statistically significant results, only 36 per cent of replications did so (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 76).</p> <p>xxxvi. Several researchers argue that scientific papers are published in a way that prevents replication of experiments, and that only a small percentage (30%) of these results can be repeated and independently verified (Eintalu, 2021).</p>	
<b>Rising Retraction Rates</b>	<p>xxvii. The rate of retractions and removals of publications from journals has increased steadily since the 1970s, and accelerated especially after 2000 (Hesselmann et al., 2017). This rate was ten times higher in 2018 than in 1997 (Brainard and You, 2018). ii.</p> <p>xxviii. Withdrawn publications often remain visible and searchable, but the purpose of a retraction is to mark them as 'removed' from the scientific record. In practice, however, some retracted articles continue to be seen as valid content by researchers and the public, who are often unaware of the retraction (Schneider et al., 2022).</p>	
<b>Avoidance of meddling (no critique)</b>	<p>xxix. Few studies have the courage to challenge and rebut the studies they cite (Bornman and Daniel, 2005, 2008).</p> <p>xl. Although science is built on criticism, the level of</p>	

	<p>undertaking criticism of previously published materials remains at around 2.4% (negative citations).</p> <p>xli. Considering that research is conducted to either make a jump, new consolidation, new bridge, repeat consolidation or repeat bridge, Foster et al. (2015) reported that the frequency of each strategy in the literature published between 1983 and 2008 was inversely proportional to the potential risk of failure. Repeat statements were six times more common than new or jump statements (85.8% vs. 14.2%). New bridges and new consolidations were about equally frequent as jumps (12.4% vs. 1.8%).</p>
<b>Rise in publication Bias</b>	<p>xlii. Studies show that studies with a positive or statistically significant association/difference are published more often than studies of similar quality with negative or "no difference" results (Emerson et al., 2010).</p> <p>xliii. The publication rate of positive findings is over 93% in psychology journals, 80% in medical journals (Dickersin and Min, 1993), 75% in orthodontic journals (Koletsis et al., 2009), 84% in accounting journals (Lindsay, 1994) and 92% in marketing journals (Hubbard and Armstrong, 1994). The reporting of positive findings is 3.4 times higher in studies using behavioural and social methods (Fanelli, 2010).</p>
<b>Never-ending competition</b>	<p>xliv. 73 per cent of scientists have a preference not to share research or data at the request of another researcher (Wicherts et al., 2011).</p>
<b>Response Bias and weasel recommendations</b>	<p>xlv. Another recent survey of leading scientific publications (e.g. Science, Nature, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science) found that only 17% of articles in these journals mentioned limitations, including response bias (Ioannidis, 2007).</p> <p>xlvi. Similarly, Mortel (2008), who reviewed 14275 studies, found that only 0.002% (31) used a social desirability scale to detect social desirability bias.</p>
<b>Cost of publishing? Is it really worthed?</b>	<p>xlvii. "Scientific activities can contribute to climate change mitigation, but they inevitably consume energy and emit greenhouse gases (GHG). For example, international flights to environmental conferences can ironically create a large carbon footprint (CF), so scientists should be more aware of climate change than the average citizen because they fly around the world more frequently (Burke, 2011; Gremillet, 2008)" cf. (Song, Che, &amp; Zang, 2016, p. 275). Each publication leaves an average carbon footprint of 5.4 kg. Is it worth it?</p> <p>xlviii. According to estimates, there were over one million academic articles published in 1996, whereas in 2009 there were over one million and a half (about one article every twenty-two seconds) (Alvesson et al., 2017).</p> <p>xlix. According to Belluz (2005) and Ioannidis (2006), for example, the US alone wastes almost \$200 billion a year - 85 per cent of science funding - on meaningless research.</p>

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**Source:** Yuksel A. (in progress). Back to the Basics in Transformative Researchery and Conscientization: Research, Researcher, Researched, Realitas and Research Consciousness

The reason why false truths and misconduct (Table 1) are more prevalent in the social sciences today may be attributed to the current contextual culture of preoccupation with research enquiries for the sake of publication and prestige. It is likely that the rush to get ahead of others and the lust for publication make it difficult to observe carefully, to re-evaluate carefully, to research responsibly and to write effectively. There is no doubt that using research for career advancement - and often exploiting it - has a very detrimental effect (Fals Borda, 2001). In addition, this cultural context in the research world has tended to close off tourism researchers to the world outside their own, and they tend to stick to the beaten track. Despite occasional bumps into reality, most researchers pick themselves up and walk away as if nothing has happened (Trevors et al., 2012). Researchers have often sacrificed external validity in favour of statistics (Substance is taken over by statistics, and researchers have become nothing but slaves to numbers), partly because researchers tend to value methodological rigour over intellectual or societal rigour. In essence, researchers seem to have neglected one of the main functions of science and tend to avoid changing their environment with their research. Scientific insight and authority come from a genuine connection with real life. Moreover, the lack of concurrent and sequential research practices suggests that we need to rediscover the true meaning of what research is all about. Here I must remind that the word research is rooted in a word that means "to search again", anew, back again, to wander or to go round and round. As Hurston says, "Research is formalised curiosity. It is poking and prying with a purpose" (Hurston, 1942/1996, p. 143 cf. Braud 1998). The idea of revisiting a topic - especially an important one - in the hope of understanding it from different perspectives reminds me of Carl Jung's statement in the context of personal growth and development: Development cannot be linear; it must be circular. In Jung's view, uniform development occurs only at the beginning, after which everything else becomes central (Jung, 1965).

I think that the following understudied issues are the bottlenecks that need to be overcome for tourism research to move forward. Here I must note again that the accumulation of millions of research publications does not necessarily mean progress in science, as this could actually be regression (moving in the wrong direction). As I will be elaborating on these issues on other occasions in the future, I think it is sufficient to present the brief description of these categories.

- (i) **False Consciousness:** Science itself has become an ideology or the religion it once criticised for its dogmatism. I believe that the current orthodoxy of the Ph.D. contributes greatly to intellectual slavery and degeneration. As Engels (1968) notes, the PhD is a period of bifurcation of consciousness in which one not only adopts ideas that are not one's own, but also thinks in ways and logics that are not one's own. This period is similar to the period in which one is influenced by the ideas, values and ideal positions of others; one becomes heteronomous in terms of adopting their own thought patterns, values and ideals (Thomson, 2015, p. 450). Marx introduced the concept of false consciousness long before Engels, describing institutionalised processes that mislead actors and conceal the exploitation inherent in social relations between classes based on institutionalised processes. Sloterdijk et al. (1984, p. 193) describe false consciousness as the knowledge that one has no illusions but is still being dragged down by

'the force of things'. There is a willingness to articulate an ideologically formulated position despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary (Hantke, 2007, p. 77). Through sophistry and idols of the mind, false or indifferent consciousness is characterised by a distorted perception and understanding of reality. Despite the complexity of the production process of false consciousness, once it is created, it becomes imperialistic because of the dedicated followers (disciples) who "do not know it is false but believe it anyway" and "know it is false but believe it anyway". It is generally argued that educational institutions play an important role in the spread of false consciousness. Research suggests that they serve as the primary mechanism for instilling a sense of perspective and evaluation (Apple, 2004). As a result, they produce hegemonic but contested desires, ambitions and researcher identities, suppress fundamental innovation and undermine their basic commitments (Kuhn, 1962). Equally interesting, doctoral students are explicitly required to produce publishable work rather than using their student years to develop and extend their knowledge (Teeuwen and Hantke, 2007). In general, as researchers, we are trained to model and present the world we believe in to those participants who generally do not wish to withdraw to think about it by placing our modelled thoughts in the minds of actors (Bourdieu, 2019). However, there is a difference between the worlds imagined and modelled by researchers and the world in which people live. Institutions determine what knowledge should be taught and whose knowledge is legitimate, thereby influencing the quality of doctoral education. In the curricula of these institutions, the ideology of obedience, conformity, indifference, docility and submission is easily hidden and masked. Once designed to promote critical and free thinking, such institutions have been transformed into institutions that produce obedient individuals with inductive or deductive reasoning as their sole means of thinking (Rennesland, 2020).

- (ii) **Plutocracy** is a form of oligarchic knowledge production and management in which power is shared among materially superior, powerful and wealthy actors.
- (iii) **Managerialism** rewards scholars who devote themselves to tasks and activities that are measurable and visible for the least risk and effort (Willmott 1995, p.1024). As a result of managerialism, researchers are encouraged to ask pragmatic and practical questions rather than address broad, pervasive, complex and controversial social issues (Adler & Hansen, 2012).
- (iv) **Epistemic tribalism** is the act of organising, practising or advocating epistemic tribes or tribal modes of research inquiry. A tribe evaluates scientific information not on the basis of whether it conforms to common standards of evidence or conforms to a common understanding of phenomena, but on whether it supports its values and goals and is endorsed by tribal and star scientists. The result of tribalism is compliance, which includes continued acceptance of the tribe's goals and participation in the approved methods of achieving them.

- (v) **Scientism**, the belief that science and the scientific method hold the key to unlocking the mysteries of the world. The firm belief in science itself is known as scientism, which is the view that science is no longer a form of possible knowledge, but that knowledge must be identified with it (Habermas, 1987, p. 4; see Foucault, 1980, p. 27 cf. Ayikoru, 2009, p. 67). When we realise that science is not the only way of knowing, we have an epiphany, we realise that we have different ways of knowing. Afterwards, one is relieved that one does not have to conform to a 'one-size-fits-all' model of scientific inquiry to gain credibility, that strict adherence to the rules and systematic procedures of quantitative research without much room for innovation and flexibility is not necessary (Mertkan & Bayraklı, 2018).
- (vi) **Incrementalism** refers to taking small steps towards already established concepts, methods and knowledge by carrying out a large number of small projects. This leads to small incremental changes rather than big changes.
- (vii) **The instrumentalist philosophy** of science holds that the value of scientific concepts and theories depends not on whether they are literally true or correspond in some sense to reality, but rather on whether they help to make accurate empirical predictions or solve conceptual problems. Most published studies have been criticised for having statistical significance but failing to meet the conditions of social relevance, external validity and applicability, despite their overarching aims. "Research often downplays or ignores issues of external validity and/or assumes that they have been satisfactorily addressed within the statistical generalisation model - sample to population - through random sampling" (Hubbard and Lindsay, 2012, p. 2). Despite the increase in publications, often based on a single commercial perspective and fuelled by the false belief that research produces 'knowledge', it has been argued that the impact and relevance of these publications to society is declining. Scientific endeavour is seen by some as a vast wasteland, with little robust research being conducted, scientists failing to make a significant impact on practice, and results being little more than esoteric trivia (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005; November, 2004). November (2004) warns practitioners not to ignore academic research, as very few theories and findings go beyond the level of common sense and practical/tactical knowledge in society. Similarly, Bennis and O'Toole (2005) observe that "statistical and methodological wizardry can blind rather than enlighten business decisions when dealing with scattered and incomplete data" (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005, p. 6). Because science studies exaggerated problems, it is divorced from reality. Despite McCarthyism and the Cold War, Wilner's (1985) research found that only 6.4% of US publications between 1936 and 1941 discussed the economic depression, and only 1% of US publications between 1947 and 1956 discussed McCarthyism. Among the three main reasons why the social sciences are in such a dramatic state is a lack of genuine inquiry, creativity and inspiration (Alvesson and Gabriel, 2013; Alvesson and Spicer, 2016; Alvesson et al., 2017; Rusu, 2014, Vana 2020a, b). They have been accused of being disconnected from social reality and therefore lagging behind mainstream practical knowledge.

- (viii) **Templateism:** Methodological templatism refers to studies that follow the same methodological and research design. The social sciences are composed of different epistemological communities and aim to produce systematic, objective and meaningful knowledge about society, claiming scientific validity, external validity and statistical reliability. Social reality studies are based on rigid technical templates/guidelines that have been developed. It is generally assumed that new, useful and impactful knowledge is creative, but there is an inverted U relationship between knowledge and creativity (Scrivner & Mastriperri, 2018). Thus, knowledge has fallen into the domain of convergent thinking, which in positivist science has "become a religion for defining what is real and what is true" (Czarniawska & Joerges, 2005). There is a common scientific vicious circle that can be summarised as the constant repetition of stereotypical theoretical perspectives and hypotheses produced by the pioneers of the respective scientific discipline. There are many influences on mainstream academic culture that shape the way research is conducted, conceptual and theoretical perspectives are developed, and how interpretation and reporting are carried out. As a result, researchers are unable to move beyond stereotypical approaches and established technical design boundaries, leading to stereotypes. A lack of imagination and creativity has given rise to Mc-Scientology, in which the topics chosen are the same, the methods used are the same, the findings are the same, the interpretations are the same, and so the results are only strikingly similar. Divergent rather than convergent thinking is required in science, which requires flexibility in thinking and the creation of alternative views to long-held beliefs (p. 140).
- (ix) **Metricism** is the belief that measurement and improvement are directly related. A (false) saying attributed to Lord Kelvin is: "If you can't measure it, you can't improve it." Similarly, Tom Peters coined the phrase "what gets measured gets done", which became the cornerstone of metrics. Over time, it has become clear that "anything that can be measured cannot be improved". Furthermore, a major problem with metrics is that they can lead people to distort their own behaviour in order to optimise what is measured (such as publication in highly cited journals) at the expense of what is not measured (such as careful teaching) (Macilwain, 2013). Quantitative intensity and over-reliance on quantity are problematic. As McNamara's experience during the Vietnam War painfully demonstrated, leaders tend to get into trouble not by fudging the numbers, but by failing to give proper weight to all the quantitative and qualitative factors that should be involved in their decisions (Bennis & O'Toole, 2005, p. 7).
- (x) **Sophism** refers to a tendency towards motivated reasoning in which favoured conclusions are readily accepted and undesirable claims are not critically scrutinised. Over science is a common misconception whereby people mistakenly assume that a finding has been published as evidence that it is established. In addition, they may be influenced by status quo biases, such as a preference for maintaining scientific consensus, or an intuitive assessment of a researcher's work based on their prestige rather than the strength of their evidence. As a result,

some 'scientific breakthroughs' do not stand up to scientific scrutiny (Jussim et al., 2019; Forgas and Baumeister, 2009).

- (xi) ***Ceterus Paribusism***: As a result of dominant processes, we have formulated the problem of knowledge in accordance with an ism, namely determinism and positivism, and legitimised knowledge in terms of a scientificism characterised by positivism. Positivism sees man as a producer and consumer. From this positivist perspective, it is impossible to understand man as a being who sets values, desires, stands, does, is free, knows, develops and idealises. As far as I am concerned, science has come to a choice between living human reality or knowing it. In order to solve this problem of knowledge, one cannot abandon dogmatic beliefs. It is not enough to treat man as a mechanism within a framework of social relations that can only be determined by behavioural and factual factors. A phenomenological approach to the human being would be more appropriate, since it presents this concrete totality in all its phenomenological aspects, rather than breaking it down. Through his senses, man is able to perceive a world of constant contrasts. A world in constant flux cannot be grasped by positivist reasoning. It occurs because of the conflict that arises when change and becoming take place. We can experience the world as a whole, where opposites merge together rather than separately (Mengüşoglu, 2017, p. 337).
- (xii) ***Negligence of ongoing ontic and epistemic errors***: Since Parmenides, the argument about epistemic and ontic error has been a dilemma in the social sciences. I am not sure that tourism researchers are ever concerned with it. According to Parmenides, existence exists and non-existence does not. The truth is that to think what exists is to think without contradiction; to think what doesn't exist is to fall into contradiction (Sunar, 1971). The reduction of ontology to epistemology is a common epistemological error. The objective becomes subjective. Knowledge of being is equated with being itself. This error leads to epistemology replacing ontology, knowledge replacing truth, and epistemology taking precedence over ontology. It implies that knowledge of Being can only be acquired empirically, which is a highly controversial view. Reality itself is not determined by epistemology; rather, it is made meaningful by epistemology. Thus, ontology cannot be reduced to different ways of understanding the world. The ontic error is the objectification of the subjective. Existence is reduced to what can be known. As a result, the visible and concrete are considered as being, while the invisible (tendencies, power, structures, absences) are excluded. The reduction of ontology to mere positive (concrete) existence is a fallacy in ontological thinking. According to Ulman et al. (2011), no theory can communicate with another if only observable facts are accepted as ontological truth. By conflating existence and reality, these fallacies reduce science to calculations (hypotheses) and observations (data), thereby sterilising it. This is a problematic issue. For example, is science valid if calculations agree with statistical processes and procedures, but the reality of life does not agree with the calculations? Can a social theory be said to be true if it is supported by data consistent with its hypothesis? Isn't the aim of science to make the theory relevant to life, not just to verify or falsify it?



Another problem with the social sciences is that science hasn't been able to overcome anthropomorphism (Türk, 2012, p. 203). The fact that the study of human beings is only concerned with behaviour (visual, based on external stimuli) without taking into account other elements that make up the human being is also problematic.

- (xiii) **Lack of philosophy:** The exclusion of philosophy from science is a costly extravagance. Philosophical understanding refers to the ability to see the whole. Most existing books on scientific research, developed under the positivist paradigm, provide candidates with canonical but controversial techniques and tools, limiting them to technical specialists. There is more to research than technical skills. Since Galileo, it has been rather disappointing for those who believe that scientific research, generally based on quantifiable techniques, will eventually lead to an understanding of something, how much other methods of analysis can contribute to that understanding, for example philosophy, psychology or linguistics. That philosophy has almost no place in books on research methods is curious, since philosophy provides conceptual analysis outside the realm of science. Philosophy is essential because it provides researchers with a conceptual framework on which to base their research. In this respect, philosophy and science must work together on research questions to achieve the best results. Philosophy and science are not opposites, but complement each other in a symbiotic relationship. Philosophers rethink reality conceptually, while scientists experiment to obtain empirical information. To achieve their specific goals, scientists often need to isolate themselves from outside influences. Philosophers can try to formulate a theoretical explanation of the relationship between constructs and concepts when they step back and examine all these discoveries in science. Similarly, whatever equipment is used to collect data, philosophy is needed to interpret the data collected: technical data describe what the world is, but philosophy helps to describe how to understand it. Speaking of philosophy, the view of ontology dominated by Western philosophy, which is concerned with what is physically available, needs to be revisited with greater attention. According to popular opinion, the most fundamental things in the world are things or, in technical philosophical terms, substances (Dupre, 2006). Others, however, believe that change is the most fundamental aspect of reality. There is a competition between substance and process ontologies, and things that appear stable and only change their random properties are in fact nothing more than partial stabilisations within the flow of the environment, or vortices within the flow of processes (Dupre, 2006). In summary, the question that needs to be addressed here is whether researchers should be regarded as 'substances with fundamental properties' or as 'processes causally linked to specific activities' (Bueno et al., 2006).

## 5. Conclusion: Inquiry into factual knowledge or wisdom?

Judging from the signs summarised in Table 1, it seems necessary to re-examine existing conceptions of what research is, what philosophy is, who is a researcher, what are their responsibilities, who is being researched, what is reality, what is a research

habitus, what is an expansion of consciousness, and to include other important elements that have been neglected, in order to mitigate the destructive effects of current *modus operandi* (e.g. ways of doing science), *modus faciendi* (e.g. moods of science), *vivencia* (e.g., ways of research experience) and *modus vivendi* (e.g. ways of academic life). In line with Maxwell, I think that a major reason for the current turmoil in research is the fact that factual knowledge inquiry is much more favoured than wisdom inquiry (Maxwell, 1984, 2003, 2010). Factual knowledge inquiry is the process of finding facts or information. Despite the fact that knowledge inquiry acquires and uses factual information (Maxwell, 1984, 2003, 2010), this approach does not prioritise the articulation and development of articulations of our life issues. The concept of wisdom refers to the ability to recognise what is valuable in life for oneself and others (Iradel, 2007, p. 120). Although the search for factual knowledge increases our capacity to act, it does not increase our capacity to act wisely (Maxwell, 2010).

In his succinct summary of the urgent changes needed in research, Maxwell summarises: (i) The basic purpose of research should change. It should shift from increasing knowledge to increasing wisdom - wisdom being recognised as the ability to discern what is valuable in life for oneself and others, and including knowledge, understanding and technological expertise (but much more). (ii) There is also a need to shift the nature of academic problems to include both knowledge and life problems. (iii) A shift in the nature of academic ideas is needed to include proposals for action and claims to knowledge. (iv) There should be a shift in what constitutes intellectual progress, so that progress in ideas about how to achieve a more civilised world is considered alongside progress in knowledge. (v) The nature of social research must change fundamentally. Economics, politics, sociology, tourism and so on are not basic sciences and are not expected to develop a basic understanding of social phenomena. Their tasks are threefold rather than one. The first is to identify the problems of life and to propose and critically evaluate possible solutions, actions or policies on the basis of their potential to promote wiser living. A second objective is to promote a collaborative, rational approach to social issues. Finally, to support the development of a hierarchical and/or heterarchical structure of ends and means for purposeful rationality at the individual, institutional and global levels, thus creating a framework within which personal and social ends and means can be improved over time. With these three tasks we aim to promote the collaborative approach to life's problems, while developing empathic or 'personal' understanding between people as a valuable activity in itself. In order to facilitate the three main tasks above, learning about social phenomena is an important but secondary activity. (vi) There needs to be a significant change in the way academic inquiry engages with the rest of the world. As a way of promoting collaborative rationality and social wisdom, academic research needs to engage with, learn from, teach and debate with society, rather than being intellectually detached from it. (vii) To maintain its independence from government, industry, the military and public opinion, the academy must have just enough power. In this sense, the academy acts as a public service, doing openly and independently what real public services must do in secret for their governments. (viii) To achieve this goal, pure science and academia must adjust its aims, priorities and character to focus on what really matters: curiosity, seeing and searching, knowing and understanding, and the impersonal, esoteric, purely intellectual aspect of science and academia. The development of empathic understanding between people should be given intellectual priority in social research. (ix) We need philosophy to cease being a specialised field and to become an aspect of research that deals with our most fundamental and general problems - problems that transcend all disciplinary boundaries - so that it ceases to be a specialised field. In philosophy, the intellect must be devoted to the development of wisdom in life, as it was for Socrates. (x) There needs to be a shift in

what constitutes a scholarly contribution, so that publications that promote (or have the potential to promote) an understanding of what our life problems are and what we should do about them are included (Maxwell), in addition to contributions primarily to the academic community.

In addition to the operational, technical and procedural controversies mentioned above, I believe that the ways in which "research" and "being and becoming a researcher" are perceived and realised can also have an important impact on the acceleration of false truths and misconduct in the research world, if not addressed contextually. Clearly, being and becoming a researcher is not limited to technical and procedural skills. There may be a difference between learning how to do qualitative research and developing a qualitative eye, mind and soul (Morse, 2005). The step from 'learning about' to 'learning to do' is a big one. Researchers' identities can be influenced by the social, cultural and epistemic contexts in which they think and act. Research texts often treat becoming a researcher as a process of learning tools and techniques, regardless of the context, and associate research with procedures appropriate to different worldviews (Mertkan & Bayraklı, 2018). Despite the widespread knowledge of research techniques and methods, little is known about how researcher identities are formed during and after doctoral training and how they are influenced by the context of their development. However, the concept of becoming a researcher implicitly includes a temporal dimension. The concept of becoming implies transforming oneself over time: becoming something other than what one already is (Barnacle, 2005, p. 179). A metamorphic concept such as becoming is highly complex and messy, characterised by power dynamics and identity negotiations (Waite, 2014). Accordingly, becoming a researcher is more than being able to create and apply a toolbox of techniques. In some ways, the process of becoming identities is similar to the solidification of crustal points in volcanic lava, which repeatedly solidifies before melting and dissolves before cooling (Bauman, 2000, p. 83). As a result of fluidity, the researcher must keep trying. As a way of attempting these attempts, one may cling desperately to something solid and concrete that promises to last, to see if it is possible to put them together, and to assume that once they are put together, they will stay together (Bauman, 2000). In Bauman's view, identity is never something that an individual possesses, and it remains essentially relatively the same from birth to death (2000). In a globalised and heterogeneous age, social scientists need to address the creation of highly fluid, porous and borderless identities (Bauman, 2000; Thomson and Gunter, 2011). To trace the opportunities and challenges of the hybrid process of becoming, being and belonging (Thomson & Gunter, 2011), social science must play its part.

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