

SOME ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM RULE IN SUDAN (1899-1914)

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İsmail Hakkı GÖKSOY*

ABSTRACT

Although Sudan together with Egypt had been officially a part of Ottoman Empire, the country came under the joint administration of Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule in 1899. Afterwards, the British authorities tried to separate Sudan from Egypt in terms of its political and administrative systems. They administered the country as a separate and autonomous region with the “condominium agreement” of 1899. Initially there was a British governor-general who came originally from military personnel. He was responsible for the administration of the country at the top level. Later on a civilian British governor-general was appointed to that post. Various administrative departments connected to the office of governor-general were created gradually, which had responsibility in the administration of the country. An advisory council attached to the governor-general’s office was formed from senior officials to help him in administrative affairs. In addition, the British established the civil, financial and legal departments as well as the political and intelligence unit called as “Sudan agent”. All the departments were headed by the British officials at the top levels, while the Egyptian officials were working at the lower levels of the administration and their numbers were kept in a limited one. The proportion of local Sudanese elements in the administration has been tried to gradually increase. The British followed a careful and balanced policy towards the local tribes and developed various ties with them. The native people so became more adoptable to accept the current system of administration, and they were encouraged to take over the posts at the lower levels. Although Sudan was depended initially on the Egyptian budget in terms of financial matters, it reached gradually to a sufficient level to form its own budget. The Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule applied in the country before the First World War constituted a basis for Sudan’s emergence as an independent state in the future.

Keywords: Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, British Rule in Sudan.

SUDAN’DA İNGİLİZ-MISIR ORTAK YÖNETİMİNİN BAZI ÖZELLİKLERİ (1899-1914)

ÖZET

Mısır’ın bir parçası olarak Sudan, resmen Osmanlı Devleti’ne bağlı olmakla birlikte 1899 yılından itibaren İngiliz-Mısır ortak yönetimi altına girmişti. İngilizler Sudan’ı baştan itibaren siyasi ve idari olarak Mısır’dan ayırmaya ve 1899 tarihli “condominium” anlaşması ile bölgeyi ayrı ve özerk bir ülke gibi yönetmeye başladılar. Başlangıçta ülkenin en yüksek seviyede yönetiminden sorumlu asker kökenli bir genel vali bulunurken, daha sonra sivil bir İngiliz genel valisi atandı. Zamanla Sudan’ın yönetiminden sorumlu ve genel valiye bağlı çeşitli birimler kuruldu. Kıdemli görevlilerden oluşan ve genel valiye bağlı bir danışma konseyi oluşturularak idari işlerde ona yardımcı oldu. Ayrıca, genel valiye bağlı sivil, mali ve hukuki birimler ile “Sudan agent” denilen siyasi ve istihbarat birimi kuruldu. Tüm bu birimlerin başında da yönetici olarak İngiliz yetkililer bulunmaktaydı. Mısırlı memurlar ise daha çok alt seviyelerdeki makamlarda görev yapmakta ve onların sayıları da sınırlı tutulmaktaydı. İdaredeki Sudanlı yerel unsurların oranı da, giderek artırılmaya çalışıldı. İngilizler ülkedeki kabilelere karşı dikkatli ve dengeli bir siyaset izleyerek ve kabile reisleriyle çeşitli ilişkiler geliştirerek yerel halkın mevcut yönetimi benimsemelerini sağladılar. Eğitim alanında daha çok meslek elemanı yetiştirmeye ve idari bürolarda ihtiyaç duyulan ara eleman sıkıntısını gidermeye yönelik politika izlediler. Mali bakımdan Sudan ilk zamanlar Mısır’a bağımlı olurken, zamanla kendi bütçesini karşılayacak bir seviyeye getirildi. Böylece, Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesindeki İngiliz-Mısır ortak yönetimi Sudan’ın daha sonra müstakil bir ülke olarak ortaya çıkmasına temel teşkil etti.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sudan, İngiliz-Mısır Sudanı, Sudan’da İngiliz Yönetimi.

1. Introduction

The northern and eastern parts of Sudan was under Ottoman rule from the middle of the 16th century till the beginning of 19th century.¹ The conquest of the whole parts of the country was undertaken by Muhammad Ali Pasha, the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, in 1820. From that time onwards, Sudan was governed by his successors through governors sent from Egypt until 1881, when Muhammad

*. Prof. Dr., Suleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic History and Arts, Isparta/TURKEY.

¹ A considerable part of the data used in this article were drawn from our Master Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester in Great Britain in 1986. However, some additional English and Turkish sources have been consulted to complete this article.

Ahmad al-Mahdi succeeded in rising a revolt against the Turco-Egyptian rule. This revolt coincided with a major crisis in the affairs of the central Egyptian government, provided by bankruptcy and the armed forces' mutiny led by Ahmed Arabi Pasha against the Khedive. The outcome of this crisis was that Britain occupied Egypt in September 1882 in the hope of protecting her economic interests and of restoring the domestic authority of the Khedive. Faced with the success of the Mahdist revolt² in Sudan and with the penury of Egypt's treasury, the British government decided in late 1883 that the Khedive should abandon the entire Sudan. Only certain parts of the Red Sea ports were retained under British-Egyptian control. The Khedive and his ministers accepted this policy of abandonment under the strongest protest.³

However, by 1890 the colonial expansion of France and Italy into regions close to the Nile Valley had forced the British government to reconsider its policy of abandonment. While Sudan might safely be left to the Sudanese, the security of Britain's own position in Egypt would be seriously damaged if it were to fall into the hands of another European great power. In theory, the central position of Sudan could give military and economic control of Egypt to any great power as well. Neither Britain nor Egypt could permit any power to acquire rights on the river or its tributaries, because the Nile was the source of Egypt's prosperity and a means by which Britain could safeguard her position in Egypt. It was also considered that the importance of the Nile to Egypt compares to the Suez Canal to the British Empire. The loss of the Nile would have forced the British out of Egypt, and her hold in the Suez would possibly be endangered.⁴

Egypt had always pressed strongly upon the British representative in Cairo, Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) the need to win Sudan back for Egypt. Egyptian Prime Minister Riaz Pasha maintained on one occasion that "the Nile is the life of Egypt ... The Nile means the Sudan... If any powers took possession of the banks of the Nile, it would be all over with Egypt. The Government of His Highness the Khedive will never willingly consent, not without compulsion, to such an attack on its existence".⁵ While the Egyptian government found it necessary to regain her lost territory in Sudan, Britain wished to extend her sphere of influence in the Nile Valley. Therefore, British policy was to keep all of the European powers away from the whole of the Nile basins in order to secure her position in Egypt.⁶

One of the great powers to take an interest in the Upper Nile region was Italy. The Italians signed the Treaty of Ucciali⁷ with the Ethiopian King Menelek in May 1889, by which they gained the protection of Abyssinia as regards foreign affairs. The Italians also laid claim to Kassala region which commanded the Atbara tributary of the Nile. By this way, they could go further towards the city of Khartoum. This became the first threat to the British in the imperial conflict. In the view of Lord Cromer, the Italians evidently wanted to extend their influence westwards to the Valley of the Nile. The British government therefore followed "a strictly defensive policy" together with careful diplomacy to keep the Italians out of the Nile Valley until a more convenient time.⁸

In 1891 Italy and Britain signed an agreement⁹ by which Italy obtained temporary occupation of Kassala from Britain in order to weaken the Dervishes, who were their common enemy in the region. The strategically important city of Kassala was occupied in July 1891 by the Italians in pursuance of the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1891. On this occasion, the Italian Foreign Minister wrote to Clare Ford, the British Ambassador at Rome, stating that "this military operation on the part of the Italian forces does not prejudice any territorial question. It preserves Masawa and Suakin from fresh attacks, and for the moment places Italy in a co-occupant with England of Egyptian territory in virtue of interest which are

². See for the Mahdist movement, P. M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1958.

³. Harold MacMichael, *The Sudan*, Ernest Benn, London 1954, pp.42-43.

⁴. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925*, Oxford University Press, London 1927, Vol.1, pp.234-235.

⁵. Robinson, R. E., J. Callagher, A. Denny, *Africa and Victorings: The Official Mind of Imperialism*, Macmillan, London 1961, pp.283-284.

⁶. Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question*, Faber & Faber, London 1951, p.87.

⁷. Edward Hertstel, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, Vol. I-II, Harrison and Sons, Second and Revised Edition, London 1896, Vol.1, pp.12-17.

⁸. Robinson – Callagher – Denny, *Africa and Victorings*, pp.284-285.

⁹. Hertstel, *The Map of Africa by Treaty*, Vol. II, p.668.

common to both countries".¹⁰ However, Cromer and British Prime Minister Salisbury looked on the question of Kassala from different points of views. They thought that diminishing the power of the Khalifa Abdullah in that region should be a prime policy, and without destroying him Kassala would have little value.¹¹ So, the British attitude towards Sudan had been based on the calculation that the Khalifa would decline far enough to be occupied Sudan, beside protecting the Nile from the other European powers.

Another European great power having interest in the region was France. Since the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, France had always opposed to British actions in Egypt, and did not recognise any British sphere in the Nile Valley. France intended to utilize the presence of a French expedition on the Nile to force the British out of Egypt.¹² The French planned to penetrate eastward from Central Africa to Bahr al-Ghazal, and then reach the Upper Nile. French Foreign Minister, T. Delcasse, even discussed with Lord Salisbury (Prime Minister of England) the matter of Sudan on the 8th September of 1893 in London. The main point of discussion was the partition of the Nile. Delcasse argued that the Upper Nile Valley and Bahr al-Ghazal had not been effectively ruled by the Khalifa. Therefore, France could claim rights of expansion in these regions. Salisbury replied that Britain could not recognise any French political rights over any portion of the Nile Valley. But, he was ready to let France have a purely commercial outlet on the Nile without any political concessions.¹³ In order to prevent French expansion into the Nile Valley, Britain put forward the idea that Egypt had a dormant claim in these territories, because the Sudan was formally under her rule.¹⁴ The question of the Nile Valley was even raised in the House of Commons on the 11th March 1895. Towards the possibility of a French expedition from the West of Africa with the intention of occupying up to the Nile Valley, the British government maintained that "the British and Egyptian spheres of influence covered the whole of the Nile waterway."¹⁵

By June 1898 it became clear that the French would reach a point on the Nile and the Abyssinians would advance along the Blue Nile. It was also known that Menelek had sought the support of France, after the denunciation of the treaty of Ucciali by Abyssinia. France continued to claim that she had as much right in Sudan as the British in Uganda.¹⁶ When the French officer M. Marchand with his party reached at Fashoda on the 10th July of 1898 and hoisted a French flag there, the British authorities considered the presence of French forces at Fashoda as a direct violation of the rights of Egypt and Great Britain. They protested the French occupation of Fashoda and the hoisting of a French flag in the Khedive's dominions. After the strong negotiations between Britain and France on the 4th November 1898, the French forces withdraw from Fashoda,¹⁷ and a convention was signed a few weeks later (21 March 1899). According to this convention, France was excluded from the whole Nile Basins, and in return the Congo and Chad Basins remained under the French sphere.¹⁸

2. The Overthrow of the Mahdist State

Guarding the Nile Valley by diplomacy against Italy and France seemed to be uncertain to the British. After the defeat of the Italians at Adua by the Dervishes on March 1, 1896, this matter entered a different phase. Then, the British left the abandonment policy towards Sudan and wanted to regain the country together with the Egyptian Khedive. In March 1896, the British government decided to occupy Dongola from the northern Sudan to relieve the pressure upon the Italians as well as prepare for an

¹⁰ Mekki Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan, 1882-1902*, Oxford University Press, London 1952, pp.327,331.

¹¹ Robinson – Callagher - Denny, *Africa and Victorings*, p.347.

¹² J. A. S. Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Ministry: The Close of the Nineteenth Century*, The Athlone Press, London 1932, p.108.

¹³ Grenville, *Lord Salisbury and Foreign Ministry*, p.233.

¹⁴ Temperley - Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy*, pp.501-502,505.

¹⁵ Harold Temperley - Lillian M. Penson, *Foundations of British Foreign Policy (1792-1902)*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/London 1938, p.502.

¹⁶ William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902)*, Vol. II, Knopf, Second Edition, New York 1935, p.557.

¹⁷ See for the Fashoda crisis, Darrell Bates, *The Fashoda Incident of 1898*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1984.

¹⁸ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, p.471; Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, Vol. II, p.570.

anticipated action by the French upon the Upper Nile.¹⁹ Arrangements for the occupation of Dongola were made by sending Indian troops to Suakin.

The advance to Dongola started in September 1896 with the occupation of Karma, it continued with the evacuation of Hafir by the Khalifa's forces. Finally, the Egyptian flag was hoisted on the old building of the province headquarters in Dongola on the 23rd September 1896. After the Dongola campaign, a further advance onto Khartum depended on purely a question of money. For this reason, the British government informed Cromer that "There is no change in our policy with respect to the Sudan advance. Financial considerations do not, in our judgement, make it possible to carry our occupation further than Marawi this year".²⁰

Any further delay in taking Khartum might give rise to difficulties with the French on the Upper Nile. The Cancellor of the Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks Beach explained to the House of Commons that "Egypt would never be permanently secure so long as a hostile power remained in occupation of the Nile up to Khartum".²¹ Furthermore it was reported to the Sirdar Kitchener²² as the commander of joint British and Egyptian forces that the Khalifa Abdullah had relinquished his offensive plans and was busy building forts at Omdurman for defensive purposes. Also it was known that the Khalifa Abdullah tried to make good relations with the Ethiopian Emperor Menelek. For that, he sent missions to him for moral support.²³

In May 1897, the Khalifa Abdullah also sent an envoy to Istanbul to get recognition from the Ottoman sultan. Headed by Suleyman b. Inger, this envoy claimed that Sudan has not been ruled by Egypt, but administered independently by the Sudanese themselves. Therefore Suleyman b. Inger requested from the Ottoman government a khedivate status for Sudan like Egypt, and in return they would obey the Ottoman Caliph as a legitimate ruler over the people in Sudan and give up the use of the mahdi and khalifa titles. The Ottoman government, having discussed the matter, were suspected of the letter brought by this envoy, considering that it was not written in Sudan, but might have been composed on the way to Istanbul. The government therefore wanted to know about the accuracy of the letter and referred it to its representative in Cairo for further investigation.²⁴

The advance onto Khartum needed more railway building. Khartum campaign therefore became achievable by constructing a railway line from Wadi Halfa to Ebu Hamad. Following his defeat of a Dervish force at Atbara in April 1898, Kitchener ordered a general advance upon Omdurman, where he routed the Khalifa's main army. He did not finish off the whole thing at Omdurman, and continued the advance to Khartum.²⁵ The whole of Sudan came consequently under the British and Egyptian rule. The British and Egyptian flags were hoisted side by side as a symbol of the judicial equality of the two countries.²⁶

3. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement and Ottoman Reactions to It

Sudan was brought under the Anglo-Egyptian rule by the joint English and Egyptian troops who were officered and trained by the Englishmen in the name of the Khedive of Egypt. However, thereafter decisive action was taken in the name of the British government alone and Britain was given a preponderant authority in the administration of the Sudan. Lord Salisbury described this policy clearly in his letter to Cromer in August 1898: "You explain to the Khedive and to his ministers that the procedure I have indicated is intended to emphasise the fact that Her Majesty's Government consider that they have a predominant voice in all matters connected with the Sudan, and that they expect that

¹⁹. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, Vol. II, p.537.

²⁰. Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan*, p.373.

²¹. Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, Macmillan, London 1908, p.94.

²². See for Kitchener, Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*, E. P. Dutton, London 1958; George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, Vol. I, Macmillan, London 1977.

²³. Shibeika, *British Policy in the Sudan*, pp.382,387-388.

²⁴. *Osmanlı İdaresinde Sudan* (Compiler: Publication Committee), General Directorate of State Archives, Department of Ottoman Archives Publications (Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları), No:124, İstanbul 2013, pp.46, 246-247.

²⁵. Magnus, *Kitchener*, p.111.

²⁶. G. N. Sanderson, *England, Europe and The Upper Nile, 1882-1898*, Edinburg University Press, Edinburg 1965, p.266.

any advice they may think fit to render to the Egyptian Government in respect to Sudan Affairs, will be followed.”²⁷

On January 4, 1899, at Omdurman Lord Cromer himself made a speech to the shaikhs and notables of Sudan, saying that “You see that both the British and Egyptian flags are floating over this house. That is an indication that for the future you will be governed by the Queen of England and by the Khedive of Egypt. The only representative of both states in Sudan will be Serdar. Britain and Egypt is full of confidence in the person sitting in this chair. Sudan not from Cairo or London, but will be administered from Khartum.”²⁸

Cromer did not wish for the direct annexation of the country by Britain, because of the financial burdens on the British Empire. Annexation would also have necessarily reawakened French, Turkish and Egyptian hostilities towards the British. He, furthermore, was not willing to recognise Sudan as a portion of Egypt or the Ottoman Empire.²⁹ Thus, Cromer decided to create a “hybrid form of government” by the Condominium Agreement of 1899 which enabled Britain to become a *de facto* ruler over the country with the possible satisfaction of the Egyptians as the co-governors of Sudan.³⁰

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement for the administration of Sudan established British sovereignty over Sudan “by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the said system of administration and legislation”.³¹ In the Agreement, no reference was made to Ottoman sovereignty over Sudan. It was practically “swept away by a stroke of the pen”³², although the Khedive of Egypt had no right to conclude treaties with any foreign power other than commercial and customs conventions.

The British and Egyptian flags were jointly hoisted for the purposes that it would bring the political theory of the Condominium into harmony with reality. However, by article three, the Khedive’s authority over Sudanese affairs was made dependent on the consent of British government. Even the appointment of the Governor-General was also under the authority of the British, although his formal appointment would be issued by the Egyptian Khedive. The Condominium Agreement denied the validity of Egyptian laws, decrees, and mixed tribunals in Sudan. The special privileges, enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt, were also barred by the same agreement. It empowered the Governor-General with full power to promulgate laws and regulations and to change them whenever necessary under the martial law imposed over the country. The Governor-General was invested with supreme military and civil authority, and he would only be disposed from his office by the British. The application of Egyptian laws and decrees was excluded from Sudan. There will be no foreign consulate offices in Sudan. Europeans were given the right to trade freely and to reside in Sudan, but were granted no special privileges or capitulations. By the article ninth the country was put under martial law so that the Governor-General might have power to maintain law and order, and to expel any trouble-makers from the country.³³

Six months later a Supplementary Agreement abrogated the Egyptian system of mixed tribunals at the port of Suakin and withdrew Egypt’s right to fly her flag there independently. The two agreements rendered Sudan a separate and autonomous country.³⁴

The Condominium agreement created a big confusion among the Ottoman statesmen in Istanbul. Ottoman Sultan II. Abdulhamid and his government maintained that the agreement was contrary to the firmans given to the Khedive of Egypt, and also it contravened the Ottoman legal documents concerning with the administration of Sudan. It was argued that Sudan has been recognised as an Ottoman territory in the previous agreements made with the British. It was also stated that the British always made a

^{27.} Muddathir Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1969, p.29.

^{28.} Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, pp.115-116.

^{29.} Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, pp.30-31.

^{30.} See for the status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, pp.232-240.

^{31.} Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.233, App. II, the preamble of the Agreement.

^{32.} Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p.117.

^{33.} See the articles IV, V, VIII of the agreement, Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, App. II, pp.234-235. See for the analysis of the agreement L. A. Fabunmi, *The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics, 1800-1956*, Greenwood Press, London, 1960, pp.51-61.

^{34.} See for the full texts of these agreements, Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, App. II (p.213) and App. III (p.226); Göksoy, “The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914”, pp.10-13.

commitment to that effect, as Cromer said that “Sudan should be regarded as Ottoman territory”. Even the British officials claimed to the French authorities as their colonial rival in Africa during the Fashoda crisis that the Fashoda area was an Ottoman territory. So, they asked them to evacuate from this region of Sudan very urgently.³⁵

Despite this, the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire over Sudan was not mentioned at all in the Condominium Agreement. The Ottoman government declared its non-recognition of new administration in Sudan, and sent protests to the British government through its legation in London. It maintained that the Egyptian Khedive did not have any right to sign such political agreement, and considered the said agreement as invalid. The appointment of a British governor-general to a part of its territory was not also acceptable, since Sudan was legally and politically under Ottoman sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government protested in that way, but it could not take the matter further on, because of the balance of powers and real politics of the period.³⁶ In fact, the British always tried to distance Sudan from Egypt and Egypt from the Ottoman Empire.

4. The Form of Central Government and Its Departments

After the signing of the Condominium Agreement, Sudan was put under the administration of a British Governor-General named Sirdar Kitchener (Horatio Herbert Kitchener) who was also the commander of the joint British and Egyptian army forces. His appointment was revealed on the same day that the Condominium Agreement was signed on 19 January 1899. He was also declared to be “Lord Kitchener of Khartoum” afterwards. The establishment of new administration commenced under his Governor-Generalship.³⁷ However, when he was appointed to another mission in South Africa in December 1899, Reginald Wingate as the director of military intelligence unit succeeded him as the second Governor-General of Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. He ruled Sudan until 1916.

At the central administration, the Governor-General was assisted by a Secretary-General, an Inspector-General, a Legal Secretary, a Financial Secretary and Directors of Departments. The chief departments were those of Surveys, Works, Education, Irrigation, Medicine and Sanitation, Woods and Forests, Agriculture and Lands, Railways, Steamers and Boats, Telegraphs and Posts, Customs, Game Preservations, Veterinary Work and Slavery Repression.³⁸ However, the government’s general policy and all the major administrative measures were formulated by Lord Cromer in Egypt, while the details of execution were left to the Governor-General in Sudan. In his letter to Kitchener, Cromer expressed the principles of his relations with Sudan as follows: “Generally what I want is to control the big questions, but to leave all the detail and execution to be managed locally.”³⁹

As the country was governed under martial law, higher ranks of the administration both in Khartoum and in the provinces were mainly dominated by army officers. The British and Egyptian troops were organised in peace time by the Governor-General who delegated the command of the British troops to senior British officers. In emergency cases, the British officers also commanded the mixed British and Egyptian troops, while Egyptian officers were kept in a sub-ordinate position. On one occasion, Cromer stated that “These officers constitute the best possible agents for the administration of a country in the present condition of the Sudan.”⁴⁰ Therefore, the system of the government during the Condominium period could be described as an “autocracy on military lines for civil purposes”, so that people could be pacified easily, and the country be organised properly by direct control with close supervision by the Government. The Governor-General’s authority in the provinces was exercised through his representatives who were themselves directly in contact with the people.⁴¹

^{35.} See for the Ottoman reactions to this agreement, Komisyon, *Osmanlı İdaresinde Sudan*, pp.47, 292-297; Ali Bilgenoğlu, “İngiliz Sömürgeciliğinin Mısır ve Sudan Örneğinde Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çözümlemesi”, Dokuz Eylül University, Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, Department of History, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, İzmir 2013, pp.286-287.

^{36.} Tarig Mohamed Nour, “Sevakin’de Türk-İngiliz Rekabeti”, İstanbul University, Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, Department of History, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, İstanbul 2006, pp.274-275, 282.

^{37.} See for his biography, P. Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*, Dutton, London 1958.

^{38.} E. A. W. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan: Its History and Monuments*, Vol. II, Kegan Paul, London 1907, p.502.

^{39.} Gabriel Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1916*, Frank Cass, London 1971, p.3.

^{40.} Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate*, p.79.

^{41.} Harold MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Faber and Faber, London 1934, p.108.

An advisory Council to the Governor-General was set up in January 1910 to meet the administrative needs of the country. It consisted of four ex-officio members, namely the inspector-general, the financial, legal and civil secretaries, and between two and four members appointed by the Governor-General himself. Cromer argued that this new Council “will tend to promote administrative stability and continuity of policy in Sudan affairs, and will prove a very useful part of the machinery of the government”. The suggestion to include a native member into this council was, however, turned down by Wingate, because he thought that there were no such people in Sudan suitable to occupy a seat on the Council.⁴²

The Council could act in an advisory capacity in all matters of promotion, appointments, defence and military affairs when permitted to do so by the governor-general. Heads of departments and provincial governors could also bring to the council business relating to their own departments and provinces, but the governors had first to obtain the sanction of the governor-general. In general, no action involving major policy was to be taken by either the Governor-General acting alone, or by the Council itself, before consulting the Consul-General in Cairo, who could convey the views of the British and Egyptian Governments. The Governor-General had supreme authority to overrule the council’s decisions or to suspend their operations. In such cases, however, he was obliged to record his reasons and refer the matter to the British and Egyptian governments. All ordinances, laws and regulations were to be enacted by proclamation through this Council. The annual budget and supplementary credits were also to be passed through this Council.⁴³

The first meeting of the Council was held at the palace of the Governor-General in Khartoum on 27th January 1910. The meeting mostly dealt with problems of land-ownership, personnel, agriculture, trade and the yearly budget.⁴⁴ This council mainly caused the introducing of a form of “constitutionalism” into the administration, delegating some responsibilities to the various heads of departments and governors of provinces in respect of their several spheres. The Council also formalised conversations about the problems of the Sudanese affairs in the administration, and unofficial relations between the Governor-General and the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt.⁴⁵

In addition to this Council, a department called Sudan Agent was formed by transferring initially some staff of the intelligence department of the Egyptian army to Khartoum. It functioned as a channel of communication between the Sudanese and Egyptian departments as well as the British agent in Cairo. The 1903 circular stated that “The Sudan agent will broadly be the channel of communication between the other world and civil administration of the Sudan government.... He will be the channel between the Sudan and the various offices of the Egyptian Ministers and the Army of occupation... He will be the sole channel between the Departments of the Sudan Government.... and the British Agent and Consul-General.”⁴⁶ After intense discussion about its duties, in 1904 the Sudan agent was made a part of the civil Secretary’s Office until 1907, when it was separated from the intelligence service. Later on, it became a sole representative of the Sudanese affairs in Cairo, by submitting Sudan Government’s ordinances to the Consul-General in Cairo and the Egyptian authorities. Its duties also included commercial negotiations, the sale and registration of Sudanese lands, and the recruiting of officials from other Arabic speaking countries. The Intelligence department in Khartoum was also under this Sudan Agent and the director of Intelligence in Cairo. It was led by an assistant director in Khartoum under the direct supervision of the Inspector-General Slatin.⁴⁷

The separation of military administrative system from that of civilian was gradually applied. The supreme authority of Wingate as the Governor-General in all military and civil administrative matters concerning the provinces remained unchallenged throughout his office term. In 1905, a system for recruiting young British university graduates into civil service under the Sudan Government was initiated. They were selected by a board set up in Cairo. In the provinces, eight civilians were appointed as assistant inspectors in the government of Sudan, while a few retired military officers remained in the

⁴². Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.47.

⁴³. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, pp.47-48. See also full text of Governor-General’s Council Ordinances, *Ibid*, pp.241-243. Appendix V.

⁴⁴. Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate*, p.76.

⁴⁵. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p.113.

⁴⁶. Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate*, pp.59-60.

⁴⁷. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.60-62.

administration. After taking one-year courses in Arabic as well as other administrative subjects, these university graduates were appointed as deputy inspectors; some later became provincial governors and heads of departments.⁴⁸ In 1909, the first civilian governor of a province was appointed, and within three years their number had reached three out of twelve. Two more were added in 1914. However, the use of military officers in the administration continued, as the process of pacification was not deemed to have been completed.⁴⁹

The Sudanisation of the administration was encouraged especially at the lower level. The British policy was to create a native class suitable for the administrative purposes in the local offices. Cromer defined this policy clearly, when he visited Khartum in 1903, stating "It is, to say at least, very difficult to govern any country properly without some administrative assistance from its inhabitants. In the Sudan the whole governing agency is practically foreign, for it must not be forgotten that the Egyptian is quite as much a foreigner as an Englishman", and he continued "I do not doubt that R. Wingate will do all in his power to create a class of the subordinate posts under the government. High education is, of course, for the time being, quite out of the question, but if we limit our ambition to reading, writing, and arithmetic we ought to be able to produce some satisfactory results."⁵⁰ Whenever sufficiently educated Sudanese could be found to be appointed to official positions, they were willingly given preference, even though they required further training at Gordon College.

5. Provincial Administration

For administrative and military purposes, Sudan was divided into a number of provinces, each of which was put under the direct rule of a British military governor. These provinces were further subdivided into districts with British district commissioners, and small units administered by Egyptian officials (mamurs).⁵¹ The number of provinces varied from time to time. Initially, there were seven provinces called as "Muduriyah" and also three districts named as "Muhafiziyah" according to the provincial units adopted during the Turco-Egyptian rule since 1820's.⁵² In 1907, the Muduriyahs (or First Class Provinces) included those of Khartum, Sennar, Kordofon, Fashoda, Bahr al-Ghazal, Kassala, Barbar, Dongola, while the Muhafiziyahs (or Second Class Provinces) were those of Jazira, White Nile, Red Sea, Mongalla and Halfa.⁵³ Later on, in 1914 there were fourteen administrative provinces in the country.

Kitchener, as the first governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, laid down the principles of provincial administration by instructing the British provincial governors (mudirs) and district inspectors "to make the government of your district as great a contrast as possible to that of the Dervishes". This was to be achieved through the "individual action of British officers, working independently, but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained."⁵⁴ Thus, Kitchener's idea of collaboration was based upon the individual collaborators, rather than upon groups and classes of the people. Furthermore, "the greatest care and circumspection exercised in selecting the class of minor officials who are in immediate touch with the people". Besides this cooperation with the native classes, it was found necessary to create a class of artisans and clerks to fill minor posts in the administration both in Khartum and in the provincial administrative centers. Gordon College was established in order to meet this need. At the provincial level, the government authorities were required to follow mainly a policy of non-interference in the people's religion, low taxation, and a toleration of domestic slavery.⁵⁵

⁴⁸. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, pp.82,83; P. F. Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution: A Study of the Economic, Financial, and Administrative Conditions of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Constable & Co. Ltd., London 1921, pp.42,43.

⁴⁹. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.43; Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.74.

⁵⁰. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.87-88.

⁵¹. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.49.

⁵². Mehmed Mihrî, *Sûdân Seyahatnamesi*, Matbaa of Ahmed İhsân and His Partners, İstanbul 1326 [1909], pp. 307-326.

⁵³. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, pp.393-409.

⁵⁴. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.239. memorandum to Mudirs.

⁵⁵. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, pp.41-46; see also Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", pp.17-19.

The administration at the provincial level aimed to decentralise the affairs from Khartoum headquarters. The provincial governors were given more power within the general framework of existing laws in the administrative problems of their own provinces, especially in view of the vast area of the country and the poor system of transport. However, affairs within the provinces were governed by the opposite principle, in that the lower the level in the provincial administration the greater was the degree of control from above. The Inspectors (or District Commissioners) could sometimes act as if they were governors in their districts, the Mamurs were very closely scrutinized by their superiors, and in turn, these Mamurs kept careful watch over the Shaikhs and the Chiefs.⁵⁶ Although little change in the administration of provinces was made by the 1910 council, the above system of government and its basis has remained essentially the same. The various technical departments also operated in the provinces in collaboration with the governors and their staff.⁵⁷ The duties of governors, inspectors and mamurs were laid down by Kitchener in his first memorandum to Mudirs⁵⁸ in 1899, which was also followed by Wingate in his seventeen years Governor-Generalship.⁵⁹

The Mudirs as the provincial governors in the provinces were responsible for the preservation of public order, the maintenance of justice between communities and individuals acting as the chief magistrate. They supervised over other officials' functions and in allocating duties to the staff of district commissioners, mamurs, police and prison officers and clerical staff. They were also responsible for budgeting for the provinces.⁶⁰

The system of direct rule at the district levels was personified by the district inspectors, while the mudirs themselves remained as the head of the districts. These inspectors were defined as "the mudir's staff officer in charge of the district to which they are appointed by the mudirs", but they were not "channels of communication between mamurs and the mudiriah".⁶¹ Their duties were to supervise the administration of their particular sub-districts, and most important to supervise the operations of the police to ensure the maintenance of public security. They acted as judges, administrators, chief surveyors, inspectors of education, chief of police. In other words, they were a "Jack of all trades". When tribal organisation was weak, they also played an active role in administering tribal law and in collecting taxes in certain cases.⁶² The provincial governors and district inspectors were required to gain the confidence of the local people that they ruled.

At the lower level of provincial administration there were the mamurs who carried out all the daily official affairs. They were generally Egyptians and occasionally Sudanese officers who had first-class ability and qualification. They all acted as magistrates in most cases, and held responsibilities for the execution of orders and regulations issued by the Inspectors. Moreover, they executed all decrees and judgements issued by the Qadi (religious judge) from the Islamic Courts, which remained under the Civil Justice.⁶³

The other local leaders such as Omdas and Shaikhs played also important role in the provincial administration. They were selected from among trustworthy natives, who had the confidence and respect of their own people. They acted as government employees under direct British administration, even though they were outside the British bureaucracy. They were expected to look after their people, but had been given no formal powers, either in administrative or judicial capacity to support them in their task. These native chiefs were allowed to make undefined levies on their people, but later a fixed amount of subsidy was paid by the government to prevent them becoming tyrannical persons towards their people. According to the regulations of the government, the Omdas and Shaikhs were required to report to the Government every event happening in the countryside against the regulations and orders. For instance, Wingate wrote to Ali el-Morghani, the Head of the Khatmiyya Tarikah, saying that "it is expected that you will always spend special attention on their doings, and will not deprive them of your good advices that they may always be good and loyal and try to improve in every way, as the Government looks at

⁵⁶. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.50.

⁵⁷. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p.114.

⁵⁸. See full text of this memorandum, Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, pp.237-240, Appendix IV.

⁵⁹. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.72.

⁶⁰. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p.115; Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.71.

⁶¹. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, p.51

⁶². Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.73; MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, pp.115,116.

⁶³. Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution*, p.49.

you as the head of your family and relations. The Government expects from you to do your best for your family and relations, and that you all carry out loyally the Government's wishes and orders."⁶⁴

6. Government's Tribal Policy and Pacification of the People.

Sudan was peopled by a multitude of tribes drawn from various ethnic groups. Its tribal structure underwent a considerable change during the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist periods. While some of the tribes lost their power and influence, others became dominant and powerful. At the same time, major tribes remained socially and politically intact, and continued to oppose any form of control by outsiders.

The population of Sudan was composed of three different races, namely the Arabs who were stretched up mainly to the north of Sudan; the Negroids; and the Blacks who had usually been slaves. These three main elements were split into fifty major ethnic groups and more than one hundred spoken language-groups. It was estimated that more than two hundred tribes existed at the time of the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan. In each region, one major group dominated the others. Some tribes like the Dinkas and the Nuers in the South, were separate communities which were socially and territorily closed to each other, despite their common languages, cultures and historical origin.⁶⁵

In all tribes, the males were divided into ranks according to their ages, capabilities and duties. The elders advised their tribe in all aspects of life, while the youths fought against tribes and outsiders. The government of the tribal community remained in the hands of the elders, and was inherited by their elder sons. Tribal chiefs exercised their powers in all matters concerning the civil and spiritual needs of the community. They supervised the distribution and allocation of the clan lands as the owner of the lands. They administered the customary law. Some of the tribal leaders were at the same time leaders of religious orders and dealt with the religious affairs of their tribes.⁶⁶

The Condominium administrators faced with strong tribal and religious opposition in some areas. It was very difficult to reduce the power of the tribal and religious leaders and pacify their people who were morally and formally dependent upon their tribal chiefs. The socio-cultural diversity of Sudanese society and the impression that previous governments had left in the country made the solution of these administrative problems more difficult. Some of the tribes like the Dinka, the Nuer and the Nubians had always manifested a spirit of opposition to foreign intrusion into their territories, and they were not used to the idea of centralised authoritative government. In their eyes, the Condominium rule was no different from the previous Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes which they had considered to be outsiders.⁶⁷ Thus, the diversity of Sudanese society and the traditional autonomy of tribal and religious leaders forced the government to follow a careful and subtle tribal policy.

The government tried to establish its posts throughout Sudan in order to secure its authority and pacify the people. To do this, it sought the co-operation of the tribal leaders. In his memorandum to mudirs, governors, inspectors and mamurs, Kitchener defined the principles of the tribal administration: Firstly, cooperation was required with "the better class of natives", namely Shaikhs, for the work of the administration, so that government could gradually influence the whole population. Secondly, the posts of Omdas and Nâzirs, which were first introduced into Sudan during the Turco-Egyptian period, were re-introduced into Sudan to make the tribes more dependent on the direct government authority, and influence over the subordinate tribal units. The Omdas, who had no hereditary power and were known as the "kelb al-hukumah (the dog of government)",⁶⁸ played an important role in facilitating the extension of control. Thirdly, tribes were not only subject to the above administrative authorities, but also found themselves tribally split and even sub-tribally by a number of arbitrarily drawn administrative boundaries for the purposes of administering justice and collecting the taxes. A good example of this was the Beja tribes who were partitioned between three provinces; Berber, Red Sea and Kassala. Inter-tribal unity were expected to be broken under the government's tribal policy, because the government

⁶⁴. Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", pp.28-29.

⁶⁵. See for detail, H. A. MacMichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan*, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922, pp.131-155.

⁶⁶. Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", p.34.

⁶⁷. Lazarus Leek Mawut, *Dinka Resistance to Condominium Rule, 1902-1932*, Graduate College, University of Khartum, Khartum 1983, p.12.

⁶⁸. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.144.

feared an inter-tribal coalition which might result in revolt against its authority. Government usually tried to distance itself from drawing into inter-tribal quarrels.⁶⁹

The resettlement and migration of the tribes was a major feature of the tribal policy. The dislocated tribes during the Mahdia period were re-organised and necessary assistance was given to them by the intelligence departments. For instance, in 1900 the Bakkara tribe, which had been forced to immigrate to Jazira by the Khalifa Abdullah before, was called to return to Kordofan from the Jazira. On the other hand, the population of Omdurman was drastically decreased from 150.000 in 1892 to about 40.000 in 1900 by mass migration to the other parts of Sudan during the early years of Condominium rule. The government's aim at encouraging the re-settlement of the tribes had three justifications: to decrease homogenous hostile population to the government, namely Omdurman; to encourage cultivation; and to restore the tribal map of Sudan in its pre-Mahdist time.⁷⁰ So, government was able to establish the tribal administration through settlement and migration policies of the government.

Armed expeditions were among the features of the government's tribal policy throughout Wingate's governor-generalship, especially in the southern Sudan. In 1900, the government sent agents to the tribal leaders of the southern Sudan with the emphasis of establishing its posts in the area, and flags were given to them for that purpose. However, on the rejection of these agents by the native leaders, the punitive expeditions followed to demonstrate the power of the government to the tribal population and to secure tax collection. By 1905, there were nine military posts in the Bahr al-Ghazal province, totalling 1300 men and 64 officers.⁷¹ In the Upper Nile (Fashoda) and Mongalla provinces, the situation was almost the same. The tribes showed their hostility openly to the government authorities. Even, some of the tribes such as the Dinka and the Nuer in the Fashoda district, attacked each other, because of the allegiance of the Dinka tribe to the government authorities and the given assistance by the officials to come over the Nuer tribe. Moreover, the activities of the missionary societies in the southern Sudan, which were encouraged by the authorities, played an important role in securing the British rule in the area.⁷²

In the northern provinces, the government followed similar policies. Turbulent tribes and religious uprisings were dealt with by police measures in order to establish government's authority firmly. Military operations took place, when the serious revolts occurred. In general, rebellions against the government were mainly associated with religious motives in the northern part of Sudan. In 1903, a feki from Bornu, Muhammad al-Amir claimed to be a mahdi. In 1904 another man, Muhammad Wad Adam asserted that he was a Nabi Isa by using the religious notion that after the mahdi, al-Nabi Isa was bound to come and deliver the faithful and fill the earth with justice.⁷³

The most serious uprising came from the ex-Mahdist groups led by Abd al-Qadir Wad Habboub in the Jazira in 1908. Wingate reported about this event to E. Gorst, by saying that "Mahdism in this country is not really dead; it has been stifled, but there is still plenty of vitality in it. Therefore, it behoves us ... never relax for a moment over precautions to guard against the spread of such movements and the only means of doing this, with our meagre source, is to crush them – almost mercilessly – in its inception". All these uprisings were suppressed through military operations. Another major military operation took place in the Nuba mountains, at Talodi in 1906 against the Arabs who were against the government's anti-slavery measures, and killed the Egyptian mamur. The government's forces massacred many Arabs with the help of the Nuba Makks. After the incident, Wingate reported Cromer that "with our pin point garrisons at al-Obeid, Bara and Talodi we are really ruling the vast Kordofan country far more by bluff than by any things else."⁷⁴

A crucial operation against the Nyima mountains of the Nuba district was undertaken in 1908 to bring the district under the government control. The inhabitants of the area were severely punished. It was described by Savile, then, governor of Kordofan; "On finding no opposition we only burned the houses and grain, and killed all animals."⁷⁵

⁶⁹. A. Paul, *A History of the Beja Tribes of the Sudan*, Frank Cass & Company Ltd., London 1971, pp.123-124.

⁷⁰. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.142.

⁷¹. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, pp.138-139.

⁷². Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", p.38.

⁷³. MacMichael, *A History of the Arabs in the Sudan*, p.98,99-101.

⁷⁴. Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", pp.39-40.

⁷⁵. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, pp.151-152.

Arms legislation were also thought to have a direct bearing on the pacification of the people. Government tried to limit the large quantities of the arms and ammunition, which had been abandoned by the defeated Egyptian and Mahdist armies, and subsequently came into possession of the tribes. However, government continued to hand out firearms to the trusted Shaikhs and other local leaders as a reward for their services for the government.⁷⁶

7. Financial Administration of Sudan and Government's Economic Policy.

The Condominium Agreement offered no guidance as to the financial problems which the new Sudanese administration soon faced. Sudan was bound to require economic assistance from Egyptian treasury for administrative expenses. Article VII of the agreement stated that import duties should not be paid on goods entering Sudan from Egyptian territory, through such duties should be paid on goods imported from elsewhere.⁷⁷ The Finance Ministry of Egypt held the Governor-General of Sudan and his Finance Secretary (who was appointed sometime later after the agreement) responsible for Sudan's budget. "Any special or unseen expenditure which can not be defrayed from the budget and revenues of the Sudan will have to be met by special grants applied for in the usual manner and passed by the Council of Ministers."⁷⁸ Sudanese budget and financial regulations were subject to approval by the newly-established Governor-General's Council from 1910. The Financial Advisor to the Egyptian Government in Cairo had supervisory control over the financial policies of Sudan.

The economic policy of the government aimed at introducing the benefits of Western civilisation into Sudan, thereby also furnishing profits to British entrepreneurs. In 1907, Wingate defined his economic objectives thus: "The task which the Sudan Government has set itself to perform is primarily to confer the benefits of the civilisation on the inhabitants by rendering secure, as far as is possible, their persons and their property; by improving communications across those wide stretches of desert or wilderness; by adding to the fertility of the naturally rich soil by means of artificial irrigation...; and finally by proving... a good port and harbour on the Red Sea within easy access of the interior, whereby the inhabitants may be more economically furnished with their requirements from abroad, and find outside markets for their natural products."⁷⁹

In pursuit of these economic goals, attempts were made to improve communications within Sudan, but more particularly to the eastern Sudan – rather than to the north, linking Sudan with Egypt – by the extension of the railway lines in the north and the reopening of river transport in the south.⁸⁰ The Atbara line was linked with the coast of the Red Sea, and a new port was established, named Port Sudan. It was opened officially in 1909.⁸¹

In the field of agricultural development, the principal project was the Jazira scheme whose purpose was to facilitate the supply of raw material to the British cotton industry in Lancashire. British authorities always encouraged the growing of cotton in the country. Even the British Government in London guaranteed a loan totalling three million pounds for the promotion of cotton growing in Sudan in 1912, so that the Lancashire cotton industry could compete with the cotton industries of the USA, Japan and China.⁸²

Initially, the ability of private enterprise in the country was considered very weak, and its possible success was therefore being doubted by the authorities. In his letter to Wingate in 1901, Cromer expressed his view in this respect saying that "I do not much believe in private enterprise in the Sudan except on terms which throw all the risk on the Government and give all the profits to private

⁷⁶. Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, p.140.

⁷⁷. Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, App. II, p.234.

⁷⁸. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, pp.112-113.

⁷⁹. John Obert Voll- Sarah Potts Voll, *The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multi-Cultural State*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, p.96.

⁸⁰. R. O. Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898-1919*, Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1971, pp.238-240.

⁸¹ R. L. Hill, *Sudan Transport: A History of Railway, Marine and River Services in the Republic of the Sudan*, Oxford University Press, London 1965, pp.52-53 and 67-74.

⁸². Göksoy, "The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914", p.58.

individuals.”⁸³ In general, the government pursued a policy of free trade, but some restrictions were put on the entry of Muslim traders into the southern Sudan.

Although the Condominium rule made Sudan administratively and legally as a distinct and autonomous country from Egypt, the country depended financially on Egypt until 1912, because Sudan was bound to require economic assistance from Egypt for its administrative expenses and infrastructure projects. British authorities eased the financial burdens of the country by granting money from the Egyptian treasury. While solving the country’s financial deficits, they tried to give the impression to the Egyptian authorities that Sudan was a part of Egypt. For instance, on the occasion of the opening of Port Sudan in 1909, British agent in Cairo, Eldon Gorst, wrote to Wingate that “The show should be made as Egyptian as possible... because the Sudan can not possibly make any further progress without capital, and as Great Britain can not or will not find this, you have only Egypt to look to... Therefore, we must try and reconcile the Egyptians to spend some of their money on the Sudan, and the only way to do this is to make them feel that the Sudan is part of Egypt”.⁸⁴

Every year a considerable amount of money was therefore paid from the Egyptian treasury to Sudan in order to meet its budget deficit. Although the amount of payment has been reduced gradually, the annual subvention from the Egyptian treasury continued until 1912, when Sudan’s budget was balanced by an increase in taxes. In 1901, the incomes of Sudan budget was counted only 140.000 Egyptian pounds, but an amount of 417.179 pounds was given from the Egyptian treasury. In 1902 government required an amount of 325.000 pounds as an additional allowance from Egypt’s treasury, while the incomes of Sudan were registered only 1.100.000 Egyptian pounds in the same year. For the year 1905, we see that the revenue from the provinces was 216.579 Egyptian pounds, and from the other services 448.832 pounds, making in total 665.411 Egyptian pounds. The contribution by the Egyptian Government for civil expenditure was 379.763, while the total revenue in the same year was 1.045.174 Egyptian pounds. In 1910, an amount of 10.000 pound less than previous year required to meet the civil administration of Sudan. The custom dues which was collected at Egyptian ports on goods coming to and going from Sudan were also given to the Sudanese Government.⁸⁵ By raising the level of taxation in Sudan in 1913 and by securing the necessary capital for the Jazira Project from the British government’s loan in 1912, the financial ties of Sudan with Egypt were loosened. Exports and imports were continuously increased. It was 1.891.494 pounds for import and 1.020.260 pounds for export in 1914.⁸⁶

In the field of land settlement, the government’s guiding principles were three: first no land sales were recognised without a valid title in order to protect native landowners against any foreign speculations. Second, five years’ continuous possession of land gave absolute title to its owners; lands purchased, inherited, or given as a gift or dowry were registered in the names of their owners. Third, it was proposed to create as large a land-holding class as possible by granting ownership rights to persons bringing hitherto uncultivated lands into cultivation. It was thought that this would also increase agricultural production. For that, the Land Settlement Commissions, established according to the Land Ordinance of 1899, registered private lands. Lands to which there were no private claims were assumed to belong to the government, and the Land Acquisition Ordinance of 1903 allowed the government to purchase any land from the people for public purposes.⁸⁷ Land concessions to foreign cultivators were given only in the uncultivated government lands in order to develop these lands. A wealthy American named Leight Hunt was the first man who gained a large concession on the Nile at Zeidab consisting of 10.000 feddans. Although government’s land policy was generally successful in the northern parts of the country, land disputes, especially in tribal areas continued.⁸⁸

With regard to taxation, government pursued initially a system of light taxation policy rather than reformed one. No radical change in the assessment and collection of the taxes was introduced. However, a gradual increase in taxation occurred throughout the Wingate era, and also a system of

⁸³. G. Warburg, “The Governor General of the Sudan and his Relations with the British Consuls-General in Egypt, 1899-1916”, *Asian and African Studies*, Vol.5, (Jerusalem 1969), p.101.

⁸⁴ Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan*, pp.51-52.

⁸⁵. See for the list of annual Egyptian subvention, Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution*, pp.110-112; Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, Vol. II, p.453-454.

⁸⁶. See the list for the rates of import and export, Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution*, p.101.

⁸⁷. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p.74; Voll - Voll, *The Sudan*, pp.96-97.

⁸⁸. Göksoy, “The Establishment of Anglo-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan, 1897-1914”, p. 60.

taxation was instituted which observed the methods of local tax customs.⁸⁹ The principal taxes consisted of land or ushur, date and herd taxes, and tribute from nomad tribes. The policy of preserving a low rate of taxation went on until the end of 1912, when the Egyptian annual subvention was withdrawn. The road and the boat taxes were gradually introduced, and taxes were extended to major towns. When the “Trader’s Tax Ordinance” for merchants was promulgated in March 1913 imposing between 3 and 4 percent on their profits, some feeling of dissatisfaction was occasioned among the traders. Taxes in the South were levied only in the directly administered areas.⁹⁰

The Condominium Agreement strictly prohibited the importation and exportation of the slaves in Sudan. To deal with this problem, government maintained a special department, known as the “Repression of Slave Trade” under the Civil Secretary.⁹¹ From January to September in 1899, about 67 slave dealers were captured, and 61 of them received sentences of imprisonment varying from seven years to one.⁹² However, domestic slavery was tolerated by the authorities for some time, it was feared that strict anti-slavery measures could cause serious uprisings, just as such measures had constituted one of the causes of Mahdi’s success in the past. It was also feared that the immediate liberation of the slaves would bring economic ruin upon the country, for slaves were one of the main sources of labour in Sudan.⁹³

Furthermore, to have freed all the slaves would have meant letting loose upon society thousands of men and women with no sense of social responsibility who would have been a menace to public security and morals. For this reason, government followed a policy of gradual elimination of slavery. As regards this policy, Wingate stated that “by carefully protecting the interests of those who were previously slaves, and at the same time gradually employing them on remunerative work in other capacities... We shall eventually with... the assistance of the inhabitants... gradually transform the status of slavery, and substitute for it a system of paid labour.”⁹⁴ At the same time, it was laid down that no person born after 1898 was to be considered otherwise than being free and masters had no legal right to retain slaves against their will.⁹⁵ The slave routes across Sudan’s frontiers was stopped, though the western borders with Ethiopia and the pilgrimage route to the Arabian Peninsula constituted exceptions. Domestic slavery continued to be in existence throughout the Wingate era.⁹⁶

8. Conclusion

Sudan came under British influence from 1882, when Egypt was occupied by the British forces. After some years of abandonment policy pursued during the Mahdiya period, the British government wanted to bring Sudan under its direct control in late 1890’s. Britain wished to keep the other European powers out of the Nile Basin and to protect her interests in Egypt. While Egypt was hoping to regain her lost territory in Sudan. Consequently, the joint Anglo-Egyptian forces led by British officers reconquered the country from the Mahdist leaders in 1899. The Condominium Agreement of January 1899 signed between Britain and Egypt made Sudan as a separate and autonomous country apart from Egypt. Although the British did not deny the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire over Sudan until the First World War, they nevertheless ruled the country like a colony under British Governor-General. All the top and major administrative posts were also delegated to the British officials.

The Condominium form of government was initially based on military lines for civil purposes in order to pacify the country very easily. Besides the civil, financial and legal units of government, an advisory Council to the Governor-General, the Sudan agent as the political and intelligence service and Sudanese civil service were created later at the central level. Sudanisation of the administration was

⁸⁹. MacMichael, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, p.75; Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan* p.39.

⁹⁰. Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution*, pp.92-99; Collins, *Land Beyond the Rivers*, pp.233-234.

⁹¹. See for detail, Martin, *The Sudan in Evolution*, pp.216-218; Warburg, *The Sudan Under Wingate*, pp.170-174.

⁹². Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, Vol.II, pp.488-489.

⁹³. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, Vol.II, pp.175-177.

⁹⁴. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p.554.

⁹⁵. M. O. Beshar, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*, Khartoum University Press, Khartoum 1970, p.20.

⁹⁶. See G. Warburg, “Slavery and Labour in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan”, *Asian and African Studies*, Vol.12, No:2, 1978, pp.221-245.

also encouraged at the lower level offices. British authorities followed a careful and balanced tribal policy, as the Sudanese society was diversified. The Mahdist and radical sufi movements were always kept under surveillance. Suspect tribal leaders were also replaced by others loyal to the government. Collaboration with the native notables facilitated direct rule upon the people. However, Sudan continued to be depended on Egypt financially for some years. A reasonable sum of money was therefore annually transferred into the Sudanese budget from the Egyptian treasury. Economic activities and developments were mainly directed towards meeting government's expenses in administration and improving the public transportation.

In short, the early period of Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan under the Condominium Agreement constituted a basis for the future administration of the country. The British wished to separate Sudan from Egypt in terms of its administrative affairs and its political structure from the right beginning. They achieved this goal gradually.

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