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The Convergence of German Security Policy and EU CFSP: What Role for Germany?

Alman Güvenlik Politikası ile AB ODGP'nin Çakışması: Almanya için Ne Rol?

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Abstract

After the end of the Cold War, Germany has continued to rely on NATO for her sovereignty and territorial integrity (Article V) and maintained the transatlantic link. For the other security risks and threats (non-Article V), Germany together with France has pioneered the establishment of a separate European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Now, CFSP has matured and CSDP became established. EU's economic, political and military power provides Germany with much greater strength to achieve her national security interests. Germany collaborates with France in major issues concerning European security. This behaviour expedites the materialization of German interests. On the other hand, Germany has other security engagements such as multilateral ones with UN, OSCE and bilateral relations with some non-EU states. Therefore, CFSP accounts for an important but modest part of broader Germany security policy. Germany has seemed reluctant to exert a hegemonic role within CFSP framework. Besides, the EU structure does not allow her to exercise such a role. Germany's leading role within CFSP conforms to the definition of 'shared leadership'. In the short to mid-term, a radical change in the main orientation of FRG's security policies does not seem likely. Due to the slow but steady change in the German security policy stance, it is too early to make a sound prediction regarding how the main orientation of the German security policy will transform in the long run.

Özet

Almanya; Soğuk Savaş sonrasında, egemenlik ve toprak bütünlüğü (V'nci Madde) konusunda NATO'ya güvenmeye devam etmiş ve Atlantik ötesi bağlantıyı sürdürmüştür. Almanya, diğer güvenlik risk ve tehditleri (V'nci Madde dışı) için, Fransa ile birlikte, ayrı bir Avrupa Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve bir Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP) tesis edilmesi konusunda öncülük etmiştir. AB'nin ekonomik, siyasi ve askerî gücü, Almanya'ya kendi millî güvenlik menfaatlerini gerçekleştirme konusunda çok daha fazla güç sağlamaktadır. Almanya, Avrupa güvenliğiyle ilgili önemli konularda Fransa ile işbirliği yapmaktadır. Bu davranış Alman menfaatlerinin gerçekleşmesini hızlandırmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, Almanya, BM ve AGİT ile olan çok taraflı taahhütler ve bazı AB üyesi olmayan ülkelerle olan ikili ilişkiler gibi diğer güvenlik angajmanlarına sahiptir. Böylece ODGP, daha geniş Alman güvenlik politikasının önemli ama mütevazı bölümünü oluşturmaktadır. Almanya, ODGP çerçevesinde hegemonik bir rol uygulamak konusunda isteksiz görünmektedir. Üstelik AB yapısı böyle bir rolü tatbik etmesine izin vermemektedir. Almanya'nın ODGP'deki öncü rolü "paylaşılan liderlik" tanımına uygundur. Kısa ve orta vadede Almanya'nın güvenlik politikalarının ana istikametinde radikal bir değişiklik muhtemel görülmemektedir. Alman güvenlik politikası duruşundaki yavaş ancak istikrarlı değişim nedeniyle, Alman güvenlik politikasının ana istikametinin uzun vadede nasıl dönüşeceğine ilişkin sağlıklı bir tahminde bulunmak henüz çok erkendir.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Before starting substantive explanations on the convergence of German and European security policies, at the very onset, it may be better to define what we mean by the term 'security'. Even though there is no consensus among the scholars about the meaning of security, and an acknowledged difficulty to define it (Buzan, 1983, p. 6), most scholars of International Security (IS) work with a definition that "involves the alleviation of threats to cherished values"(Williams, 2008, p. 1). The threats to core values may threaten the very survival of particular states or individuals. Therefore, security entails the ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions. Among various scholarly definitions, Booth's definition fits best for the work within IS. He calls security as *"survival-plus (the 'plus' being some freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore space to make choices)"* (Booth, 2007, p. 102). Security is a concept, which is political in nature. Unavoidably, with the Lasswell's popular definition of politics, security has a role while deciding 'who gets what, when, and how'(Lasswell, 1936).

During the Cold War period, Germany, defined by Katzenstein as a semi-sovereign state (Katzenstein, p. 1987), mainly depended on the NATO to safeguard her security interests. The developments in world politics that led to the end of the Cold War also paved the way to the unification of two German republics in 1990. With the reunification, Germany (FRG) was granted full sovereignty and became the Europe's strongest economic power with the largest population. After the Cold War, FRG has restructured her security policy to sit on two pillars: NATO for the sovereignty and territorial integrity (Article V), and the EU for other security risks and threats (Non-article V). The expectations of the United States and of the member states of European Union (EU) from FRG concerning her potential role to play in the regional and international security put her under great pressure. FRG felt herself obliged to respond to these expectations favourably and reformulate her foreign and security policy in order to make it compatible with the new realities of her domestic as well as international politics. By now, more than three decades have passed since the reunification. The former European Community (EC) transformed into the EU, and enlarged to accommodate 27 member nations at present. The UK got divorced from the Union (BREXIT) on 31 January 2020. Since the end of the Cold War, FRG as one of the major EU powers has been playing a central role in the European Security.

This article focuses on the extent that how much FRG satisfies her overall security interests through the EU CFSP. The degree of this satisfaction will determine the FRG's role to play within the CFSP framework and the leadership style to adopt in the EU accordingly. Therefore, the research question is formulated to read: *What role will FRG play within the CFSP framework to achieve European security interests at large and German ones in particular?* This paper argues that even though there is a substantial degree of harmony between the EU and German security interests, the achievement of overall German interests at a high scale within the CFSP framework is somewhat unattainable due to the

decision making mechanism in the EU, in particular in its security and defence realm (Second Pillar[2]). EU structure does not allow a single member to have the European Council or the Council take any decision for the achievement of her security interests in a speedy fashion as the member's liking. In the Second Pillar, decisions are made by consensus[3] and apart from the member nations, the EU High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also have certain roles to play in this Pillar.[4] Accordingly, a shared leadership with France best suits for FRG in the EU.

A constructivist theoretical approach is adopted in most parts of the research as German security policy is values-based and norm-driven. Constructivism considers security as a social construction and it constitutes a platform for actors to compete and define the identity and values of a particular group in a way to provide a foundation for political action. For constructivism, in the study of security, identity and norms are central and provide the limits for feasible and legitimate political action (Mc Donald, 2008, p. 67). In addition to Constructivism, while analysing the most probable leadership style of Germany in the EU, Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability (Kindleberger, 1981) and Robert Cox's neo-Gramscian hegemonic theory (Cox, 1983) are made use of determining whether the security policy behaviours of FRG have hegemonic attributes.

The literature on the EU CFSP and German security policy are abundant to include bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties, WEU/EU summit declarations, official papers, academic books and articles. However, the literature on the convergence of both policies are scarce and a gapped area remains there. This paper is intended to fill this gap. The literature is categorized into four groups: First, the sources which discuss German and European identity. Second, the literature which explain German security policy and national interests. Third, those which establish the linkage between German security policy and EU CFSP. Finally, the sources which focus on German Leadership role within CFSP. In the first category, Witlinger's and Warburg's books and articles are assessed as the reliable sources to form an opinion about German identity and its impact on the German foreign and security policy. In the second category, German government's White Papers of 2006 and 2016 and National Security Strategy (NSS) constitute the primary sources on the German national interests and her security policy formulation. As secondary sources, the articles by Hyde-Price, Maull and Allers provide reliable information in the same field. In the third category, that is, on the development of CFSP, treaties and other official sources namely, EU/WEU summit declarations, Maastricht Treaty of 1992, Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Nice Treaty of

[2] Maastricht Treaty, signed on the 7th of February 1992, consisted of three pillars on which the EU was based: The first pillar was European Community (EC, Article G, H and I); The second was CFSP (Article J); and the third was Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, Article K). Therefore, CFSP matters fall into the sphere of Second Pillar.

[3] According to the Treaty on the EU, the CFSP is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously (European Union, 2012a, p. 30, Article 24.1).

[4] The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, contributes through his proposals to the development of the common foreign and security policy and ensures implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council. The European External Action Service assist the High Representative in fulfilling his mandate (European Union, 2012a, p. 32, Article 27.1, 3.).

2001, and Lisbon Treaty of 2007 form the primary sources. As secondary sources, the academic studies by Howorth, Wright, Miskimmon and Meyer comprise detailed knowledge on the development of CFSP and CSDP in the EU. In the fourth category, Crawford, Hyde-Price, Siddi, Bulmer and Paterson in their academic works discuss in detail various leadership types that would be adopted by FRG within the CFSP framework. Citations are made in the ensuing sections when a need arises.

Document Analysis method (Bowen, 2009, pp. 33–34) of qualitative research technique is adopted during the research. The study is limited by the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods.

In the ensuing sections, a discussion on German security interests and security policy formulation will be followed by Germany's stance towards European Security. Thereafter, in the light of regional and global security context, an assessment will be made about the convergence of German security policy and CFSP. Finally, a brief debate will be carried out over German leadership in European security.

2. GERMAN SECURITY INTERESTS AND SECURITY POLICY FORMULATION

The first step in the security policy formulation of a particular state is to determine its security interests. Before discussing German security interests, it may be worthwhile to have a quick look at some past German state behaviours which reveal the fundamental principles of her security policy.

2.1. State Behaviours Affecting Security Policy

Despite its gigantic economic strength, FRG has not made any attempt to increase substantially its military power since the reunification. The military expenditure of FRG as percentage of gross domestic product was over 2,6 before the reunification. However, after reunification, this ratio has gone down and fluctuated between 2,0 and 1,5 in the period between 1991and 1996. Defence spending of FRG has been reduced even more during the period between 1997 and 2020 and its ratio to gross domestic product has changed between 1,4 % and 1,1 % (SIPRI 2021, 2021). This is a clear indication that FRG has not had any appetite to build up a strong military and to pursue power politics.[5] Instead, her stance for security policy has more relied on non-military means. Thus, German security policy conformed to the characteristics of "civilian power" concept (Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001, p. 707).

Secondly, since the end of the WW II, in external security matters, FRG has acted together with international community. Until the chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder in 1998, German political leadership avoided pronouncing the term "national interest" or "German interests" in addressing the matters concerning security policy. This was due to the fact that German security policy was impacted by the burden of Germany's past namely, her responsibility for the two destructive World Wars and the Holocaust. Therefore, German leadership paid special attention to act and cooperate with their counterparts in tackling with security affairs within the Euro-Atlantic area. FRG has attached and still attaches utmost importance to multilateral security institutions such as NATO, the EU and OSCE in

[5] To improve the military capabilities of the German armed forces, FRG allocated an extra-budgetary fund of €100 billion after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This may lead to a substantial increase in German military expenditure in the coming years (SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2023, 9)

addressing regional and global security issues. Acting together with international community rather than following a "*sonderweg* (special way)" has become a distinct feature of German Security Policy after WWII. According to Miskimmon, convincing her partners of Germany's rejection of foreign policy exceptionalism (*kleins sonderweg*) was among the key norms shaping Germany's approach to negotiations during the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union at the beginning of the 1990s (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 51).

Thirdly, FRG has sought legitimacy and legality of a military operation before deciding on German participation in it. A legitimate UN mandate, conformity with the German basic law (*Grundgesetz*) and a separate national parliament (*Bundestag*) approval were the basic norms for the German politicians before their decisions to use a military force for regional and global crises (Pradetto, 2006, pp. 19-21). Therefore, it can be argued with broad terms that German security policy has been norm-driven.

Finally, national identity plays an important role in the formulation of national interests (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-33) and it may change gradually in time. However, German leadership has avoided pronouncing the term national identity in security and defence matters for decades. Instead, they have preferred to identify themselves as Europeans (Wittlinger, 2009, p. 370). According to Wittlinger, "*a key part of the Bonn Republic's identity was its commitment to Europe. West German elites and society at large constituted model Europeans*" (Wittlinger, 2010, p. 143). German White Paper 2016 substantiated the Wittlinger's argument to some extent and stated that "German identity was inseparably connected with European identity" (The Federal Government, 2016, p. 22). The issue of identity still seems to be a matter of concern for German leadership and German NSS entertains it in a separate sub-section entitled "Our Security Identity". Here, German Government admits their nation's past wrongdoings: "*We act in awareness of our history and of the guilt our country bears for unleashing the Second World War and for perpetrating the Shoah, that betrayal of all civilised values*" (The Federal Government, 2023, pp. 19-20).

2.2. German Security Interests

The ultimate aim of a national security policy is to achieve national security interests. According to the German NSS, *"German foreign and security policy is …values-based and interest-driven"* (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 20). German values comprise democracy, the rule of law and human rights, in particular the right to life and physical integrity, freedom of opinion, the press, assembly and religion, equal rights for all and the right to free development of personality (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 20).[6] German government determined its contemporary national security interests in the NSS as follows (The Federal Government 2023, pp. 20-21): (i) Protection of the people, sovereignty and territory of

[6] In German White Paper of 2016, German values were introduced under two groups: (i) Values of German Constitution namely, human dignity, basic rights, democracy, rule of law, (ii) The provisions of European law and international law concerning the protection of universal human rights, and maintenance of peace. (The Federal Government, 2016, p. 24)

FRG, the EU and German allies, (ii) Protection of German free democratic order, (iii) Strengthening the European Union's ability to act and its internal cohesion and further deepening FRG's friendship with France, (iv) Consolidating the transatlantic alliance and FRG's close partnership based on mutual trust with the United States of America, (v) Fostering prosperity and social cohesion in FRG by protecting her social market economy, (vi) Promotion of an international order based on international law, the UN Charter and universal human rights, (vii) Fostering peace and stability worldwide and championing democracy, the rule of law, human development and participation by all population groups as a prerequisite for sustainable security, (viii) Promotion of the sustainable protection of natural resources, limiting the climate crisis and managing its impacts, securing access to water and food, as well as protecting people's health, (ix) Maintaining an open, rules-based international economic and financial system with free trade routes and a secure, sustainable supply of raw materials and energy. Some of these national security interests have already been included in the German White Paper of 2016 (The Federal Government, 2016, pp. 24-25). Items (ii), (vii), (ix) and partly item (viii) above are newly determined security interests. These additional national security items reveal the changes in FRG's national security perception. Protection of domestic free democratic order is one of the new items. It may indicate German unrest with regard to emerging autocratic regimes in the Euro-Atlantic region. Item (vii) shows a radical change in the German foreign policy behaviour. FRG declares explicitly that she is ready to assume an active role in fostering peace and stability worldwide and championing democracy, the rule of law, human development and participation by all population groups as a prerequisite for sustainable security. In the very same item it is implicit that FRG's integrated security understanding comprises the conception of "individual security" or "human security".[7] Environmental issues such as climate change, access to water and protection of people's health are likely to occupy an important place in the future German security agenda. Last but not least, functioning of rules-based international economic and financial system, secure free trade routes, and sustainable supply of raw materials and energy are the points which may attract the engagement of German national security apparatus.

Security environment is another factor that plays a key role in the formulation of security policy. German leadership considers the contemporary security environment as more multipolar and less stable, posing diverse threats and challenges to German security interests. Russia with her war of aggression against Ukraine proved once more to be the most significant threat to peace and security in Europe. China's competition and systemic rivalry may counter German interests and values, putting regional stability and international security under increasing pressure. Crises and conflicts in Europe's neighbourhood especially those in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel may also have impacts on the

[7] Annalena Baerbock, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of FRG, mentions explicitly "individual security" needs in her introduction at the beginning of NSS document. (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 7). German NSS also underlines her commitment to focus on the individual. It states that *"enhancing the security of the individual … also enhances the stability of the state and of society"* (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 29).

security of FRG and Europe. The climate crisis can now be considered an existential threat. Terrorism, extremism, organised crime, illegal financial flows, and cyberattacks are likely to cause significant damage and pose risks to German security and stability. Protection of critical infrastructure and a secure supply of energy sources and raw materials can be at risk. One-sided dependencies in international economic and financial relations may develop into security risks. (The Federal Government, 2023, pp. 11-13) German NSS is formulated to address these threats and risks under a comprehensive security strategy with three dimensions: The first dimension is the protection of Germans and their allies from war and external violence. The second one is the protection of the FRG's freedom to be able to shape German's life, democracy and economy in the way they desire, without any constraints and economic dependencies. The third dimension is safeguarding the resources on which FRG depend (The Federal Government, 2023, p.7, 19).

2.3. Collective Memories

Apart from values and national interests, "collective memories" also play a crucial role in shaping the foreign and security policy of a particular nation. In many ways, collective memories determined both the direction and the style of German political culture (Warburg, 2010, p. 54). Germans' perception of the world politics cannot be explained without reference to their past experiences (Wittlinger and Larose, 2007, pp. 486-88). Therefore, "never again war" (*nie wieder krieg*), "never again the Holocaust" (*nie wieder Auschwitz*), "never again special path" (*nie wieder sonderweg*), "loyalty towards Alliance" reflect how German foreign and security policies have been impacted by collective memories for decades after the WWII. According to Wittlinger and Larose, *"German collective memory of the Second World War and the Holocaust was no doubt the single most important factor to have influenced institutions and policies as well as the political culture and its discourse"*(Wittlinger and Larose, 2007, p.483).

2.4. Main Traits of German Foreign and Security Policy

Throughout the Cold War period, Western orientation, strong multilateralism, civilian character and euro-centrism have been the main traits of German foreign and security policy (Webber, 2001, pp. 2-5). The trait of Western orientation (or "*Westpolitik*") was established by Chancellor Adenauer, in the 1950s and manifested as participation in all major Western alliances and regional organisations, i.e. EC, the Western European Union (WEU), and NATO (Webber, 2001, p. 3). Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* in 1969 and ensuing years should not be viewed a more active Eastern policy at the expense of Western integration, rather a natural supplement of it (Tewes, 2002, p. 46)**.**

Multilateralism, another German foreign and security policy trait, was first introduced by again Chancellor Adenauer in 1950 with his support for the Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. German multilateralist policy was distinguished by its two dimensions: First, it entailed a preparedness for the transfer of national decision-making competencies to international or supranational bodies. Second, it involved acting jointly with other allied states rather than alone on important foreign

and security policy issues (Webber, 2001, p. 3). For Germans, institutionalized and rules-based forms of multilateralism is likely to be preferable, due to its adherence to a liberal international order (Maull, 2011, p. 153).

The third main trait of German foreign and security policy has been its civilian character and it entails rejecting the use of military force as a policy instrument (anti-militarism). The basic law of FRG banned wars of aggression and German participation in military interventions beyond the NATO's area of responsibility (Webber, 2001, p. 5).

The final principal trait of German foreign and security policy has been its Euro-centrism. FRG did not pursue a global strategy or conception of its security interests. NATO's area of responsibility used to be a geographical boundary for FRG in orienting her security policy. FRG interest with regard to the maintenance and promotion of free international trade was pursued in and through the European Community (Webber, 2001, p. 5).

2.5. Changes in the Main Traits of German Security Policy after the Reunification

After the reunification, several alterations have been observed in the security policy of Berlin Republic due to the challenges taken place in the regional and global security environment. In the following paragraphs, it will be briefly touched upon which traits of Bonn Republic's foreign and security were changed during the Berlin Republic.

First and foremost, the Western orientation of German security policy remained unchanged. However, a gradual shift from NATO to the EU in the weight of the Western alliances on which German security policy relied has taken place as the EU CFSP and CSDP established and matured. NATO's monopoly in the German security has left its place to the duopoly of the EU and NATO. According to German NSS, "*Germany's security is indivisible from that of its allies and European partners"* (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 30).

The trait of multilateralism has also remained unchanged (Wright, 2018, p. 479). Enduring cooperation with allies and regional organisations such as the UN, NATO, the EU and OSCE constitute the core of German security policy. They provide the primary framework for German security policy actions. German NSS confirms her commitment to strengthening these multilateral structures with a view to resolving global challenges and thereby countering the emergence of new blocs. German government actively supports multilateralism (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 15, 49, 50). At the same time German bilateral relations with Israel, France and the US are of paramount importance for the German security policy (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 11).

The traits of "civilian orientation" of German security policy have been transformed significantly. Starting from 1991 Gulf War, FRG came under heavy pressure by the Allies to participate in NATO or coalition operations militarily. She alleviated this pressure during the Gulf War via "cheque-book diplomacy" and used the constitutional restrictions as a rationale for not joining the war (Hyde-Price

and Jeffery, 2001, p. 703). The Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) ruling of July 1994 paved the way for the German soldiers' participation in out-of-area military operations as long as they were launched under UN mandate and approved by the Bundestag (Dorff, 1997, p. 57). Following this ruling, German military personnel were committed to a number of humanitarian and peace-keeping operations in support of the UN and NATO. NATO's Bosnia operations in 1995, Kosovo operations in 1999 and International Security Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (ISAF) between 2002 and 2014 were the operations with significant German military participation. According to Baumann and Hellmann, all these were a significant policy change for FRG concerning the use of military force (Baumann and Hellmann 2010, p. 79). On the other hand, Maull maintains the opposite view and defends that German foreign and security policy behaviour still corresponds to "civilian power" role concept (Maull, 2018, p. 462). He bases his argument on the following elements: (i) The pursuit of the foreign and security policy compatible with the values of the basic law, (ii) A strong commitment to multilateral institutions and not to act alone, (iii) Acting with restraint in the use of military force and denial of using armed forces for any major foreign policy purpose unilateral, (iv) A willingness to adhere to the norms of international law and to integrate itself into supranational institutions (Maull, 2018, pp. 461-62). Yet, it is a fact that despite German military participation in NATO operations conducted in the Balkans and Afghanistan, FRG refused to participate in the coalition operations in Iraq in 2003 and NATO operations in Libya in 2011. The "civilian power" concept does not refer to the exclusively non-military foreign and security policy. A "civilian power" relies residually on the use of military force (Tewes, 2002, p. 12). There were legitimate grounds for German participation in the operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and she acted jointly rather than alone. Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Maas indicated in February 2020 that the use of German military cannot be ruled out when the security conditions dictates: "*To put it quite clearly, Germany is prepared to become more involved, also militarily. However, this military commitment must be embedded in a political rationale"* (Maas, 2020).

German NSS introduces a new terminology for the German security policy: "Integrated Security". It means bringing together all instruments available and relevant while addressing security risks and threats. It also combines preventive actions with intervention and follow-up measures. It comprises the means more than the sum of diplomatic and military ones. Contemporary German national security policy aims at combining all relevant capabilities and integrating political actions across all policy fields by pursuing a policy of Integrated Security (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 30).

Euro-centrism, the last important security policy trait of Bonn Republic, has undergone a fundamental change after the reunification. Today, German military troops are participating in peace support operations beyond Europe, in Africa and in Asia. This is a clear indication that there is a fundamental change in the German perception with regard to the geographical boundaries of the area which German security policy has to take into account. One of the former German Defence Ministers Peter Struck famously introduced this notion that *"German interests had to be defended at the Hindu Kush Mountains as well"* (Struck, 2004). German NSS does not bring any geographical limitations to her national

security policy actions. It recognises that German security is linked to the security and stability of other regions in the world. It is in FRG's interest to make substantial contributions to international crisis management (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 40).

In addition to the traits discussed above, it can be argued that "continuity" is another trait of German foreign and security policy. In spite of the changes took place since the reunification, one can still observe a broad continuity in the overall orientation of German security policy. This observance is also shared by Bulmer and Paterson (Bulmer and Paterson, 2010, p. 1071). Concerning the implementation style of German foreign and security policy, modesty, moderation, self-limitation, a culture of military restraint and a leadership avoidance reflex are the salient characteristics (Wittlinger, 2010, pp. 116-17). With the chancellorship of Schröder assertiveness and German patriotism have also become new characteristics in the implementation of German security policy (Wittlinger ve Larose, 2007, p. 485). Besides these characteristics, Maull argues that persuasion, consensus and coalition-building, cultivating trust, taking smaller member states and European institutions seriously, leading by example, by down-payments to advance common solutions, and sometimes also by stealth were the elements which contributed to the success of German foreign and security policy (Maull, 2011, p. 156).

The last point is that domestic considerations, coalition dynamics, German leader's individual preferences, and diplomatic craftsmanship play their respective distinct roles in the formulation of German security policy.

3. GERMANY'S STANCE TOWARDS EUROPEAN SECURITY

After WWII, in order to integrate FRG into Western security structures, the Western European Union (WEU) was established on 23 October 1954 with Paris Agreement (Modified Brussels Treaty) and FRG became a member state. The then German Chancellor Adenaur played a crucial role in Germany's integration into the Western political and security structures. Throughout the Cold War period, the role of the WEU was overshadowed by NATO and hardly discernible. However, after the Cold War, the WEU was given visibility for less than a decade, to play its role in the establishment of an EU identity in the European security. FRG together with France has been quite enthusiastic to establish a separate European foreign and security policy within the EU. Finally, EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is established and matured. Germany's role in the establishment and the functioning of EU CFSP will be briefly discussed in the following two sections.

3.1. German Contributions to the Institutionalizing of CFSP

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) of December 1969 was an initiative to establish a separate European identity in international affairs. The adoption of Single European Act (SEA) in February 1986 legalised the EPC and established its parameters until the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) was signed in Maastricht in December 1991 (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 30). SEA can be considered as the first concrete attempt in the development of CFSP. The Article 30.6 (a) of SEA justifies this argument:

"*closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of European identity in external policy matters"* (European Communities, 1987, Article 30.6.(a)). Genscher-Colombo initiative of 1981 was an important milestone on the road to the adoption of the Act. The initiative proposed to bring of the EPC process into the main EC structure and to extend its remit to eventually include defence matters (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 30). It is safe to argue that the adoption process of SEA enjoyed a strong German support.

According to the TEU, CFSP would include the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (Article J.4.1). The Treaty also tasked the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (Article J.4.2) (European Union, 2012). Concerning the German role in the establishment of CFSP, in the preparatory phase of the TEU, Genscher-Dumas Paper of 4 February 1991 called for the development of an EC Foreign and Security Policy which should lead in the end to a common European defense. Germany's WEU presidency in the second half of 1991 played a crucial coordinating role in the debates over the framing of the CFSP, and her contribution was personified in the role that the then German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Genscher played (Miskimmon, 2007, pp. 41-47).

Another milestone in the institutionalizing of CFSP was the Treaty of Amsterdam signed on 2 October, 1997. The Treaty heralded the WEU's integration into the EU: "*The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide"* (European Union, 1997, Art. J7.1). WEU Petersberg tasks were also included in the EU legislation via Amsterdam Treaty (Article J.7.2). The Treaty introduced new bodies to deal with CFSP, namely the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative (HR) post (Article J.8.3) and Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEW) (Declaration 6). The concept of "enhanced cooperation" (Protocol A on Article7), and "positive abstention" in the approval of the decisions (Article J.13.1) were other novelties in the CFSP pillar which Amsterdam Treaty consisted of. During the negotiation phase for the Treaty, Germany was quite active to translate her security interests into the EU policy. However, Germany's role remained limited to achieve the desired outcome (Miskimmon, 2007, pp. 66-70, p. 83, 91, 93, 95).

The Joint EU/WEU German Presidency in the first half of 1999 was a unique opportunity for FRG to generate and further the debate concerning CSDP in line with her security interests. After Franco-British St. Malo declaration of 4 December 1998, Germany was quite eager and assertive for the development of CSDP. The Germany's White Paper-2006 claims that "*ESDP was 'born' in Cologne, Germany"* (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 33). The Joint Presidency greatly facilitated the co-ordination of efforts to work towards the development of EU military capabilities. It was during the German Joint Presidency that introduction of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC), Military Committee (EUMC), and Military Staff (EUMS) were achieved. Another success story during this period was the establishment of the Stability Pact for South Eastern

Europe (SPSEE) pledging considerable funds and resources (1, 2 Billion DM) (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 112, 117, 129).

The integration of EU/WEU was an EU policy dream for German Chancellor Kohl and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Kinkel throughout the 1990s. This dream finally came true with the signing of the Treaty of Nice on 26 February 2001. Most of the responsibilities of WEU were transferred to the EU except Article V matters (Article 17) (Miskimmon, 2007, p. 191).

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 13 December 2007 and formed the final milestone in the institutionalizing of CFSP and CSDP within the EU. From the CFSP point of view, the Treaty consisted of a mutual assistance clause (Article 28A.7), a solidarity clause (Article 188R.1. TFEU), a "permanent structured cooperation" which led later to EU PESCO (Article 28.A.6), and introduction of a European External Action Service (Declaration 15) (European Union, 2007). After the failure of the ratification of "The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe" (signed in 2004 in Rome), EU German Presidency of 2007 revitalised the EU's constitutional reform process, culminating in the agreement of the Treaty of Lisbon in the same year (Wright, 2019b, p. 124, 127).

Having secured the establishment of the CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) within the EU, in White Paper 2016, FRG set the achievement of a European Security and Defence Union as her long-term goal for EU security transformation (The Federal Government, 2016, p. 76). However, this goal is not included in her first-ever National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted on 14 June 2023 by the Federal Government (The Federal Government, 2023).

3.2. German participation in the operationalizing of CFSP

The operationalizing of CFSP has been solidified in three different domains: EU crisis management operations, defence cooperation and security strategies adopted by the EU. In the following paragraphs, German contributions to these domains will be shortly explained.

In the crisis management domain, Operations Concordia launched in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2003 was the first EU mission. Between 2003-2023, over 40 CSDP missions and operations have been launched. Currently, there are 22 ongoing CSDP missions and operations, of which 13 are civilian and 9 military (EEAS, 2023a). Germany has been participating in more than 30 CSDP missions (Federal Foreign Office, 2024). German participation level to the CSDP operations/missions varies from one mission to another and from one year to another. Currently, a total of 2089 German nationals are deployed to peace operations worldwide, of which 1850 are military, 57 are police and 186 are civilian personnel (ZİF Berlin, 2024). It is worth mentioning that EUFOR Congo started under the German-lead in 2007, providing invaluable lessons identified in the preparatory phase for the mission. While deciding on the participation in the CSDP missions, Wright argues that *"the primary focus of German foreign and security policy has been to keep the country from becoming embroiled in any major military activity*" (Wright, 2019b, p.129). Germany's opposition to military interventions in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013 might be, *inter alia*, interpreted as an evidence of this concern.

The EU Battle Group Concept is another important activity in crisis management domain. It was officially proposed in February 2004 as a Franco-British-German initiative. The Concept was finalised at the Military Capability Commitments Conference on 22 November 2004 and included in the Headline Goal-2010. It aimed to have a highly mobile set of forces which were capable of rapid deployment. The Battle Groups were considered to be a coherent force package with 1500 military personnel capable of stand-alone operations. The initial operating capability for the concept was achieved in 2005 while full operating capability on the 1st of January 2007. A number of Battle Groups were established by the member and non-EU nations. However, since the adoption of the concept, none of them has been tasked in any CSDP operations due to both financial and political reasons. FRG has fulfilled lead-nation role for four different rotations and also committed German military troops to four additional Battle Group rotations led-by France, Poland (two rotations) and the Netherlands until 2013 (Chappell, 2012, p. 139, 142). Even though Germany was one of the nations to propose this concept, due to unwillingness of the EU members to task these Battle Groups, German support for the concept has gradually diminished. On the other hand, modified EU Battle Groups may be one of the options in the operationalisation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capability under EU Strategic Compass initiative (Borell, 2023, pp. 8-9).

European Peace Facility (EPF) is a recent and off-budget instrument aimed at enhancing the EU's ability to prevent conflicts, build peace and strengthen international security, by enabling the financing of EU operational actions with military and defence implications. EPF was launched on 22 March 2021 by the EU Council (EU Council, 2021) and has two pillars: One for military operations and the other for assistance measures. The operations pillar covers the common costs of military CSDP missions and operations. Currently, 10 active EU military operations benefit from EPF common funding, as well as 2 assistance measures implemented by an operation (EUMAM Ukraine). The assistance measures pillar finances the military aspects of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and supports capacity building of partner countries and international organisations in military and defence matters (The General Secretariat of the Council, 2023). To give an example, under assistance measures pillar, as of March 2023, through EPF, EU have provided € 3.6 billion in military supplies to Ukraine (Borell, 2023, p. 5). FRG wants to strengthen EPF in order to achieve the EU's security goals (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 39).

In the domain of defence cooperation, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence is a prominent EU initiative. The EU Council officially decided on the establishment of PESCO on the 11th of December 2017. Currently, with the exemption of Malta, 26 EU member states participate in PESCO. The mechanism of PESCO between a certain group of EU member states stipulated in the articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU. It was one of the proposals in the Franco-German joint paper of 11 September 2016 co-authored by German Defence Minister Leyen and her French counterpart Le Drian in order to reinforce the solidarity of the EU members and the European defence capabilities (Rettman, 2016). It aims at optimizing the available resources and improving their overall effectiveness to contribute to the fulfilment of the EU level of ambition. The willing and able member states have been jointly planning, developing and investing in shared capability projects with a view to enhancing the operational readiness and capabilities of

their armed forces. The EU Council have adopted 72 projects across five different waves since the beginning of the initiative (EEAS, 2023b).[8] FRG has the coordinator role for 10 Projects, and is participant in 15 additional project (European Union, 2023). In German NSS, German government underlines its commitment to the further development of PESCO (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 39).

With regard to the EU security strategies, two EU initiatives have had high level visibility: One is "A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" and the other is "The Strategic Compass for Security and Defence." The Global Strategy was presented by EU High Representative (HR) Mogherini on 28 June 2016 and constituted a prime example within security strategies domain. The Global Strategy defined the principles, priorities and instruments of EU foreign and security policy. It identified five priorities, one of which was security. The Concept paper underlined the need for an urgent investment in security and defence, especially in the fields of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) digital capabilities and high-end military capabilities. It emphasised that defence cooperation must become the norm. Striving to create a solid European defence industry, a more structured form of cooperation, and becoming more joined-up in security policies were other recommendations made in the paper. Germany considered that EU Global Strategy is an important milestone to reach the Germany's long-standing objective of creating a common European Defence Union (The Federal Government, 2017, pp. 36-37). However, after the tenure of HR Mogherini, a revised version of EU Global Strategy has not been promulgated. German NSS does not make any reference to EU Global Strategy.

The Strategic Compass was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by Heads of State and Government on 24-25 March 2022, one month after the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. With the Strategic Compass, EU members agree on a common strategic vision for the EU's role in security and defence and commit to a set of concrete and wide-ranging objectives (EEAS, 2022, p. 15). It provides the EU with an ambitious plan of action to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 (EEAS, 2022, p. 13). The strategic compass has launched to sit on four pillars or work strands. First, "act" rapidly and robustly when a crisis erupts. Second, "secure" the citizens of EU member states. Third, "invest" in required capabilities and innovative technologies. Last, "partner" with other nations and organisations to achieve common goals. Each work strand has various concrete priority actions. It should be emphasised that, in the "act" work strand, the development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025 to allow the EU to quickly deploy up to 5,000 troops for different types of crises is an ambitious objective (EEAS, 2022, pp. 11-13). The Strategic Compass comprised over 80 concrete and time-bound actions to translate the EU's ambition in security and defence into reality (Borell, 2023, p. 4). German government committed herself to the resolutely implementation of the Strategic Compass projects (The Federal Government, 2023, p. 38).

[8] These waves are as follows: The first wave 17 projects (6 March 2018), the second wave 17 projects (19 November 2018), the third wave 13 projects (12 November 2019), the fourth wave 14 projects (16 November 2021), the fifth wave 11 projects (23 May 2023) (EEAS, 2023b).

To paraphrase the main points outlined in this section., after the end of the Cold War, on the one hand, FRG accepted the primacy of NATO in European security and was committed to maintain transatlantic link. On the other, she pursued a well-conceived strategy of developing a European identity in the realm of security and defence. Establishment of an autonomous European Security and Defence Capability, without any doubt, was a German security objective. This objective has incrementally been achieved starting even before the end of the Cold War. The journey for the introduction of a separate European security identity started with the SEA of 1986. Establishment of CFSP pillar in 1992 through the TEU was a concrete step during this journey. With the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, institutional bodies namely, HR post and Policy Planning and Early Warning (PPEW) unit for the functioning of the CFSP were introduced. Transfer of major functions of the WEU to the EU was achieved via 2001 Nice Treaty. Finally, introduction of a mutual assistance clause, a solidarity clause, a "permanent structured cooperation" and establishment of EEAS were realized through Lisbon Treaty of 2007. FRG has not been alone during this journey. France has been a close companion of her. There has also been a clear desire among the member nations to make the EU a global security actor (Howorth, 2007, pp. 56-57).

Germany acted with caution, however, in order not to disturb the US in the establishment of a separate European security identity. Prior to the Franco-British Declaration of 1998 in St. Malo, FRG was hesitant to pronounce an autonomous European security and defence capability and preferred to use the term "European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)". However, after the St. Malo declaration, she became quite vocal in using the term "Common Security and Defence Policy". FRG together with France were the driving force behind all important EU CFSP and CSDP initiatives.

In pioneering to launch both CFSP and CSDP, however, FRG has never meant to replace NATO or to balance the United States (Allers, 2016, p. 530). German President Steinmeier's speech during 56th Munich Security Conference substantiated what has been summarized above. The speech stated;

"For Germany, Europe is not something that is merely nice to have or important when other partnerships wilt. No, it is our strongest, our most fundamental national interest. Today and tomorrow, Europe is the indispensable framework for us to assert ourselves in the World.

…..

To put it quite clearly: if we want to keep this Europe together, on security issues too, then it is not enough to make the European Union alone stronger in terms of security policy and the military; rather, we must, I am convinced, also continue to invest in our transatlantic links" (Walter-Steinmeier, 2020).

4. ASSESSMENT: THE CONVERGENCE OF GERMANY SECURITY POLICY AND THE EU CFSP

In section 2 above, main features of German security have already been explained based on the factors which are important in the formulation of national interests, such as, values, security interests, security environment, and implementation style. A sound assessment concerning the convergence of and EU

CFSP should be made against these factors. EU Security policy needs to be explained based on the same factors before a sound assessment on the convergence of both policies.

4.1 Factors and the EU Security Policy:

The EU values are laid out in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty as human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (European Union, 2012b, p. 17). The juxtaposition of the EU and German values can reveal that there is a high degree of conformity between the two as the latter is a constituent part of the former. Thus, from the values point of view, no mismatch exists between EU and German security policies.

With regard to "security interests", peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order were determined as the vital interests common to all EU nations in the EU Global Strategy of 2016 (European Union, 2016, p. 13). In addition, the fact that majority of EU members are the members of NATO, they have the same interest in strengthening NATO to protect their sovereignty, territorial integrity and citizens against any armed aggression. From the perspective of security interests, there is no clash of security interests between German and EU that requires FRG to formulate additional security policy actions.

As to the factor of "security environment", the unprovoked and unjustified Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022 has transformed the relatively predictable security landscape into more volatile, complex and fragmented one. The EU perceives that Russia directly threatens the European security order and the security of European citizens. China with its developing military and economic means and aims has been growing a risk against the EU interests. The instability that exists in the EU's eastern and southern neighbourhood, geopolitical rivalries, increased commercial interests including on natural resources in the Arctic region, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are substantial issues that may pose risks for the EU interests. Ongoing conflicts, poor governance and weak states across Africa in particular in Mali, the wider Sahel region and Central Africa affect European security. Active conflicts and persistent instability in the wider Middle East and Gulf Region put EU security and economic interests at risk. Afghanistan continues to pose serious security concerns for the European Union in terms of terrorism, the smuggling of drugs and irregular migration. North Korea with its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes endanger international peace and security and pose risks to the EU interests. The requirement for the establishment of security measures on the key trade routes such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Horn of Africa and the Mozambique has been a cause for concern for the EU. Emerging and transnational threats and challenges, namely terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, hybrid strategies, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, direct interference in elections and political processes, economic coercion and irregular migration flows, climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters have direct impacts on the EU's security (EEAS (EU External Action Service), 2022, pp. 17–23). The weight of these risks and threats on the security policy of respective EU states varies from one member state to another depending on their security perceptions. For example, uncontrolled migration may pose

relatively higher level of risks to the security of smaller EU members than those of bigger members. Similarly, Baltic states may perceive a high level of Russian threat to their sovereignty and territorial integrity while Western European states feel relatively lower one. German threat perceptions have already been explained in Section 2.B above. A high level conformity exists between the EU and German perceptions. There is no major risk or threat which affects only FRG interests within the EU.

The factor of "implementation style" may not reflect a high level agreement between German security policy and the EU CFSP. This is due to two main reasons: First, Germany is a nation state while EU an international organisation. Adoption processes for their security policies follow different paths within their internal structures. An EU policy is adopted after extensive discussions and bargaining processes among the member nations while the adoption of a German security policy requires intensive discussions among political parties (particularly coalition partners) and even *Länder's* (Federal States). The outcome is a compromised policy. Second, security culture plays a crucial role in the implementation style of a security policy. Significant differences are supposed to be expected in the implementation style of German security policy and that of EU CFSP as the other members of the EU have their own distinct security cultures. For example, in addressing crises, France has tended to use military means while Germany has inclined to use civilian crisis management tools (Allers, 2016, p. 521). Because, Germany has developed a culture of military restraint and been reluctant to consider the use of military force in the field of security since 1955, her entry into NATO (H. W. Maull, 2018, p. 468).

Finally, major traits of EU security policy can be identified as follows: (i) For an EU security operation or mission a UN mandate is pre-requisite, (ii) The type of mission/operation should fall into the spectrum of Petersberg tasks (peace support operations), (iii) Civilian crisis management tools have the priority over military instruments (Allers, 2016, p. 530). All these traits are consistent with the those of German Security Policy. Moreover, major German security proposals are usually conceived in close cooperation with France or other EU members before they are presented to respective EU bodies for their inclusion into the EU policies and strategies (Allers, 2016, p. 531).

4.2. The weight of the EU CFSP within German Security Policy:

As underlined in Section 2 above FRG follows a multilateral foreign and security policy. Maull argues that "*Germany alone is neither politically nor even economically influential enough to play a shaping role in international relations"* (Maull, 2011, p. 148). Therefore, Germany is aware that she can pursue her security interests best through multilateral organisations, and the EU in particular. Due to her political and economic weight in the EU, CSDP offers a good opportunity for FRG to increase her influence in security and defence matters (Allers, 2016, p. 526). However, FRG's ability to influence the course of CFSP/CSDP has mostly relied on her partnership with France. The Franco-German partnership remained instrumental in maintaining the dynamic towards deepening foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU.

It is important to underline that CSDP is not the sole instrument for FRG in the security domain, rather it constitutes a modest component of overall German security engagements. Germany's relations with

NATO, the UN, OSCE and individual countries which are established on bilateral basis constitute other pillars of German security policy. German security engagements under NATO or the UN umbrella may overweigh those achieved within CSDP depending on the importance of the operations of respective organisations for the German security interests. For example, as of June 2019, Germany's commitment to UN operations and missions were three times bigger than her contribution to EU CSDP operations. Germany deployed 1,030 military, 16 police and 40 civilian personnel to support UN operations and missions while its personnel contribution to CSDP missions and operations remained at the level of 260 military, 29 police and 58 civilian personnel.

The Establishment of a European Common Defence Union (ECDU) is a long-standing objective for FRG. German leadership has been trying to convince their French counterparts to act together in the realization of ECDU. German Foreign Minister MAAS explicitly stated this during the 56th Munich Security Conference: "*I'm thinking in this context, of course, about building a European Security and Defence Union – as a strong, European pillar of NATO…..Together with France, we are working on this intensively*" (Maas, 2020). Common defence Union may pave the way for a common armament and equipment procurement program and possibly a European army. This would mean, among others, more business opportunities for strong German Defence Industry Companies. In the White Paper-2016, the Europeanisation of the defence industries was one of the German policy objectives. The paper said: *"Together with the European Commission, the European Defence Agency, and key partners, we aim to intensify the Europeanisation of the defence industries* (The Federal Government, 2016, p. 74). PESCO can be considered as a first step in the establishment of ECDU as emphasised by former President of EC Juncker. On the occasion of the adoption of the decision for formally establishing PESCO by the EU Council, he said: *"I welcome the operational steps taken today by Member States to lay the foundations of a European Defense Union"* (European Commission, 2017).

5. WHAT TYPE OF GERMAN LEADESHIP?

There have been divergent thoughts over the type of leadership that FRG exercised in the realm of CFSP in general and CSDP in particular. Bulmer and Paterson argue that FRG traditionally played a "co-leadership" role with France (Bulmer & Paterson, 2010, p. 1065). Wright maintains that FRG has preferred a "shared leadership" with France to achieve her EU policy goals (Wright, 2019a, p. 167). Crawford holds that it is an "embedded leadership", as FRG shouldered disproportionate share of the regional burden of institutionalized cooperation (Crawford, 2007, p. 15). Siddi contends that FRG exercised a "hegemonic leadership" in EU-Russia relations after the Russia's annexation of Crimea (Siddi, 2020, p. 97). According to Maull, German leadership fits the characteristics of "leadership by example" (H. J. Maull, 2011, p. 148). Bagger prefers to use "negotiated leadership" or "network diplomacy" to characterize Germany's role in Europe (Bagger, 2013), (Bagger, 2015). Hellman, on the other hand, consider that Germany has become a "shaping power" with a "contested leadership" role (Hellmann, 2016, pp. 11–13).

All scholars mentioned above have formulated their definitions on FRG's leadership role, based on their interpretations of German foreign policy behaviours in various circumstances or major events. This paper argues that a state only rarely follows a pure certain leadership style. A specific type of leadership followed by a state in a particular situation is conceived as a point along a continuum between the most cooperative leadership and the hardest coercive strategy. Moreover, big powers can modify their leadership strategies as time passes, moving from a soft strategy to a harder one or vice versa in response to either changing behaviours of their followers or based on the alterations at the level of her power status or both. The frequency of exercising a specific leadership style helps us define the leadership role of a particular state. After the reunification, FRG has found herself in a position to make many foreign policy choices against major crises, such as, 1991 Gulf War, 1994 Bosnia and 1999 Kosovo crises, 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan, 2003 US invasion of Iraq, 2011 military intervention in Libya, 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, 2022 Russian invasion of south-eastern Ukraine. When German policy behaviours are analysed against these major crises, one can find certain characteristics common to majority of them. Outside the EU framework, in addressing these crisis, major characteristics of FRG foreign and security policy behaviours do not conform to the specifications of hegemonic leadership. Firstly, FRG has acted with military restraint in making her choices except Bosnian, Kosovo and Afghanistan crises. She preferred to employ more civilian means than military ones in participating them. Secondly, FRG acted jointly with multilateral organisations rather than acting unilaterally. Finally, FRG has mostly sought a UN mandate as a pre-condition to participate in any mission or operation to respond a particular crisis. Moreover, German military and political power and even her economic strength fall short of supporting a hegemonic role at the global level (Matthijs, 2016, p. 141).

At the EU level, common traits of German policy behaviours do not support a hegemonic role either. An analysis of German foreign and security policy behaviours based on the characteristics of Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability and of Cox's neo-Gramscian hegemonic theory can guide us to reach the following conclusions: (i) FRG prefers to act bilaterally with France or in some cases multilaterally with other members before major EU decisions are made. (ii) FRG generally favours using civilian instruments rather than military ones in addressing major crises. (iii) German military power does not allow her to pursue a hegemonic role within the EU. Besides, ideological foundation of the EU is built on the idea that leadership should be dispersed on multiple levels to inhibit a powerful leadership at the centre (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017, p. 3). FRG's leadership essentially relies on coalition/majority building and it often entails decision making by consensus. (v) German internal politics and coalition practices do not support the pursuit of a hegemonic role (H. W. Maull, 2018, p. 473); (Bulmer, 2018, p. 16). (vi) Even if her economic strength allows FRG to provide other EU members with financial aid to a certain extent, her ability to provide common goods and build institutions for economic development is very limited. (vii) Despite Allers' argument that Allies and partners are looking to Berlin to take the lead on policy initiatives (Allers, 2016, p. 532), many EU

members may not be willing to accept a German hegemony due to her past bad image (Hellmann, 2016, p. 10).

All in all, it is safe to argue that FRG's role within the EU CFSP is not a "hegemonic leadership". As to the "co-leadership", by definition, it requires a kind of formal empowerment of leading actors. Therefore, the use of this term for FRG's leadership within CSDP is deemed inappropriate. Crawford's definition of German" embedded hegemony" is valid to a certain extent, however, there have been occasions in which EU's institutional norms have conflicted with the German interests. The use of Bagger's term of "negotiated leadership" may be proper to describe the style of German leadership on certain occasions, but not the ability to persuade others. FRG has often preferred to consult and act only with France whenever she attempted to initiate important CFSP or CSDP projects. Thus, this paper argues that Wright's term of "shared leadership" seems to be the most effective type which FRG exercises together with France. This type of leadership can have many benefits, and may be the only way in which leadership can be performed effectively in the EU CFSP and CSDP (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017, p. 14).

6. CONCLUSION

Throughout the Cold War period, West Germany had relied on NATO to ensure their security and territorial defence while East Germany dependent on Warsaw Pact for the same purpose. NATO and Warsaw Pact dominated their foreign and security policies respectively. Until Brandt's Chancellorship the main orientation of West Germany's foreign policy was *Westpolitik* with an ultimate aim of reunifying the two German Republics. Brandt added *Ostpolitik* as a supplement to *Westpolitik* in 1969 in order to facilitate the achievement of the reunification. During the Cold War period West German security policy had been geographically limited by the then NATO's area of responsibility.

The end of the Cold War led to the German reunification in 1990. After reunification, FRG has gradually re-oriented her security policy due to the strategic conditions prevailing in 1990's. FRG and other European allies, on the one hand, have continued relying on NATO to counter all security threats (Article V). In the meantime, they have endeavoured to establish a separate European security identity to address the security risks falling outside Article V sphere. With the establishment of the EU CFSP and CSDP, Germany has re-structured her own security policy to sit on two main pillars. For her sovereignty and territorial integrity (Article V), she has opted to rely on NATO and maintain transatlantic link. For the rest of security affairs, Germany favoured EU framework to address them. The geographical limits of German foreign and security policy enlarged to encompass the entire globe.

Due to her responsibility for two destructive World Wars and "the Holocaust", German diplomatic language has traditionally been disinclined to use the term "national interests" until 1998. With the beginning of Schröder's Chancellorship, German leadership became vocal to use this term and he explicitly stated that German foreign and security policy would pursue the achievement of German national interests.

Merkel Governments followed the same path (Wright, 2019b, p. 135). German government defined her security interests in the White Paper of 2016 and formulated her security policy. Finally, the Government revised German security interests through NSS based on her values, her geographical location, her membership of the European Union and NATO, her outward-looking and internationally integrated social market economy and her responsibility for natural resources (The Federal Government, 2023, pp. 20–1).

FRG has been one of the main driving forces behind the EU CFSP and CSDP developments as FRG considers it more effective to achieve her security objectives, as far as possible, within the EU framework. With the establishment of these two common policies, the next step for FRG is to endeavour for the establishment of a European Common Defence Union (ECDU). It remains a long-standing German objective and she needs to garner French support to realize it.

Despite the fact that there is a substantial degree of harmony between the EU and German security interests, the achievement of overall German interests at a high scale within the CFSP framework is somewhat unattainable due to the decision making mechanism in the EU, in particular in its security and defence realm. Therefore, the EU is not the sole framework to advance German security objectives. FRG has traditionally adopted a multilateral security policy including its bilateral relations with NATO, UN, OSCE, and certain individual states. Thus CFSP and CSDP form only a modest part of broader German security policy architecture.

With respect to the German leading role within the EU CFSP, FRG has been disinclined to pursue a hegemonic role within the EU. Besides, the EU structure has not allowed her to exercise such a role. However, after Russian invasion of south-eastern Ukraine, as articulated in the German NSS, FRG promises to pursue more active role in the EU as far as its structure permits her to do so. A "shared leadership" with France best describes FRG's role within the EU. Acting in close cooperation with France expedites the work in the EU and promises more success. Since the end of Cold War, this behaviour has proved to be best course of action for FRG to achieve her security interests in the EU framework. The Aachen Franco-German Treaty of 22 January 2019 provides a good base for the Franco-German cooperation.

In the short to mid-term, a radical change in the main orientation of FRG's security policies does not seem likely. Due to the slow but steady change in the German security policy stance, it is too early to make a sound prediction regarding how the main orientation of the German security policy will transform in the long run. From a constructivist theoretical perspective, it may also be argued that the anti-militarist societal preferences may continue for a while to constrain the German elites and policy makers, who sometimes indicate their preferences for more proactive and broader German involvement in EU and global affairs, without excluding military options either. This divide is best perceived in explaining German security policy and its implementation from a constructivist point of view. German political leaders and the Constitutional Court have had to resolve this dilemma by placing the burden of responsibility for troop deployments outside FRG on the

Federal Parliament. Yet, the Parliament has so far not ignored the public choice of anti-militarism and has sought international legitimacy for any operation in which German participation is considered or requested.

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