A Neo-Realist Case Study of U.N.-Authorized Humanitarian Interventions in The Post-Cold War World

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Abstract

As the Neo-realist theory in international relations suggests, international political system presents an anarchic environment. In other words, since there is no formally recognized supreme authority among equally sovereign units, states generally act in "self-help" to maximize their national interests. However, due to ever-increasing importance of human rights issues in the 21st century, the Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty in international affairs has gradually eroded and turned into a new one in which states intervene in each other's domestic jurisdictions especially regarding human rights issues. The extremist practice of this intervention is humanitarian interventions. However, when the practice of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War is examined, it is seen that not only altruistic motives were effective for states, but they also aimed at maximizing their self-interest and that the main concept of the neo-realist theory is still valid.

Keywords: Neo-realist theory, Humanitarian intervention, Human rights.

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Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dünyada BM Tarafından Yetkilendirilmiş İnsani Müdahaleler Üzerine Neo-Realist Bir Örnek Olay İncelemesi

Öz

Uluslararası ilişkilerdeki neo-realist teorinin önerdiği üzere, uluslararası politik sistem anarşik bir görünüm arz eder. Diğer bir değişle, egemen eşitler arasında üst bir otorite olmadığı için, devletler genel olarak kendi kendine yetme motivasyonu ile hareket ederek, kendi çıkarlarını maksimize etmeye çalışırlar. 21. yüzyılda insan haklarına verilen önemin artmasıyla beraber, uluslararası sistemde Westfalyan anlayış yerini, devletlerin insan hakları ihlalleri söz konusu olduğunda birbirlerinin içişlerine müdahale ettiği bir anlayışa bırakmıştır. Bu müdahalenin en uç uygulaması ise insani müdahaledir. Ancak, Soğuk Savaş sonrası insani müdahale uygulamaları incelendiğinde, devletlerin savaşa girmeleri için yalnızca özgecil motivasyonların tek başına yeterli olmadığı, bununla beraber kendi çıkarlarını önceleyebildikleri, dolayısıyla neo-realist teorinin hala geçerliliğini koruduğu görülür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neo-realist teori, İnsani müdahale, İnsan hakları.

Introduction

A conventional definition of humanitarian intervention is "the threat or use of force by a state, a group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights" (Murphy, 1996: 11-12). When the U.N. enacted Article 2(4), it outlawed the use of force for any reason, except in self-defense (Article 51) and when it is authorized by the Security Council to maintain international peace and security (generally Chapter VII). Article 2(4) clearly provides that states should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against any other state. Article 2(7) also clearly provides the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, a well-established rule in international law.

This article aims at testing the neo-realist theory with the focus on humanitarian intervention. In the first section of the article, the theory of neo-realism in international relations discipline will be briefly presented and its major concepts will be explained. The second section will cover seven cases of military interventions for humanitarian purposes. The article will analyze whether or not the rapidly changing post-Cold War world with its major implications for a more humanitarian world has refuted the main concepts of the neo-realist theory.

There are two types of humanitarian intervention depending on the actors undertaking the intervention. The first type is unilateral humanitarian interventions, which are conducted without a prior Security Council authorization. An example of this type of intervention is the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. When it is not possible to pass a resolution in the Security Council, this option may become operational. The second type interventions occur as a result of a United Nations Security Council Resolution such as the ones in Somalia and Rwanda in 1990s.

This article does not cover unilateral humanitarian interventions because the dominant opinion in the literature is that unilateral humanitarian interventions are illegal under international law (Verwey, 1985). That being said, all of the seven humanitarian interventions examined below are U.N.-authorized interventions, and thus should be accepted legal. Although some commentators argue that humanitarian interventions may be undertaken independent of the United Nations (Benjamin, 1992; Stein, 2004), this article favors others' contention that it is the Security Council only, acting under its Chapter VII powers, that can authorize military interventions for humanitarian purposes. If unilateral humanitarian interventions were lawful, there would be no reason for the majority of the international community to claim that the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo was unlawful (Kosovo Report, 2000: 4). That being said, this article accepts the contention in the 2000 Kosovo Report.

Additionally, the second section of the article begins with the humanitarian crisis in Somalia in 1992-1993, but not with the case of Iraq's treatments of the Kurds in the period before the First Gulf War. Although some argue that the Resolution 688 authorizing military action in Iraq was the first time with which the Security Council authorized an intervention for humanitarian reasons in a state's domestic jurisdiction (Nanda, 1992: 306), it is, on the other hand, true that the Resolution contains no reference to an authorization of the use of force, and therefore, did not establish a precedent for the future Security Council

decisions (Nafziger, 1991: 29; Murphy, 1996: 192-197; Malanczuk, 1993: 18; Gordon, 1996: 49-51). Indeed, in Resolution 688, the classic phrase of the Security Council "to use all necessary means" is not found.

While examining whether the practice of humanitarian intervention in international relations undermined the neo-realist theory's assumptions, the focus of the article will be the motivations of the intervening states. In other words, it will be examined what triggered the interveners to spend their tax payers' money for strangers. It should be also noted that although there were more interveners in the cases below, the article covers only one or two countries actively participated or lead the intervention because such an assessment including all countries would be beyond the scope of this paper.

1. Neo-Realist Theory of International Relations

Neo-realism, or structural realism, emerged as a school in international relations with Kenneth Waltz's book, *Theory of International Politics* in 1979. Waltz's book was actually a response to the famous Realism theory of international relations, and it attempted to update the classic Realist approach. Therefore, Neo-realist theory is both a criticism of and support to classic Realism. The very basic assumption of the Realist school is that the political order and how states act in their international affairs are determined by the human nature (Donnelly, 2000: 10). Therefore, the classic Realist school pays close attention to human factor in politics such as ambitions and aspiration.

However, neo-realists do not insist upon the realists' conceptualization that human nature determines international politics, but rather they focus on a systemic nature of the world affairs and claim that it is the system itself determining the affairs among states. Waltz's claim is that the international political system illustrates an anarchic environment because there is not any formal authority to regulate the affairs, and therefore, every state is equally sovereign in the system. The logic of self-help dominates the neo-realist international system, meaning that states try to maximize their own interest and do not regard their interest as of lesser importance than the others. Since this is the purpose of every state, states compete with each other. Thus, gaining power is of central importance. In order to maximize their gains, states may enter into strategic alliances, but the main purpose of such alliances is achieving their own objectives. In a neo-realist world, military and economic power are the major criteria for security; achievement of these criteria should be done by all possible means. War is inevitable in a neo-realist world, but since the states having nuclear powers know that the consequences of such a war are devastating, such a power is seen as a means of deterrence and balance of powers (Waltz, 1979: 8-15).

Waltz's idea of international relations system desires a balance in international political system, and the anarchy of international system actually provides an order rather than chaos. If one state breaks the balance of power, peace may not be sustained. "A state having too much power may scare other states into uniting against it and thus become less secure. A state having too little power may tempt other states to take advantage of it" (Waltz, 2004: 6).

Despite of being more optimistic than classic Realism, the very core assumption of the Neo-realist theory holds one's own: States try to maximize the interests of their own citizens. How about waging war in the name of the people suffering in the hands of crucial governments? Does modern humanitarianism

soften the hearts of neo-realists? If humanitarian intervention is "saving strangers" (Wheeler, 2002), do states ever go into wars for the sake of humanity? Have the humanitarian interventions that are undertaken since the end of the Cold War refuted the neo-realist theory? Next section should answer these questions.

2. Cases of Humanitarian Interventions After The Cold War

Humanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial practices in international relations. Although it could be traced even back to St. Augustine's *Just War Theory*, its notion has changed since then. However, the question of how to deal with people whose human rights are abused by their own governments has remained the same even after the foundation of the U.N. The majority of the international community today consider humanitarian intervention as a legitimate practice of international relations. For example, in the United Nation's 2005 World Summit Outcome, an historic outcome document with the largest gathering of world leaders in history, the General Assembly endorsed the Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") Doctrine, with which the Assembly held both the individual states and the international community responsible to prevent gross human rights violations, as explained more in the below (2005 World Summit Outcome).

In the post-Cold War era, there are seven humanitarian interventions in the true sense, undertaken with the authorization of legal U.N. bodies, namely in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya. However, an examination of these modern applications of humanitarian intervention shows that states, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, use the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in an attempt to achieve their political interests besides altruistic motives, which may amount to a misuse of the doctrine.

2.1. The Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia (1992-93)

The Somali crisis cropped up after President Mohammed Siad Barre, the country's longtime dictator, fled the capital city of Mogadishu in January 1991. Barre's departure split the opposition. The country was divided into many zones of control (Clark, 1993: 112). A so-called "reconciliation conference" between the warring factions was held in July 1991. As a result of the conference, Omer Qhalib was elected as interim Prime Minister. However, Qhalib, in essence, did not have any influential authority over the Somalian faction leaders (Teson, 1997: 242). By November 1991, the struggle between the factions turned into a full-scale civil war.

All governmental authority collapsed and the traditional clan warfare continued, which led to a situation of mass starvation accompanied with drought (Teson, 1997: 243). In December 1992, the Security Council's evaluation of the situation in Somalia resulted in Resolution 794, which found that the human rights crisis in Somalia and the obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constituted "threats to international peace and security" (Holzgrefe, 2003: 42).[1] Within days, 24,000 U.S. troops arrived in Somalia, in the words of the Resolution 794, "under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, […] to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief

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[1] It is noteworthy that the term "humanitarian" appeared 18 times in the Resolution.

operations in Somalia." Resolution 794 referred to "the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict," and "the deterioration of the humanitarian situation" (S.C. Res. 794, Dec. 3, 1992).

2.1.1. Motivations for the Intervention

There were three main motivations in Somalia case, which are George H. Bush's personal feelings, the interest of petroleum giants, and local political interests. It seems that feeling of a moral obligation played an important role in the intervention in Somalia. "It was truly [Bush's] personal decision, based in large measure on his growing feelings of concern as the humanitarian disaster continued to unfold relentlessly despite the half measures being undertaken by the international community" (Diprizio, 2002: 52). Thus, "it becomes apparent that Bush's personal feelings of compassion to a large extent triggered an altruistic decision" (Krieg, 2013: 75).

Although some argue that the intervention in Somalia was "the first war that has not been waged in the name of 'national interests', but rather in the name of principles and values" (Havel, 1999), Mark Fineman, from LA Times, has persuasive arguments against this common inclination. According to Fineman, the intervention actually focused on the interest of four American petroleum giants (Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips), because the civil war threatened their multi-million dollar investments (Fineman, 1993). Fineman claims that restoring peace and stability was in the interest of the American oil giants that had oil contracts with the Barre regime (Fineman, 1993). Indeed, the fact that the U.S. troops used premises of Conoco as their base and operational headquarters in Somalia supports the claim that the Bush administration was partially motivated by the pressure from oil lobbyists (Gibbs, 2002: 378).

Local political interest also played a key role in the intervention. During the presidential election campaign of 1992, Democratic candidate Clinton repeatedly criticized President Bush for having neglected international crises such as those in Somalia and Bosnia (Baum, 2004: 189). A Defence Department Official stated at that time, "I had the feeling that no matter what was said (by his advisors), [President Bush] would not want to leave office with 50,000 people starving that he could have saved" (Diprizio, 2002: 51). Thus, Bush' Presidency "was not marked by successful foreign policy initiatives causing him to first of all initiate a humanitarian relief operation to win the elections and after the elections defeat, causing him to send troops to Somalia in order to save his reputation" (Krieg, 2013: 76).

Although the intervention in Somalia might have the potential to refute the neo-realist claim in international relations that altruism is utopian, the political interests of the Bush administration and Fineman's very persuasive theory still taint the picture of an altruistic intervention.

2.2. The Case of Haiti (1994-95)

The case of Haiti began when a military coup in September 1991, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras, overthrew the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the first elected president in Haitian history with a 67 percent of the popular votes (Falk, 1995: 344; Teson, 1997: 250; Arend, 1993: 500). The Haiti's Ambassador to the U.N. unsuccessfully requested an assembly of the Security Council to take up the matter. The Council did not formally assemble "because a majority of the members felt that the situation in Haiti was entirely a domestic matter and therefore beyond the competence of the Security

Council to consider, since the coup was not thought to constitute a 'threat to the peace'" (Arend, 1993: 501).

Later, the General Assembly took up the issue and adopted Resolution 46/7 by consensus condemning the "illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti" and demanding "the immediate restoration of the legitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide" It is noteworthy that there was no reference to the domestic jurisdiction of Haiti in the Resolution (G.A. Res. 46/7, 1991).

The refusal by Haiti's de facto military dictators to reinstate the democratically-elected Aristide government and the continued violence of Aristide supporters led the Security Council to finally adopt Resolution 841 in June 1993 (S.C. Res. 841, 1993). The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, imposed a mandatory economic embargo on Haiti. The military junta crushed under the strict U.N. sanctions accepted a U.N. agreement in July 1993, known as the Governors Island Agreement, which would have returned Haiti to democratic rule under President Aristide (Lecce, 1998: 255). Despite the U.N. lifted the sanctions on Haiti, the Governors Island Agreement failed because violence against Aristide supporters rebegan in September 1993 (Lecce, 1998: 255).

A point of escalation in the crisis was seen when pro-junta groups blocked the debarkation of U.N. troops assigned to assist in the monitoring and modernization of Haiti's police and military. After unanimously passing Resolution 873 (S.C. Res. 873, 1993) imposing again the economic sanctions and Resolution 875 (S.C. Res. 875, 1993) authorizing the member states to use military force to enforce the sanctions, the Security Council, expressing its concern of "the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties", adopted Resolution 940. The Resolution authorized member states "to form a multinational force [and] to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership" (S.C. Res. 940, 1994).

2.2.1. Motivations for the Intervention

There were mainly three motivations triggering the intervention in Haiti, which are economic interests, safety related problems, and personal political interests. Although Haiti is not a wealthy state having noteworthy economic productions, Mike Blakley (1999: 91) argues that economic interests were an important driving force for the U.S. government to intervene in Haiti because of the influx of refugees to the U.S. In other words, the influx of refugees would cause economic harm to the U.S., and "the Clinton administration used cost savings as an explicit rationale for intervention" (Blakley , 1999: 91).

Further, the U.S. government took the crisis in Haiti as a treat to its security. Since the Haitian crisis did not occur in a region far away from the U.S. homeland, it constituted a peripheral security risk. As Clinton stated in an address to the nation, promoting democracy in its hemisphere would protect its interests (The American Presidency Project, 1994). Therefore, the restoration of a democratic regime in its backyard was partially a self-interested motive of the U.S.

The intervention was also triggered by personal political interests of President Clinton. Although he criticized Bush for not having an active foreign policy as we have seen in the Somali case, he showed a

clear example of inconsistency by first refusing to bomb Bosnia, later sending, and then withdrawing troops from Somalia. Therefore, the Haiti case was an opportunity to earn some foreign policy credits. Moreover, he had the upcoming midterm elections of 1994, and his foreign policy would be a key element in his political future.

Some even argue that the Security Council's operation in Haiti cannot be termed a humanitarian intervention because the main goal of the intervention was to restore democratically elected government rather than protecting human rights (Gordon, 1996: 53). Thus, the case in Haiti might present a misuse of the humanitarian intervention doctrine where the U.S. covered up its regime-change operation in a country with humanitarian intervention, for which there is no exception to the general prohibition on the use of force.

Clinton's hesitancy to send troops to Haiti remained the same until he figured out that the costs of non-intervention would become so high and that an intervention would actually be a sensible and cost-efficient alternative. The intervention in Haiti presents a highly self-interested motivation compared to the crisis in Somalia.

2.3. The Case of Rwanda (1994-95)

The world witnessed one of the most brutal ethnic cleansing in the history in Rwanda in 1990s. The crisis in Rwanda began on April 6, 1994 when the President of Rwanda was killed when his plane was shot down over the capital city (Des Forges, 1999: 255). The Hutu-dominated Rwandan military blamed the incident on the minority Tutsis, and began slaughtering innocent Tutsis.

On May 31, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported to the Security Council that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandan men, women, and children were killed and that in a nation of approximately seven million persons, this was not proportional (Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda, 1994: 2-3). For about a month, the Security Council could not obtain commitments from member nations for the necessities for an operation. On June 20, the French government sent the Security Council a proposal for unilateral intervention to end the bloodshed and establish safe havens for the hundreds of thousands of fleeing refugees (Letter dated 20 June 1994). Three days after the Security Council approved the French intervention with Resolution 929, 2,500 French troops stationed in Rwanda and neighboring Zaire establishing safe havens for refugees near the border (S.C. Res. 929, 1994).

2.3.1. Motivations for the Intervention

Two different issue, namely geo-strategic interests and personal feelings, motivated France to actively intervene in Rwanda. Although the Mitterrand administration of France did not have economic interests in Rwanda due to the fact that the country's population mostly deal with agriculture unlike other Central African countries having precious underground minerals, Mitterrand was still motivated by geo-strategic interests. After the Cold War, francophone countries were trying to expand their horizons by establishing independent relations with newly emerged states, and the French government had the fear of losing one leg in Africa with Rwanda which might create a domino effect resulting further states turning their back on French influence (McQueen, 2006: 130). It is also suggested that a victory by the Anglophone

RPF that could result in a consolidation of British or American influence in Rwanda was the biggest motivation of France to intervene pursuant to France's classic Fashoda syndrome (Prunier, 1995: 105).[2]

The intervention was also related to the Mitterrand's personal preferences. "Mitterrand was apparently driven by strategic considerations and concern about his own place in history. He did not want to be remembered as the president who fiddled while Rwanda burned" (Jakobsen, 1996: 210).

If France was actually driven by altruistic motives, the intervention would have occurred in an earlier time. However, the reason for the late intervention was that the Francophone Hutu regime was about to lose the war against Anglophone RPF. The French intervention in Rwanda comprised of a high degree of national interests that may be perceived an abuse of the principle of humanitarian intervention (Wheeler and Bellamy, 2008: 522).

2.4. NATO Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995)

After the fall of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the new republics that composed Yugoslavia started seeking secession and creating their independent countries. On June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence, followed by the referendum held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which nearly two-thirds of the eligible voters participated, and almost all voted for the republic's independence on February 29 and March 1, 1992 (Murphy, 1996: 198). The government declared independence on March 3, 1992. Rebel Bosnian-Serb forces immediately started violent acts to overthrow the government, and the practice of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian-Muslims began.

The Security Council involved in the situation the first time with Resolution 770 which provided coercive measures to deal with the conflict August, 1992. Resolution 770 found "that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Council's effort to restore international peace and security in the area", and it called upon states "to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery […] of humanitarian assistance" in Bosnia-Herzegovina (S.C. Res. 770, 1992).[3]

Despite of this resolution, the Security Council faced the failure of several efforts at protecting the Bosnian-Muslims. In October 1992, Security Council Resolution 781 imposed a "no-fly" zone over Bosnia to prevent Serbian assaults from obstructing the transfer of humanitarian aid supplies. Since the violations by the Serbs did not stop, the Security Council again adopted Resolution 816 in March 1993, authorizing member states with Resolution to take "all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations to ensure compliance with the ban on flights". Based on these resolutions, NATO air forces conducted a series of bombings and other military actions against Bosnian-Serb positions. Partly because of the NATO attacks, the parties agreed on peace negotiations which resulted in the Dayton Accord in December 1995.

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[2] Fashoda syndrome is the tendency within the French foreign policy in Africa. It basically gives importance to asserting French influence in areas where the U.K. may increase its strength without French dominance. *See* Prunier, 1995.

[3] Resolution 770 was adopted by 12 votes in favor and three abstentions (China, India, and Zimbabwe).

2.4.1. Motivations for the Intervention

There were at least four reasons why the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina could take place, and they were economic interests, safety related issues, NATO's organization interest, and personal political interests. Economic interests played a key role in the intervention. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created lucrative opportunities for Western European companies, particularly for Germany. As of 1992, Germany was the most important trade partner of Eastern European and Balkans countries including Yugoslavia (Ash, 1993: 403). German companies, such as Volkswagen or Siemens, had a considerable amount of investment in the region and wanted to ensure that those investments were not at stake due to the crisis (Ash, 1993: 403). "Thus, the economic interests in the Balkans as a lucrative outlet and cost-efficient production site most likely facilitated the decision of several NATO member states to finally bring stability to Bosnia" (Krieg, 2013: 87).

The intervention decision was also driven by the potential security threats that the Western countries faced. While there was a fire in the backyard of Western Europe, the NATO's motivation in the intervention was "preventing the possibility of wider war which could have implications for EU and NATO members" (Gow, 1997: 14). Millions of displaced posed a major security threat as well. As Clinton stated in 1994, the U.S. had "an interest in stemming the destabilizing flows of refugees that this horrible conflict is creating" (Public Papers of the Presidents, 1994).

Besides these clear security motives, NATO itself had specific interests in intervening in the crisis in Bosnia. The collapse of the Communist bloc created a power gap in Eurasia, and NATO felt obligated to redefine its role from a defensive character to a proactive military institution promoting neo-liberal values such as democracy and human rights (Duffield, 1994, 763). As Clinton explicitly stated in 1994 that the U.S. had "an interest in showing that NATO, history's greatest military alliance, remains a credible force for peace in post-cold-war Europe" (Public Papers of the Presidents, 1994). Therefore, it could be suggested that the decision for the intervention was motivated by U.S. interests to grant credibility to NATO's prestige in the region.

Personal political interests had a role in the intervention decision to an extent, at least for Clinton. "Bill Clinton seems to have decided, rather suddenly, that the Bosnian war should be settled before next year's American presidential elections," so that he might have gained electoral popularity (Kaufman, 2002: 121).

The intervention in Bosnia was motivated by both humanitarian and self-interested elements. However, after three years of passivity, the security concerns that the conflict close to the Western European heartland could not be solved by diplomatic means was the most important national interest-based motivation for most NATO members.

2.5. East Timor (1999)

In 1974, Portugal decided to end its colonial control over East Timor and held an election to determine the future status of the territory (Seybolt, 2008: 86). Despite the fact that 78.5 percent of the voters favored independence, violence broke out between pro and anti-independence groups immediately after the announcement of the result (Krieg, 2013: 93). Portugal was unable to control the territory and allowed Indonesian President Suharto to assert military control over the island (Seybolt, 2008: 86). The East Timorese unsuccessfully resisted the Indonesian occupation, causing them 60.000 deaths by the end of 1975 (Seybolt, 2008: 86). East Timorese guerrilla resistance continued, and between 100.000 and 250.000 people lost their lives by 1978 (Lachica, 211: 2). Human rights groups accused the Suharto government of widespread repression and human rights violations, including massacres, during the occupation years (Silove, 1999).

In an attempt to respond the humanitarian crisis occurring in East Timor, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1264 in September 1999, authorizing an international military intervention under the leadership of Australia to take all necessary measures "to restore peace and security in East Timor". The Security Council justified the intervention based on the "continuing violence against and large-scale displacement and relocation of East Timorese civilians" (S.C. Res. 1264, 1999).

2.5.1. Motivations for the Intervention

Security concerns and economic interests made the intervention in East Timor possible. Despite of the public pressure for an altruistic intervention, Australia's motives were more national-interest based. First, "Australian defence planning has long seen Indonesia as a potential threat" (Wheeler and Dunne: 2001: 808). "It was therefore thought that Australia would be better served by promoting a stable pro-Western government in Jakarta and maintaining friendly relationships with it" (Perez, 2015: 35).

Second, because of the geographic proximity of East Timor to Australia, trade between the two has always been mutually beneficial. Instability caused by the crisis in East Timor raised trade concerns in Australia. Therefore, bringing peace and security in the region was in the interest of the Australia (Wheeler and Dunne: 2001: 809).

2.6. The European Union Intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo (2003)

The civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) lasted from 1998 until summer 2003, when a transitional power-sharing government was set up (Gegout, 2005: 430). During this period, an estimated 3.3 million people died, and millions were displaced (Gegout, 2005: 430). The Security Council involved in the situation in the summer of 2003 with Resolution 1484. "Expressing its utmost concern at the fighting and atrocities in Ituri, as well as the gravity of the humanitarian situation in the town of Bunia", Resolution 1484 authorized "Artemis," the French-led European Union (EU) intervention force of 2.000 troops to "take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate" and stop the conflict in Bunia, in the north-eastern Ituri Province (S.C. Res. 1484, 2003). It should be noted that the operation had very limited aims in time and in geographical location. The EU intervention only lasted three months and was limited to the town of Bunia; the intervention did not deal with violence outside of this zone.

2.6.1. Motivations for the Intervention

What was behind the intervention in DRC was the efforts of France and the UK that desired to strengthen the EU as an independent international organization. The EU military intervention in DRC was the first time EU troops were deployed out of the continent, and the reason why France and the United Kingdom (the UK) agreed to an EU intervention could be explained by maximal realism leading us to believe that it was a heavily national-interest based intervention. First, France thought that this was the best case to prove that the EU could act independently from NATO and the U.S. Therefore, the French-led intervention "does not seem to have been based on the necessity to react to a humanitarian crisis of murders, mutilations and rapes. Instead, France primarily wished to prove the capacity of the EU to act without the USA" (Gegout, 2005: 437). Indeed, the intervention was limited in the city of Bunia, and the EU troops did not involve in the situation of Bunia, which may be an indicator of the France's motivation.

Second, it may seem interesting that the UK took part in the intervention even though it has neither historical nor economic connections with the DRC. The UK's part in the intervention was actually symbolic because the total of its military personnel was 85, of which 70 were engineers who worked to upgrade the airfield at Bunia. "For the United Kingdom, Artemis was mainly a confirmation of its desire to promote and lead a European defence policy" (Gegout, 2005: 439). Therefore, the EU intervention is not made first and foremost for humanitarian reasons.

2.7. Libya: A New Age in Humanitarian Intervention? (2011)

In February 2011, the wave of protests that was sweeping the Middle East (known also as "Arab Spring") since December 2010 arrived in Libya. The protests in Libya began peacefully, but were immediately confronted with a violent and repressive response by the Gaddafi administration. The situation quickly turned into a civil war between the opposition and the ruling regime, which used excessive force against civilians. The growing threat of violence in Libya quickly got the Security Council's attention, which held its first considerations on the situation within the first week of protests.

On 26 February, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 under chapter VII of the UN Charter, expressly referring to R2P by "recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population" (S.C. Res. 1970, 2011). Resolution 1970 imposed an arms embargo and other restrictions on travel and Libyan assets, and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. After Gaddafi's explicit threats against civilians in Benghazi, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, with 10 affirmative votes, and abstentions from China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany. Resolution 1973 determined that "the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security." It established a no-fly zone and authorized member states to take "all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack," while expressly "excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory" (S.C. Res. 1973, 2011). On 19 March, a coalition of states, including the U.S., the U.K, and France began military action against Libyan targets. Libyan rebel forces removed the Gaddafi regime and taken control of Tripoli by August 2011.

In the Libyan case, the Security Council not only announced that the member states cannot use state sovereignty as a shield to conduct gross human rights violations, but also it endorsed the R2P Doctrine as a justification to militarily intervene in states. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission convened by the Canadian government in 2001, proposed the R2P Doctrine. According to the R2P Doctrine, although each state is individually responsible to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, in the event of a state's unwillingness or failure to prevent those, the international community is given the responsibility to warn the state and, if deemed necessary, militarily intervene (ICISS, 2001a).

According to Gareth Evans, the intervention was "a textbook case of the [R2P] norm working exactly as it was supposed to" (Evans, 2011: 40). The Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also declared that the intervention "affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government" (Ban, 2011). The intervention in Libya may be considered a new age in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention because it was the first time the Security Council adopted the R2P Doctrine.

On the other hand, there are commentators who point out that the intervention in Libya was not an R2P practice in fact. For example, Garwood-Gowers (2013: 606-608) argues that textual analysis of Resolution 1973 on Libya reveals that states did not expressly acknowledge the international dimension of the R2P Doctrine, and even from a point of a very optimistic view it was only a partial endorsement of the R2P Doctrine. Similarly, statements made by two permanent members of the Security Council in the aftermath of the adoption of Resolution 1973 may evidence this finding. Russia stated that it had serious questions about the intervention such as how the no-fly zone would be enforced, what the rules of engagement would be, and what limits on the use of force there would be. (UN Doc S/PV.6498, 2011: 8). China also declared that it had "difficulty with parts of the resolution" and it preference was to "resolve the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means" (UN Doc S/PV.6498, 2011: 11).

Additionally, some commentators argue that the R2P Doctrine is the product of a struggle to justify the negative perceptions of humanitarian interventions. For example, Thakur (2011) claims that the NATO intervention in Libya marks a triumph for R2P, but also raises questions about how to prevent the possible abuses by the permanent members of the Security Council to use international force for purposes beyond human protection.

2.7.1. Motivations for the Intervention

It might be claimed that U.N.-authorized NATO intervention in Libya was undertaken to protect the national interests of the intervening states as well as to protect the civilians from a cruel dictator. Two self-interested motivations were economic interests and security concerns. First, the access to Libya's oil reserves was vital for European states. Libya has exported roughly 85 percent of oil to several European states, such as Italy, France, Spain and the UK (Kazianis, 2011). Libyan oil accounted for more than 28 percent of Italy's, 17 percent of France's, and 8 percent of UK's oil imports (Datta, 2014: 386). During the civil war, oil production dropped to less than 20 percent of Libya's domestic needs (Datta, 2014: 386).

Thus, since it caused great damage to the economies of those oil importing European states, those states played important roles in the intervention.

Second, Western states were concerned that Libya could turn to a terrorist-sponsored state again if Gaddafi won the civil war, which would greatly threaten the security of Europe because of Libya's proximity to the continent. Also, the conflict had a mission to eliminate the potential to create safe havens for al-Qaeda, which is why the U.S. was among the intervening states. Third, Libya's possession and potential use of chemical weapons against the intervening countries constituted a security risk. "Because [Gaddafi] was not generally considered a rational actor, his possession of weapons was a threat to Western states" (Yoshida, 2013).

Therefore, the interests of NATO members, both economic and safety related, played a key role in the intervention. In other words, the realist theory explains the interveners' motivations in Libya better compared to altruistic theorists. (Kazianis, 2011).

Conclusion

This article tested the neo-realist theory with the focus on humanitarian intervention, a very controversial practice in international relations. After examining seven cases in which the Security Council made explicit references to human rights abuses in states, and authorized military interventions, the first finding is that the new trend in the Security Council's practice as well as within the international relations system is evolving from a narrow-minded state sovereignty in which governments have full authority on their citizens to a new one that gives clues of a more humane world.

Another conclusion of these military interventions is that states typically take into account multiple factors when undertaking a military intervention such as whether there are possible economic, social, political outcomes; humanitarian values; national interests and other states' interests. In this sense, humanitarian considerations alone are unlikely to be sufficient for states to undertake military interventions costing large amount of money and putting their soldiers at risk. Therefore, it is safe to argue that states have adopted Kenneth Waltz's conception that in a self-help international relations system, states determine their foreign policy largely based on their national interests, therefore acting only based on altruistic motives is not considered a rational foreign policy practice. (Waltz, 2001).

R. J. Vincent suggests that, if states systematically violate human rights, "*then* there might fall to the international community a duty of humanitarian intervention" (Vincent, 1986: 127). Similarly, for Michael Walzer, "[h]umanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts 'that shock the moral conscience of mankind'" (Walzer, 1977: 107).

However, the practice so far has justified Waltz's position that gaining power is of central importance and states are unlikely to pull the trigger unless there is a potential benefit. As the Syrian case, where the Security Council has been deadlocked due to the unwillingness of Russia and China who have veto power, has shown since 2011, the Security Council's general attitude towards such interventions creates a selectivity issue. When there is either a conflict of national interests among permanent five members of the Security Council or no interests at all, an intervention is unlikely to occur. When other

variables for the success of an intervention — such as public support, military power of the country that the intervention is taken against, or international agreement over the intervention — are taken into account, purely altruistic interventions become highly impossible.

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