

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT (1728-1731)

 Ahmet BÜYÜKAKSOY^a

Abstract

Russia was a growing power in 18th century thanks to efforts of Peter the Great. In his time Russia, started to play important role in European politics and started to involve in European affairs. However rise of the Russia, was detrimental to Britain who construct her foreign policy upon five main pillars. In early 1720's Russia was threatening every pillar of the British foreign policy. Thereby two powers came to brink of war. Conclusions of the Treaties of Vienna and Hannover, served only to increase the polarisation. Yet after the death of George I's- first Hanoverian king of Great Britain, conjecture started to change. Europe entered a "détente" period and Russia's enmity towards to Great Britain started to vanish. Tensions were easing and Russia started to abandon her expansionist policies. British government was aware of potential of Russia and therefore sent two representatives to Russia: Claudius Rondeau and Thomas Ward. Main aim of these representatives was to protect the rights of the British merchant and observe the moves of the Russian government. Their arrival represents a new epoch in Anglo-Russian relations: A period of rapprochement. British pair, who found themselves in a hostile environment, without an official character, worked three years under difficult conditions, and finally they managed to restore the old friendship between two powers. Their works would pave way for future close cooperation, which would endure until the end of 18th century. This paper will first explain the reasons of the estrangement between Great Britain and Russia. Then, activities of Claudius Rondeau and Thomas Ward, which would be ended with the completion of rapprochement, will be examined. Finally reasons that why did the British government decided to restore her relations with Russia will be investigated.

Keywords: Russia, Great Britain, Treaty of Seville, Treaty of Vienna, Claudius Rondeau, Thomas Ward.



İNGİLİZ-RUS YAKINLAŞMASI (1728-1731)

Öz

Büyük Petro'nun çabaları sayesinde Rusya, XVIII. yüzyılda büyük bir güç olmuştur. Onun zamanında Rusya Avrupa meselelerinde hem önemli bir rol oynuyor hem de onlara müdahil oluyordu. Ancak Rusya'nın büyümesi, dış politikasını beş ana temel üzerine inşa eden İngiltere için zararlı olmuştur. Zira Rusya bu beş temelin beşini de tehdit eder hâle gelmişti. Bu şekilde iki ülke savaşın eşiğine geldi. Viyana ve Hannover Antlaşmaları'nın imzalanması Avrupa'daki kutuplaşmaları daha da artırdı. Ancak İngiltere'nin ilk Hannoverli kralı olan I. George'un

^a Asstant Professor in National Defence University, İstanbul/Türkiye ahmetbuyukaksoy@hotmail.com

vefatından sonar konjonktür deđiřti. Gerginlik azaldı ve Rusya yayılmacı politikalarını terk etti. İngiliz hükümeti de Rusya'nın potansiyelinin farkındaydı ve bu yüzden de Rusya'ya Claudius Rondeau ve Thomas Ward isimli iki mümessil gönderdi. Bu mümessillerin görevi İngiliz tüccarlarının haklarını korumak ve Rus hükümetinin hamlelerini incelemektir. Onların gelişleri İngiliz-Rus ilişkilerinde yeni bir dönemi simgeliyordu: Yakınlaşma dönemi. Resmî bir paye olmaksızın kendilerini yabancı bir ortamda bulan İngiliz çift, üç yıl zor şartlar altında çalıştılar ve en nihayetinde iki devlet arasındaki eski dostluğu restore edebildiler. Onların çalışmaları XVIII. yüzyıl sonuna kadar sürecek bir yakın işbirliği sürecinin yolunu açtı. Bu makalede ilk önce İngiltere ve Rusya'nın birbirlerine düşman olmasına yol açan sebepler izah edilecektir. Sonra da faaliyetleri iki devletin yakınlaşmasıyla sona erecek olan Cladius ve Rondeau'nun faaliyetleri incelenecektir. Sonra da neden İngiliz hükümetinin Rusya ile ilişkileri iyileştirmek istediğinin sebepleri araştırılacaktır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Rusya, İngiltere, Sevilla Antlaşması, Viyana Antlaşması, Claudius Rondeau, Thomas Ward.



АНГЛО-РУССКОЕ СБЛИЖЕНИЕ (1728-1731)

Аннотация

В XVIII веке, благодаря усилиям Петра Великого, Россия стала бурно развивающейся державой. В период его правления она начала играть важную роль в европейской политике, участвовать в европейских делах. Однако подъем России в начале 1720-х годов наносил ущерб Британии и ее внешней политике. Таким образом, две державы оказались на грани войны. Заключение Венского и Ганноверского договоров лишь усилили поляризацию. Однако после смерти Георга I, первого ганноверского короля Великобритании, конъюнктура поменялась. Европа вступила в период «разрядки», и враждебность между Россией и Великобританией начала исчезать. Напряженность ослабела, а Россия начала отказываться от экспансионистской политики. Британское правительство осознавало потенциал Российского государства и поэтому направило в нее двух представителей: Клавдия Рондо и Томаса Уорда. Основными задачами этих представителей были защита прав британского купечества и наблюдение за действиями российского правительства. Их приезд представлял собой новую эпоху в англо-российских отношениях — период сближения. Британская двоица, оказавшаяся во враждебном окружении, не имела официального статуса и три года работала в тяжелых условиях. Им удалось, наконец, восстановить старую дружбу между двумя державами. Их работы проложат путь для будущего тесного сотрудничества, которое продлится до конца XVIII века. В статье сначала объясняются причины отчуждения между Великобританией и Россией. Затем рассматривается деятельность Клавдия Рондо и Томаса Уорда, которая завершилась сближением. Наконец, расследуются причины, по которым британское правительство решило восстановить отношения с Россией.

Ключевые слова: Россия, Великобритания, Севильский договор, Венский договор, Клавдий Рондо, Томас Уорд.



Introduction

The relations between the crowns of Great Britain and Imperial Russia were turbulent. Two crowns first opposed the French Revolution, then to Napoléon, faced each other in Afghanistan¹ and fought in the Crimean War.² On the other hand, they were allies in World War I, and the British had intervened in the Russian Civil War in favour of pro-imperial forces. Yet when we look at the 18th century relations between the two powers remained more stable. Even in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) when Great Britain was fighting against Russia's ally, France, Britain despite protests from her ally Prussia³, relations between the two powers, despite some intervals,⁴ remained as friendly as possible.

However, there was no time in the 18th century as in the years between 1716 and 1727 when the degree of relations had turned into a semi-open hostility. Russia gained a significant amount of influence both in Germany and the Baltic, after the triumphs of Peter the Great (1682-1725) and thus he changed the power balance in Northern Europe. The rise of Russian power in the North was alarming for Great Britain for several reasons. First of all the dominance in the Baltic Sea, was passed to Russians which was menacing the commercial interests of Great Britain.⁵ Also dynastic policies were also a concern for the British. Russia was increasing her sphere of influence in the Holy Roman Empire through military presence or dynastic marriages and this was a great threat to the Electorate of Hanover, the electorship of King George I (1714-1727) of Great Britain who was deeply fond of his German dominions.⁶ Finally, Tsar Peter I started to employ Jacobites-dissidents to Hanover succession and political enemies of the king- in Russia and, in the final years of his reign Peter promised a material aid for the Jacobite cause.⁷

The hostility between the two powers ensued up until the death of George I in 1727. In 1719 Great Britain recalled her representative from Russia. During this time even

¹ For Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan see, Oğuzhan Konuk, "‘Büyük Oyun’ Bağlamında Afganistan’a Tarihi Bir Bakış", *ATASAREN Bülten* 5 (2023): 55-60.

² For British policy in Crimean War, see, Ayşen Müderrisoğlu, "Kırım Savaşı'nda İngiliz Politikası" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Istanbul University, 2017).

³ For Prussia's complaints, see, NA, SP 90/75 Andrew Mitchell's letter to Earl of Holderness dated 25/04/1760; Ahmet Büyükkaksoy, "James Porter'in İstanbul Büyükelçiliği" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Marmara University, 2016), 117, note 773.

⁴ 1741 Revolution was a great blow to the British interests in Russia. See, Ahmet Büyükkaksoy, "1741 İhtilali ve İngiltere'nin Rusya Politikasının İflası", *Rusya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8 (2022): 1-15

⁵ Jeremy Black, *The Continental Commitment Britain, Hanover and Interventionism 1714-1793* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 33.

⁶ First of all, Peter the Great demanded to return of Sleswig, which was captured by Denmark and, Verden and Bremen, which was captured by Hanover during the Great Northern War, to his son-in-law, Charles Frederick Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. One might easily guess that as the Elector of Hanover, George I was keen to keep his electoral possessions and keep Denmark as an ally to check the growth of Russian influence. Russian military presence in Mecklenburg was also signifying the growing power of Russia in Germany. German concerns were a determining factor in Anglo-Russian relations, especially in the first quarter of the 18th century. Derek McKay & H. M. Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, trns. Eşref Bengi Özbilen (İstanbul: Dergâh, 2019), 112-113; Hans Bagger, "Role of Baltic in Russian Foreign Policy", *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 46; Fatih Karabulut, "Avrupa Veraset Savaşları Sırasında Osmanlı-Avrupa Devletleri İlişkileri (1699-1756) 'Savaşların Gölgesindeki Diplomasi'" (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Kırıkkale University, 2021), 123-125; Ahmet Büyükkaksoy, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri", *Vakanüvis International Journal of Historical Researches* 8/8 (2023): 1138-1139.

⁷ For Jacobites and their dealings with Peter the Great, see Maruice Bruce, "Jacobite Relations with Peter the Great", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 14/41 (1936): 343-362.

though neither side committed open hostilities a struggle that reminisces the cold war was realized. In this respect, both sides aimed to use “proxies” to weaken each other. George I aimed to use the Turks.⁸ As it mentioned above, Peter I, contemplated using the Jacobite card to overthrow the hostile Hanoverian regime in Great Britain. Britain blockaded port of Reval.⁹

In 1726 Europe divided into two hostile but strange camps. On one side there were Great Britain, France, Prussia and Sweden, who were united under the banner of the Alliance of Hanover.¹⁰ On the other hand, Spain and Austria concluded the Treaty of Vienna in 1725.¹¹ The enmity between the two sides resembles division prior to World War I. In 1726 Russian government concluded an offensive-defensive alliance with Austria which put Russia into the Austro-Spanish bloc.

In my earlier studies, when I was examining Anglo-Ottoman relations in the first quarter of the 18th century, I argued that in the era of the first Gregorian kings (1714-1760), British foreign policy was framed upon five concerns. These concerns were namely, protection of the balance of power, protection of the commercial interests, protection of the Hanoverian succession, protection of electoral dominions and protection of the Protestant interests.¹² The same concerns might be applied to Anglo-Russian relations. In this article, I will try to examine the rapprochement between Great Britain and Russia which would be concluded by a commercial treaty in 1733. Also in the same article, I argued that Britain changed her policy towards Russia when George II (1727-1760) came to power.¹³ To understand this change one must look at the British activities in Russia prior to the Treaty of Seville (1729).

1) Détente Years (1727-1731)

The year of 1727 was a difficult one. The Spanish Army besieged Gibraltar in early 1727.¹⁴ The British navy was at the Baltic. It was contemplated that George I should take the control of the ally army in Netherlands against the Austria.¹⁵ The war seemed imminent. However, one man changed the course of action.

As the wheels of foreign policy were at the hands of overzealous Townshend in Great Britain, in her ally France, it was the milder Cardinal Fleury who conducted the foreign policy. The dexterous cardinal through managed to conduct the negotiations and

⁸ Büyükaksoy, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri”, 1138-1147.

⁹ McKay & Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, 159.

¹⁰ James Frederick Chance wrote a monumental book about the Alliance of Hannover. See, James Frederick Chance, *The Alliance of Hannover* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1923).

¹¹ There was hostility between Great Britain and Austrian Habsburgs in this time. The main reason of this hostility was the establishment of the Ostend Company by the Emperor Charles VI (1711-1740) in Austrian Netherlands. For a contemporary treatise about the British complains about the Ostend Company see, Benjamin Hoadly, *An Enquiry into the Reasons of the Conduct of Great Britain with the Relation to Present State of Affairs in Europe* (Dublin: A. Rhames, 1727), 68.

¹² Büyükaksoy, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri”, 1147.

¹³ Büyükaksoy, “XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri”, 1147.

¹⁴ In 1726 British unsuccessfully tried to prevent the journey of Spanish treasure fleet to Americas. This provoked the Royal Couple of Spain, Philip V (1700-1745) and Elisabeth Farnese, and they ordered an attack against British Gibraltar. McKay & Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, 159.

¹⁵ Chance, *The Alliance of Hannover*, 716.

preliminaries of peace between the hostile powers was signed at Paris in 31 May 1727.¹⁶ Final settlement would be decided in Soissons.

Prior to signature of preliminaries Catherine I (1725-27) proclaimed that despite the British hostility no British merchants should be harassed by Russians. However, it was the signature of preliminaries which paved way to détente. Prince Kurakin, Russian ambassador to France, repudiated the support that had allegedly given to Jacobites. Shortly after Catherine I, died and, Horatio Walpole, the British representative in Paris advised his government that a man “not of any great distinction or with any character, but of dexterity and abilities enough to gain P. Menzicoff.” This idea was at first rejected by British government¹⁷, but after the death of George I, British decided to ease the tension with Russia.

In Russia, there were numerous British merchants, whose trade was crucial for Great Britain. Also in the reign of Catherine I, as mentioned above was eager to repair the relations between the two powers. George II was not as hostile as his predecessor.¹⁸ Also, repeated trials to create a rupture between the Russians and the Turks, failed due to the latter’s policy. Tensions were easing and, it was plausible for George II to establish diplomatic ties with Russia. This was important for several reasons. First, a diplomatic representative would protect the rights of the British merchants. According to Bitter the main aim of British diplomatic overture’s main aim was to improve commerce.¹⁹ Also, a representative was useful to get valuable information about the potential enemy’s power.²⁰ Finally, when a great change in the course of events might happen -this was common in 18th century politics- a diplomatic representative might be crucial to manipulate the events. Therefore, Whitehall decided to send two representatives to Russia. However, it should be stressed that their main duty was trade. In this respect, Whitehall seemed to listen to the advice of Horatio Walpole which at first she refused. Great Britain sent two undistinguished but capable diplomats to Russia: Thomas Ward and Claudius Rondeau.²¹

It was clear that the pair would find themselves in a hostile environment. Russia was allied with Austria and maintained friendly relations with Spain. Both were the enemies of the Alliance of Hanover. So it was obvious that Hapsburg and Spanish representatives would do anything to thwart British in Russia. Furthermore, Duke of Liria, the Spanish representative, was special concern. He was the illegitimate son of King James (1685-1688) the exiled King of England who entered Spanish service.

¹⁶ Arthur McCandless Wilson, *French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury 1726-1743* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), 151-167.

¹⁷ Chance, *The Alliance of Hannover*, 741.

¹⁸ McKay & Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, 162.

¹⁹ Michael Jay Bitter, “A British Embassy to St. Petersburg: George, Lord Forbes, and the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty” (Unpublished PhD thesis, Univeristy of Minnesota, Minnesota, 1999), 71.

²⁰ During his residence in Russia, Rondeau repeatedly sent reports about the military and naval strength of Russia. For example, short time after his arrival he sent a report about the Russian navy. See *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoričeskogo obšestva*, Vol. LXVI (St. Petersburg, 1867), 621-625.

²¹ For this pair, see, Anthony Glenn Cross, *By the Banks of Neva: Chapters from The Lives and Careers From the Lives and Careers of the British in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Glasgow: Cambridge University Press: 1997), 53-55.

The pair arrived in Russia in the summer of 1728. At first, they reached Kronstadt²² where they were received by their exiled countryman Admiral Thomas Gordon.²³ In St. Petersburg they were received by the governor of the city, Bukhard Cristoph von Münnich.²⁴ Both Ward and Rondeau were satisfied with the entertainment. They both claimed that their entertainment exceeded their expectations.²⁵

When they reached St. Petersburg they prepared a picture of figures of powers and court intrigues in Russia. Claudius Rondeau claimed that Tsar Peter II (1727-1730) lacked the enthusiasm for the navy, of his grandfather Peter the Great, and all naval preparations were set aside. Young Tsar was fond of hunting and debauched parties. His court favourite was Prince Dolguraki, who never left the Tsar alone and accompanied his profligation. Rondeau also claimed that the Tsar was indisposed due his debauched lifestyle. According to Rondeau, Count Andrey Ivanovich Osterman was another important figure. As an expertise of foreign affairs, he regained his status in the reign of the young Tsar, by using famous fraudulency.²⁶ In the same month Rondeau wrote a letter about the naval power of Russia.²⁷

From September to October, the pair was mostly busy gathering information about the foreign policy of Russia. They claimed that Russians were afraid of losing Livonia which was conquered during the Great Northern War.²⁸ Also they reported that Russia was divided into factions, and they had no power to disturb her neighbours.²⁹ Meanwhile, Thomas Ward delivered the letter of George II to the Tsar.³⁰ At this point we do not have the full access to the contents of this letter, but most probably it contains a notification about the appointment of Thomas Ward as a consul and wishes of friendship.

Rondeau was persuaded that the Russian government would be willing to repair the relations with Great Britain as the British trade was crucial for the Russians which stemmed from a natural affection to the British people. According to him British government should also answer a Russian step of accommodation as it would be beneficial for the British who suffered due to the friction between the two courts.³¹

In the next month, Rondeau's expectations were partly realized. Count Osterman sent a constructive letter to Thomas Ward. Count Golowkin, also demanded that a copy of this letter be sent to the British ambassador in Soissons where a congress was gathered in order the settle the differences in Europe. However, Rondeau saw that, for the accommodations Russians were expecting the first step from the British government. In this respect Rondeau, beseched this point from the Whitehall for the sake of British

²² Kronstadt was the main base of the Russian navy.

²³ Admiral Gordon was a Scottish privateer under the service of the British. He was forced to leave the service and join Russia as he was a fervent Jacobite supporter. Constance Oliver Skelton & John Malcolm Bulloch, *The House of Gordon III* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1917), XLIV-XLV.

²⁴ He would be later, field marshal, war hero, prime Minister and a political convict.

²⁵ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 2.

²⁶ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 5.

²⁷ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 9-12.

²⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 20.

²⁹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 24.

³⁰ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 23.

³¹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 24.

merchants in Russia.³² During the remainder of the year the pair, was busy with observing the activities of Spanish and Austrian ambassadors and precedence issues.³³

In the spring of 1729, the pair arrived at Moscow where they were received by Count Osterman. In the meeting, the German-born Russian minister tried to show the willingness of his government for the reparation of the relations. However, Thomas Ward replied that he was not authorized to speak about past events and he was only there to oversee the British trade in Russia. Count, on the other hand, said that he was not an expert on commercial affairs but he would do everything in his power to increase the British trade. According to him the development of British trade would be mutually beneficial for both powers.³⁴ Even though Ward was not empowered to talk about political affairs he faithfully transmitted Count Osterman's inclination towards Great Britain.

Osterman's inclinations were echoed in the halls of Whitehall. George II was satisfied with the good inclination of Russia towards Great Britain. However, what made him ecstatic was the readiness of the Russian government to improve the British trade. To answer Russian gestures, he ordered his plenipotentiaries to Soissons, to recognize the full powers of the Russian representative, Count Golowkin. By taking this step, the king was hoping that the ancient friendship between the two courts would be restored soon.³⁵ British treatment to Count Golowkin at Soissons was well received by the Russian government.³⁶

While both sides declared their good inclinations to each other, the two sides were fully aware that it would be the Congress of Soissons that would determine the future of the relations of the two crowns. Rondeau claimed that if Congress broke down, Russia, together with her ally, Austria might attack the Ottoman Empire.³⁷ Russians also feared that Britain and France were provoking Ottomans to attack Russia.³⁸ This was not true though. In the reign of George II, the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Abraham Stanyan, hardly made a move to provoke the Turks.³⁹ Yet it was clear that the conclusion of the congress would be crucial for the future of Europe.

Against all expectations, the Congress of Soissons failed to produce any material thing. Instead thanks to the efforts of Cardinal Fleury, a new treaty was made between, Great Britain, France and Spain. This treaty fetched Spanish from the Austrian and Russian camp and brought her into the British camp. This left Austria in an isolated position and Russia remained her only ally.⁴⁰

³² Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 27-28.

³³ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 29-32.

³⁴ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 40-41.

³⁵ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 44-45.

³⁶ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 51.

³⁷ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 85.

³⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 88.

³⁹ Alfred C. Wood, "The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762," *The English Historical Review* 40/160 (1925): 552.

⁴⁰ For the full examination of this treaty, see Richard Lodge, "The Treaty of Seville(1729)," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 16 (1933): 1-43.

Yet Russia did desire to repair the ties with Great Britain. Prior to the Treaty of Seville Grand Chancellor Count Gavril Ivanovich Golovkin declared that Peter II was desirous to restore the amity between the two powers. Also, Russian statesmen condescended about the British demands on precedence. Thomas Ward also warned his government that Great Britain was making the most valuable trade in Russia, and Britain should take a step to enhance the trade.⁴¹ The isolation of Austria did not change the attitude of Russians. Even though Vice-Chancellor Count Osterman was an Austrian supporter, almighty Prince Dolguraki would not allow Russia to pick side a with the Austrians. Best of all Duke of Liria joined to British side.⁴² He claimed that Spain and Great Britain must work together to nullify the Austro-Russian Alliance of 1726. To achieve this Great Britain must make a commercial treaty with Russia and pledge to be a mediator between the Turks and Russians.⁴³ However one thing was necessary to begin this project. "In this juncture [Rondeau must had] a character that could enable" him "to talk to this ministry." Liria deemed that the promotion of Rondeau was crucial for the separation of Russia from Hapsburgs.⁴⁴

As the Treaty of Seville created a rapprochement between Spain and Great Britain a remarkable event happened. Tsar Peter II died and Peter I's niece the Duchess of Courland Anna came to power. Russian nobles invited the duchess to Moscow but in return, they curtailed her power as an autocrat and created an oligarchy.⁴⁵ This development was welcomed by the British public. British thought that Russia was turning into a constitutional monarchy and this would make Anglo-Russian rapprochement more possible.⁴⁶ Combined with the Spanish support Anglo-Russian friendship became more and more plausible.

Expectations of a constitutional government were short-lived as the Tsarina quickly regained absolute power. Authors of this project were punished⁴⁷ and British-inclined ministers were removed from office.⁴⁸ Rondeau observed that Count Osterman, an imperial supporter would gain much more power and he would be the man who would determine the foreign policy. The only advantage of Great Britain in Russia was the isolation of Austria after the Treaty of Seville. He expected that if a war were to occur between Austria and the allies of Seville, allies might support Sweden to re-conquer the territories which that were lost to Russia, after the Treaty of Nystat.⁴⁹ In any case Osterman would be the man that British had to negotiate to complete the isolation of Austria.

Through Danish representative Hans-Georg Westphal Count Osterman wanted to

⁴¹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 104.

⁴² Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 118.

⁴³ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 125.

⁴⁴ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 127

⁴⁵ For this process see Sergei M. Soloviev, *History of Russia*, Vol. 34, trns, Walter J. Gleason, Jr (USA: Academic International Press, 1984), 3-5.

⁴⁶ Jeremy Black, "Russia and The British Press 1720-1740," *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 5/1 (1982): 88.

⁴⁷ Sergei M. Soloviev, *History of Russia*, Vol. 34, 21-25.

⁴⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 163.

⁴⁹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 163.

see Rondeau.⁵⁰ This demand perplexed Rondeau as he had neither official character nor an instruction to speak with the vice-chancellor.⁵¹ However he knew the influence of Osterman and he demanded immediate instructions.⁵² Yet less than a week he met with the vice chancellor.

In the meeting both Osterman and Rondeau tried to ensure each other with the good inclinations of their respective monarchs. According to Rondeau, the Russian government was ready for rapprochement but Rondeau had no authority to propose anything. It was Osterman who would propose an accommodation to London. Also in the meeting Rondeau claimed that trade with Great Britain was crucially advantageous to Russia and means were to be found to improve and encourage it. The vice-chancellor agreed and promised to consider this.⁵³ The attitude of Count Osterman was appreciated by Rondeau who hoped that he would manage to win the vice chancellor for the British side. Yet, he once again stressed that in order to make a good start he would need instructions.⁵⁴

Rondeau's reports show that Osterman was sincerely keen for rapprochement. After their first meeting, Osterman and Rondeau made another meeting. This time they deeply discussed the affairs of Europe. The vice-chancellor talked about the coldness between the two courts, and he guaranteed that the Russian government did desire nothing more than rapprochement. He also guaranteed that the Russian treaty with Austria was defensive in nature and they were hoping that the British would ensure the peace of Europe. He also showed his desire to meet Rondeau more frequently.⁵⁵ Thomas Ward was also persuaded by Osterman that treaty with Austria was only conjectural and Russians had positive feelings towards to the Court of London.⁵⁶

Even though Whitehall was tardy to send instructions to Rondeau, his meetings with the vice-chancellor made the Court of Vienna uneasy. Austrian resident got anxious about the actions of the Russian government and he tried to win the Danish representative to thwart the Anglo-Russian rapprochement by claiming that the Court of Great Britain would help to Duke of Holstein to recover Sleswig. However Danish representative did not heed the Austrian warning and he informed Rondeau. Rondeau made two conclusions from this information: Russia indeed desired to restore the relations, and the British government should lose no time to take a step.⁵⁷ He also advised the Duke of Newcastle that if George II wrote a letter of condolence for Peter II's death and congratulation for Anna's ascension to the Russian throne, it would both well received by the Russian ministry and frighten the Hapsburgs were deeply disturbed by Count Osterman's growing positive demeanor to Rondeau.⁵⁸ At the same day Ward also claimed that "If His Majesty

⁵⁰ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 173; Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 80.

⁵¹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 173

⁵² Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 174.

⁵³ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 176.

⁵⁴ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 178.

⁵⁵ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 183.

⁵⁶ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 189.

⁵⁷ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 196.

⁵⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 205.

would be pleased to condescend to this request... [He would] doubt not but his affairs in these parts would be managed to entire satisfaction both in relation to politics as also in relation to the settling an advantageous commerce between the two nations, to which His Majesty has ever shewn a tender regard.”⁵⁹

The British Government remained hesitant. George II sent a letter of congratulation, which was well received by the vice-chancellor⁶⁰ but he did not promote Rondeau to an official position. According to Bitter, it was the Whitehall who was waiting first step from the Russians.⁶¹ Without official support from the home, Rondeau and Ward were left alone in Moscow. However, there was another Englishman who supported the British cause in Moscow. The Duke of Liria met with Russian ministers and warned them that if the Russians supported Vienna, in accordance with the defensive treaty, the Turks would most surely use this opportunity and attack to Russians to avenge offences which were happened after the Treaty of Pruth. The Royal Duke also claimed that Sweden would be next in the line for avenging the Treaty of Nystat. This overture would make Russia to lean towards Great Britain.⁶² On the other hand, Rondeau showed the vice-chancellor that George II was expecting an establishment of Russian residency in London. Count Osterman promised to inform the Tsarina about the British demand.⁶³

Months passed and Rondeau repeatedly asked for an official character, and even though the British government did consider, Rondeau’s demand, Whitehall did not do anything. Also, Thomas Ward died during this time and Rondeau was left alone.⁶⁴ There might be an explanation about Whitehall’s indifference towards to Rondeau’s demand for an official character. In this hiatus, the British government was negotiating with Hapsburgs -Russia’s ally- for a settlement. It was plausible for Whitehall to see the results of the negotiation before taking a step in Russia. The diplomatic revolution of 1731 marked a change in Anglo-Russian relations. But before entering this process one must evaluate these “détente” years.

Before the ascension of George II to the throne, the British government was clearly hostile towards to Russia. Yet the signature of preliminaries in Paris and the opening of the Congress of Soissons eased tension in Europe, and Great Britain both to protect the commercial rights of her merchants and to observe her potential enemies’ situation, sent to representatives. During Rondeau’s and Wards time in Russia, Russian government did indeed show her desire to restore the amity between the two powers and but the British government remained hesitant. It was the Treaty of Vienna which was signed in 1731 would accelerate the restoration of friendship and amity.

2) Treaty of Vienna and Aftermath

After the Treaty of Seville, Whitehall did not persuade that the settlement with Spain would be viable. Spain could easily repudiate the treaty if the emperor could not be

⁵⁹ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 93-94.

⁶⁰ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 207.

⁶¹ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 95.

⁶² Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 216-217.

⁶³ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 223; Michael Jay Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 111.

⁶⁴ For this process, see Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 113-117.

persuaded to agree on the articles of the treaty.⁶⁵ If allies of Seville were to fail to convince Austria to yield the demands then they would enforce the settlement by force. This obviously meant war. Whitehall was divided when the possibility of war was realized. King, the de facto Prime Minister Robert Walpole and the Secretary of Southern Department Duke of Newcastle were averse to war. Only Townshend, the Secretary of the Northern Department in the government was an actual war supporter and by finding that he was unable to convince the king and the government, he resigned. More pro-Austrian ministers such as Newcastle and Walpole gained more influence.⁶⁶ These ministers thought that rapprochement with Austria would be more beneficial for Great Britain. Also, political air changed after the Treaty of Seville. Dynastical differences between France and Spain were removed by birth of the Dauphin and, this would pave the way for a rapprochement between Bourbons. This made it possible for Versailles to remove Great Britain from her back, as she was no longer isolated.⁶⁷ An Anglo-French-Spanish Alliance would be very unnatural indeed. Therefore, in order to counterbalance the emerging Bourbon solidarity, an alliance with Austria was necessary.

When the news of the Treaty of Vienna reached Moscow, Count Osterman was overjoyed and he claimed that “the old system” would be advantageous to both Austria and Great Britain, and it was high time to restore the ancient amity between Russia and Great Britain. To achieve this restoration Whitehall should promote Rondeau.⁶⁸

According to Bitter, Whitehall was still indifferent to Russian demands as Lord Harrington, the Secretary of the Northern Department asked Rondeau discover to means to improve the relations with Russia.⁶⁹ His conclusion might be true as Rondeau, one than once reported his government that his promotion would be necessary to restore the ancient amity. Yet one may conclude that Britain only took Rondeau seriously after the signature of the Treaty of Vienna, as Harrington claimed that Whitehall had “the best dispositions in the world to live in perfect amity with Moscow.”⁷⁰

On 19 July 1731 Rondeau met with Osterman and he transmitted his orders to the vice-chancellor. Osterman, explained that his earlier expressions were clear⁷¹ and either Rondeau “should have a character as soon as possible, or that His Majesty would send some noblemen of great distinction with a character of the first rank to compliment the Czarinna, to convince the world that all that had formerly happened was forgot on both sides.”⁷²

London decided to yield Osterman’s demand, and the king decided to give an official character to Rondeau.⁷³ By sending credentials to Rondeau, Whitehall would show her “great willingness to live in perfect friendship with the Czarinna.”⁷⁴ However, Rondeau

⁶⁵ Wilson, *French Foreign Policy*, 218.

⁶⁶ Reed Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1975), 58.

⁶⁷ Lodge, “The Treaty of Seville(1729),” 41.

⁶⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 314; Bitter 118.

⁶⁹ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 118-119.

⁷⁰ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 119.

⁷¹ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 332-333.

⁷² Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 120.

⁷³ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 121.

⁷⁴ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 357.

was ordered that before asking an audience or delivering his letters of credence a proper person should be named by the Russian government to come to London.⁷⁵ King George II was still stressing the concept of reciprocity, before appointing Rondeau as a resident. Instructions to Rondeau were given four days later and the importance of reciprocity was once again stressed by the king.⁷⁶ However, if the Russian government would comply with the British wishes and decide to send a proper person to London, “then” Rondeau would ask for an audience with the Tsarina. In the audience, he should deliver his credentials and give Tsarina “the best assurances of great value and esteem” George II had for her “person and friendship” and his “steady resolution to maintain and increase the ancient amity and good correspondence between” him and “Her Czarish Majesty.” George II also claimed that from the “good understanding” between two monarchs, trade would flourish and other mutually beneficial advantages would be achieved.⁷⁷ In response, Count Osterman promised to inform the Tsarina and he was easy about his mistress’s decision.⁷⁸ The Tsarina approved this demand, and the Russian government started to look for a proper person.⁷⁹

In November 1731 the Russian government appointed Prince Kantemir, son of Dimitri Kantemir the former hospodar of Moldovia, as her representative in London.⁸⁰ Thereby, Rondeau became eligible to seek an audience from the Tsarina. On 11 November 1731, Rondeau was presented to the Tsarina.⁸¹ Thus after 12 years of absence, Great Britain was once again started to be represented in Russia.

Prior to the Treaty of Vienna, Great Britain was reluctant to improve her relations with Russia but, her rapprochement with the Hapsburgs also made rapprochement with Russia possible as the two courts were allies. Even though Count Osterman repeatedly claimed that Russia was eager to repair the relations, London might doubt his sincerity as the count was notorious for his fraudulency. Before, the Anglo-Austrian rapprochement Russia was bound to send 30,000 auxiliary men to the emperor in case of a war. According to the Duke of Liria, this clause made an Anglo-Russian commercial treaty impossible.⁸² Yet by the Treaty of Vienna, the Austrian obstacle was got out of the way, and Whitehall considered promoting Claudius Rondeau. On the other hand, the Russian government also showed her willingness to improve relations with Great Britain, by appointing a noble-born minister. The rapprochement was complete. Now new opportunities were opened to the British.

3) Reasons of Rapprochement

Rapprochement created new possibilities for Great Britain. First, the British government desired to crown the rapprochement with a new commercial treaty. Whitehall sent Lord Forbes, to negotiate the treaty which process he handled with

⁷⁵ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 121.

⁷⁶ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 122.

⁷⁷ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 361-362.

⁷⁸ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 127.

⁷⁹ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 127.

⁸⁰ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 131.

⁸¹ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 129.

⁸² Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 123.

success.⁸³ In 1738 the king ordered Rondeau to offer a defensive alliance to Russia.⁸⁴ The 1741 Revolution crushed British aims extensively, yet in 1746 defensive treaty was finally materialized. All of these were the consequences of the rapprochement process which was begun with the arrival of Claudius Rondeau and Thomas Ward, and the presentation of Rondeau to the Tsarina.

Then one should ask this question: Why did the British government seek to improve relations with Russia? Was it possible for George II, to follow his father's policy? In order to understand this, change one must look at the five articles that I mentioned above.

Trade was crucial for Great Britain. A contemporary pamphleteer once declared that the British trade was the backbone of the nation's strength.⁸⁵ Therefore it was not possible for Whitehall to ignore Russian trade. First of all, Russia provided many necessities of the Royal Navy, and a breakdown of this trade according to Townshend would jeopardize the natural security of Great Britain. The British Government tried to fill this gap with American products but she failed. The Royal Navy, the greatest strength of Great Britain was bound to Russia.⁸⁶ At the other hand, Russian trade was valuable for Great Britain. In the turn of the century, Britain profited 74,417 pounds from the Russian trade.⁸⁷ Thomas Ward reported the importance of Russian trade with these words: "The trade to this country does not cease to be great use to nation of Great Britain... the russes will never believe but that we want their trade more than they do ours."⁸⁸ If trade with Russia was crucial then Britain should restore friendly relations with Russia. Such was the policy of Sir Robert Walpole de facto prime minister of Great Britain, who linked trade with peace: "It was not, I say, our business to run ourselves into an unjust war that did not strike directly at the balance of power, the Protestant religion, or the liberties of Europe. Peace was our interest, because it always was, and will be the nurse of trade, it can't thrive without it; and I am sure without trade, this nation can neither thrive nor subsist."⁸⁹ Trade was obviously one of the most important factors that stimulated the rapprochement.

Protecting the Hanoverian succession was another determining factor in 18th-century Great Britain. An anonymous pamphleteer explained that a British minister "can never act up to the Spirit of the Revolution, nor answer the Ends of it, unless he has a constant Eye to the defeating all secret as well as open Attempts in favour of the Pretender." In Peter the Great's time, Russia openly supported the Jacobites which was one of the reasons for the breakdown. Yet after his death, support for the Jacobites declined.⁹⁰ Tsarina Catherine I claimed that her government was not supporting

⁸³ Bitter's PhD dissertation extensively deals with Forbes's negotiations.

⁸⁴ Sbornik, Vol. LXXX (St. Petersburg, 1889), 402.

⁸⁵ Wilson, *French Foreign Policy*, 49.

⁸⁶ Bitter, *A British Embassy*, 16-18.

⁸⁷ Matthew P. Romiello, *Enterprising Empires, Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 81.

⁸⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 104.

⁸⁹ *The Conduct of the Late Administration, with the regard to Foreign Affairs, from 1722 to 1742, wherein that of the Right Hon[orable] the Earl of Ordorf (late Sir Robert Walpole) is Particularly Vindicated* (Dublin: George Faulkner, 1742), 52.

⁹⁰ M. S. Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia 1553-1815* (London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1958), 110.

Jacobites.⁹¹ After the Treaty of Seville, the political climate of Europe had changed⁹² and official support to Jacobitism ended. In his early days, Rondeau observed that Russia had no intentions to serve the pretender.⁹³ Thereby Great Britain had no scruple to restore her relations with Russia as she did not show any hostility to the ruler house.

If Russia's ties with the Jacobites broke and the trade with Russia was crucial for Great Britain, then Whitehall might consider Russia in shaping her foreign policy. After the Treaty of Vienna (1731) the balance of power had changed and, the Anglo-French Alliance deteriorated. France shook her former dependency and regained her former glory under the guidance of Cardinal Fleury.⁹⁴ The rise of France and growing her might, changed the balance of power in Europe. Now Russia might be a useful tool for Great Britain in order to check the growth of France. Especially after 1731 British and Russian diplomats worked together in Scandinavia to counterbalance to influence of France.⁹⁵ In order to jointly oppose French influence rapprochement was necessary.

The Electorate of Hanover was the soft spot of the first two Gregorian kings (1714-1760) as the antagonism between George I and Peter the Great stemmed mainly from the Hanover issue. George I was jealous of the growing influence of Russia in Holy Roman Empire which he saw as a threat to his electoral dominions. Especially Russia was supporting the Holstein-Gottorp claims on Verden and Bremen which were annexed by Hanover during the Great Northern War.⁹⁶ Yet after the death of Catherine I, Russia stopped supporting Holstein-Gottorp claims⁹⁷ and after the Treaty of Seville, the Holstein Party in Russia saw that tide was visibly turned against their favour.⁹⁸ When Anne came to power Count Osterman advised that Russia must sever her ties with Holstein and Mecklenburg. This policy, adopted in 1728, paved for re-establishing the relations between the two powers.⁹⁹ By no longer supporting Holstein-Gottorp claims, Russia ceased to be a threat to Hanover. So why should not Britain use Russia to protect Hanover? Rapprochement made it possible. In 1733-4 Britain used Russia in the dispute of Mecklenburg.¹⁰⁰ In 1755 George II again hoped to use Russia for the protection of Hanover.¹⁰¹ In a future written pamphlet it was stressed that Hanover was a "helpless unfortified country"¹⁰² and "The Empress of all the Russias", who was "indeed an august and resplendent princess"¹⁰³ might be beneficial for the protection of the electorate. It was clear that Russia's growing military might started to impress Britain observes.¹⁰⁴ Rondeau, on one occasion claimed that Russians would defeat the Turkish army in the

⁹¹ Rebecca Wills, *The Jacobites and Russia 1715-1750* (East Liston: Tuckwell Press, 2002), 116.

⁹² Wills, *The Jacobites*, 136

⁹³ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 15.

⁹⁴ McKay & Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, 165.

⁹⁵ McKay & Scott, *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*, 172.

⁹⁶ Büyükkaksoy, "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri", 1138-1139.

⁹⁷ Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia 1553-1815*, 109.

⁹⁸ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 117.

⁹⁹ Bagger, "Role of Baltic in Russian Foreign Policy," 54.

¹⁰⁰ Black, *The Continental Commitment, Britain, Hanover and Interventionism*, 88.

¹⁰¹ Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia 1553-1815*, 110.

¹⁰² Martin Samuel, *Deliberate Thoughts on the System of our Late Treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia in Regard to Hanover* (London: J.Scott, 1756), 10.

¹⁰³ Samuel, *Deliberate Thoughts*, 11.

¹⁰⁴ Anderson, *Britain's Discovery of Russia 1553-1815*, 111.

Caucasus as they had better soldiers.¹⁰⁵ Therefore as Russia might potentially be useful for future of Hanover, Britain might seriously consider working with Russia.

In the 18th-century, support of Protestantism was one of the pillars of British diplomacy. According to power British alliances were shaped “for the Defence and Protection of some of the Protestant States, that is, for the mutual Defence and Support of the Protestant Cause.”¹⁰⁶ Yet at the first glance, it is very difficult to explain the rapprochement with the British religious priorities. On the other hand, there are some indications that British policy against Russia was shaped by religious concern. It is known that Russia’s expansion was seen in London as a threat to Protestantism. In the early 1720’s according to British diplomat Charles Whitworth if a war of religion occurred in Europe, Russia would side with the Catholic side and push the Protestants from the Baltic.¹⁰⁷ Just before rapprochement Russian threat to the Protestant powers of Northern Europe was implied in a pamphlet. “The Protestant Estates of the Empire, and the Powers of the North, united by common Ties, each the other’s Support, and the Support of England; and the suffering any of them to be distress’d or weaken’d, were so far to weaken ourselves, and to take Weight out of the Scale which weighs against Popery.” Which is why British “fleets were sent seasonably for their Deliverance.”¹⁰⁸ Even though this pamphlet was written to criticize Hapsburgs, these words were clearly implying the growing Russian influence both in Baltic and Northern Germany.¹⁰⁹ Yet Russia as it was mentioned before retreated from Germany. Also, after the fall of Townshend, the Duke of Newcastle, a pro-imperialist, took the helm of the British foreign policy. Newcastle was old enough to remember that close cooperation with the Hapsburgs was more beneficial for the Protestant cause. It was his policy to restore the old system.¹¹⁰ So if restoration of good relations with Austria was beneficial for the Protestant cause, it was also plausible for Whitehall to seek rapprochement with Russia, Austria’s ally.

Conclusion

In the late mid-1720’s Europe was divided into two hostile camps. Yet the signature of preliminaries eased the tension. Great Britain was highly hostile to Russia for many reasons. Russia was a growing power and this was a concern for London until 1727. Yet after the deaths of Catherine I and George I, respectively, both countries became less provocative to each other. British were still sceptical to Russia but she was reluctant to sacrifice her all interest. After nearly a decade-long absence the British government once again decided to be represented. Whitehall sent two representatives both to protect her commercial interests and observe Russia’s policy. Thus the rapprochement process had

¹⁰⁵ Sbornik, Vol. LXVI, 58.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew C. Thompson, *Britain, Hanover, and The Protestant Interest, 1688-1756* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006), 8.

¹⁰⁷ Thompson, *Britain, Hanover, and The Protestant Interest*, 91.

¹⁰⁸ *A Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration* (London: J. Peele, 1731), s. 23.

¹⁰⁹ This pamphlet was criticized by the opposition. The opposition author claimed that the author owned “blessed” British position to, Great Britain’s dealing with Sweden, Denmark and “a barbarous sort of a Nation” Russians. However, it is clear that the opposition author, ridiculed his opponent as Great Britain had no such subsidy treaty with Russia. *Remarks on a Pamphlet Entitl’d a Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration* (London: A Moore Near St. Paul’s, 1731), 23.

¹¹⁰ Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle*, 161.

begun.

However, first rapprochement was made with Russia's ally, Austria. Then, the British government decided to improve relations with Russia by appointing an official minister. Whitehall first wanted to see the sincerity of Russia and demanded an official appointment from Russia to the British court. So in the end, Russia satisfied the British demand and Rondeau was appointed as the official representative. Thus the rapprochement was completed. This rapprochement would become the basis of a close cooperation that would continue to the end of the century.



Beyanname:

- 1. Etik Kurul İzni:** Etik Kurul İzni gerekmemektedir.
- 2. Katkı Oranı Beyanı:** Yazar, makaleye başkasının katkıda bulunmadığını beyan etmektedir.
- 3. Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı:** Yazar, herhangi bir çıkar çatışması olmadığını beyan etmektedir.

Declarations:

- 1. Ethics approval:** Not applicable.
- 2. Author contribution:** The author declares no one has contributed to the article.
- 3. Competing interests:** The author declares no competing interests.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- A Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration.* London: J. Peele, 1731.
- Anderson, M. S. *Discovery of Russia 1553-1815.* London: MacMillan and Company Limited, 1958.
- Bitter, Jay Michael. "A British Embassy to St. Petersburg: George, Lord Forbes, and the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty." Unpublished PhD thesis, Univeristy of Minnesota, Minnesota, 1999.
- Black, Jeremy. *The Continental Commitment Britain, Hanover and Interventionism 1714-1793.* New York: Routledge, 2005.
- _____. "Russia and The British Press 1720-1740." *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 5/1 (1982): 85-92.
- Browning, Reed. *The Duke of Newcastle.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975.
- Bruce, Maurice. "Jacobite Relations with Peter the Great." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 14/41 (1936): 343-362.
- Büyükkaksoy, Ahmet. "James Porter'in İstanbul Büyükelçiliği." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Marmara University, 2016.
- _____. "1741 İhtilali ve İngiltere'nin Rusya Politikasının İflası." *Rusya Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8 (2022): 1-15.
- _____. "XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Çeyreğinde Osmanlı-İngiliz İlişkileri." *Vakanüvis International Journal of Historical Researches* 8/8 (2023): 1121-1155.
- Chance, Frederick & John, Chance. *The Alliance of Hannover.* London: William Clowes and Sons, 1923.

- Cross, Anthony Glenn. *By the Banks of Neva: Chapters from The Lives and Careers From the Lives and Careers of the British in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Glasgow: Cambridge University Press: 1997.
- Hoadly, Benjamin. *An Enquiry into the Reasons of The Conduct of Great Britain with the Relation to Present State of Affairs in Europe*. Dublin: A. Rhames, 1727.
- Karabulut, Fatih. "Avrupa Veraset Savaşları Sırasında Osmanlı-Avrupa Devletleri İlişkileri (1699-1756) 'Savaşların Gölgesindeki Diploması'." Unpublished PhD Thesis, Kırıkkale University, 2021.
- Konuk, Oğuzhan. "Büyük Oyun Bağlamında Afganistan'a Tarihi Bir Bakış." *ATASAREN Bülten* 5 (2023): 55-60.
- Lodge, Richard. "The Treaty of Seville(1729)." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 16 (1933): 1-43.
- McKay, Derek & H. M. Scott. *Büyük Devletlerin Yükselişi 1648-1815*. Trns. Eşref Bengi Özbilen. İstanbul: Dergâh, 2019.
- Müderrişoğlu, Ayşen. "Kırım Savaşı'nda İngiliz Politikası." Unpublished PhD Thesis, İstanbul University, 2017.
- National Archives, State Papers, 90/75.
- Remarks on a Pamphlet Entitl'd a Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration*. London: A Moore Near St. Paul's, 1731.
- The Conduct of the Late Administration, with the regard to Foreign Affairs, from 1722 to 1742, wherein that of the Right Hon[orable] the Earl of Ordorf (late Sir Robert Walpole) is Particularly Vindicated*. Dublin: George Faulkner, 1742.
- Thompson, C. & Britain Andrew. *Hanover, and The Protestant Interest, 1688-1756*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006.
- Romiello, P. Matthew. *Enterprising Empires, Russia and Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Samuel, Martin. *Deliberate Thoughts on the System of our Late Treaties with Hesse-Cassel and Russia in Regard to Hanover*. London: J. Scott, 1756.
- Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoričeskogo obšestva*. Vol. LXVI. St. Petersburg, 1867.
- Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoričeskogo obšestva*. Vol. LXXX. St. Petersburg, 1889.
- Skelton, Constance Olivier & John Malcom Bulloch. *The House of Gordon III*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1917.
- Soloviev, Sergei. *History of Russia*. Vol. 34. Trns. Walter J. Gleason Jr. USA: Academic International Press, 1984.
- Wills, Rebecca. *The Jacobites and Russia 1715-1750*. East Liston: Tuckwell Press, 2002.
- Wilson, Arthur MacCandless. *French Foreign Policy During the Administration of Cardinal Fleury 1726-1743*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936.
- Wood, Alfred. "The English Embassy at Constantinople, 1660-1762." *The English Historical Review* 40/160 (1925): 533-561.

