EVALUATION OF THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND NATO INTERVENTION USING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF REALISM (NEO-CLASSICAL REALISM)

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Abstract

The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began in Slovenia and Croatia, and this disaster was discharged into Bosnia and Herzegovina and ended up in the last bastion of Kosovo. One of the longest and most critical wars in the former Yugoslavia was the inter-ethnic conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. In particular, the most prominent humanitarian crisis that this paper will deal with concerns the period of 1998- 1999. The Armed Forces of the government of Serbia might be classified in the ranks of "defensive realism". The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was struggling to protect the Albanian civilian population from the Milosevic regime, while Serbia was committed to preserving and attaining national security. In addition, there the principle of security dilemma because the KLA was declared a terrorist organization by state organs at that time. On the other hand, NATO's intervention in Kosovo, even

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though it was missioned to protect human values, additionally aimed at its geopolitical and hegemonic strategies in the world of the anarchic international political system. Yet, in the theory of international relations, this can be classified as a form of offensive realism. This article consists of two main parts: The first part aims to research the position of classical realism regarding the conflict in Kosovo using the main principles as they are; survival, self-help, and security dilemma, and the position of neoclassical realism, which focuses more on state agents and domestic policy and the reflection of these state variables toward the impact on the construction of foreign policies. The second part of this study focuses on criticisms of the realist school's criticism of NATO's intervention in Kosovo. The main purpose of this article is to investigate the position of realism claiming that; the exclusive monopoly in the use of power belongs to states. In addition, this study aims to illuminate the criticisms that realism uses against foreign interference in domestic affairs. Yet, states are major actors in the anarchic global system that possesses a sole monopoly over their people and sovereignty. Any domestic disturbance and intervention from abroad is strongly condemned and violates the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.

Keywords: NATO, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Milosevic, Serbia.

KOSOVA KRİZİ VE NATO MÜDAHALESİNİN REALİZMİN (NEO-KLASİK REALİZM) TEMEL İLKELERİYLE DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Öz

Sosyalist Federal Yugoslavya Cumhuriyeti'nin (SFYC) çöküşü Slovenya ve Hırvatistan'da başladı, bu felaket Bosna Hersek'e sıçradı ve Kosova'nın son kalesine kadar ulaşmıştı. Eski Yugoslavya'daki en uzun ve en kritik savaşlardan biri Kosovalı Arnavutlar ile Sırplar arasındaki etnik gruplar arası çatışmaydı. Özellikle bu makalenin ele alacağı insani krizlerden en öne çıkanı 1998-1999 dönemini kapsamaktadır. Sırbistan hükümetinin Silahlı Kuvvetleri "savunmacı realizm" saflarında sınıflandırılabilir. Kosova Kurtuluş Ordusu (KKO), Arnavut sivil halkı Miloseviç rejiminden korumak için mücadele ederken, Sırbistan, ulusal güvenliğini de korumaya ve sağlamaya kararlıydı. Buna ek olarak, KKO'nun o dönemde devlet organları tarafından terörist bir örgüt olarak ilan edilmesi nedeniyle güvenlik ikilemi ilkesi de söz konusudur. Öte yandan, NATO'nun Kosova'ya müdahalesi, sadece insani değerlerin korunması için değil, aynı zamanda anarşik uluslararası siyasi sistem dünyasında jeopolitik ve hegemonik stratejilerini de hedeflemiştir. Yine de uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinde bu durum saldırgan realizmin bir yapısı olarak sınıflandırılabilir. Bu makale iki ana bölümden oluşmaktadır: Birinci bölüm, klasik realizmin

Kosova'daki çatışmaya ilişkin pozisyonunu; hayatta kalma, kendi kendine yardım ve güvenlik ikilemi gibi temel ilkeleri kullanarak ve daha çok devlet aktörlerine ve iç politikaya odaklanan neoklasik realizmin pozisyonunu ve bu devlet değişkenlerinin dış politikaların inşasındaki etkisine yönelik yansımasını araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümü, Realist okulun of NATO'nun Kosova'ya müdahalesine yönelik eleştirilerine odaklanmaktadır. Bu makalenin temel amacı, güç kullanımında münhasır tekelin devletlere ait olduğunu iddia eden realizmin pozisyonunu incelemektir. Buna ek olarak, bu çalışma realizmin içişlerine yönelik herhangi bir dış müdahaleye karşı kullandığı eleştirileri ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Oysa devletler, anarşik küresel sistemde kendi halklarına ve egemenliklerine karşı tekel konumunda olan başlıca aktörlerdir. Her türlü iç karışıklık ve dışarıdan müdahale şiddetle kınanmakta ve diğer egemen devletlerin iç işlerine karışmama ilkesini ihlal etmektedir.
    Anahtar Kelimeler: *NATO, Yugoslavya, Kosova, Miloseviç, Sırbistan.*

Introduction: The Combination of Classical and - Neoclassical Realism in the Kosovo Crisis

Although Realism as a theory of international relations was established late in the mid-20th century, the roots of political realism, or as it is otherwise known as *Realpolitik*, date back to the ancient times of the Greek historian Thucydides. As a classic and central theory of international relations, Realism studies the interests of states and their unavoidable struggle for power. Furthermore, according to Classical Realism as interpreted by Hobbes and Machiavelli, states are the main actors in international politics (Hobbes 1992, Machiavelli 1992). In other words, just like humans who are selfish and eager in the pursuit and desire for power, states are also akin to humans and fight only for their interests (Hobbes 1996, Machiavelli 2003).

To understand the concept that human nature is always in search of strength and the desire for power, we need to look back into the writings of the 5th-century BC historian Thucydides. Although the island of Melos had some ancestral relations to the state of Sparta, during the Peloponnesian War, Melos decided to remain neutral and not mix with any side. This was for the purpose of escaping from the invasion. Thoroughly, in 416 BC, Athens occupied the island of Melos and conferred a powerful ultimatum to them; either surrender and pay tribute or they would be mercilessly ravaged by Athenian forces (Thucydides 2012). The inhabitants of Melos refused to surrender, so, the Athenians viciously destroyed the city, killing the men and, enslaving their women and children. Here follows the famous quote used by the Athenians: "…know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." (Thucydides 2012). Perceiving the danger of the magnificent strength of Athens, Sparta panicked, fearing that this might be a failure for their state. In other words, the ruin of the *balance of power* and conflict of interest is the main cause of the outbreak of war. Likewise, in the case of the Kosovo War, Serbia, known until 2003 as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was losing its *balance of power* to control the entire country, the economic crisis was skyrocketing, and Milosevic's supremacist slogans only divided people and incited hatred between Serbs and Albanians (Vučetić 2021). I would

like to compare Serbia with Athens of the time of Thucydides, when, in the famous dialog of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians asked Melos Island to surrender or they would disappear. Likewise, The U.S. special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke, addressed Milosevic in this frame: "Either you will accept the Peace Agreement in Rambouillet (Paris) and the stationing of 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Serbia and Kosovo, or, NATO will start bombing the Serbian targets." (Branson and Doder 1999). By all means, Milosevic's obstinacy did not let go at all, and on March 24, 1999, NATO began its Operation Allied Force (Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999) 2022, Scahill 2021).

For a state to be functional, it must have the rule of law, weapons, and a strong army (Machiavelli 1992). In his political essays about the *Prince*, Machiavelli stressed that diplomacy was undoubtedly one of the key instruments of state stability, especially the republican state. However, diplomacy should serve as a dynamic apparatus to increase state power. In addition, diplomacy cannot replace the role of military power and economic development. At the moment when foreign diplomacy conflicts with the most sublime state interests, such as *civic virtue*, then republican states must rely only on the use of force (Berridge 2001, 539-556). Straightforward, Machiavelli emphasized that a strong army was one of the most important elements for a state to succeed in international politics (Machiavelli 2003).

Milosevic's military presence against NATO could not even be compared. Indeed, the NATO bombing lasted for 78 days, but this could have ended even in a shorter period if it were not for civilians living on the ground (Zivanovic and Haxhiaj 2019). However, in *Realpolitik*, states that want to stay thriving and alive must give importance to power over norms and moral ethics. If a state wants to be in power for a long time, it must constantly be in war, invading, and dominating other countries. A country that does not move and remains sluggish has a short life. In his masterpiece *The Prince*, Machiavelli maintains that the ruler must be hard-hearted and show no grief or tenderness to others. If a monarch is good-natured and tender-hearted, others may abuse his kindness and thus not only fall from power but also have a notorious end (Machiavelli 1992). Milosevic is a classic example of a prototype of Machiavelli's realistic theory that the struggle for power and superior dominance over others is the main thing that a person and states should maintain. In other words: "Attack before you are being attacked"!

Thomas Hobbes asserts that 'Nature created people in the same form with physical body and logic' yet, in this life full of competition and struggle for survival, each human being tends to emerge triumphant over another (Hobbes 1992). It sometimes appears that someone is physically weaker than others, but this does not mean that they cease their ambitions and needs. The weak also secretly plot or collude with others to defeat the

strong." (Hobbes 1996, Hobbes 1992). Among other things, Hobbes claims that "Distrust also results from inequality. If two people run after a single thing that they cannot have at the same time, this makes them enemies of each other, and each of them fights for their egos and survival." (Hobbes 1992). It is a fact that wars do not happen every day, but one thing is true; the threat and fear of the enemy always originate in the human heart, and that is why people are always ready to face mysterious facts and insecurity (Balcı 2019, 119-146). Furthermore, according to Hobbes, three main causes drive people toward conflict and war: *competition*; *insecurity*; and *glory* and *honor* (Hobbes 1992).

As stated previously, wars do not arise every day; however, the fear of the enemy and the potential for war exist in the human heart. Naturally, humans are created with the inclination for combat and rampage, wrongdoing and robbery, and ego and survival. Hobbes points out that the birth of the *state* gives us a security for existence, sovereignty, and protection against foreigners and nemesis. In addition, a state weighs down and suppresses countless desires and requests that spin into the human mind. Nonetheless, the state itself is a creature of man, and just like man, the state and its rulers are eager for power and dominance. Therefore, it is a kind of equilibrium between demands and supplies and between war and peace (Hobbes 1992).

There is no significant contrast between people and states. People become jealous, run to defeat the others, and aspire to authority. States also use spies, military forces, and allies to attempt to conquer their enemies and emerge victorious. Likewise, states are also gripped by fear, sagacious either to enter or retreat from war and finally to sign peace agreements or conclude defeats and capitulation (Balcı 2019, 119-146).

Gideon Rose was the first scholar to introduce the term neoclassical realism, defining it in this way (Rose 1998, 146):

> It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy are driven first and foremost by its position in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realists. They further argued, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.

Neoclassical realism, contrary to other schools like neo-realism, which focuses on the international system of political powers, also aims to analyze the domestic level and the individual agent toward international policies (James 2009, 45-63). Devlen and Özdamar, studying the perception of neoclassical realist theory, assert that; "leaders' attitudes toward the international system, and their concern with the *political*

survival and the maintenance of *large group identity* (the identity of a nation), are the main determining factors regarding the shaping of states' foreign policy during international crises." (Devlen and Özdamar 2009, 136-164). Furthermore, domestic variables were a major segment during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, which pushed Milosevic to take decision-making powers over foreign policy issues (Devlen and Özdamar 2009).

If we were to pose the question of; why Milosevic did not sit with the Albanian side to resolve the conflict in the Rambouillet Accords of 23 February 1999, according to Devlen and Özdamar, two main reasons. The first is the concept of *large-group identity*, and the second is *political survival* (Devlen and Özdamar 2009). *The large-group identity* concept, which was developed by Vamık Volkan, explains to us that: ethnicity, religion, and language are sharp senses that form the *identity* of a certain social group of people (Volkan 2004, 23-56).

Furthermore, Volkan identifies seven threads that form the large-group identity; however, for this study, we are interested only in two of them: "*chosen glories*" and "*chosen traumas*" (Volkan 2004, 47-52). The "*chosen glories*" that the Serbs are proud of must have been their medieval state during the Nemanjic Dynasty, which ended with the martyrization of Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic. Whereas, the "*chosen trauma*" is linked with the Battle of Kosovo, which symbolizes the end of the then Serbian power and their submission to the Ottoman

Empire. This *trauma* was carried from generation to generation for 600 years until the last war in Kosovo, where the Serbs, as a sign of vengeance against the Ottoman Empire, mobilized the military apparatus, aiming to purge the Albanians in Kosovo and the Muslim Bosniaks in Bosnia, considering them as the last remnants of the Ottomans in the Balkans (Volkan 2004, 50).

Second, the logic of *political survival* is the fundamental motive that every leader seeks to retain power. Consequently, domestic and foreign policies that could lead to the dismissal of leaders from office will probably not be applied (Devlen and Özdamar 2009, 143-144). Nevertheless, Devlen and Özdamar affirm that in the course of inter-ethnic crises, political leaders benefit from an opportunity to preserve their political regimes. In other words, a political leader is likely to use cost–benefit analysis regarding the expected final result (Devlen and Özdamar 2009, 143-144). Hence, Milosevic anticipated that surrendering before the international community would undermine his power base and, as a result, put him on trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Also, perhaps the anxiety of being labeled a "traitor to the nation" might be another analogy that abstained Milosevic from responding to international recommendations. In short, *large-group identity* and *political survival* are two powerful concepts and two functional variables that have oriented the leader of the former Yugoslavia toward a restrictive foreign policy direction (Devlen and Özdamar 2009).

1. The Main Concepts of the IR Theory of Realism

1.1. Statism

Gilpin defined the concept of 'state' claims as follows: "State is an organization that provides protection and welfare for its citizens with all mechanisms of legitimacy and right over one territory. In addition, a state provides the basis for dispute resolution. The primary function of the state is to provide *security* and *insurance* against internal and external threats…" (Gilpin 1981). Realists maintain that nation-states are the main actors in international politics (Snyder 2004, 52-62).

States have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force to protect their citizens against threats from other states and entities. Ralf Dahrendorf asserts that a state is a "conflict group" (Dahrendorf 1959). Other conflict groups like tribes, labor unions, and guerilla bands, are also present, but the state is the major actor. The principle of a state is 'its territory' (Dahrendorf 1959). Every state is obliged to protect its sovereignty and territory with its will because no one comes from outside to protect it. Except for this, natural resources are scarce and limited, and states compete to obtain them. Thus, in the eyes of every country, an outsider can be a rival and a threat. Moreover, the main function of a state is the protection of sovereignty and its territory from inner and outer menace. In international relations, other actors have similar functions as states, such as; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and

commercial companies. However, none of these possess the autonomy and power that the state possesses. Concerning the state as a *holistic*, structural entity and the main actor in international relations, Stephen T. Hosmer contends that; Slobodan Milošević rejected to accept the Rambouillet Agreement in Paris for a couple of reasons: (a) He presumed that admitting the conditions at Rambouillet would jeopardize his dominion in the FRY; (b) State is the most crucial actor in international relations; thus, every party, be it governmental or non-governmental organization uninvited by state authorities, is in contradiction with International Law; (c) Milošević assumed that the bombing would be short and the state of Yugoslavia would overcome the difficult situation; however, this did not go parallel to his mathematical calculations and logic; (d) Milošević, also did not want his country to be invaded by a Western Alliance, such as NATO, which would impede future relations with its co-orthodox Slavic ally, Russia (Hosmer 2001).

In conjunction with this, Max Weber affirms that; the only legitimate monopoly that can exercise physical force toward its citizens within a certain and internationally recognized territory is a state (Smith 1986). Here I would like to make a comparison with the state machinery of Slobodan Milošević as the main *monopoly* of the government of Serbia, and the KLA, which at that time was declared as a terrorist (by Serbia and the international community) organization (Özerdem 2003, 79-101).

Furthermore, the importance of the state and the term *statism* lie in the fact that any type of organization or guerilla troops outside of state legitimacy is not accepted and does not enjoy the right to its activities.

1.2. Survival

One of the fundamental issues of a state in an anarchic environment is *survival*. All countries must increase their military arsenals to survive in an environment surrounded by enemies. In addition to military power, states must increase economic and men's power. After all, countries with large armies, such as China or the USA, must have strong economic power to feed these large numbers of soldiers (Snyder 2004, 55).

The importance of Kosovo for Serbia was viable from both historical and cultural perspectives, as well as in geo-political and economic terms. Regarding the historical aspect, sources of information notify that the first medieval Serbian state created by the dynasty of Stefan Nemanjič included part of today's Raška/Rashka and Kosovo (Vickers 1998, 1-16). From the year 1180 until the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which occurred between the Ottoman Empire and the Serbian Medieval Kingdom, Kosovo was headed by these administrative cities; Prizren, Skopje, Peja, Decani, and even Shkoder/Skadar, comprising a thriving part of Serbian culture and civilization (Vickers 1998, 1-16). As a matter of fact, the Battle of Kosovo, which took place on June 28, 1389, when the Ottoman army

conquered the Serbian forces, will become an immortal myth and historical memory for the entire Serbian people. Although defeated, the Serbs consider the Battle of Kosovo, put differently "Saint Vitus Day (Vidovdan)", as their honorable and religious holiday because Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic was martyred as a symbol of "Christ" and "*He has chosen The Kingdom of Heaven instead of the Kingdom of Earth*" (Malcolm 2002, 58-81). It is not for nothing that the Serbs call Kosovo the "*Heart of Serbia*" or the "*Jerusalem of Serbia*" because Kosovo is the site of their sacrifice for "Christ" and the foundation of their First Serbian State (Malcolm 2002, 58-81).

It is worth noting that Kosovo is divided into two geographical halves: the Eastern Kosovo region and the western region, which the Serbs call *Metohija*, translated from the old Greek language as the *land of the Monasteries.* The Metohija region also has rich endowments of farmlands, orchards, and renowned quality vineyards (Malcolm 2002, Vickers 1998). In short, for the Serbs, Kosovo is the cornerstone of their civilization, culture, religion, and centuries-old history (Malcolm 2002).

Although Kosovo has been one of the most underdeveloped provinces in the former Yugoslavia, it still has rich minerals and ores of zinc and nickel that have been quite lucrative during the former Yugoslavia but continue to be so even today (Becker 1998, 9-17). The Trepça Mine, which began

operating for the first time in 1920 by a British company during the period between the two great wars, was one of the largest suppliers of lead and zinc in Europe. In addition, the mine of Artana/Novo Brdo located in the southeast of Prishtina during the 1960s is said to have contained 60% of the aforementioned minerals in the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia and almost 100% of the Ni ores (Malcolm 2002).

Undoubtedly, it would be meaningless to say that the economy of Serbia depends on its autonomous province of Kosovo. The mere goal of the former leader of Serbia, Milosevic, to keep Kosovo under his yoke has been economic in nature, but one thing is undeniable; the historical past, natural resources, agricultural sector, and mountain tourism have been key elements that the Kosovo region had during its period as an autonomous province of Serbia.

In other words, realists are in contradiction when the question is posed as; do countries lean more toward the concept of *security* maximizers or *power* maximizers? The first group of *neorealists*, led by Kenneth Waltz, claimed that states always prioritize *security* over *power maximizing* (Waltz 1979). In this case, the *defensive neorealist* claims that states will never put their security at risk in exchange for the struggle for power and ascendancy. The opposite is the claim of *offensive neorealists*, headed by Mearsheimer, who claim that the goal of states is to reach a hegemonic position where no one will be able to

compete with them in the international context (Mearsheimer 2001). In addition, Mearsheimer maintains that states sometimes prefer to *bandwagon* with great power rather than *balance* their power (Dunne and Schmidt 2020, 130-144). This conclusion of offensive neorealists lies in their compatibility with the wars waged by the former FRY in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. First, the supreme goal of Serbia was to hegemonizer the entire territory of the former Yugoslav republic and declare itself the sole state based on Serbian nationalism. Nevertheless, when the NATO Alliance decided to confront Serbia in the 1999 war in Kosovo, Serbia, considering the peril that its national security was compromised, accepted the ultimatum of the U.S. and NATO. In addition, it had no other choice but to withdraw its troops from Kosovo after 78 days of fighting (Zivanovic and Haxhiaj 2019). From this, we can realize that; *national* and *state security* precede tendencies for *maximizing power* and *hegemonic domination*.

1.3. Self-Help

According to realists, contrary to the domestic political system comprised of a hierarchy in which one side gives commands and the other obeys, international politics has only an anarchic system where no one is above the other. Domestic politics is centralized and has institutions and government. However, in international politics, we have no central authority, and the system is anarchic and decentralized. For that reason, all

states are obliged to be in a position to take care of themselves and not trust and depend on anyone except themselves. In compliance with the school of realism, it is also called a *self-help* principle. As Kenneth Waltz states The international imperative is to "*take care of yourself*!" (Waltz 1979). The purpose of creating military forces is reasonable because, in international politics, there is no authority higher than the state. In any emergency and attack from the outside, states intervene by *self-help* using military power (Balcı 2019, 119-146). Realists contend that the creation of interstate alliances is another way for states to *survive* and eliminate the risk of annihilation. However, in moments of war and instability, there is no warranty of not being damaged and knocked down. "Today we may be friends but tomorrow enemies". The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is a good example of a famous slogan in international relations "There is no term such as eternal friends but rather eternal interests" (Gorodetsky 1990, 27-41).

Although Russia has been a staunch ally of Serbia in its political affairs, this does not mean that Serbia should rely entirely on Russia's support. As mentioned above in the famous maxim that "there are no permanent friends but only permanent interests", Serbia should also ensure its *self-help*. During the NATO bombings in 1999 and the KFOR's intervention, Russia was not able to offer any assistance by enlisting in the war on behalf of Serbia against NATO. The most Russia could do was block UN decisions that were at the disadvantage of Serbia by

using the veto right. On the other hand, during the annexation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by Russian forces, Serbia maintained its position against the unilateral independence of Crimea because of its vulnerable question of Kosovo (Stradner 2023).

From the perspective of Serbia, envisaging the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, *self-help* could be the only notion in which they were preoccupied with the protection of the Serbian people and their territory outside the motherland. Approximately 24% of the Serb nationality lives outside their home country, mainly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Rusinow 1991, 145). For the central government in Serbia, the only resolution to save their compatriots outside the territory of Serbia after the destruction of Yugoslavia was the formation of local administration in regions with a Serbian majority. To make it clearer, the creation of a decentralization system and the establishment of municipalities dominated by the Serbian community are the only possible solutions (Dalipi and Shala 2016, 1-28).

2. Balance of Power

One of the most basic concepts in international politics is the concept of *the balance of power*. States attempt to maintain the balance of power or always try to change it in their favor as the primary priority in international politics (Walt 1987). The Athenians' increase in military assets impaired power balance,

forcing Sparta to go to war with them. Therefore, the increase in power by one side and the fear of attack perceived by the other triggered states in wars and conflicts, which, in the terminology of international relations, is called a *security dilemma*. To put it differently, a *security dilemma* occurs when a state implements security measures for the protection of its territory and sovereignty and increases its military and men power. On the other hand, this is meant as a threat to the other actor, which naturally breaks the balance of power (Ersoy 2016, 159-186). According to Ali Balcı, when there is an alteration in the *balance of power*, states respond in three forms; first, when a state increases its military power, the other state, as a perception of fear, is also forced to increase that same power, which is called *internal balancing*; second, when a state is weaker than the enemy and cannot maintain the balance of power, it is forced to ally with the other more powerful actor, which in the literature of international relations is called *external balancing*; and third, when the second party is neither able to maintain the *internal balance* nor has any allies that could protect them from threats and possible attacks. On that occasion, the only binding solution is to enter the war with as much opportunity and potential as they have (Balcı 2019, 119-146).

If a state does not use one of the aforementioned balances of power methods, it later uses the *bandwagoning* strategy. Usually, weak states go after powerful ones to preserve their existence and shield themselves from the risk of attack. The

term *Bandwagoning,* is first applied by Kenneth Waltz in his monumental *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz used this concept as a counter-phrase for the balancing taxonomy (Waltz 1979). Notwithstanding, Schweller insisted that not only the weak states but also the revisionist states *bandwagon* the strongest and mighty ones. For example, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many countries in Southeastern Europe joined the Western international organizations, namely, the EU and NATO (Schweller 1994, 72-107). Furthermore, *bandwagoning* does not mean just the *status quo* of the current power, but rather increases and benefits for their purposes. For instance, during WWII, Mussolini refused to join France and Britain's Allied Powers because Hitler promised him that the Mediterranean would become an "Italian Lake" in the future. Hence, expansionist politics were the main cause that Mussolini led the Nazi-Fascist ideology (Schweller 1994, 72-107). In addition, the *bandwagoning* term might be juxtaposed to the liberation of Kosovo from the centuries-old yoke of the Serbian repressive regime by the creation of an international alliance with NATO and the United States. It is known that during the Milošević regime, Kosovo lost the autonomy it had nourished since Tito's time. The war of 1999, the intervention of NATO forces, and the thorough contribution of the U.S. and the EU to gain independence have persuaded the Kosovo political elite to cling to the strong and cooperate closely, sometimes even under the commands of the great powers. Furthermore, *bandwagoning*

Western Powers would be a reward for Kosovo in the forthcoming EU visa liberalization process and full membership in NATO, the EU, and the UN.

3. Principle of the Security Dilemma

The *security dilemma* is one of the most important and outstanding analytical ideas in international relations. The most prominent scholars of this theoretical analysis are; Herbert Butterfield, John Herz, and Robert Jervis (Tang 2009, 587-623). An important point that must be clarified is that the *security dilemma* is related to *defensive* realism because it is a balancing scale between states against a common enemy. However, for *offensive* realism, the *security dilemma* is not worth much because war is inevitable between states competing to be superpowers (Tang 2009).

John J. Herz, when defining the *security dilemma* asserts as follows: "In anarchic society, individuals, groups of people, or states in general, have always been preoccupied and endangered by the attacks of others. To avoid or mitigate the risk of external attack, states accumulate power to defend themselves. On the other hand, the defensive side also perceives an increase in the arsenal for self-defense as a possible danger for sudden attacks. Thus, this uncertainty creates a *security dilemma*, where both the offensive and defensive sides compete for the accumulation of self-security and power increase." (Herz 1950, 157). Robert Jervis elaborates on the theory of *security*

dilemma using the "Stag Hunt" game, which was first used by philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, Jervis emphasizes that since the international system is anarchic and states do not cooperate, this results in mistrust between each other and continuous wars. Just like in the "Stag Hunt" if both hunters agree to cooperate to trap the stag, then both will be satisfied with plenty of meat for each other. But if one betrays his word, on that occasion both lose. To rephrase, Jervis points out that people tend to satisfy only their desires, look only at their interests, and cooperate less (Jervis 1978, 167-168). Butterfield has figured out the theory of the *security dilemma* as a "tragedy". He states thus: "The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two powers, both of which were desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort." (Butterfield 1951, 19-20).

No one knows what a man carries and hides in his mind and heart. Still, Herbert Butterfield gives us a good example regarding the *security dilemma*, calling it differently as 'Hobbesian Fear' (Butterfield 1950). Jervis further argued that states cannot know their true purpose, whether they enrich their weapons for *defensive* or *offensive* purposes. Therefore, eliminating the ambiguity is impossible (Jervis 1978, 167-214). Imagine being with a person with whom you have had hostility and conflict for a long time, and now you are together in the

same room, both with a handgun in their hands. The best way to escape this difficult situation would be for both of them to throw their weapons out of the window, but it is very difficult for the mind to accept this. Because there is no guarantee that if you drop the gun first, he will also drop it. Even if both are negotiated to throw the weapon at the same time, there is a dilemma that the person in front of you might break this bargain and tighten his weapon firmly, where your end would be death (Balcı 2019, 119-146). Therefore, both parties are in a dilemma about their safety, and the only guarantee for their lives is holding a weapon in their hands. This example also applies to antagonistic interstate relations when each political leader attempts to increase power as a guarantee for the *worst case* that could happen to them if they are attacked by the enemy. Perhaps for a short time, the accumulation of power could be with a good purpose, but after a while, even a small incident could carry big consequences (Balcı 2019, 119-146).

When discussing the security dilemma, Barry Posen uses the phrase: *worst-case scenario*. This means that even if states proliferate their armaments for *self-defense*, this dilemma still carries uncertainty from other actors. Neo-realists like Posen, indicate that the *security dilemma* is structurally driven. Accordingly, states must be ready at any time to face possible surprises (Posen 1993, 28). In addition, Posen, taking the collapse of the state of Yugoslavia as the focus of his research, specifies that in the multi-ethnic states that are on the verge of

destruction, an "*emerging anarchy*" begins to appear where they have already lost the central authority and that the different ethnicities that live must provide security for themselves (Posen 1993, 27-47).

Inter-ethnic conflict began to take place in large proportions in the former Yugoslavia immediately at the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, in the former Yugoslavia, apart from the economic crisis, civil defense and security were not safe, and *inter-ethnic* enmity was the biggest problem regarding the well-known phrase of the *security dilemma* (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20).

According to Barry Posen, the syndrome of the phrase "*inter-ethnic* conflict" conveys the message of *the security dilemma* theory (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017). For example, during the *inter-ethnic* conflict in Kosovo, the expulsion of Kosovar Albanians as refugees from their homes was perpetrated more through apartheid instruments and propaganda, implemented by Milošević regime. Therefore, it is not necessary just to have heavy artillery like; tanks, combat planes, and helicopters, to evict a certain group of people (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the *security dilemma* of the governmental power structures and the Serbian elite in Belgrade toward Albanians was expressed via negative propaganda in the media (songs and movies with nationalistic motives), newspapers, and public opinion. The commemoration

of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo on June 28, 1989, in Gazimestan near the Kosovo Polje Field, was one of the most negative images Milosevic and his political corpus had used against Albanians (Vučetić 2021, 223–243).

In addition, it would be useful to illustrate an example of the war in Kosovo during the late 1990s. When the Serbian forces started attacking houses and innocent people, the Albanian diaspora and the local population of Kosovo called for the organization of a volunteer army that would protect noncomatant people and at least prevent the brutal aggression of Serbia. Albanian diaspora living in Europe, America, and elsewhere began to illegally supply the KLA light weapons for civilian families to protect themselves from the violence and attacks of Serbian paramilitaries (Koinova 2013, 433-453). After understanding this danger, Milosevic propagated his propaganda that he would increase the concentration of Serbian troops in Kosovo because there was a risk that the "terrorist organization of the KLA" threatened the FRY. In fact, with the first clash between the Serbian military forces and the KLA in 1997-99, the *security dilemma* among the parties increased. Yet, John Herz summarized the *security dilemma* as; increasing the national security of a state for self-defense means reducing the national security of another state, where the weaker state will also try to increase its power (Herz 1950, 157-180). The voluntary aid and supply of weapons to the KLA by the brethren Albania and its diaspora might have been elucidated by some as

an act of *self-defense* against the aggression of the Serbian paramilitaries. On the other hand, the Serbian state could perceive this as an *offensive* attack against its government. Accordingly, the complexity of the security dilemma is that for some can be apprehended as an *offensive* action, and for others as a *defensive* action (Posen 1993, 27-47).

To better understand the theory of *societal security dilemma* developed by Paul Roe, we must first clearly understand the importance of the term *identity*. Identity and *societal security* are a combination that produces the conceptuality of the *societal security dilemma*. Ole Waever stated that just as *sovereignty* is important for the survival of a state, *identity* is also the basis for the existence of a society. Namely, *identity*, as a broad notion, can be defined along several dimensions like; religion, language, and culture (Waever 1993, 17-41). Threats to the sovereignty of a state usually involve military attacks. However, the risk associated with a *societal identity* can be spread through different methods and dimensions. They might be *military* or *nonmilitary* (Waever 1993).

Paul Roe formulates the concept of a *societal security dilemma* in this way: "A societal security dilemma is expressed when one society increases its societal security (identity) where this might induce a reaction to the second society (fear that the first society can weaken the second society)" (Roe 2005, 56-75).

To be more precise, if a society, through *defensive* manners for security reasons, seeks to ensure its human well-being, e.g. education, healthcare, cultural nationalism, economic development, etc. this action can cause *misconceptions* for the opposite side, making the other take offensive action and create conflict (Roe 2005, 56-75). In addition, Roe claims that; "the security dilemma is a double-edged sword: a threat to the territorial integrity of a state posed by the demands of an ethnic minority for the protection of its collective cultural-linguistic identity, and the challenge to that identity posed by an *étatist* policy that is culturally monolithic and exclusivist." (Roe 2005).

Language and religion are two important components that can identify the *identity* of a particular society. For example, Roe, researching the societal security dilemma between Serbs and Croats, has come across these results: Serbs who made up 12% of the population in Croatia, were the majority in the region of Serbian Krajina. In April 1990, when Franjo Tudjman was elected president of Croatia, an inter-ethnic conflict broke out, where the Serbs of Croatia demanded their rights to education in the Serbian language and the Cyrillic alphabet. On the other hand, the Croats, remembering the centralist and dominant politics of the Serbs during the periods of First (1918-1941) and Second Yugoslavia (1945-1992), raised the dilemma of social security trying to "Croatise" the population of the Serbian Krajina (Roe). Likewise, the sectarian difference between Catholic and Orthodox faiths is one of the culminating

issues that have created the conflict between Croats and Serbs (Roe).

Regarding the issue of Kosovo, the enormous demographic growth of Albanians has been a great dilemma for the societal security of the state of Serbia. For 43 years from 1948 to 1991, the Albanian population in Kosovo increased by 220%, whereas that of the Serbs increased by only 13% (Salihu 2018). The large increase in the population had alarmed almost the entire Serbian political elite, including the political theorist and thinker Dobrica Ćosić. Ćosić warned the Yugoslav government that if this issue is not taken seriously, Kosovo could secede one day from the hands of Serbia (Salihu 2018). The *societal security dilemma* can be demonstrated in other ways. For instance, an increase in linguistic influence and the addition of educational institutions can be perceived as a threat to another society. The granting of the autonomy of Kosovo by Tito in 1974, subsequently the formation of the University of Prishtina, and the official recognition of the Albanian language in parallel with the Serbo-Croatian state languages (Kosovo: The Jerusalem of Serbia, 1999) were not so easy for the Serbian government to accept at that time.

Moreover, Paul Roe states that if a certain society endangers another community, then, the threatened community can be defended through 'cultural, historical and linguistic nationalism'. This method is also called nonmilitary method

(Roe 2005). Milosevic applied this method in the 1990s in Kosovo, seeing the danger that the Serbian society was a minority while the Albanian community was the majority. In his famous speech in Gazimestan, Milosevic used *nonmilitary* means of defense linking the 'glorious' past of the Serbs to the Battle of Kosovo (Vučetić 2021, 223–243). Further, during the crisis, Milosevic used the nationalistic and separatist language of victimization addressed to the local Serbs, saying, "No one will ever dare beat you again!" (Branson and Doder 1999). This hate speech is also called the language of separation or alienation between "*we*" and "*others*". Put another way, "your otherness brings my identity into question" (Roe 2005). In addition, according to Paul Roe, when a society notices that its *identity* is fading and weak, at that point, the need for a reconstruction of social *identity* is necessary. In fact, this is a rhetoric accompanied by myths and repetition of past history (Roe 2005). Waever postulated that the humiliation of one community could contribute to the rise of nationalism (Waever 1993, 17-41). Stereotyping a certain group of people and their denial of their right to language, education, and economic and socio-political rights boomerang in the process of revitalization, with large protests and claims for self-determination and autonomy (Roe 2005). As an example, we can mention the student mobilization in the demonstrations of 1968, 1981, and 1997, expressing dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav Communist regime demanding universities and recognition of Albania as an official

language, return of autonomy, and equal rights with other Yugoslav people (Archer 2022, 1-5). The lack of commonality between the governing power and different social groups creates *ethnic violence and societal security dilemmas*. This further fosters other dimensions of ethnic violence, which Roe mentions as deportation, ethnic extermination, and genocide (Roe n. d.).

To sum up, knowing that the international system is anarchic, the only preoccupation and concern of the states is to guarantee how to *survive* in this vortex full of enemies and competition for power and personal security. From the perspective of Serbia, envisaging the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, *self-help* could be the only notion in which they were preoccupied with the protection of the Serbian people and their territory outside the motherland. Approximately 24% of the Serb nationality lives outside their home country, mainly in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Rusinow 1991, 145). For the central government in Serbia, the only resolution to save their compatriots outside the territory of Serbia after the destruction of Yugoslavia was the formation of local administration in regions with a Serbian majority. To make it clearer, the creation of a decentralization system and the establishment of municipalities ruled by the Serbian community.

4. Realist Criticisms of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo

Concerning the U.S. hegemonic significance in the world, realists have asserted that NATO's carried-out intervention in

Kosovo has been nothing but an interest in the expansion of hegemonic structures against its Russian rival in the Balkans and beyond (Sıvış 2020, 87-101). Of course, American foreign policy would not stop only in Kosovo and the Balkans, but this region and the entire region would be very important assets for the country's geopolitical expansionism policy.

Robert Jervis points out quite well that, "requests for security focus are those attempts that activate a state to interfere into the domestic politics of another state, where the least it can achieve is to create ideology of buffer-zone there" (Jervis 1978, 167-214).

The gap created in the Balkan region during the period after the Cold War was more than necessary to be compensated with the humanitarian intervention of NATO for "moral values" at first glance and for long-term American interests in general (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20). Almost all realists agree that throughout history, the decisions that the states have taken in international politics have been of the nature of the national security interest, and this has continued until today, when states try to increase their power by not paying much attention to ethical issues as well as international norms (Buzan 1996, 47-65, Donnelly 2005, 30-52, Dunne and Schmidt 2020, 130-144). While the theory of liberalism protects the principle issues of ethical norms and humanitarian intervention, proponents of realism claim that the values of morality are not so important in

national interests. Realists emphasize that international law and norms are the creation of great powers. In other words, even though NATO and the United States have failed to get the approval of the UNSC to intervene in Kosovo, no one has been able to stop them from doing so (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20).

According to official declarations, the central objective of NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was; the continuous pressure of the international organization to stop Milošević's violence against civilians and end this brutal regime that consumed Yugoslavia in its last days (Kosovo Air Campaign (March-June 1999) 2022). Holzgrefe and Finnemore declared that NATO's intervention in Kosovo during the 1998-99 crisis, was merely a humanitarian intervention to end the violence and pressure that had been exerted in that area (Holzgrefe 2003, 15-52, Finnemore 2003). Furthermore, while some scholars of liberal and constructivist theories agree and accept the norms of *morality* and *responsibility to protect*, realists openly deny that humanitarian interventions maintain a particular purpose to save people's lives (Finnemore 2003). Realists find that NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a mask of the great powers, especially the USA, for their geostrategic interests in the Balkans. A large number of realist theorists assert that NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a military invasion that infringed on the fundamental principles of the international system, which are

sovereignty and territorial integrity (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 179-196).

Realists maintain that NATO's intervention in Kosovo cannot be called simply humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the U.S., fearing that a wider spreading conflict in the Balkans and Europe could spoil the hegemonic controlling balances and the issue of the international refugee crisis, were among the major reasons NATO intervened in Kosovo (Kushi 2013, 1-36). Concerning the NATO intervention condemnation in Kosovo, realist scholars claim that if it were for humanitarian issues and the protection of the lives of the civilians, then 10,000 civilians (mostly Albanians) would not have been killed during the first 11 weeks of NATO bombing. In other words, the murders and genocide committed against the civilian population during the 78 days of NATO bombings exceeded the casualties of the entire Kosovo-Serbia conflict (Kushi 2013). In any case, NATO officials have determined that the 10,000 murdered civilians in Kosovo were the perpetration of the harsh hand of the Milosevic regime, whereas the NATO bombardment causalities that occurred between 24 March 1999 and 10 June 1999 did not exceed the number of 527 victims killed (Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign 2000).

Additionally, realists have emphasized that NATO-allied countries do not put their soldiers in danger when conducting humanitarian interventions unless an enormous geopolitical and

economic interest is at stake (Wheeler 2000). Statistics demonstrate that since the first entry of KFOR troops in 1999 until 2019, that is, for 20 years, only 200 soldiers have lost their lives in the line of duty (KFOR in Kosovo – 20 years later 2019). Concerning the authorization that NATO did not receive from the UN Security Council to intervene in Kosovo, realists still contend that; even the law is a product of power politics, and no one could stop the U.S. and NATO from taking their actions (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20). NATO's military intervention in Kosovo testifies to the fact that the U.S. as a global hegemon has been the final arbiter in deciding this issue, something that even the UN could not be able to prevent (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017).

If we take a look at the report of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, we will see that; out of 13 countries' aircraft flew, and of the 38,400 sorties that were carried out, 60% were of American origin. Furthermore, out of 10,484 air strikes, 80% were by the American army (The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 2000). In other words, the United States had its interests in intervening in Kosovo, naming: the prevention of Russophile influence and expansionism politics in the Balkans. In countries where the Slavic language is spoken and members of the Orthodox faith dominate. The American military headquarters of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) called *Bondsteel,* located in Ferizaj (Kosovo), can accommodate up to 7,000 troops and is currently the largest

American base in the Balkans. The position of this base is so advantageous and strategic that it could control not only the three borders (Kosovo-Serbia-Macedonia) but almost the entire Balkan region (Camp Bondsteel 2020). Indeed, the U.S. before taking its actions in Kosovo, the United States calculated its *costs* and *benefits*. If the benefits are greater, then humanitarian intervention would be worthwhile. In the framework of the *cost-benefit* calculation, the following conditions are also included: the population of the host country, territory and geography, country's natural resources, and proximity to the American state. All of these above-mentioned parameters correspond to American interests. Kosovo, with a small territory and population but of exceptional importance in terms of geo-strategic and geo-political interests, was exactly in line with American foreign policy (Gilligan and Stedman 2003, 37-54).

Realist theorists have referred to several points regarding the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. At the top of the reference point is the question of whether NATO's intervention in Kosovo was thoroughly conducted for humanitarian reasons or for other reasons. According to realists, NATO's intervention in Kosovo transgressed state borders, and a policy of nonintervention was guaranteed based on the Westphalia model. Second, NATO's intervention had no other purpose but to serve hegemonic and national interests (Kushi 2013, 1-36). Furthermore, the legitimacy of NATO's intervention was opposed by some powerful states in the world, such as China, Russia, and India,

having acted outside the authority of the UN, contrary to Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which calls for the refrain of the use of force against any territorial unit of the independent state (Özerdem 2003, 79-101). Anderson maintains that NATO has even acted against its treaty. Article 5 of the NATO Charter postulates that "NATO will not intervene militarily unless is provoked or unless one of its members is attacked…" (Anderson 2000, 31-39). Still, in any case, if a NATO member is attacked; this issue should be first observed and consulted with the UN Security Council before the reaction is taken (Anderson 2000). Besides the breach of international law for non-intervention, NATO aerial operations also transgressed the cluster of other international conventions like; the destruction of religious and historical sites, the devastation of oil refineries, chemical plants, and so on. Many trustworthy organizations assert that a large number of weapons that have been used in the areas of Kosovo and other parts of the former Yugoslavia contain a large amount of depleted uranium (Anderson 2000).

To summarize, realism as a school of thought in international relations contends that the war in Kosovo is a typical example of the rule of the strong over the weak. In international *realpolitik*, powerful states always seek to dominate the weak. In this case, Serbia has tendered to take the Kosovo region under its direct control (with a heterogeneous population and completely different from central Serbia) and subjugate its autonomy, which was granted by the Yugoslav

Constitution in 1974. On the other hand, the military alliance of NATO in cooperation with the UN and the United States was the best *realpolitik* lesson regarding global hegemonic domination (Kushi 2013, 1-36, Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20). Following the realist perspective, the inter-ethnic crisis in Kosovo could not be thoroughly perceived as a subject of ethical and humanitarian considerations. In war or any military intervention, there is no place for "moral and ethical values". War is a national interest, be it in the domestic affairs of a state or any international organization such as the UN (Nardin 2009, 284-310). In this regard, realists strongly adhere that the United States masquerading under the "umbrella of NATO" was continuously calling for the "allegedly humanitarian" intervention. Serbia, on the other hand, continued its steps toward protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. Realists also believe that Serbia and Milosevic have considered Kosovo as a centuries-old cradle, and the *status quo* should remain intact. On the contrary, the Albanian civilian population needed assistance from global powers such as NATO and the United States (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017, 1-20). Finally, this military intervention demonstrates to us the fact that NATO (USA), as the sole hegemonic power in the world, has been the final arbiter in further decision-making processes in Kosovo (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2017). Conversely, Russia, as a historical and close ally of Serbia, had nothing to do but agree with this unpleasant scenario!

Conclusion

Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, two greatest philosophers and political thinkers, claim that states are the main actors of international politics (Hobbes 1996, Machiavelli 1992). States, in many cases, behave like human beings (brutish and ambitious for power) and always seek domination over others. In this anarchic system of international politics, states first compete for *survival*, and as soon as they achieve this, they seek something more, which is *power maximizing* and domination. According to the realist theory, states are always in competition to achieve power and success. States can achieve this either individually or through alliances they form.

This research paper aimed to examine the attitudes of the realist school toward the last conflict in Kosovo and the intervention of NATO forces in March 1999. In the first part of this article, as seen up to now, we have used basic components of realism regarding the inter-ethnic crisis in Kosovo. For instance, the principle of *balance of power* has been as old as history since the time of the Greek philosopher Thucydides, when he used it in the Peloponnesian War. The state of Athens had imposed conditions on the Island of Melos; "Either surrender before the commandments that were required or the Athenian forces would intervene by force". The well-known saying of Thucydides follows as a reason for this: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"

(Thucydides 2012). By any means, this was also the final response of the US special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, to the compromise negotiations with Milosevic: "Either you will accept the ultimatum of the international community for peace talks in Rambouillet, or you will be bombed by NATO." (Branson and Doder 1999). In addition, Milosevic lost the *balance of power* because the state he led was on the verge of collapse, both economically and politically. Serbia could also not rely too heavily on the theory of *bandwagoning* to align with Russia, since the bipolar system had already ended and Moscow had just emerged from a crisis of political impasse and economic stalemate. The sole way that Milosevic, the former Serbian leader, could rely on was through the principle of *self-help*.

Concerning the principle of *statism*, one of the reasons why Milosevic rejected to sit down with the Kosovo Albanian side for negotiations in Rambouillet is that the state is an exclusive monopoly and a holistic structure in decision-making processes and a major protector of sovereignty (Hosmer 2001). The Serbian leader characterized NATO's international intervention as an invasion unauthorized by the state bodies of the FRY. The KLA, according to the political elite of Serbia, was a guerilla army (later on as a terrorist organization) that destabilized the state orders of FRY.

Regarding the neoclassical realist model of crisis behavior, Devlen and Özdamar claim that, in times of international crises and inter-ethnic conflict, state leaders constrain their decision-making processes in international politics to two main factors: *large-group identity* and *political survival* (Devlen and Özdamar 2009, 136-164). These two notions are intertwined with each other because political leaders who want to remain in power and legitimize their regime must fulfill the requirements of *a large-group identity*. In other words, Milosevic knew one thing for sure; he should never agree to sit at the negotiating table with the Albanians. This would also pose a risk for his epithet to be called "traitor of the nation". Vamık Volkan (Volkan 2004) connects the sensational history of Serbia with the myths and glorifications inherited over the centuries by mentioning the notion of "*chosen glories*" which has to do with the glorious medieval Serbian state and "*chosen trauma*" for the historical bitterness associated with the Battle of Kosovo. As a result, for the Serbs, the Field of Kosovo is sacred, and the 'Ottomans' (Albanians and Bosniaks as two Muslim nations in the Balkans, in most cases were labeled by the Serbs as Turkicized or Muslimized Peoples) should not once again come to power (Malcolm 2002, Vickers 1998, Jagodić 1998).

Another interesting point that we have discussed in this research article is the principle of the *security dilemma*. Almost all scholars agree that the *security dilemma* describes the actions of one state to increase its security (building artillery and

creating alliances) causing reactions from other states, tending to make them more insecure, thus leading them to respond in the same way, creating a spiral of hostility (Butterfield, History and Human Relations 1951, Herz 1950, 157-180, Jervis 1978, 167-214). The proliferation of weapons for the KLA from neighboring Albania and the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in Europe and the United States created a *security dilemma* for the Yugoslav state bodies at that time.

In addition to material assets and armament insecurity, the Yugoslav state evoked fear and uncertainty in terms of *identity* Professor Paul Roe has done a very good study on this topic and elaborates it in his his major study "*Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma*". In intra-state conflicts, *identity* is the most diverse issue in the terminology of the *security dilemma* (Roe 2005). Roe, concentrating on the study of the societal *security dilemma* of the Serbs in the region of Serbian Krajina in Croatia and the Hungarians in the region of Transylvania in Romania, emphasizes that the *identity* growth of a social group (minorities) can increase dissatisfaction and uncertainty for the majority population. In other words, state policy in the *homogenization* of a social structure by minimizing the rights of minorities and denying their cultural, linguistic, and religious rights is also called mutual *incompatibility*. This can lead to *inter-ethnic* conflicts. For example, radical nationalism in Serbian Krajina to restrict the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for Serbs by Croatian state nomenclature is a scheme for *ethnic*

violence and *a social security dilemma* (Roe n.d.). In the case of Kosovo, we can take the example of the high birth rate of the Albanian population, which threatened the disappearance of the Serbs. As part of this, the deportation of Kosovo Albanians from their homes and the creation of a humanitarian crisis during the 1999 conflict testify to *ethnic violence and the social security dilemma.*

Finally, the second part of this study addressed the perspective and criticism of the realists toward NATO's intervention in Kosovo. From what has been discussed so far, we see that the realists strongly uphold the criticism that NATO's intervention in Kosovo was not merely for humanitarian reasons but for ethical grounds. On the contrary, realists emphasize that NATO has invaded a sovereign state without respecting international laws and the UN Charter for the non-infringement of territories. Likewise, the great majority of realist researchers alluded that this intervention was transformed more to preserve American hegemonic geopolitical interests.

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