

**ESTABLISHED REVOLUTION VS. UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:
CONTRASTING PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIZATION
IN MEXICO AND TURKEY (*)**

Yazan : Doç. Dr. Ergun ÖZBUDUN

The «Party of Revolutionary Institutions» (PRI) in Mexico and the «Republican People's Party» (RPP) in Turkey are the prototypes of non-totalitarian modernizing single-party systems which appeared in a great number of new nations in the post-World War II era of decolonization, Similarities between the Turkish and Mexican single-party experiences undoubtedly warrant a comparative study of the two systems, and their differences make such a comparison even more worthwhile for a broader understanding of single-party systems in general.

Turkey and Mexico represent two typical examples of modern tutelary regimes which consciously attempted to modernize their traditional societies and politics largely by means of induced (government-directed) change. In both countries, the tutelary regimes were the products of convulsive, national revolutions. In both countries, post-revolutionary order depended on a single-party system, and authority was effectively concentrated in the party leadership. In both countries, a constitutional façade based on liberal democratic norms masked authoritarian operational structures. Ideologically, both Mexican and Turkish single-parties were highly nationalistic, strongly anti-clerical, and development-oriented. Under both tutelary regimes, significant social, economic, and political modernization was accomplished. Moreover, this was done without resort to totalitarianism or to any rigid ideological framework. In fact, a high degree of pragmatism and ideological

(*) Bu makale, yazarın, 5-7 Nisan, 1968 tarihleri arasında Timber Cove, California'da yapılan «Yerleşik Tek-parti Sistemlerinin Evrimi» konulu symposium'da verdiği tebliğin biraz değiştirilmiş şeklidir. Tebliğ üzerindeki görüş ve eleştirilerinden dolayı, Profesör Samuel P. Huntington (Harvard University) ve Profesör Clement H. Moore'a (University of California at Berkeley)e teşekkür ederim.

flexibility characterized both systems. In both countries, the military played a dominant role in the early phases of the revolution; but gradually, it lost its political power to the new civilian political institutions created by the revolution. Finally, both countries moved, in due course and in their own ways, toward a more pluralistic political system and a greater distribution and reciprocity of power

If these similarities between the two single-party systems are significant, so are the differences. In Mexico, after a decade of bloody civil war in which more than a million Mexicans lost their lives, the problem of peaceful succession has finally been surmounted. The last serious threat of violence occurred in 1935 when ex-president and one-time strong man Calles moved unsuccessfully against President Cárdenas; since Cardenas Mexico has been a post-revolutionary society. In Turkey, by contrast, fifteen years of multi-party rule came to an abrupt end with the military *coup* of 1960. The civilian governments which followed the military interregnum of 1960-61 were faced with two open, and a number of abandoned, attempts of *coup*. The last four Mexican presidents have been civilians, whereas the last two Turkish presidents have been military commanders. Thus, while the post-revolutionary political system of Mexico displayed a high degree of stability based on widely-shared goals of the Revolution, the past two decades of multi-party rule in Turkey witnessed the weakening of the Kemalist unity and the resurrection of severe pre-Kemalist intraelite conflict which produced «simultaneous stagnation and instability.»¹

The different paths the two revolutions have followed are also reflected in the different fates of the two single-parties. In Mexico, the existence and reasonably free operation of opposition parties have not challenged seriously the dominant position of the PRI so far. In each presidential election that the PRI has contested, it has won a minimum of 75 per cent of the ballots cast. In the last two Mexican presidential elections of 1958 and 1964, the party's candidates, Adolfo Lopez Mateos and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, polled respectively 90.4 and 89 per cent of the popular vote compared to about 10 per cent of the *Partido de Accion Nacional*

(1) Frederick W. Frey, **The Turkish Political Elite** (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 1965), pp. 391 ff.

(PAN), the strongest opposition party.² Distribution of seats in the national Congress also attests to the domination of the PRI. In the 1958 elections, the PRI obtained 153 out of 162 seats (94.5 per cent) in the Chamber of Deputies and all the seats in the Senate. Indeed, the PRI felt so secure about its virtual monopoly that a recent constitutional amendment deliberately sought to assure the opposition parties an increased representation in the legislature. Under this change, any national party gaining 2.5 per cent of the total vote for the Chamber of Deputies would receive a minimum of five deputies, with additional seats for each additional 0.5 per cent of the vote up to a maximum of twenty seats. Thus, in the 1964 elections, only two candidates of the PAN and one of the *Partido Popular Socialista* (PPS) were elected to the Chamber by direct popular vote and the new electoral scheme entitled the minor parties to «party deputies» as follows. PAN— 18; PPS— 9; and PARM (*Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana*)— 5.³

By contrast, the Turkish single-party, the RPP, lost power to its major rival, the Democratic Party (DP), in the first genuinely free general election it contested in 1950 and has been reduced to an almost permanent minority party since then. It received 40 per cent of the votes in 1950, 35.3 per cent in 1954, 40.9 per cent in 1957, 36.7 per cent in 1961, and 28.75 per cent in 1965. Throughout this period, the RPP has been out of power except for the years 1961-64 when it participated in the coalition governments. Between 1950 and 1960, the DP ruled the country with comfortable electoral and parliamentary majorities (only in the 1957 election did the percentage of its popular majority fall a little below 50 per cent). Although the DP was dissolved by a court order under the military regime of 1960-61, its successor, the Justice Party (JP), was able to become a major partner in the first civilian coalition government which followed the military rule. In 1965, the JP became the governing party of Turkey with a clear popular majority of 53 per cent.

-
- (2) Howard F. Cline, **Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960** (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 166, Table 31; L. Vincent Padgett, **The Mexican Political System** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p. 68; Martin C. Needler, «Changing the Guard in Mexico,» **Current History**, 48 (January, 1965), p. 27.
 - (3) Padgett, **op. cit.**, pp. 80-81; Robert E. Scott, «Mexico: The Established Revolution,» in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., **Political Culture and Political Development** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 370.

This enormous difference in the present popular strength of one-time single-parties provides a good vantage point from which to study and compare the Turkish and Mexican patterns of political development. Why has the Mexican PRI been able to retain its domination, while the Turkish RPP was voted out of office as soon as the Turkish voters obtained an opportunity to do so? What are the sources of strength of the PRI in comparison to the weaknesses of the RPP? Do these differences reflect a fundamental dissimilarity in the courses the two revolutions have followed? And what broader implications can be drawn from this comparative analysis for the study of single-party systems in general?

One can argue, of course, that democratization of the single-party system in Mexico simply has not gone as far as in Turkey and that the Mexican elections are essentially an «affirmation of authoritarianism.»⁴ It has been suggested, for example, that toleration of the opposition parties in Mexico does not indicate a readiness on the part of the PRI leaders to turn over power to the opposition should the latter ever becomes a majority. Some scholars have even expressed doubts about the true nature of the Mexican opposition parties, maintaining that the legally recognized parties (PAN, PPS, PARM) are in fact mere instruments of the governing party used and paid by it to provide a democratic façade.⁵ Haight, for example, observed that «over the self-styled and legal opposition parties there hangs a sizeable cloud of suspicion to the effect that they are merely a directed opposition, in more or less clandestine relationship with the government.»⁶ Whether this is true or not, it is certain that the Mexican opposition parties are not allowed to depart radically from the established operating norms of the political system. If they do, «they may find their political party outlawed, as did General Henriquez Guzman after the 1952 election or their business hampered by labor difficulties, or them-

(4) For a skeptical view concerning the fairness of Mexican elections, see Philip B. Taylor, Jr., «The Mexican Elections of 1958: Affirmation of Authoritarianism?», **Western Political Quarterly**, 13 (September, 1960), pp. 729, 742. Taylor argues that «Mexico seems to be a smoothly running authoritarian regime... In all fairness it must be concluded that the possibility of a truly honest election in Mexico is still very scant indeed.»

(5) Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

(6) Charles H. Haight, **The Contemporary Mexican Revolution as Viewed by Mexican Intellectuals** (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Stanford University, 1956), pp. 66-67.

selves in jail, as David Alfaro Siqueiros of the Communist Party did for several years until granted amnesty after the 1964 presidential election.»⁷

Now, it is true that the leaders of the present Mexican regime have not so far been confronted with the «acid test» of surrendering power to their opponents after being defeated at the poll (if this is indeed an acid test of democracy). It should also be admitted that the Mexican political system has not yet evolved into a full competitive system, open not only to «loyal» opposition parties but to the extremist ones as well. Nevertheless, this is hardly a convincing factor to explain the different patterns of political development in Turkey and Mexico. For one thing, despite the existence of a measure of intimidation and fraud in the early Mexican elections, the overwhelming victories of the PRI certainly cannot be attributed to such electoral manipulations. Needler, for example, observes that «today... unfair electoral practices are met with probably no more frequently in Mexico than in the United States, and the P.R.I. gains its victories fairly and squarely.»⁸ Clarence Senior argued in the same vein that «the basis of the revolutionary victories seems to be the same as that of the Democrats [in the Solid South of the United States], in spite of fraud, violence, and antiquated voting procedures. Violence is decreasing steadily and a new electoral code which may help reduce electoral skulduggery was recently adopted. The 1940, 1946, 1952 and 1958 federal elections were held with little more trouble than Kansas City or Chicago elections of recent memory.»⁹

Similarly, the loyalty of the opposition parties cannot be taken as decisive evidence of the authoritarianism of the Mexican political system. The relatively moderate positions the opposition parties tended to take in recent electoral campaigns are attributable less to their fear of repression than to their desire to capture as large a following as possible. Scott has convincingly argued that the Mexican opposition parties are faced with two alternatives: either they adopt doctrinaire and extreme programs thus limiting themselves to a very specialized role and a very special clientele, or they move toward the center and resemble the PRI in

(7) Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-80.

(8) Needler, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

(9) Clarence Senior, *Land Reform and Democracy* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958), p. 43.

order to maximize their mass appeal.¹⁰ Furthermore, it should be remembered that the limited range of party competition does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a governmental turnover. After all, the Turkish multi-party system from 1946 to 1960 was an extremely limited one in the sense that both right and left parties (even relatively moderate ones) were excluded from the race, leaving the competition open only to the center parties. Finally, even though extremist tendencies were not given a free hand to organize politically in both countries, freedom of press and of expression has been undoubtedly much greater in Mexico than in Turkey.¹¹ In short, to explain the continued domination of the PRI in contrast to the electoral failure of the RPP by the more authoritarian methods of the former simply will not do.

In fact, the dominant position of the PRI is due, more than anything else, to its immense popular strength. This, in turn, derives from the party's identification in the popular mind with the widely-shared goals of the Mexican Revolution and from the fact that it «represents the policy preferences of the vast majority of Mexicans.»¹² But before explaining why and how this has happened in Mexico and has not happened in Turkey, it would be worthwhile to discuss another possible explanation based on the political-cultural characteristics of the two nations.

One recent study of these Mexican characteristics is that by Professor Scott who argues that the dominant political sub-culture in Mexico is the *subject* political culture. Scott estimates that about .65 per cent of Mexicans can be classified as subjects, as opposed to 25 per cent parochials and 10 per cent participants. Prevailing subject norms include, for example, dependency, lack of self-esteem, search for miracle, weak ego-image, *machismo* (masculinity), authoritarianism, and the norm which weakens associational sentiments and inhibits collective action. These subject norms are implanted mostly by pre-adult experiences, but adult workplace experience does little to counter such early authoritarian and anti-social influences. These subject norms, Scott argues,

(10) Robert E. Scott, **Mexican Government in Transition** (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 176-81.

(11) Haight, **op. cit.**, pp. 15, 65, 101-109.

(12) Needler, **op. cit.**, p. 27. Almond and Verba's cross-national survey also indicated that 85 per cent of the Mexican respondents supported the PRI to some extent (Cited by Scott, «Mexico: The Established Revolution,» p. 333, n. 3).

are consistent with the authoritarian operational political structures and inhibit the move toward a more participant political system. «The predominant subject political norms are satisfied by the strong emphasis on effective government output performance made possible by the development of central authority structures.»¹³

Qualifications to these findings of Scott are to be found in the study of civic cultures by Almond and Verba who argue instead that Mexicans display a relatively high level of subjective political competence (i.e., orientation to participation), even if such a sense of participation exists mainly on an aspirational level and is unmatched by actual performance. Furthermore, this high level of aspirational political competence is combined with a conspicuously low level of subject competence. «In Mexico,» Almond and Verba argue, «the balance between subject and participant orientations is heavily weighted in the direction of the participant.»¹⁴ Even if we assume that the Mexican political culture is a typical case of subject political culture, such a cultural pattern cannot be said to preclude categorically the development of an opposition against an authoritarian government. If anything, Turkey seems to be closer to a subject political culture than is Mexico, yet it was in Turkey that the tutelary single-party system came to an end by popular vote, not in Mexico where participatory orientations are considerably more developed.¹⁵

-
- (13) Scott, «Mexico: The Established Revolution,» *passim*; quotation is from p. 389.
- (14) Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), *passim*; quotation is from p. 364.
- (15) Frey, for example, compares the subjective political competence (perceived political efficacy) of the Turkish peasants with the similar data presented in *The Civic Culture*. Turkish peasants score higher than the Mexican respondents in local efficacy, but lower in national efficacy. Furthermore, the use of groups to influence the decisions of local and national governments is an almost unknown strategy to Turkish peasants. Thus, as opposed to 20-28 per cent of Mexicans, only one per cent of the Turkish villagers said they would enlist others in their efforts to influence the government, an overwhelming majority preferring to act alone. It is to be noted, however, that the Mexican data were collected only in towns of over 10,000 inhabitants, whereas the Turkish data concerned only peasants. See Frederick W. Frey, «Five Nations Plus One: Comparative Survey Research on Political Efficacy,» paper delivered at the Annual Convention of The American Association for Public Opinion Research, Excelsior Springs, Mo., May, 1964.

In discussing the different fates encountered by the Turkish and Mexican single-parties, I shall now concentrate on three main variables: the pattern of interests, the pattern of power, and the pattern of policy.¹⁶ These variables are certainly interrelated; but for the sake of convenience, I shall examine them separately.

The Pattern of Interests

In the study of revolutions, the most pertinent questions to be asked are perhaps the following: Who led the revolution? Who provided its mass support? Who ultimately benefited from it? Against whom was it directed? What were the interests (or rather the alliances of interests) involved? Seen from these perspectives, the Turkish and Mexican revolutions clearly differ from each other.

Although opinions vary as to the social bases of the Mexican Revolution, probably the most convincing answer will be that the Revolution was initiated by the urban middle-class, and its crucial mass support was provided by the peasants and urban workers. In fact, under the Diaz dictatorship (1876-1910) both the intellectual and commercial elements of the growing urban middle-class were denied easy access to the top positions in their respective fields, administration and business. The former was dominated by the dictator's personal favorites and by a small group of technocrats known as the *cientificos*, while the latter came to be increasingly dominated by foreign capitalists. Thus, the businessmen's demand that «Mexico be returned to the Mexicans» was added to the quest for political participation of the urban intellectuals.¹⁷ The old regime, based on a coalition of the landed aristoc-

(16) For this framework of analysis, see Samuel H. Beer, «The Analysis of Political Systems,» in Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., **Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe** (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 3-68.

(17) John J. Johnson, **Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 128-31; Raymond Vernon, **The Dilemma of Mexico's Development: The Roles of the Private and Public Sectors** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 54-55; Haight, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-20; Scott, **Mexican Government in Transition**, pp. 56-58, 77, 83. Frank Tannenbaum maintains, however, that the Mexican Revolution was primarily lower-class and agricultural in character, and was opposed by the urban middle-class: **Peace by Revolution: Mexico After 1910** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), Chapt. 11.

racy, the Church, and the army, conspicuously lacked the adaptability to accommodate the demands of these urban groups.

An equally important component in the revolutionary coalition was the support of the peasants and urban industrial workers. One reason for this support may be seen in the policies followed by the old regime. Although the Diaz government heavily stressed modernization and material progress, this was by no means a progress in an egalitarian sense. Under Diaz, wealth was concentrated in ever fewer hands while the poverty of the rural masses increased. In Haight's words, «the economic condition of the majority of the Mexican people in 1910 was poor and lowly to a degree that was remarkable even for a country famous for centuries as providing a classic example of social inequality.» The concentration of land ownership in the hands of an exceedingly small minority was carried «to heights that had few equals in the history of any other epoch or any other nation.»¹⁸ Thus, «by 1910 approximately 97 per cent of the total arable land of the country had fallen into the hands of approximately 835 families.»¹⁹ This continuous absorption of small estates by *hacienda* owners not only robbed the small farmers of their properties but also reduced them (as rural wage workers) to virtual slavery or feudal servitude (*peonismo*) in their relationships with the great landed proprietors. The *hacendado's* monopoly of land was also supplemented by a monopoly of force. Diaz had constituted an elite corps of mounted police, known as the *rurales*, the main function of which was «to hunt down anyone who threatened the rights of property in the countryside.»²⁰ Thus, with the backing of the *rurales*, and eventually of the army, the *hacendado* could with impunity punish or even kill the recalcitrant *peon*.²¹

The peasants' plight was largely shared by the urban proletariat. Despite considerable headway made in industrialization under Diaz, the emergent class of industrial workers was forced to

(18) Haight, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

(19) Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 186; Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16. Similarly Casanova notes that in 1910 «88.4 per cent of the agricultural population were **peons** ...only 0.02 per cent were owners of plantations.» See Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, «Mexico: A Semicapitalist Revolution,» in Ignacy Sachs, ed., **Planning and Economic Development**, Studies on Developing Countries, Vol. I (Warszawa: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1964), pp. 174-75.

(20) Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

(21) Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

work at a subsistence level. Strikes were repressed by the army with extreme brutality. As Padgett notes, little of the new prosperity engendered by industrialization «touched the workers of the factories, the mines, and the railroads. The urban day laborers and the peons and Indians of the countryside continued in the same miserable circumstances. There was the same institutionalized exploitation of workers through the company store, impossibly low wages, and the long work day. Stratification was made more rigid by use of foreigners as skilled workers, technicians, and managers.»²² This condition of personal and economic servitude that bound factory workers to their employers, known as *fabriquismo*, was certainly among the causes of the Mexican Revolution.²³

Thus, the Mexican Revolution from its earliest years found peasants and workers among its most ardent supporters. The famous revolutionary motto *tierra y libertad* (land and liberty) characteristically combined the middle class' desire for liberty with the peasants' yearning for land, symbolizing the revolutionary alliance between these two classes. It is true that the urban middle-class elements in the revolutionary coalition did not originally have much interest in land reform. For example, Francisco Madero, «the Apostle of the Revolution» and the first revolutionary president, had barely included land reform in his platform. But the peasants made it clear that they wanted *both* land and liberty. Thus, in 1915, even such a conservative revolutionary as Carranza, himself a large landholder and a former senator under Diaz, had to issue an agrarian reform decree not dissimilar to the proposals of radical Zapata and to grant the fundamental demands of the organized labor. This was a clear indication of the fact that the contribution of the peasants and workers to the revolutionary cause was simply too great to be ignored.²⁴

(22) Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-65.

(23) Haight, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

(24) Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23; Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25; Hung-chao Tai, «Land Reform in the Developing Countries: Tenure Defects and Political Response,» unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, August 1967, p. 25. A very good account of the bloody conflict between revolutionary radicals (Conventionists) and revolutionary moderates (Constitutionalists) is given by Robert E. Quirk, **The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915** (New York: The Citadel Press, 1963). The civil war of 1914-1915 between the two wings of the revolutionary forces was won by the Constitutionalists. But interestingly, through presidents who succeeded Carranza, the ideas of the Conventionists established themselves ever more firmly as the basis

Workers and peasants not only played a crucial role in the formative years of the Mexican Revolution, but they also remained active participants in the revolutionary coalition after the violent, civil-war phase of the Revolution ended in 1920. On several critical occasions they put their weight behind the men and the programs that were more representative of their group interests, and in each of these cases their intervention seems to have changed the course of events. For example, in 1923 three generals (Sanchez, Estrada, and Adolfo de la Huerta), «disappointed by Obregón's choice of Calles to succeed him as President... gathered the greater part of the army to their cause, which seemed certain to be victorious... But then unusual things began to happen; organized *ejidatarios* cut Estrada's communication lines, sabotaged his supplies, and even formed diminutive armies which attacked his rear. It soon became clear that Estrada's army was not going to be able to 'hold' rural areas at all; then President Obregon marshalled a new army out of a few detachments of troops that had remained loyal, volunteers from the *ejidos*, and 'labor battalions' of Mexico City union members, took to the field, and defeated Estrada... For this result, Mexico had to thank the labor battalions and especially the organized peasants. So labor and the *ejidatarios* gave substance to their claim for an equal voice with the military in the councils of the Revolution.»²⁵ A similar, although this time unarmed, confrontation took place in 1936, when ex-President Calles broke with Cárdenas and threatened him openly. Then «a so-called Proletarian Defense Committee rallied to the side of President Cárdenas immediately.» This show of organized strength was one of the principal factors which forced Calles to retire from politics and leave the country.²⁶

It would appear from this discussion that peasants and urban workers constituted an integral element of the Mexican Revolution. Together with the urban middle-class, they were clearly the

of government programs. As Professor Quirk said, «the inarticulate, militarily ineffectual Zapata accomplished in death what he could not win in life,» but «the victory of Carranza and his Constitutionalist armies on the battlefield brought no similar triumph for the political ideas of the First Chief.» His liberalism «was, after all, an anachronism in twentieth-century Mexico. The future belonged to the mentality of the Convention.» (*Op. cit.*, pp. 292-93).

(25) Martin C. Needler, «The Political Development of Mexico,» *American Political Science Review*, 55 (June, 1961), p. 310.

(26) Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, p. 129.

revolutionary forces in the Mexican society. The revolutionary alliance between the middle class and the lower classes determined the present power structure and the pattern of policy of Mexico. Indeed, it seems that this is the only type of alliance which makes possible the emergence of a political system that is at once stable, progressive, and democratic —certainly a very rare combination in developing countries. Most of the fundamental differences between the Turkish and Mexican patterns of political development can, I think, be explained by the different nature of the revolutionary coalitions in these two countries.

The Turkish Revolution, like the Mexican, was led by the urban middle-class. However, in the absence of a sizable group of Turkish entrepreneurs, this was a military-bureaucratic-intellectual, rather than an entrepreneurial, middle class. Furthermore, while the Mexican Revolution was purely a domestic event, the Turkish Revolution was, at the same time, a war of national independence. As such, it was not directed against a particular social class, but against foreign enemies and their Turkish collaborators. After the Greek invasion had been repulsed, the revolutionary leaders, in their efforts to secularize the country, moved against the religious establishment whose sources of support were widely diffused throughout all social strata. Consequently, the Turkish Revolution always remained a political, rather than a social, revolution; and it did not produce such clearly identifiable coalitions of interests as did the Mexican Revolution.

This does not mean, however, that there was no discernible pattern of interest-coalition in the Turkish Revolution. Very briefly, this coalition was between the military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite at the national level and many small town and rural notables at the local level. Frey has shown, in his excellent study of the Turkish political elite, that the military-bureaucratic element was dominant at the level of national legislature during the single-party era, but that there was also in the Assembly a sizable group of locally based deputies.²⁷ This finding probably reflects accurately the relative strength of the two distinct elements in the RPP coalition: the national military-bureaucratic elite was the major partner, but the local notables, most of whom were undoubtedly large landholders, also wielded considerable influence. This influence was naturally greater at the local level than at the national level.

(27) Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, Chaps. 5-6.

Thus, although the owners of large estates constituted a relatively small contingent in the National Assembly, they generally dominated local governments and the local levels of the RPP apparatus.

This ruling coalition denied the lower strata of the Turkish society (namely, the incipient urban proletariat and the great mass of agricultural workers and smallholders) any effective share of political power. Herein lies the most basic difference between the Turkish and the Mexican revolutions: Unlike in Mexico, the Turkish peasants and workers did not become an integral part of the revolution; and while the landed aristocracy was effectively broken by the Mexican Revolution, their nearest Turkish counterparts, the local notables, became influential, even if junior, partners in the governing coalition of Turkey. In short, while the urban middle-class led both revolutions, it allied itself with fundamentally different groups in each country. The difference in the social bases of the revolutionary coalitions set divergent paths for the two revolutions and deeply affected both their power structures and policy outputs. However, before comparing Turkey and Mexico in these terms, it may be worthwhile to explain why the revolutionary middle-class in Turkey chose to ally itself with the landed oligarchy instead of with rural and urban lower-classes.

This question becomes all the more important in view of the fact that the Turkish military-bureaucratic elite seemed at that time to possess sufficient freedom of action to turn the political revolution into a genuinely social one. It can be argued indeed that this national political elite had been largely independent of the economic elite from the Ottoman times. Unlike in some developing countries, the Turkish army and the civilian bureaucracy had no strong ties with the landed oligarchy. Neither this unorganized landed oligarchy nor the incipient business groups were politically strong enough at a national level to make the military-bureaucratic elite an instrument of their class interests. On the contrary, as I have shown elsewhere, the bulk of the Turkish officer corps was (and still is) recruited from the lower middle-class and the salaried middle-class.²⁸ Therefore, the alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite and the landed local oligarchy should not be viewed as the inevitable outcome of their identical interests, but as a result of a deliberate and relatively free choice on the part of the former.

(28) Ergun Özbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics*, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, Number 14, November 1966, pp. 28-29.

This choice was encouraged partly by the circumstances of the Turkish War of Independence and partly by the nature of the «modernization» program the revolutionary leadership envisaged for Turkey. The local nobility had, on the whole, made a significant contribution to the War of Independence. In many parts of the country, the local notables had formed the nucleus of the local branch of the «Defense of Rights Association» which was the political arm of the nationalist movement. Thus, the RPP, which was based on the already existing organization of the Defense of Rights Association, continued to reflect the war-time alliance between the national elite and the landed local nobility. But perhaps a still more significant factor in that alliance was the nature of the Kemalist conception of modernization. Modernization (or Westernization), as was understood by the RPP leadership, involved mainly the adoption of Western political and cultural institutions with no radical change in the social structure. The local nobility, being relatively well-educated and exposed to Western civilization, was more likely to support such a program than the more traditionally oriented peasant masses, provided that the Revolution did not touch the sources of their local power. Thus, an implicit trade-off materialized between the two groups. The local nobility supported the modernization program of the national military-bureaucratic elite, in return of which it was allowed to retain its land, status, and local influence, as evidenced in the conspicuous absence of any real land reform under the Republican governments.²⁹

The main losers in this trade-off were the peasants. They also had fought heroically in the War of Independence, even if they were motivated less by truly nationalistic feelings than the desire to defend their homeland and religion against «infidel» invaders and to save the Caliph from the hands of the enemy (the latter remained the officially proclaimed goal of the nationalist movement until the final victory). But the peasants did not represent an articulate and organized force to press their demands for land and better standards of living on the revolutionary government. Perhaps they were not even aware of such a possibility. It is clear that the Turkish Revolution did not have the peasant leaders and heroes of the Mexican Revolution, such as Zapata and Villa. Furthermore, when the foreign enemy was defeated and the national leadership began

(29) For a similar explanation, see Turan Güneş, «C.H.P. Halktan Nasıl Uzaklaştı,» *Yön*, Sayı 1, 20 Aralık 1961, p. 14.

to launch its secularizing reforms, the tradition-bound peasant masses became more apathetic, if not openly hostile. Their failure to grasp the meaning of and to support the Westernization program pushed them further away from the locus of political power.

Here again we find an important difference between Turkey and Mexico. In pre-revolutionary Mexico, the Church had become an object of popular hatred because of its strong ties with the politicians of the old regime and with the aristocratic land system. The Mexican Church not only had been «the country's largest single landowner and largest single banker» but also preached submission to the civil authorities, to the *hacendado*, the factory owner, and the mine superintendent.³⁰ Therefore, the anti-clerical attitude and secularizing reforms of the Mexican Revolution had genuine popular support. By contrast, Islam has never been such an oppressive force in Turkey, and while the Sultan-Caliph and the heads of the official religious hierarchy in Istanbul collaborated with the occupation powers, many local religious leaders in Anatolia strongly supported the nationalist movement. The First Grand National Assembly (1920-1923) contained a large group of clerics (at least 17 per cent of all deputies).³¹ Thus, the lack of support among the Turkish peasants for the secularist policies of the Republican governments is quite understandable from their own point of view. But it is equally clear that this was one of the factors which led the national leadership, thoroughly determined to secularize the society, to stretch its hand to the local nobility instead of attempting to enlist peasant support.

Our discussion so far has shown that the Mexican and Turkish revolutions differ from each other in terms of their social bases. The Mexican Revolution carries many characteristics of the peasant revolutions, while the Turkish Revolution is much closer to the model of the «revolution from above,» although admittedly neither of them are pure or ideal types.³² Let us now consider how this difference has affected the pattern of power and the pattern of policy in each country.

(30) Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19, 59-60.

(31) Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, p. 183.

(32) For this classification of revolutions, see Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), Chaps. 8-9.

The Pattern of Power

The structure of the Mexican PRI clearly reflects the combination of social forces which made the Revolution.³³ Before examining the present «sector organization» of the PRI, however, it will be necessary to say a few words on its historical development. Briefly, three phases can be discerned in the development of the Mexican «official» party. It was formed in 1929 by the outgoing President Plutarco Calles to meet the crisis of presidential succession. From 1929 through 1937 it was known as the National Revolutionary Party, PNR (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario*), and was personally dominated by Calles until the accession of Cárdenas to the Presidency in 1934. «Unlike its official successors, the original PNR was not highly centralized; instead it was an amalgam of local political machines and of various agricultural, labor, and other interest associations, backed by the silent but ever-present force of the military.»³⁴ Although agrarian and labor groups were included in this loosely organized political apparatus, it was not before the consolidation of power by Cárdenas that the foundations of the present sector organization were laid. During the presidential term of Cárdenas, the party was reorganized on a functional rather than a geographical basis, under the name of the Party of the Mexican Revolution, PRM (*Partido de la Revolución Mexicana*). In this second phase of its development (1937-1946), which may appropriately be called the period of «corporate centralism,» the party's structure was divided into four functionally based «sectors» — agricultural, labor, popular, and military. Under this scheme, the party's candidates were to be apportioned among the sectors before each state or national election, except the presidential one. «The sector organization or, in actual practice, the sector's leadership, then named individual candidates for the offices allotted to it. The individuals so nominated then were supported in the campaign and at the polls by the combined efforts of all four sectors... Presidential nominations also reflected a corporative tendency. Selection of the revolutionary party's candidate at the national nominating convention required the support of a majority of the sectors, at first three of the four and later,

(33) My discussion of the organization of the PRI relies heavily upon Professor Scott's excellent account: **Mexican Government in Transition**, pp. 115-181. See also Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-62; Cline, *op. cit.*, Chap. 15.

(34) Scott, **Mexican Government in Transition**, p. 122.

when the military sector had been dissolved, two of the three sectors.»³⁵

In this corporate structure, each sector had its own hierarchy reaching down to the state and local levels. The Agricultural Sector, represented by the *Confederacion Nacional Campesina* (CNC) where all *ejido* farmers were automatically enrolled, was based on local Peasant Leagues. Similarly, the basic Labor Sector unit was the local union (or confederation of local unions), and for the Popular Sector the local political association. This organizational pattern remained almost unchanged until 1946, with the exception that the Military Sector was dissolved in 1940 and those officers who wished to stay active in politics affiliated themselves with the Popular Sector.

Starting from the middle 1940's, a third phase in the life of the official party (having changed its name to that of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or the PRI) can be discerned. This phase involved attempts, especially by the middle-class elements of the party, to put an end to sector political power. Opponents of the sector organization argued that the system could neither accommodate many interest groups which remained outside the party sectors, nor facilitate popular participation in the decision-making process. Consequently, party rules were changed in 1946, and while the three sectors were kept as basic organizational divisions of the party, party primaries were substituted for the sector designation of the candidates, thus stripping the sectors from the main source of their political power. However, the new nominating system did not last long. Faced with increasing intra-party conflict and great labor dissatisfaction with the reorganization, the party leadership had to restore the nominating powers of the sector organizations in 1950. The sector system persists today in a slightly modified form adopted by the 1960 party rules which tended to increase the power of the party's own hierarchy at the expense of the sector organizations.³⁶

Much has been, and can be, said for and against the corporate organization of the PRI. It has been maintained, for example, that this organizational pattern tended to discourage popular participation in politics. It may also be true that the dual representa-

(35) *Ibid.*, p. 131.

(36) *Ibid.*, pp. 139-44; for the organizational changes introduced by the 1960 rules, see Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-60.

tive-administrative role of the sector leaders sometimes led them to neglect their representative function and to demonstrate a lack of loyalty to the organizations which originally gave them political power.³⁷ Furthermore, the corruption of the sector leaders cannot be checked easily, since their position as the head of a particular interest-association is further strengthened by the position they simultaneously occupy in the party hierarchy.³⁸

However, I believe that the sector system, even with all its shortcomings, did not discourage but encouraged popular participation in politics (if by «popular» participation we do not exclusively mean «middle class» participation). The corporate structure of the party gave an incentive to the sector organizations to conduct recruiting drives, because the more members the organization had, the greater its bargaining power within the party. This led to a marked expansion in the proportion of the population represented when decisions were made.³⁹ Through sector organization, workers and peasants obtained a direct voice in the highest party councils. They could even dominate these councils, at least numerically, if they chose to act together. To this should be added the moral satisfaction and the sense of political competence the Mexican workers and peasants received from belonging to the official party. As Professor Scott commented, «to many politically aware Mexicans, membership in a farm organization, a labor union, or a 'popular' organization is tantamount to membership in the revolutionary party that governs the country; for most, this is a satisfactory solution to the problem of political action.»⁴⁰ In short, the corporate structure of the party has favored the underprivileged groups, namely the peasants and the workers. The main thrust for the abolition of the sector system came, therefore, from the middle-class elements; conversely, the loudest objection to this change was voiced by the Labor sector, leading to the break with the party by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a prominent labor leader, and by some labor groups in 1946.⁴¹

However, the influence wielded by the agricultural and labor groups through sector organization should not conceal the growing importance of the middle sectors in the PRI. Especially in

(37) Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, p. 25.

(38) For a case example, see Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-120.

(39) Needler, «The Political Development of Mexico,» p. 311.

(40) Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, p. 174.

(41) *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.

the past two decades the Popular sector, the representative of the middle sectors, has been becoming stronger and stronger in the revolutionary coalition, and gradually changing the «collectivist, proletarian orientation» of the party under Cárdenas.⁴² The Popular sector (*La Confederacion Nacional de Organizaciones Populares*, CNOP) is clearly over-represented in the national and state governments. «By the latter 1950's its membership in Congress and other elective posts roughly doubled the highest figure from any other organized sector of the Revolutionary Coalition.»⁴³ In 1955, a full 62.9 per cent of the PRI candidates for the Chamber of Deputies were middle-class professionals. Thus, Scott observes that «for all its early amorphism... today the urban middle class plays an important role, probably an increasingly important one, in Mexican politics... In spite of its relatively small numbers... the Mexican middle class very nearly equates in political power with the mass farm and labor interests combined, particularly as most of the bureaucracy and leadership of the functional interest associations representing these interests, as well as the government bureaucracy, come from middle-class rather than working-class ranks.»⁴⁴

The growing influence of the middle class in the revolutionary coalition has, no doubt, significantly affected the policies followed by recent Mexican governments, giving them a more centrist character. But the other partners in the coalition, the peasants and the workers, have by no means been reduced to an insignificant role. The present power structure of Mexico reflects a relative balance between the interests of these classes. The corporate structure of the party appears to have contributed to the maintenance of this balance by consciously organizing the masses and thereby preventing a complete domination by the middle sectors.

In contrast, the Turkish single-party, the RPP, deliberately chose to remain a cadre party, an elite organization. Indeed, the structure of the RPP reminds one of European liberal parties rather than the twentieth century totalitarian and authoritarian single-parties.⁴⁵ The party hierarchy was dominated by the military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite at the national level and by the

(42) Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

(43) Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

(44) Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition*, pp. 81-83, 193-94.

(45) For a similar view on the RPP, see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: Wiley, Science Editions, 1963), pp. 276-78.

landed local nobility at the local level.⁴⁶ Interestingly, the RPP leadership made no notable effort to broaden the party's popular base and to enlist the support of the masses, concentrating its attention on the small Westernized elite.

This cadre party structure accorded well both with the composition of the revolutionary coalition and the nature of the party's philosophy, the main components of which were nationalism, rationalism, secularism, anti-clericalism, and eventual political democracy. Thus, philosophically as well as organizationally, the RPP was closer to the liberal tradition than to any type of modern collectivism. As Professor Frey rightly points out, the immediate goal of the revolutionary leaders was not the fundamental improvement of the peasant's lot or the grant to him of increased political power. The Atatürk Revolution exploited the basic bifurcation between the educated elite and uneducated masses, rather than deploring it or immediately attacking it. The essence of the Turkish Revolution is that it concentrated on the extension and consolidation of the precarious beachhead won by the Westernized intellectuals to make it secure beyond all possible challenge. «It was not... a revolution 'from the bottom up' — an attempt to remold the society by starting with the peasant masses.»⁴⁷

Given the social bases and the philosophical goals of the Turkish Revolution, no wonder that the RPP remained essentially an elite organization. Though this organizational pattern might have suited the task at hand temporarily, in the long run it proved disastrous for the party. Neglected peasant masses were increasingly alienated from the RPP. Furthermore, neither element in the RPP coalition was in a position to command much popular sympathy. The intellectual elite had been handicapped by the perennial com-

(46) For the national leadership, see Frey, **The Turkish Political Elite**, *passim*. Unfortunately, there is no similar comprehensive study of the local cadres of the RPP in the single-party years. However, Frank Tachau observed in the province of Adana that wealthy landowners tended to concentrate in the RPP: «Provincial Party Organizations in Turkey,» paper presented to the «Conference on Social Growth and Democracy in Turkey,» held at New York University, May 27-29, 1965, pp. 14-15.

(47) Frey, **The Turkish Political Elite**, pp. 40-43; also his «Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey,» in Lucian W. Pye, ed., **Communications and Political Development** (Princeton: University Press, 1963), p. 313; see also Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, **The United States and Turkey and Iran** (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 72.

munication gap between the educated, Westernized elite and the uneducated, traditional masses. The authoritarian and extractive methods of the bureaucracy further increased the popular alienation. Thus, in the typical peasant image, the RPP came to be identified with the tax collector and the conscription officer. Many of the landed local notables, on the other hand, were often highly exploitative and despotic in their relations with the peasants; and these local notables gradually lost whatever touch they might have had with the peasant masses as they began to identify with the national elite and to imitate Western ways of life. To summarize, unlike in Mexico, the Turkish single-party was totally unsuccessful in organizing and absorbing the peasants and giving them a sense of participation in the political system.

It is interesting to note that the RPP was no more successful in appealing to and absorbing the Turkish business community. The party policy toward the respective roles of public and private sectors in economy was ambiguous. Although the official policy of *étatisme*, which was introduced in the 1930's, was anything but a systematic and coherent leftist approach, it is quite understandable that the businessmen felt more at ease with the DP which openly advocated economic liberalism. The restrictive measures of the World War years (especially the Capital Levy of 1942) and the reluctance of the RPP leadership to recruit business elements into significant political roles conceivably increased the alienation of this group from the RPP. Thus, the DP, from its inception, found particularly strong support in the business community.

The Pattern of Policy

Some of the most interesting dissimilarities between the single-party governments in Turkey and Mexico are to be found in their policy outputs. Very briefly, the revolutionary Mexican governments have, on the whole, followed policies which assured them the continued support of a large majority of their population, whereas the policies of the Turkish revolutionary regime served mainly the interests of the two partners in the RPP coalition (i.e., the military-bureaucratic elite and the local notables) and were met with indifference, if not hostility, by the peasant masses. Obviously, considerations of space preclude the possibility of extending this comparative analysis to the whole range of public policy. I would rather concentrate, therefore, on certain selected policy areas which are particularly germane to the present study, namely land reform and labor legislation.

A glance at the Turkish Constitution of 1924 and the Mexican Constitution of 1917 clearly indicates the magnitude of policy differences in these areas, although constitutional norms are by no means wholly reliable guides to the actual practices. The Turkish Constitution was unmistakably in the tradition of the nineteenth-century liberal constitutions. It stressed political democracy and guaranteed the classical civil rights, but maintained a total silence on social rights, which by that time had already found their way into some modern constitutions (e.g., the Weimar Constitution). Consequently, whatever has been done by way of social reform under the RPP rule in Turkey, has been accomplished not through but in spite of the Constitution. No better evidence than the 1924 Turkish Constitution can be found to demonstrate the lack of interest by the RPP leadership for comprehensive social reforms.

By contrast, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is commonly referred to as the most socially advanced constitution of its time. Especially two articles of this document (Articles 27 and 123) deserve attention. Article 27 vested in the nation the original ownership of the lands and waters comprised within the national territory as well as the direct ownership of the mineral resources. The same article specifically provided that necessary measures could be taken to divide up large landed estates. Similarly, Article 123 provided «the most advanced labor code in the world of that day,» recognizing the right to unionize, the right to strike, eight-hours work day, minimum wages, the right to rest, as well as many other social rights.⁴⁸

The crucial fact, however, is that these constitutional norms were closely conformed to in actual practice. Indeed, land reform in Mexico can be hailed as the single most important achievement of the revolutionary regime. Much has been written on the Mexican land reform, the details of which need not, therefore, be treated at length here.⁴⁹ However, a unanimous judgement which emerges out of these analyses is that the Mexican land reform significantly improved the lot of the Mexican peasants. To give a few il-

(48) Senior, *op. cit.*, p. 30; Haight, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-34; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-39.

(49) See, for example, Senior, *op. cit.*, *passim.*; Cline *op. cit.*, Chapt. XXII; Padgett, *op. cit.*, Chapt. 8; Eyster J. Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1937); Nathan L. Whetten, *Rural Mexico* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

illustrations, the grand total of land distributed by the end of 1964 amounted to 59.5 million hectares.⁵⁰ The number of landowners showed an astronomical increase of 6.750 per cent between 1910 and 1950.⁵¹ In the year 1910, 88.4 per cent of the agricultural population were *peons* and less than sixty thousand persons or communities could claim any sort of title to land, whereas by 1950 about 3.3 million persons, most of them heads of families, were legally landowners either as *ejidatarios* or private farmers.⁵² Moreover, despite the post-Cárdenas shift of emphasis from the *ejido* system (communal ownership) to small private holding, and occasional slowdowns in the distribution of land, land reform in Mexico has never come to a standstill. Thus, President Lopez Mateos (1958-1964) greatly revitalized the land reform, disproving the more conservative thesis that land susceptible of distribution had become very scarce. Land distributed under the administration of López Mateos amounted to 16 million hectares, or more than one-third of the total amount of land distributed between 1915 and 1958, ranking second only to the Cárdenas period.⁵³

Critics of the Mexican land reform frequently assert that the distribution of land under the revolutionary governments could not completely eradicate gross inequalities in land ownership. *Latifundios* (large private estates) still exist in under-populated regions. Legal provisions limiting the size of the private plots have sometimes been evaded resulting in «the accumulation of land and the formation of agricultural corporations of a capitalist type.» Thus, argues a prominent Mexican author, Pablo González Casanova, «from a form of exploitation close to slavery (*peonage*), the transition is made to capitalist forms of exploitation.»⁵⁴ On a countrywide basis, Cline observed that very large holdings (over 800 hectares), owned by 0.06 per cent of all the private landholders, amounted to 31.86 per cent of the privately owned rural lands, whereas about 90 per cent of the private landholders owned less than 20 per cent of such lands. The average annual income of private smallholders with plots under 5 hectares (82.5 per cent of all

(50) Padgett, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

(51) Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

(52) Casanova, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-75; Haight, *op. cit.*, p. 185; Senior, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-18 and Table 45. Tai calculated the Gini indices of land concentration for 1930 and 1960. Decline in the index in this period was 27.64 per cent. See, *op. cit.*, p. 92, Table 6.

(53) For land reform under López Mateos, see Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-200.

(54) Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

private agriculturists) was only 352 pesos in 1950; at the other extreme, very large holdings mentioned above provided their proprietors with an average annual income of over one million peses.⁵⁵ As for the *ejidos*, the critics assert that a large proportion of *ejidatarios* received small parcels (an average of 6.4 hectares apiece), or else land of poor quality. Clarence Senior compares the resultant problem of *minifundia* to «the action of a captain who allows a lifeboat to be loaded far beyond capacity.»⁵⁶

Although these criticisms contain a great deal of truth, a realistic appraisal of the Mexican land reform should be based not on what could have ideally been done, but on what has actually been done. Granting the incompleteness and certain other shortcomings of the land reform in Mexico, we can argue with safety that it brought about a substantial improvement in the standards of living of the peasant masses. Mexican peasants were not only materially benefited from the distribution of land, but also were saved from a degrading condition of virtual slavery in the hands of the *hacendados*. Even as vehement a critic of the inadequacy of the land reform as P. G. Casanova admits that «the feudal structure of Mexican rural life has disappeared» and «the colonial economy has been broken.»⁵⁷ Politically, there is no doubt that the land reform played a most important role in assuring the allegiance of the peasants to the revolutionary regime. In fact, as Haight observes, agrarianism «possesses the deepest emotional attraction for the Mexican people, many of whom may be neutral or hostile to other aspects of the [revolutionary] movement.»⁵⁸

Land reform is, probably, *the* major policy area where the Turkish and Mexican patterns of development diverge most clearly. In contrast to the Mexican experience, land reform had been absent among the primary goals of the Kemalist regime and, when at last a seemingly sincere effort in this direction was made toward the end of the single-party rule, it met with a total failure. It should be admitted, however, that the distribution of land ownership in Turkey has never been so inequitable as in pre-revolutionary Mexico. This was due, in no small part, to the Ottoman

(55) Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-21.

(56) Senior, *op. cit.*, p. 209; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-12; for a full discussion of favorable and unfavorable appraisals of the agrarian policies of revolutionary government, see Haight, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-230.

(57) Casanova, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

(58) Haight, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

land tenure system which vested the original ownership of land in the state, and limited the rights of the temporarily-appointed fief (*tımar*) holders to the collection of taxes and the supervision of peasants under their jurisdiction. Therefore, there was no feudal landed aristocracy in the Ottoman Empire, except in certain areas (e. g., east and southeast Anatolia) where the authority of the central government could not be effectively extended. However, starting from the seventeenth century, the land-tenure system of the Empire degenerated rapidly. Local notables (*âyan*) increased their wealth and power through leasing state-owned lands which were ceased to be assigned to fief holders. «Later, in the eighteenth century, the leases were made for lifetime and prior rights to the leases were granted to the sons of lessees.»⁵⁹ Finally, with the adoption of a Land Law (*Arazi Kanunu*) in 1858, which substituted private ownership of land for state-ownership, the local notables were able to concentrate in their hands the legal ownership of large portions of state-owned lands through bribery, usury, tax farming, violence, and intimidation.⁶⁰

Thus, the distribution of land ownership in Republican Turkey has been far from presenting a balanced picture, even though a majority (72.6 per cent) of farming families own some land. According to a survey made in 1952, 1.5 per cent of agricultural families own 24.8 per cent of total cultivated lands, while 75.4 per cent of agricultural families own only 29.4 per cent of such lands.⁶¹ Similarly, the Second Five Year Development Plan states that 3.71 per cent of the agricultural holdings (over 20 hectares) amount to 33.5 per cent of the total cultivated areas, while 68.78 per cent of the agricultural holdings (under 5 hectares) hold only 24.8 per cent of such areas. Distribution of income among agricultural holdings conforms to the same pattern: While about one-fourth of total agricultural income (24.8 per cent) goes to 68.78 per cent of agricultural holdings, about one-third of total agricultural income is gained by only 3.71 per cent of such holdings.⁶² Finally, village in-

(59) Halil İnalçık, «The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey,» in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., **Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 47-48.

(60) Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, **İkinci Adam** (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 303-10.

(61) **Gelir Dağılımı Araştırması (Income Distribution Study)** (Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilâtı, 1966), p. 34.

(62) **Kalkınma Planı, İkinci Beş Yıl, 1968-1972 (Development Plan, Second Five Year, 1968-1972)** (Ankara: T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teş-

ventory studies conducted in 26 provinces by the Ministry of Rural Affairs demonstrated that defects of land tenure system were more acute in these provinces: While one-third of total cultivated areas is held by only 4 per cent of agricultural families, about one-third of such families hold only 3 per cent of cultivated areas.⁶³

The fact that there was no attempt at land reform in Turkey until the year 1945 should not be interpreted as a sign of indifference of the Kemalist regime to the plight of the Turkish peasants. Atatürk's famous slogan, «the peasant is the master of the country,» cannot be easily dismissed as mere rhetoric. On the contrary, Atatürk unequivocally stated in his last annual message to the Grand National Assembly that he expected the Assembly to pass a land reform bill. «It is an absolute necessity,» Atatürk continued, «that every Turkish farming family must own the land on which they work and depend. The construction of the fatherland on solid foundations depends on this principle.» Although this recommendation was not acted upon during the early years of the İnönü administration, the time finally seemed to have become ripe for a land reform in the middle 1940's. President İnönü, who already had expressed his support for «radical» agricultural reforms in 1936 before his departure from premiership, became even more impatient with the irresponsible pursuit of profit by large landholders during the World War II years. Finally, in 1945, a Land Reform Bill was submitted to the Assembly by the government.⁶⁴ The bill provided that private holdings in excess of 500 hectares (and in regions where land is insufficient, those in excess of 200 hectares) would be expropriated to be distributed to the landless and land-short peasants. A still more radical provision was Article 17, which stipulated that properties cultivated by sharecroppers, tenants, and agricultural workers would be subject to expropriation, irrespective of the size of the plot, to be distributed to those who cultivated it; in such cases, the original landowner would be entitled to retain a piece of his land (a minimum of 5 hectares) three times the size of the plot each grantee received.⁶⁵

kilâti, 1967), pp. 239-40, Tables 118, 119. See also, **Gelir Dağılımı Araştırması**, *op. cit.*, pp. 39, 59.

(63) Gürgân Çelebican, «İktisadî Açından Toprak Reformu,» in **Türkiye'de Toprak Reformu Semineri** (Ankara: A. Ü. Hukuk Fakültesi Yayını, 1963), p. 34.

(64) For the events leading to the submission to the Assembly of the Land Reform Bill, see Aydemir, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-45.

(65) **Çifçi-yi Topraklandırma Kanunu**, No. 4753, **Düstur**, Vol. 26, pp. 1169-

National Assembly debates on the proposed bill show, perhaps better than anything else, the nature of the RPP coalition. While the military-bureaucratic-intellectual wing of the party strongly supported the measure, representatives of the local nobility vehemently opposed it. The normally docile single-party Assembly witnessed, for the first time, a genuine and protracted controversy. In fact, only İnönü's determined intervention seems to have saved the bill. Reportedly, İnönü was very much involved in the land reform attempt; he personally helped draft the famous Article 17, and let the rumor spread that he would have no connection with a party which did not want to pass the Land Reform Bill. Finally, in June, 1945, the Law was passed by the Assembly. But for all practical purposes, it was stillborn. The RPP government did not have the courage to apply its radical provisions in the face of strong intra-party and extra-party opposition by the landed oligarchy. In fact, the newly established Democratic Party was successfully exploiting the land reform issue defending the interests of the large landholders; interestingly, two of the founders of the DP, Adnan Menderes and Refik Koraltan, had voiced strong criticism against the Law during the National Assembly debates. And a great number of RPP members were either openly opposed to the Law, or gave it only nominal support. Consequently, many provisions of the Land Reform Law remained on paper. In particular, the expropriation provisions concerning private property were barely applied, the area thus expropriated amounting to only 3600 hectares. In August, 1945, the Minister of Agriculture and the chief architect of the Land Reform Law, Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu, had to resign and, curiously enough, was replaced by one of the foremost opponents of the reform, Cavit Oral, himself a large landowner. The deathblow to the Land Reform Law was finally administered in 1950 when the Law of 1945 was amended by the Assembly on the proposal of the RPP government. The amendment abolished Article 17, thereby limiting, in essence, the land to be distributed to that owned by the state and pious foundations (*vakıf*). The only land reform attempt of the RPP thus ended in a total failure.⁶⁶

A second policy area which clearly differentiates the Turkish and Mexican single-party systems is labor policy. As indicated above, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 laid the basis of a pro-

(66) Kemal H. Karpat, **Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 117-25; Aydemir, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-49.

gressive labor policy in Mexico.⁶⁷ In return for its active participation in the Revolution, the Mexican labor class was rewarded with Article 123 of the Constitution, which granted almost all the fundamental demands of organized labor. Moreover, Mexican governments have, on the whole, been consistent in their pro-labor policies. Among the more recent gains of the Mexican working-class, one may cite the substantial expansion of social security program in the 1950's and the adoption of a profit-sharing system in 1962.⁶⁸ As Professor Cline has summarized very well, «the modern labour movement formed part of the militant Revolution; therefore, from the outset it has had an honoured place in social and economic circles, assured by Article 123... There has never been an anti-labour Government in Mexico since 1917; conversely, there has never been an anti-Government labour party or programme of consequence.»⁶⁹

The Turkish labor class, on the other hand, has not been nearly as lucky as its Mexican counterpart. The first labor law of the Republic, passed in 1936, was modelled on the labor law of Fascist Italy. It denied the workers the right to unionize, and declared strikes illegal. It was not until the passage of the Trade Unions Act in 1947 that the right to unionize was recognized, but even this law did not grant the workers the right to strike. Unions were frequently closed, and their leaders jailed, whenever they were suspected of leaning to the left. Trade unionism, naturally, could not flourish under such adverse conditions. Thus, in 1950 there were only 87 labor unions in Turkey with a total membership of 76.000.⁷⁰ The Turkish workers had to wait until the 1960's to obtain those social rights (including the right to strike) their Mexican comrades had won almost a half century ago.

(67) On the labor labor policy in Mexico, see Padgett, *op. cit.*, Chapt. 7; Cline, *op. cit.*, Chapt. XXIII; Haight, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-51; Marjorie R. Clark, *Organized Labor in Mexico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934); Vicente Lombardo Toledano, «The Labor Movement,» *The Annals*, 208 (March, 1940), pp. 48-54; Horace B. Davis, «Numerical Strength of Mexican Unions,» *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 25 (June, 1954), pp. 48-55; Joseph A. Kahl, «Three Types of Mexican Industrial Workers,» *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 8 (January, 1960), pp. 164-69.

(68) Padgett, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-76.

(69) Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

(70) Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 109, 312-16; Aydemir, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-63.

Conclusion: Contrasting Responses to Democratization

As the present analysis would have already indicated, the continued domination of the PRI in Mexican politics comes chiefly from the fact that the revolutionary governments in Mexico have succeeded in pursuing policies which have brought substantial tangible benefits to the urban and rural working-class masses. Another important element in the popular strength of the PRI is its success in effectively organizing these masses, thereby giving them a strong sense of participation in the political system. Almond and Verba's insightful findings presented in *The Civic Culture* support these arguments. They observed that the Mexicans score high in subjective political, or citizen, competence (i. e., perceived ability to affect governmental decisions through political influence), even if few of them actually attempt to exercise such influence. To put it differently, participation does exist at an aspirational level, if not yet in actual practice. The authors of *The Civic Culture* also observed that the Mexicans, although apparently not satisfied with the ways in which policies are implemented (output alienation), display a high level of «system affect,» or pride in their political and governmental institutions — in fact, higher than both the Germans and the Italians. And it is precisely this kind of affect that contributes most to democratic stability. As Almond and Verba argued, «satisfaction with governmental output may lead an individual to support his political system, and high levels of such satisfaction are therefore likely to foster political stability. For long-run stability, on the other hand, a more diffuse sense of attachment — one that is less closely tied to performance — may be more significant. Satisfaction with political output usually varies with system performance. The more diffuse sense of attachment to the system (or what we have called system affect), though in the long run not unrelated to specific output, can be expected to be a more stable kind of satisfaction.»⁷¹ In view of this situation, we may predict that the PRI will retain its virtual monopoly in the foreseeable future, unless the growing influence on the party of the middle sectors and the consequent rightward shift of policy reach a point where the agricultural and labor sectors (or either of them) may decide to break away — a development which, at the moment, seems rather unlikely.⁷²

(71) Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, *passim.*, esp. pp. 185, 202-203, 310-11, 363-64; quotation is from p. 192.

(72) On the future of the PRI, see Needler, «The Political Development of Mexico,» p. 312; Cline, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72; Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 740-44.

In contrast to the Mexican experience, the Turkish RPP paid dearly for its lack of concern for the masses, manifested both in its organization and its policies. To some extent, of course, the elitist pattern of power and the essentially conservative social policies of the RPP were dictated by the social structure of the revolutionary coalition in Turkey. But I would strongly argue that this particular type of coalition was not rendered inevitable either by the organic ties between the national military-bureaucratic elite and the local nobility, nor by the inherent conservatism of the former. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence in recent Turkish history that the military-bureaucratic elite is not at all hostile to social reforms and social justice. President İnönü's attempt at land reform, risking to alienate powerful elements in his party, is a good case in point. Supporting evidence may be found in the military *coup* of 1960, which was carried out by the same national elite and, as I argued elsewhere,⁷³ was unmistakably oriented to social reforms. Finally, the opening to the left of the RPP in the middle 1960's may be interpreted as a conscious choice made by the bureaucratic-intellectual wing of the party to break away from their old partners, the local nobility, and to search for new allies among the lower classes.

All this leads me to conclude that the national elite's original choice of partner was largely dictated by the kind of reforms they envisaged for Turkey. For a reform program stressing secularism and positivism, their only possible ally would naturally be the relatively Westernized local nobility, not the traditional peasants. But had they given priority to social reforms over secularizing reforms, they could have conceivably built a coalition similar to the Mexican one. The RPP was faced with a similar choice in 1945 between land reform and immediate democratization. In the months following the inauguration of land reform legislation and of a multi-party system, it became readily apparent that both aims could not be achieved simultaneously; for the Democrats were successfully capitalizing on the discontent of the numerically weak but socially, economically, and politically influential local nobility. Consequently, the RPP leadership chose to sacrifice land reform, once again refusing to accord top priority to infrastructural change.

It remains possible, of course, that the recent efforts of the RPP to build a coalition between reform-minded intellectual-bu-

(73) Öztudun, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 22-26.

reaucratic elements and the urban-rural lower classes might eventually succeed. In fact, the leftward shift in party policy led to an intense intra-party struggle and to the resignation of many local notables, who formed the Reliance Party in the spring of 1967. However, in the following mid-term elections of June 1968, the overall percentage of the RPP vote did not fall, thus indicating that the party might have compensated for its loss by starting to gain ground among the lower classes. But evidence on this point is inconclusive; and, even if this measured optimism is justified, the RPP is still a long way from power. For one thing, the essentially negative image of the party among the peasants may take many decades to overcome. Furthermore, the strong influence of the conservative rural elites (land-owning, commercial, or religious) on the bulk of the peasantry will constitute another tremendous obstacle in the party's drive to form a winning coalition.

The ambivalence of the RPP policies toward social reform questions led to a paradoxical situation which continues to intrigue almost every observer of Turkish politics. It is true that the DP represented, and greatly benefited by, the legitimate discontent of the masses with the RPP regime. But this popular reaction was canalized and led by groups whose interests were more inherently adverse to those of the masses than were the interests of the military-bureaucratic elite: Business groups which were uneasy about the RPP's *étatisme*; many local notables who either had remained outside the RPP or were recently alienated from it because of the attempt at land reform;⁷⁴ and, finally, the religious leaders who had never forgiven the RPP for its secularist policies (Note the similarity to the sources of support of the Mexican PAN). Thus, the DP was supported by such strange bedfellows as the rural and urban lower-classes on the one hand, and the businessmen and many

(74) Some anthropologists argue, in fact, that the Turkish rural communities generally display a bipolar power structure. Thus, if one local faction belongs to the government party, the rival faction will be inclined to associate itself with the opposition. In the single-party years, the reigning factions had already identified themselves with the RPP; those who opposed them (generally lesser notables) were, therefore, committed to the DP. «This analysis implies that the DP in fact captured the support of most of the local oppositions which existed in every town and village in Turkey.» See Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York: Wiley, Science Editions, 1965), pp. 281-82; also Dankwart A. Rustow, «The Development of Parties in Turkey,» In Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 123.

local notables on the other. Paradoxical though this coalition may seem, it proved to be electorally unbeatable in the last two decades.

Unfortunately for the long-neglected Turkish masses, however, the conservative character of the DP (and now JP) leadership precluded any serious attempt at social reform. Moreover, the frustration of the bureaucratic-intellectual elite both with the conservative policies of their rivals and with their own, seemingly permanent, exclusion from power pose a major threat to the stability of the multi-party regime. After all, the *coup* of 1960 was, in essence, an outburst of this frustration, and nobody can say for sure that similar outbursts will not happen again. Thus, while in Mexico a revolutionary coalition between the middle and lower classes resulted in a regime which is stable, progressive, and increasingly democratic, the failure of the RPP to create such a coalition seems to have brought Turkey to an impasse marked by instability, conservatism, and potential authoritarianism. Professor Scott has aptly called the Mexican Revolution «the established revolution.» If we were to follow the current fashion of qualifying revolutions, the most appropriate term for the Turkish Revolution might well be «the unfinished revolution.»