



## Azerbaijan's Relations with Central Asian Turkic States and Energy Diplomacy

Bahar Özsoy<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkic states in the Caucasus and Central Asia encountered significant political, economic, and social crises, which profoundly shaped their foreign policies. By 1993, Azerbaijan, having achieved political stability, began capitalizing on its energy resources to engage in global projects and incorporated Russia into its strategy. Through effective use of both hard and soft power in its energy diplomacy, Azerbaijan strengthened its ties with Western countries. This strategy not only cemented Azerbaijan's independence on a solid political and economic basis but also established its energy export model as a crucial component in the integration of Turkic states. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War has revived opportunities for enhanced cooperation among these nations. This study investigates the evolution of Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy with Turkic states since independence and posits that the Russia-Ukraine conflict will further promote energy cooperation. Initially, the study outlines the framework of Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy. It then examines the legal foundations of its energy relations with Central Asian Turkic states. Finally, the study explores practical collaborations and potential opportunities in energy diplomacy both before and after the onset of the war.

**Key words:** Energy Diplomacy, Central Asia, Azerbaijan

**JEL Codes:** F5, F53, S48

### Azerbaycan'ın Orta Asya Türk Devletleri ile İlişkileri ve Enerji Diplomasisi

### Öz

Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ardından, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'daki Türkî devletler önemli siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal krizlerle karşılaştı; bu krizler dış politikalarını derinden etkiledi. 1993 yılında siyasi istikrarı sağladıktan sonra Azerbaycan, enerji kaynaklarını küresel projelerde kullanmaya başladı ve stratejisine Rusya'yı dahil etti. Hem sert hem de yumuşak güç kullanarak enerji diplomasisini etkin bir şekilde yöneten Azerbaycan, Batı ile ilişkilerini güçlendirdi. Bu strateji, Azerbaycan'ın bağımsızlığını sağlam bir siyasi ve ekonomik temele oturtmanın yanı sıra, enerji ihracat modelini Türkî devletlerin entegrasyonunda kritik bir unsur haline getirdi. Devam eden Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, bu ülkeler arasında iş birliği fırsatlarını yeniden gündeme getirdi. Bu çalışma, Azerbaycan'ın bağımsızlıktan sonraki Türkî devletlerle enerji diplomasisinin nasıl geliştiğini incelemekte ve Rusya-Ukrayna çatışmasının enerji işbirliğini daha da artıracak ileri sürmektedir. Çalışma, öncelikle Azerbaycan'ın enerji diplomasisinin çerçevesini çizer, ardından Orta Asya Türkî devletleriyle enerji ilişkilerinin hukuki temellerini değerlendirmektedir. Son olarak savaş öncesi ve sonrası dönemde enerji diplomasisindeki somut işbirlikleri ve potansiyelleri keşfetmektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Enerji Diplomasisi, Orta Asya, Azerbaycan

**Jel Kodları:** F5, F53, S48

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, b.ozsoy@hbv.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-6667-6789.

## **Introduction**

Azerbaijan, involved in conflicts with Armenia that evolved into war in 1991 when it gained its independence, has also experienced political instability due to ongoing power struggles. The impact of the war, political crises, and high inflation and unemployment led the country to a profound economic collapse. The efforts taken after Heydar Aliyev, the country's third president, came to power have enabled Azerbaijan to become the most powerful state in the Caucasus. In this context, a ceasefire was signed with Armenia, foreign policy was based on a balanced strategy, and the Contract of the Century, the beginning of Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy, was signed in 1994 with the participation of the USA and Western states. Azerbaijan established economic and political relations with the West without destroying relations with Moscow. It liberated its occupied territories in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 by improving its military capabilities and opportunities.

Energy diplomacy, carried out successfully for three decades, has also contributed to developing Azerbaijan's relations with the Turkic states. In the 1990s, there was support for transporting Caspian energy resources to the West via Türkiye through agreements involving Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In this regard, the Turkmenistan-Türkiye-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Trans-Caspian Pipeline/TCP), which envisages the export of 30 billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas to Türkiye and Europe, was particularly emphasized during that period. However, because Russia prioritized its energy resources with the Blue Stream and Azerbaijan's discovery of the Shah Deniz natural gas field, the cooperation options with Turkmenistan have been pushed to the background. Nevertheless, its strategic position allows Azerbaijan to stand out as an alternative bridge to Russia for the Central Asian Turkic states to reach the West and as a critical factor in ensuring Europe's energy security. In this context, settling disputes with Turkmenistan on some deposits for decades following the signing of the Aktau Agreement in 2018, which resolved the Caspian status issue, represents a new era in three respects. Firstly, since 2019, the cooperation, especially in the energy field, has allowed the relations between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to reach the highest level in their history. The development of cooperation between the two countries has contributed to strengthening Turkic states. Turkmenistan becoming an observer member of the Organisation of Turkic States in 2021 is a concrete indicator of this integration. Finally, this integration also means that the EU will put the Turkic states at the forefront in its search for alternative countries instead of Moscow, with which energy cooperation has ended mainly due to Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2022.

The main limitation of this study is the exclusion of the role of regional and global actors in Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy, which may be the subject of a different study. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that there is only a limited relationship with Uzbekistan, whose energy reserves are at least not sufficiently favorable to be transported over Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan, which is itself an energy importer and essentially supplies it from Russia and Central Asia. This study focuses on Azerbaijan's energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan after the independence. The political and diplomatic relations between these states should be noted for their contribution to energy cooperation, which constitutes a significant aspect of their economic relations. In this context, after the initial section addressing energy security within Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy framework, the legal

framework for developing Azerbaijan's relations with these three countries is examined. The final section evaluates the energy relations with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in light of recent developments.

## **1. Energy Security and Azerbaijan Energy Diplomacy**

In the 19th century, advancing technological capabilities increased the use and diversity of energy sources; in industrial societies, petroleum and natural gas began to replace coal. With their growing significance in production and life, petroleum gained economic and strategic value, forming multinational corporations and their dominant role in international trade. Today, these corporations control over 50% of production and more than 60% of reserves in oil fields (Yüce, 2013: 66). Natural gas, referred to as the "*sacred fire*" in ancient Greece and Egypt, first started being used in the production sector in the 19th century. The construction of pipelines in the 1920s expanded its usage significantly after World War II (Bayraç, 2018: 16). With the development of production capabilities, petroleum and natural gas gained importance first as economic assets and later as political ones.

In 1803, the world's first offshore oil production occurred in Azerbaijan, where the Baku petroleum industry developed significantly. By the early 20th century, Baku accounted for 51.5% of global oil production, prompting increased investments. Under Soviet rule, Azerbaijan alone contributed 76% of the Union's oil production, substantially supporting the Allies during World War II (www.socar.-com.tr, 2024.). By the third quarter of the century, global energy security had gained prominence due to developments in the Middle East. In this context, the instrumentalization of oil and natural gas in foreign policy by countries with rich energy reserves has led to regional and global crises, and at best, energy prices have moved away from the optimal option. This situation has led countries to alternative export routes.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan gained independence and became a significant energy player with its reserves. Following the ceasefire agreement that ended the war with Armenia, the Baku government 1994 built its foreign policy on its energy potential by signing the "*Contract of the Century*." This agreement, which envisioned the development of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) deposits, marked the beginning of Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy. In the project, which planned to invest approximately 11.5 billion dollars for production, 80% of the revenue would belong to Azerbaijan and 20% to the Consortium. Even though there have been some changes during the period, the share distribution in the Consortium is as follows: Azerbaijan-SOCAR 10 per cent; USA-Amoco 17.01 percent, Unocal 10.0495 percent, Exxon 8.00 per cent, Penzoil 4.8175 per cent; UK-BP 17.1267%, Ramco 2.0825%; Russia-LUKOIL 10%; Norway-Statoil 8.5633%; Türkiye-TPAO 6,75%; Japan-Itochu 3.9205%; Saudi Arabia-Delta 1.68% (Aslanlı, 2023: 106-108). The agreement, signed for 30 years, covered an investment of 33 billion dollars, and Azerbaijan received an income of 125 billion dollars in the first 23 years. In 2017, the Contract of the Century was extended until 2050. According to the updated agreement, BP holds 30.37%; AzACG (SOCAR) 25.00%; Chevron 9.57%; INPEX 9.31%; Statoil 7.27%; ExxonMobil 6.79%; TP 5.73%; ITOCHU 3.65%; ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) 2.31% (Muradov, 2017).

Initially exporting energy through Russia, Azerbaijan quickly diversified its export routes. In 1997, the Baku-Grozni-Novorossiysk (Northern line) pipeline was launched and was the first line to bring Azerbaijani oil to the global market. Its daily transmission capacity is 15750 tonnes (Abdulhasanli, 2005: 2). Additionally, Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa (Western line), with an annual capacity of 5 million tonnes, was put into operation on April 17, 1999 (Suleymanov, 2016: 236-237). The oil extracted from the Azerbaijani part of the Caspian Sea is transported to the world markets via the Western route. Yet, with the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in 2006, the amount of oil exported through both lines has decreased to a minimum level.

For the EU, which imports 82 percent of oil and 57 percent of natural gas, Azerbaijan is a significant player as an energy exporting and transit country (Baxışov, 2015: 44-47). In 1998, a Declaration on the Energy Resources of the Caspian Sea was adopted, requiring European Union countries to invest in the Caspian region. The European Commission has paid particular attention to the European Union's energy strategy in 2000 and 2020 regarding additional measures to ensure its members have sufficient energy reserves. The EU's new energy policy, implemented in 2006, was continued with the signing of the Memorandum on strategic partnership in energy between the EU and Azerbaijan in November (Mikhail, 2001). The Memorandum has created new opportunities to expand the energy dialogue between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the EU. The EU's main priority at this point was to ensure energy security by reducing dependence on Russia.

Since the 2000s, Azerbaijan has emerged as a key player in the natural gas market, thanks to the discovery of the Shah Deniz deposit 1999. This significant find, which revealed approximately 1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and 2 billion barrels of condensate, bolstered Azerbaijan's position in the energy market. The completion of the first line to transport Azerbaijani gas to Türkiye at the end of 2006 was a major milestone. Today, through the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), a segment of the Southern Gas Corridor, a substantial portion of gas extracted from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field Phase-I (approximately 7.7 billion cubic meters per year) is transported from Baku to the city of Erzurum in Türkiye (Hemidova, 2016: 44).

As well as the Shah Deniz Field, Absheron is one of the deposits that expand Azerbaijan's export potential. On February 27, 2009, an agreement was signed with France's TOTAL company on the Absheron deposit (e-qanun.az/framework, 2009). Following these achievements, efforts intensified to transport Azerbaijani gas to Western markets. Notably, the Southern Gas Corridor has played a crucial role. On January 13, 2011, in Baku, the Joint Declaration on establishing the Southern Gas Corridor and the intention protocol to create a working group was signed between Azerbaijan and the EU on the Southern Gas Corridor. It is a project to transport gas from the Shah Deniz-2 field in Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea sector to Europe via Türkiye. Shah Deniz participating interests: BP-29.99; LUKOIL-% 19.99; TPAO–19; SOCAR-% 14.35; NICO-% 10; SGC % -6.67. The existing Shah Deniz facilities' production capacity is about 79.5 million standard cubic meters of gas per day or approximately 29 billion standard cubic meters per year (BP, n.d.). The Southern Gas Corridor creates a new Silk Road that will enable an energy and transport link between Europe and the Caspian region (Bakhishov, 2015, 46). The first section of the 3500 km long pipeline is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP). In 2011 and 2012, Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed agreements on the Trans

Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. TANAP, the second section of the Southern Gas Corridor, connecting the Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan shores to the Caspian Sea, allows the transport of natural gas to Europe. This project, which will strengthen Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's cooperation in the Caspian basin, has further enhanced Baku's role as a transit country. The TANAP natural gas pipeline, which opened on June 12, 2018, was operational on June 30. The annual transmission capacity of the line is 16 billion cubic meters (Erkul Kaya, 2019). The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which forms part of the Southern gas corridor to Europe, transfers Azerbaijani gas to EU countries (Erdoğan, 2017: 17). The TAP pipeline, which extends to the south of Italy via Greece, Albania, and the Adriatic Sea, began gas flow in 2020. While TANAP has the potential to expand its capacity to between 24 and 31 billion cubic meters per year, TAP's initial capacity is 10 billion cubic meters annually (www.iea.org, 2023).

Azerbaijan's second export pipeline is the Hajigabul-Mozdok pipeline, which carried natural gas from Russia to Azerbaijan until 2007. An agreement between SOCAR and Gazprom has allowed the pipeline flow to be reversed, and gas exports to Russia started in 2010. The pipeline's annual capacity is ten bcm, and 200 km of its total 680 km are in Azerbaijan. The pipeline is operated by SOCAR and Gazprom (Russia) (www.iea.org, 2023).

To summarize, Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy started with agreements for exporting oil resources in the 1990s and expanded to include the transportation of natural gas resources in the 2000s. As an essential export market in the region, Azerbaijan's energy security is based on the sustainability of pipelines and long-term agreements with consumer countries. Turkic states are especially significant among the countries that have Azerbaijan's energy cooperation. As is known, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, three of the five Caspian littoral states are Turkic countries. Azerbaijan is in contact with these countries to share and export Caspian resources. Azerbaijan is also unique in that, along with Türkiye, it is located on an alternative route to Russia for the energy resources of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In addition, their strategic location is significant for the energy relations between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Thus, while Azerbaijan is the gateway of the corridor connecting Central Asia to Europe, Uzbekistan is an essential region of Turkestan, the eastern gateway of the corridor connecting Europe to China (Yüce, 2022). This indicates that energy relations between the two countries will deepen when considered in the context of transportation corridors that have regained importance in the last decade. In this respect, it should not be overlooked that the improvement of Azerbaijan's political-diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan following the independence was the main factor contributing to the deepening of energy cooperation.

## **2. Development of Azerbaijan's Relations with Central Asian Turkic States**

The Turkic states that received independence from the Soviet Union immediately began recognizing each other and establishing diplomatic relations. The agreements reflecting cooperation in different fields were signed, and high-level mutual visits were carried out (Garibov, 2017: 277). Yet, during this period, each state struggled with its domestic challenges, and the countries prioritized the solution to these challenges, so the relations could not turn into a partnership. Thus, even about the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia, some of

the Turkic states acted contradictorily and sometimes sided with it (Ahmadov, 2009: 149). Nevertheless, since the mid-2000s, these states have been more intensely integrated, and relations have developed in a generally positive atmosphere.

The establishment of direct bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan dates to the USSR period. On 30 September-2 October 1991, the delegation of the Azerbaijan SSR visited Kazakhstan, the aim of which was to maintain and develop cooperation and good neighborliness between the two states. So, following the negotiations held on 1 October, the 'Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan' and the 'Agreement on the Principles of Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Two States' were signed (Xalq qəzeti, 2019). Although the National Council of Azerbaijan ratified the first agreement on December 16, 1991, it was annulled by Kazakhstan, and the second agreement remained the only document regulating the relationship between the two countries until 1996 (Ahmadov, 2009: 91). Kazakhstan recognized the independence of Azerbaijan on 21 December 1991. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries on 27 August 1992.

In the years following independence, Kazakhstan's economy remained heavily reliant on Russia both financially and industrially. At that time, 43 percent of Kazakhstan's industry was controlled by Russia. However, gradually, the Kazakh government has also succeeded in improving its relations with different countries. Despite Kazakhstan's close relations with Russia based on geographical, demographic, and economic grounds, its ability to integrate into Western markets contributes to the positive growth of Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan relations. Several visits by the presidents of the two countries express their mutual interest in each other. But, until 2000, the relations were mainly aimed at establishing a legal framework in certain areas.

The first official visit of the President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, to Azerbaijan was realized on 16 September 1996. During the visit, cooperation was at the forefront of the development. In this framework, the *"Agreement on the Foundations of Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan"* and a number of documents covering political and economic issues were concluded (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010). In June 1997, during the official visit of the President of Azerbaijan, H. Aliyev, to the Republic of Kazakhstan, the *"Interstate Free Trade Agreement"* was signed. The Agreement, entering into force on 20 July 1999, has played an important role in expanding economic relations between the two countries (Ahmadov, 2009: 197). In 1999, the inter-governmental Commission on Economic Cooperation was created to develop economic cooperation between the two countries. So far, it has held 15 meetings (Nuriyev, 2008: 16). Kazakhstan, endowed with rich energy resources, has implemented the legal measures for transition to a market economy to encourage foreign capital after its independence.

The common interest in the relations that have improved as of the 2000s is the sharing and export of energy. On 29 November 2001, both countries signed an agreement in Moscow concerning dividing the Caspian Sea's seabed (Garibov, 2017: 283). Acting from similar perspectives regarding the Caspian Sea's status, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan swiftly reached an agreement with Russia. This agreement concluded on 14 May 2003, resolved the sharing of the northern part of the Caspian Sea among the littoral states, and determined the coordinates of

the maritime borders (Garibov, 2017: 283). Thus, Russia's share in the Caspian Sea is 19 percent, Kazakhstan's 29 percent, and Azerbaijan's 18-19 percent (Hasanov, 2016: 61).

The relations established and developed under Azerbaijani President Haydar Aliyev have been maintained even after İlham Aliyev came to power. Aliyev made his first official visit to Kazakhstan in 2004 and held talks with N. Nazarbayev on transporting Caspian Sea energy resources to the international arena. In this context, he emphasized the importance of Kazakhstan's participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. During the visit, a declaration of friendship and strategic cooperation between the two countries was signed (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010). On 24 May 2005, President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev visited Azerbaijan. During his visit, six documents were signed, including the "Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Alliance Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Kazakhstan" (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010; Garibov, 2017: 284). This agreement aimed to introduce a new dimension to bilateral cooperation in political, economic, scientific-technical, environmental, informational, humanitarian, cultural, and other fields and strengthen its legal basis.

During President Nursultan Nazarbayev's official visit to Azerbaijan on 2 October 2009, energy issues prominently featured on the agenda. In this context, the parties signed the Memorandum on joint use of oil and gas infrastructure facilities of the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan during the development of hydrocarbon deposits of Kazakhstan and the Agreement on joint activities related to the development of technical and economic justification of the Trans-Caspian project as well as the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on mutual visa-free movement of citizens (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010).

The summit of the heads of the Caspian states was an effective factor in the strengthening of interstate relations between the two countries. These summits contributed to the development of multilateral cooperation between the Caspian littoral states, resolving mutual accusations and disputes, which led to a consensus on the sharing of the Caspian Sea. In October 2011, the "*Joint Declaration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*" and several documents covering diplomatic and economic areas were signed (president.az/articles/23241, 2017). Eventually, bilateral relations between the two countries have reached a strategic level. It is noteworthy that the disputes with other states in Central Asia do not occur in relations with Kazakhstan, as the two countries have signed more than 100 documents that form the legal basis for negotiations (Isabayev, 2016: 162).

Azerbaijan is a bridge for Kazakhstan's access to the Western markets, and Kazakhstan holds a geostrategic and geo-economic importance for Azerbaijan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line provides new opportunities for integrating international passenger and cargo transport. As known, the "*One Belt, One Road*" project to connect Asia and Europe has been developed on China's initiative in recent years. The "*Silk Road Economic Belt*" built based on this project is expected to become the largest crossroads between East and West. This line has enabled the relations between the two countries to gain a new dimension (Habibbeyli, 2017).



In 1995, Turkmenistan adopted permanent neutrality status by a resolution at the UN General Assembly and formulated its foreign policy within this framework. The main factors limiting its engagement with the global arena are the autocratic rule of the country's first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, and Turkmenistan's geographical location. Besides, Azerbaijan's bilateral relations with the Republic of Turkmenistan are characterized by paradoxes and complexities. During the first years of independence, the issue of the "*legal status of the Caspian Sea*" was the main cause of the dispute between the two countries, and therefore, no document was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan between 1991 and 1996 that would determine the legal basis of bilateral cooperation. Despite these disputes, the heads of state and government of the two countries have met several times within the framework of international and regional organizations. The Azerbaijani government invited President Saparmurat Niyazov to Baku to strengthen relations with Turkmenistan. The first official visit of Niyazov to Azerbaijan on 18-19 March 1996 led to the clarification of a number of issues. During this visit, the development of political-diplomatic relations, friendship, and brotherhood, mutually beneficial cooperation between the two states, trade, production cooperation, pension security, and the exchange of legal information were extensively considered. Additionally, several cooperative agreements were signed covering international airlines, commercial shipping, education, health, science, technology, information, culture, and sports (Ahmadov, 2009: 106-107).

Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan were established in 1997, with Turkmenistan opening its embassy in Azerbaijan in 1999. Yet, the relations between the two countries began to turn negative again as Turkmenistan started to raise some claims against Azerbaijan on the legal status of the Caspian region and expressed the possibility of using military force to resolve the dispute at times. This led bilateral relations to remain strained throughout the Niyazov era. Following the election of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov as the new president of Turkmenistan in 2006, the political relations between the two Caspian states began to improve. Berdimuhamedov visited Azerbaijan in May 2008. The two countries established an intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation and a working group on the Caspian issue (Musayev, 2011: 143). In November, Ilham Aliyev paid an official visit to Turkmenistan, during which several agreements were signed in the fields of cargo transport, education, and economic cooperation (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010). As a result, a political and legal basis was created for the expansion of cooperation between the two countries. Despite these positive developments, in 2009, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan had a dispute over the development of hydrocarbon fields in the Caspian Sea, and the Turkmen President accused Azerbaijan of unilaterally exploiting the disputed fields. The tensions were resolved at a summit of the heads of state of the littoral states of the Caspian Sea on 18 November 2010 (president.az/articles/1122, 2010).

Türkiye has played a significant role in improving relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. On 26 May 2014, a trilateral meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan was held for the first time in Baku. In this meeting, the projects for the development of cooperation in the fields of energy and economy were discussed, and the Baku Declaration was adopted. In the Declaration, the parties emphasized the importance of enhancing partnerships in political, security, economic, trade, energy, transport, and humanitarian fields,



including culture, science, health, education, tourism, and sports, based on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other (www.azerbaijan-news.az, 2014).

The Strategic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1996 was renewed on 3 August 2017. The two countries signed agreements and protocols on cooperation in energy, protection of the environment and culture, transit, intergovernmental cooperation, transport, tourism, and tax protection to prevent emergencies and interventions and cooperation in the Caspian Sea. Adopting the Declaration on strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is very significant in raising the relations to the level of strategic partnership after many years (Azərbaycan qəzeti, 2017). According to the Declaration, both parties have expressed willingness to actively develop political dialogue at various levels on international and regional issues of mutual interest in all areas of their strategic relations. The most significant step taken following this agreement was the signing of the "*Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea*" by the Caspian heads of state on 12 August 2018. Following the agreement, President Ilham Aliyev made an official visit to Turkmenistan on 21-22 November, and the sides discussed political, economic, trade, energy, and opportunities for further development of cooperation. In this context, the heads of state adopted a joint statement in the transport-logistics and cultural-humanitarian fields. They signed 20 agreements on enhancing cooperation between the two countries in various fields with the participation of the heads of state. The relations between the two countries - as explained in the third chapter - reached the highest level in their history and enabled the efforts to enhance energy cooperation among the Turkic states. Furthermore, it should also be noted that Turkmenistan became an observer member of the Organization of Turkic States during this period when Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan relations peaked. When considering the increased integration attempts among the Turkic states, transportation corridors and energy cooperation possibilities in the new balance that emerged after the Russia-Ukraine War brought new opportunities for the Turkic states.

The establishment of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan dates back to the early years of their independence. During the first official visit of the Azerbaijani delegation to Tashkent in October 1990, an inter-governmental agreement on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the Azerbaijan SSR and the Uzbekistan SSR was signed for the period 1991-1995 (Ruinten, 2010: 129). After the adoption of the Constitution of Independence on 18 October 1991, the officials of the Republic of Azerbaijan conducted another visit to Uzbekistan on 19 October (Ahmadov, 2009: 77). Bilateral relations between the two states include visits of state and government representatives, meetings within the framework of various international and local organizations, relations at the embassy and consular level, etc. (Qasımlı, 2015: 351-352). Diplomatic relations were founded in October 1995, and in 1996, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov made his first official visit to Azerbaijan. During his visit, the "*Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Uzbekistan*" was signed, as well as 19 basic agreements on cooperation in political, economic, cultural and humanitarian fields (Aliyev, 2017: 174). Similarly, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev officially visited Uzbekistan on June 18-19, 1997. The two Presidents discussed the future of relations and signed 19 documents to regulate cooperation across various fields (Garibov, 2017: 286).

Following Ilham Aliyev's assumption of power, bilateral relations have been raised to the strategic partnership level. Aliyev visited Uzbekistan on March 23-24, 2004. During his visit, the two heads of state discussed various regional and international issues, including security issues in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Additionally, they emphasized various aspects of cooperation, such as economic ties, the expansion of humanitarian and cultural relations, and prospects for further bilateral development (Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana, 2010). During the visit, the Declaration “*On further strengthening the strategic partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Uzbekistan*” was adopted (Garibov, 2017: 287). The two countries also have a developing transport-transit relationship and signed agreements in a variety of fields, such as the regulation of railway and air transport, international vehicle transport, and transit freight transport. In the global financial and economic crisis, it is very important to determine the joint action program, strengthen and deepen cooperation between enterprises and companies of the two countries, and maintain and improve the bilateral trade cycle. In this regard, the activity of the Intergovernmental Commission on Joint Cooperation between two countries plays a pivotal role in regulating trade and economic cooperation (Fayziyev, n.d.). On the other hand, it should be noted that the trade volume between the two countries, which remains below the potential, is mostly related to the economic structure. In the economic system created in the Soviet era, the lack of sufficient product diversity and the underdevelopment of the high-tech product manufacturing industry have limited the economic relations between the two countries (www.setav.org, 2022).

Despite occasional tensions, Uzbekistan has been one of the countries that have given the greatest support to Azerbaijan on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and has not established diplomatic relations with Armenia. During Aliyev's visit to Uzbekistan on September 27-28, 2010, Karimov demonstrated that Uzbekistan's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is unchanging and permanent. He emphasized the necessity of peaceful and political settlement of the conflict, the principle of inviolability of borders, and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan (president.az/articles/776/print, 2010). During Karimov's visit to Baku on October 11-12, 2012, the issue of possible regional transport corridors was discussed (Garibov, 2017: 289). This was an important step towards further developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation, strengthening the strategic partnership, and establishing a broad cooperation program in major spheres. On October 14-15, 2019, Shavkat Mirziyoyev attended the 7th Summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (CCTS) in Baku.

The Russian-Ukrainian war led to a strengthening of cooperation among the Turkic states. Accordingly, in 2022, Ilham Aliyev paid three visits to Uzbekistan. In August 2022, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan signed an agreement to create new energy routes to bypass Russia. Uzbekistan also began to ship copper to Europe for the first time via the Central Corridor, a route through Azerbaijan that bypasses Russia (Fanger, www.caspianpolicy.org, 2023). In March 2023, Mirziyoyev traveled to Baku for the Non-Aligned Movement meeting and paid another working visit in August. During the talks, where 20 documents were signed in several fields, the two countries concluded a strategic road map covering the years 2023-2024 aimed at strengthening the comprehensive and strategic partnership (Toghrol, www.caspianpolicy.org, 2023).

### 3. Energy Relations of Azerbaijan with Central Asian Turkic States

Since gaining independence, Turkic states have grappled with a range of issues, with energy disputes taking center stage. Notably, the protracted disagreements between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over offshore deposits in the Caspian Sea have been exacerbated by the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea. However, the substantial reserves of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, coupled with Azerbaijan's pivotal role in the energy transit route from these countries to Türkiye and Europe, underscore the imperative for cooperation among Turkic states.

#### 3.1. Before the Russian-Ukrainian War

Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy is based on the 1994 Contract of the Century. The Turkic states of Central Asia, which have rich reserves, have an important position in the energy strategy of the Baku administration, which has carried out global projects to enhance Azerbaijan-Türkiye cooperation. The table below shows the oil and natural gas reserves of Turkic states:

**Table 1:** Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas in Turkic States

Countries	Oil Reserves (billion barrels)		Natural Gas Reserves (trillion cubic meters)	
	2000	2020 (%)	2000	2020 (%)
Azerbaijan	1.2	7.0 (0.4)	1.0	2.5 (1.3)
Kazakhstan	5.4	30.0 (1.7)	1.7	2.3 (1.2)
Turkmenistan	0.5	0.6 *	1.8	13.6 (7.2)
Uzbekistan	0.6	0.6 *	0.9	0.8 (0.4)
Kyrgyzstan	*	**	*	**

**Source:** BP (2021). Statistical Review of World Energy, 70th edition.

According to the table, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are the leading countries with rich reserves. In particular, the possibility of transferring Turkmenistan's natural gas, which accounts for 7.2 percent of global reserves, to Western markets has been on the agenda for decades. While Kazakh oil is exported via Russia, Azerbaijan has diversified its energy routes and deepened its energy cooperation with the West through Türkiye. On October 29, 1998, Azerbaijani President Heydər Əliyev, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, Turkish Prime Minister Mesud Yılmaz, the secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy Bill Richardson signed the Ankara Agreement consisting of 6 articles in order to transform the BTC pipeline project into a main export line. This Agreement emphasized the importance of all efforts to protect the Black Sea, the Mediterranean coastline, and the Turkic Straits (Qasımlı, 2015: 331-332). Thus, Azerbaijan has taken the first step of energy diplomacy to enable other Turkic states to adopt transit corridors centered on Türkiye. This will contribute to the weakening of Russia's influence in the region and enable the integration of the Turkic states with Türkiye and the West.

Indeed, Turkmenistan is facing challenges in exporting natural gas to the European

market. In the 1990s, the Trans-Caspian Pipeline planned to pass over Türkiye, leading to gas exports to Europe. However, prioritizing Russian and Azerbaijani gas has caused Turkmenistan to encounter several problems in its energy exports. In addition to the disputes with Russia, payment disruptions have negatively influenced Turkmenistan's energy security. At the current point, similar to Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia, China ranks first in Turkmenistan's exports (Aminjonov, 2019: 61). China is also interested in the Galkini field, the second-largest gas field in the world (en.trend.az; Jalilov, 2022). However, both countries are looking for alternative ways to reduce their dependence. Thus, Kazakhstan, which transports its oil from the territory of Azerbaijan via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as by rail to the Georgian port of Batumi, tries not to miss any opportunity for cooperation with Azerbaijan

As stated before, Ashgabat, focussing on alternative pipeline projects, is also keen on cooperation with Baku. In fact, on October 29, 1998, the presidents of Türkiye and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on implementing the Trans-Caspian project. The line would connect the Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan coasts of the Caspian Sea, starting from Kazakhstan and passing through Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, and Bulgaria. According to this Agreement, Turkmenistan was supposed to export 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 16 billion cubic meters to Türkiye, and 14 billion cubic meters to Europe (Dikbaş, 2001 ). Yet, with the discovery of the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan, the desire of Azerbaijan to export its natural gas to the world market via Türkiye and the unresolved issue of the status of the Caspian Sea hindered the implementation of this project. In addition, prioritizing the Blue Stream pipeline Russia instead of the Trans-Caspian project led Turkmenistan to change its energy policy. However, the work within the scope of BTC has continued, and the Trans-Caspian project has been on the agenda again after decades of the Russian-Ukrainian War.

On November 18, 1999, during the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, an agreement was signed between the presidents of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Georgia on oil transportation through Turkic territory via the BTC pipeline. During this period, with the support of the United States, the participation of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project was raised, and the Istanbul Declaration was signed between Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (Maliki, 2001: 112). At present, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan oil is exported to world markets via the BTC pipeline.

In addition to oil, these countries also focused on cooperation in developing transport routes. On November 29, 2012, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Türkiye signed the Agreement on the Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia. During the meeting, within the framework of the TRASEKA program, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Georgia signed a cooperation agreement by the Baku-Batum-Trabzon Protocol and the standards of road vehicle restriction. The transport ministers of the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (COEC) countries also discussed the perspectives of transport projects implemented within the framework of the organization, the state of the art of cargo transport, and new projects in the field of communications (Bayramov, 2012).

On the other hand, the final negotiations on the status of the Caspian Sea were held on August 12, 2018, in Aktau, Kazakhstan. At the Aktau Summit, the uncertainty that had lasted for more than 20 years was resolved, and the Agreement determining the legal status of the Caspian Sea was signed between the littoral states. In the Agreement's text, it was decided that the 1982 UNFCCC would apply to the open waters outside the sectoral areas of the Caspian Sea, which is defined as "*sea*." According to the Agreement, the parties will use the surface part of the Caspian Sea. At the same time, the bottom and hydrocarbon resources will be shared among the neighboring states by international law ([www.sde.org.tr](http://www.sde.org.tr), 2018).

The most significant achievement of the Aktau Agreement was undoubtedly the conclusion of the dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and the raising of relations between the two countries to the highest level in their history. Accordingly, the field with 1.4 billion barrels of proven reserves, which Azerbaijan called Kepez and Turkmenistan called Serdar for many years, was named Dostluk and was agreed on the common use of this field ([www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org), 2021). The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two countries on January 21, 2021, has brought the Trans-Caspian natural gas project back to the agenda. According to Turkmenistan's State News Agency, in October, a Turkmen delegation led by Vice-President Myratgeldi Meredov visited Brussels for a series of negotiations with the Energy Department of the European Commission, headed by Deputy Minister of the European Energy Commission Maros Shefchovich, and other relevant organizations. During the talks, the development of the legal framework for environmental reasons, but Moscow does not want Turkmenistan to cut off Russia's share of the European gas market, and Tehran is opposed to the project for the motive of blocking a competitor in case international sanctions are lifted in the future ([www.fpri.org](http://www.fpri.org), 2022). Indeed, even though the talks between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have become more intensive since 2018, no concrete step has been taken to improve energy cooperation.

Lastly, it should be noted that even though not as much as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan also plays an important role in Azerbaijan's energy diplomacy. As the most crowded country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan's strategic location and influence in the region are among the main factors determining relations. The energy companies of both countries are interested in investments in Uzbekistan. In this context, in 2019, roadmaps were signed for projects to conduct geological exploration (geological survey) in Uzbekistan's investment blocks and to increase production in the fields in the Kashkadarya region. Furthermore, it was also decided to cooperate on oil production projects in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea ([neftegaz.ru](http://neftegaz.ru), 2019).

#### **4. After the Russian-Ukrainian War**

In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine on mainly security-based grounds, motivated by concerns over Ukraine's improving relations with NATO and the EU. The war has impacted critical security, energy, and food sectors. These effects are more pronounced for countries with developed ties with Russia and Ukraine. For instance, Russia is not only a key actor in the foreign policies of the Caucasus and Central Asian countries but also an essential economic partner. In this context, there are various opportunities and threats for these countries in the ongoing conflict. The Turkic states, which defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine, have

avoided steps to confront Russia due to their close relations with Russia. However, Moscow's response to the embargo and sanctions imposed on Russia with the energy weapon has revealed once again the importance of the Turkic states with rich reserves for the West.

The Russia-Ukraine War has reshaped Azerbaijan-EU energy relations. Azerbaijan, which exports natural gas to countries including Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Romania, and Hungary, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy (MoU) with the EU on 18 July 2022. The MoU includes a commitment to double the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor to deliver at least 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year to the EU by 2027. It also includes establishing a partnership to develop generation and transmission capacity in renewable energy as part of the EU's clean energy transformation (European Commission, 2022). EU leaders describe Azerbaijan, which exports 50 percent of its natural gas to Europe, as a "reliable partner" and "pan-European gas supplier." Azerbaijan's natural gas exports to Europe increased gradually between 2021 and 2023, with 19 billion cubic meters in 2021, 22.6 billion cubic meters in 2022, and 23.8 billion cubic meters in 2023 (Energy Terminal, 2024).

Furthermore, the war has opened several opportunities for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, in particular, to deepen their relations by integrating into Western markets through routes bypassing Russia in the medium and long term. Russia's shift towards Eastern markets after the sanctions and increased export volumes to India and China have led to a competitive environment for Russian and Turkmen gas. In 2023, Turkmenistan exported 30.5 billion cubic meters of gas to China out of 39.5 billion cubic meters via pipeline. The slight decrease in exports to China compared to the previous year (about 2.5 billion cubic meters) prompted Ashgabat to consider alternative customers and routes essential for long-term energy security (Energy Institute, 2024). In addition, in 2021, Kazakhstan, which exports more than 90% of its crude oil (68 million barrels) over Russia (CABAR, 2022), is looking for alternative routes due to the disruptions in Russian routes and the fragility of these lines with the war. In this context, 2022, a five-year agreement was signed between KazMunayGas and SOCAR for transporting 1.5 million tonnes of oil per year through the BTC line. Within the scope of the agreement between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, it is planned to increase the volume of 1.5 million tonnes of oil supplied through BTC from 2023 to 6.5 million tonnes (Aslanlı, 2022). In 2023, oil exports from Aktau Port to the pipeline increased by 1 million 108 thousand tonnes compared to the previous year and reached 1 million 392 thousand tonnes (Kaz Trans Oil, 2024). Moreover, in December 2022, the First Summit of the Heads of State of Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Cooperation in the Field of Energy. Thus, the possibility of exporting Turkmen gas to Europe through Türkiye by integrating it into the Southern Gas Corridor via the Trans-Caspian Pipeline has once again become an option (Özsoy, 2023: 57-58).

The partnership, which was underlined once again by the Southern Gas Corridor Consultative Council (SGC) and the 2nd Green Energy Consultative Council held in Baku, Azerbaijan, on 1-2 March 2024, is based on concrete achievements and shared objectives, especially in the field of energy cooperation. The EU's long-term strategic engagement in Azerbaijan's energy cooperation is reflected in the EU's efforts to expand the Southern Gas Corridor and increase gas export to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) by 2027. Ukraine and

Moldova, two countries in dire need of diversifying their energy suppliers and ending imports from Russia, are among the European countries interested in joining the list of buyers of Azerbaijani gas. Bulgaria currently receives 1-1.5 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas per year, which covers about 40% of the country's gas needs ([www.commonspace.eu](http://www.commonspace.eu), 2024).

Finally, it is also worth noting that the Russian-Ukrainian war has accelerated the development of energy cooperation among the Turkic states, not only in terms of fossil resources but also in terms of renewable energy resources. In particular, the cooperation mechanisms with the Turkic States are being expanded to reduce dependence on fossil fuels under the REPowerEU Plan, which was prepared in the framework of the EU's updated energy strategy following the Russia-Ukraine War. In this context, in May 2024, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan agreed to lay an energy cable on the bottom of the Caspian Sea to facilitate the sale of electricity to Europe through their renewable energy potential ([www.enerjigunlugu.net](http://www.enerjigunlugu.net), 2024). In the aftermath of the war, Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan relations are being deepened. As such, at the Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan Business Forum held in Tashkent in August 2024, strategic cooperation agreements were signed, and the importance of green energy exports to Europe through Azerbaijan was once again emphasized ([www.qha.com](http://www.qha.com), 2024).

## **Conclusion**

This study analyses Azerbaijan's relations with the Central Asian Turkic states within the energy cooperation framework. The Turkic states established diplomatic relations after independence in 1991. However, several factors, such as Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia, territorial problems among the Central Asian Turkic states, the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea, and disputes between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over several deposits, Russia's growing influence in the region since 1993 and the economic dependence of most Central Asian countries on Moscow have limited the opportunities for cooperation. However, the consistent and successful implementation of the energy diplomacy designed by the Azerbaijani government has created a new way for the Turkic states.

The energy resources of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan serve as significant alternatives for importing countries. However, the majority of Kazakhstan's oil is funneled to Western markets via Russia, leading to increased dependence and a fragile energy security. Turkmenistan faces a similar challenge, with China's expanding influence in the energy market. This is particularly evident in Turkmenistan's struggle to diversify its energy export routes, with China emerging as the top importer of natural gas.

1994 following the Contract of the Century signing, Azerbaijan supplied oil to Western markets via BTC. Through the Southern Gas Corridor in the 2000s, it began to supply natural gas to Türkiye and Europe. Although a small amount of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan oil is transported via BTC, the cooperation opportunities have not been sufficiently utilized. But after 2018, there has been a significant acceleration in efforts to expand cooperation among Turkic states. The rapprochement between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan has gathered more excellent European support after the Russia-Ukraine War. Because of Russia's aggression against



Ukraine, the energy resources of the Turkic states have become more critical for the EU. Turkmenistan, one of the countries with the largest natural gas reserves in the world, is trying to integrate into the Southern Gas Corridor project, and efforts to implement the Trans-Caspian Project are accelerating. At this point, Azerbaijan is evolving into a vital actor both as an energy exporter and transit country. In addition, energy cooperation launched by Baku has brought the Turkic states closer and strengthened the Turkic world.

---

**Ethical Approval:** The author declare that ethical rules are followed in all preparation processes of this study. In the case of a contrary situation, Artvin Çoruh University International Journal of Social Sciences has no responsibility, and all responsibility belongs to the study's author.

---

**Etik Beyanı:** Bu çalışmanın tüm hazırlanma süreçlerinde etik kurallara uyulduğunu yazar beyan eder. Aksi bir durumun tespiti hâlinde Artvin Çoruh Üniversitesi Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi'nin hiçbir sorumluluğu olmayıp tüm sorumluluk çalışmanın yazarına aittir.

---

## References

- Abdülhasanlı, T. (2005). İqtisadi inkişafa və tərəqqiyə xidmət edən boru kəməri. Respublika.
- Ahmadov, Ə. (2009). Dağlıq Qarabağ problemi Azərbaycanın türkdilli dövlətlərlə siyasi əlaqələri fonunda. *Tarix və Onun Problemləri*, 1-2, 147-151.
- Ahmadov, Ə. (2009). *Azərbaycan beynəlxalq münasibətlərdə (Türkdilli dövlətlərlə əlaqələr XX əsrin 90-cı illəri)*. Elm və Təhsil.
- Aliyev, G. (2017). Uzbekistan — soyuznik Azerbaydzhana. *Dövlət idarəçiliyi: nəzəriyyə və təcrübə*, Oktyabr - noyabr – dekabr, 4(60), 169-180.
- Aminjonov, F. (2019). Central Asian regional economic cooperation program as driver of regional energy projects to promote energy security in the post Soviet Central Asia. *Post-Soviet Issues*, 6(1), 53-64.
- Aslanlı, A. (2023). *Azərbaycan dış politikasında ekonomi-güvenlik ilişkisi* [Yayımlanmamış doktora tezi]. AHBV Üniversitesi.
- Aslanlı, K. (2022). *İran-Azərbaycan geriliminde Kazakistan formülü*. Retrieved September 2, 2023 from <https://iramcenter.org/iran-azerbaycan-geriliminde-kazakistan-formulu-841>.
- Azərbaycan qəzeti (2014, March 16). *Azərbaycan, Türkiyə və Türkmənistan xarici işlər nazirlərinin birinci üçtərəfli görüşündə Bakı Bəyannaməsi qəbul edilmişdir*. Retrieved July 2, 2019 from <https://www.azerbaijan-news.az/>.
- Azərbaycan qəzeti (2017, August 8). *Azərbaycan-Türkmənistan sənədləri imzalanıb*. Retrieved July 12, 2024 from <https://president.az/az/articles/view/24918/images/132>
- Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidenti İlham Əliyev (2017). *Azərbaycan-Qazaxıstan sənədləri imzalanıb*. Retrived June 14, 2014 from <https://president.az/az/articles/view/23241>
- Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidenti İlham Əliyev (2010, September 27). *İlham Əliyev və İslam Kərimov mətbuat üçün bəyanatlarla çıxış etmişlər*. Retrieved June 14, 2024 from [URL:https://president.az/articles/776/print](https://president.az/articles/776/print).
- Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidenti İlham Əliyev (2010). *İlham Əliyevin və Türkmənistan Prezidenti Qurbanqulu Berdiməhəmmədovun görüşü olmuşdur*. Retrieved from <https://president.az/az/articles/view/1122>
- Azernews (2013). *China to provide new loan to Turkmenistan for Galkinish gas field*. Retrieved July 12, 2019 from <https://www.azernews.az/region/59047.html>.
- Baxışov, N.Ç. (2015). *Avropa İttifaqının enerji təhlükəsizliyinin təmin edilməsində Azərbaycanın transregional qaz layihələrinin rolu*. *Maliyyə və Uçot Jurnalı*, 1, 44-51.
- Bayraç, H. N. (2018). *Uluslararası doğalgaz piyasaının ekonomik yapısı ve uygulanan politikalar*. *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi*, 13(3), 13-36.
- Bayramov, O. (2012). *Azərbaycan, Türkiyə, Gürcüstan və Qazaxıstan arasında «Avropa, Qafqaz və Orta Asiya nəqliyyat dəhlizi sazişi» imzalanmışdır*. *Azərbaycan qəzeti*, 29 noyabr.
- Bekdeş, H.(2018). *5. Hazar zirvesi: yeni düzenlemeler*. *SD Analiz*, Retrieved July 12, 2019 from <http://www.sde.org.tr/genel/sd-analiz-5-hazar-zirvesi-yeniduzenlemeler-analizi-6591>.

- Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana (2010). Azərbaycan-Türkmənistan münasibətləri. “Heydər Əliyev irsi” Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana. Retrieved December 28, 2018 from <https://lib.aliyevheritage.org/az/3639411.html>.
- BP (2021). Statistical Review of World Energy, 70th edition.
- BP (n.d). Shah Deniz 25th anniversary in facts. Retrieved May 20, 2024 from [https://www.bp.com/en\\_az-azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/shahdeniz/Shah-Deniz-25th-anniversary-in-facts.html](https://www.bp.com/en_az-azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/shahdeniz/Shah-Deniz-25th-anniversary-in-facts.html).
- CABAR (2022). *The War in Ukraine: What impact on Central Asia?*. Retrieved August 25, 2024 from <https://cabar.asia/en/war-in-ukraine-what-impact-on-central-asia>.
- Dikbaş, K. (2001). Türkmən gazının bağımsızlıq mücadelesi. *Avrasya Dosyası, Türkmənistan Özel sayısı*, 7(2), 74-96.
- Energy Institute (2024). Statistical Review of World Energy 2024. 73rd edition.
- Energy Terminal (2024). Azerbaijan emerges as key player in European energy security. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/natural-gas/azerbaijan-emerges-as-key-player-in-european-energy-security/40765>.
- Enerji Günlüğü (2024). *Azərbaycan, Kazakistan və Özbəkistan elektrik sistemlərini birləşdiriyor*. Retrieved August 25, 2024 from <https://www.enerjigunlugu.net>.
- Erdoğan, N. (2017). Tanap projesinin Türkiye ve Azerbaycan enerji politikalarındaki yeri ve önemi. *Niğde: Ömer Halisdemir Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 10(3), 10-26.
- Erkul K. N. (2019). TANAP'tan bir yılda 1,8 milyar metreküp gaz geldi. Retrieved December 20, 2018 from <https://www.aa.com.tr/-ekonomi/tanaptan-bir-yilda-1-8-milyar-metrekup-gaz-geldi/1500970>.
- European Commission (2022). EU and Azerbaijan Enhance Bilateral Relations, Including Energy Cooperation, Retrieved May 20, 2024 from [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_22\\_4550](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_4550).
- Faiziev, S. (n.d.). In recent years, relations between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan gained significant momentum of development by upping to the level of strategic partnership. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from <http://newtimes.az/en/politics/5001/>.
- Fanger, S. (2023). President of Uzbekistan's visit to Baku signals strengthening of existing Turkic ties. Retrieved May 20, 2024 from <https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/regional-south-caucasus/-president-of-uzbekistans-visit-to-baku-signals-strengthening-of-existing-turkic-ties>.
- Garibov, A. (2017). Azərbaycan–Mərkəzi Asiya münasibətləri. *Azərbaycan Respublikasının xarici siyasətinin əsas istiqamətləri (1991-2016)* məqalələr toplusu. Poliart MMC.
- Gövdəli, T. & Başkonuş Direkçi, T. (2018). Petrol tükətimi və böyümə: OECD ölkələrinə ilişkin panel veri analizi. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 17(4), 1574-1585.
- Hasanov, Ə. (2016). *Xəzər–Qara dəniz hövzəsi və Cənubi Qafqazın geoiqtisadiyyatı: Azərbaycanın enerji siyasəti*. Zərdabi LTD MMC.
- Hemidova, M. (2016). *Azərbaycanın Xəzər və Mərkəzi Asiya region dövlətləri ilə əməkdaşlıq münasibətlərinin inkişafı* [Magistr dissertasiyası], Azərbaycan Dövlət İqtisad Universiteti.
- Huseynov, V. (2024). *Opinion: Azerbaijan is now a major contributor to Europe's energy security*. Retrieved July 3, 2024 from <https://www.commonspace.eu/opinion/opinion-azerbaijan-now-major-contributor-europes-energy-security>.
- IEA (2023). *Azerbaijan energy profile*. Retrieved May 20, 2024 from <https://www.iea.org/reports/azerbaijan-energy-profile/energy-security>.
- İsabayev, B. (2016). Qazaxıstan Respublikası. *Müstəqil Azərbaycanın 25 ili səfirlərin gözü ilə*, məqalələr toplusu. BEST-TMS MMC.
- Jalilov, O. (2022, February 2). *China plans to make additional investment in Turkmen gas fields*. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/china-plans-to-make-additional-investment-in-turkmen-gas-fields-2022-2-1-0/>
- Kaz Trans Oil (2024). В 2023 Году ао «Казтрансойл» Увеличило Объем Экспорта Нефти в Направлении Нефтепровода «Баку-Тбилиси-Джейхан» До 1 Млн 392 Тыс. Тонн. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://kaztransoil.kz/ru/press-centre/novosti/4217-v-2023-godu-ao-kaztransoyl-uvelichilo-obem-eksporta-nefti-v-napravlenii-nefteprovoda-baku-tbilisi-dzheyhan-do-1-mln-392-tys-tonn>.
- Maliki, A. (2001). Iran and Turan: On the Issue of Iran's Relations with the States of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. *Tsentrāl'naya Aziya i Kavkaz*, 5, 109-119.

- Mikhail, G. (2001). Transit of Caspian Energy Resources to the World Market: Ukraine's View. *Tsentral'naya Aziya i Kavkaz*, 3. Retrieved May 20, 2024 from [https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2001/journal\\_rus/cac-03/01.goncrus.shtml](https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2001/journal_rus/cac-03/01.goncrus.shtml).
- Muradov, Ə. (2017). *Yeni əsrin müqaviləsi dayanıqlı iqtisadi inkişafın təminatıdır*. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from <https://unec.edu.az/yeni-esrin-muqavilesi-dayaniqli-iqtisadi-inkisafin-teminatidir/>
- Musayev, M. (2011). Azərbaycan-Türkmənistan arasında diplomatik əlaqələrin yeni mərhələdə inkişafı. *Tarix və Onun Problemləri*, 2, 140-145.
- Neftegaz.Ru (2019). *Узбекнефтегаз и SOCAR обсудили проекты по геологоразведке и добыче в Узбекистане и Азербайджане*. Retrieved August 25, 2024 from <https://neftegaz.ru/news/Geological-exploration/500593>.
- Nuriyev, E. (2008). Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan: Prospects for Cooperation and Interaction, Proceedings of the International Round Table (Almaty, November 25, 2008), Ed. B.K. Sultanov. Almaty: KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 9-19.
- Özsoy, B. (2023). Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı gölgesinde AB enerji politikaları ve Türk devletleri. *Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 25(Özel), 43-66.
- Pannier, B. (2021). *Analysis: Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan resolve a 30-year dispute over Caspian field*. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://www.rferl.org/a/analysis-turkmenistan-azerbaijan-resolve-a-30-year-dispute-over-caspian-field-/31063736.html>
- Pannier, B. (2022). *Europe's wait for Turkmen natural gas continues*. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/09/europes-wait-for-turkmen-natural-gas-continues/>
- Qasımlı, M. (2015). *Azərbaycan Respublikasının xarici siyasəti (1991-2003)*. Mütərcim.
- QHA (2018). Türkmən qazını Türkiyə'ye taşıyacaq Trans Hazar Boru Hattı yolunda önəmli gelişme, Retrieved May 20, 2019 from <https://qha.com.tr/>.
- QHA (2024). *Özbekistan ve Azərbaycan arasında kardeşlik bağı güçleniyor*. Retrieved August 25, 2024 from <https://www.qha.com.tr/turk-dunyasi/ozbekistan-ve-azerbaycan-arasinda-kardeslik-bagi-gucleniyor-493627>.
- Ruintən, S. (2010). Müstəqillik illərində Azərbaycan Respublikası ilə Özbəkistan arasında münasibətlər. *Tarix və Onun Problemləri*, 4, 129-133.
- SOCAR (n.d.). *Azərbaycan petrol və qaz tarixçəsi*. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://www.socar-com.tr/tarihce-1800>.
- Süleymanov, E. (2016). *Azərbaycan İqtisadiyyatı*. FAB.
- Toghrul, A. (2023, Aug 30). Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan deepen bilateral ties. Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/south-caucasus/uzbekistan-and-azerbaijan-deepen-bilateral-ties>.
- Xalq qəzeti (2010). *BTC kəməri ilə 417 milyon tondan çox neft nəql olunub*. Retrieved May 20, 2019 from <http://xalqqazeti.com/az/news/15639>.
- Xəzər dənizinin Azərbaycan sektorunda Abşeron Dəniz Blokunun kəşfiyyatı, işlənməsi və hasilatın pay bölgüsü haqqında Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Neft Şirkəti, Total E&P Abşeron Bi.Vi.və ARDNŞ-nin Ortaq Neft Şirkəti arasında Sazişin qəbul və təsdiq edilməsi, həyata keçirilməsinə icazə verilməsi barədə Azərbaycan Respublikasının Qanunu". Retrieved June 20, 2024 from <https://e-qanun.az/framework/17777>.
- Yüce, Ç. K. (2013). 21.yüzyıl enerji savaşlarında Türk cumhuriyetleri'nin yeri ve önemi. *Turan Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Dergisi*, 5(17), 61-75.
- Yüce, M. (2022). *Azərbaycan-Özbəkistan ilişkilerinde yeni dönem*. Retrieved August 06, 2024 from <https://www.setav.org/yorum/azerbaycan-ozbekistan-iliskilerinde-yeni-donem>.