



## **Negative Feelings Towards “Outsiders:” European Public Opinion About Non-EU Migration**

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### **Abstract**

*As the United Nations 2017 International Migration Report shows, from the years of 2010 to 2017, the number of international immigrants increased from 220 to 258 million. More than half of the international immigrants (over 60% of them) live in Asia (80 million) or Europe (78 million). International migrants, especially refugees, continue to move and prefer to live in Europe. In this picture, how European Citizens respond to recent migration flow from non-member countries is important for having a peaceful future. The current literature mostly focuses on the attitude of respondents toward immigrants already living in the European Union member states. Different from the literature, by using Standard Eurobarometer data set (Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018), this study explores the impact of several factors (such as economic and non-economic) on the level of negative feelings towards immigration from non-EU countries. The statistical analyses show that economic problems, life satisfaction, welfare state, security issues and national identity are important factors that can shape negative feelings towards non-European Country migration. Thus, real or imagined problems related to economy, or democracy cause non-EU migration opposition. In the study, after a brief discussion about previous literature and theoretical framework of the subject; method of the study and the empirical results are presented and critically analyzed.*

**Keywords:** *International Migration, European Union, Non-EU Immigrants, Public Opinion Poll.*

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## Yabancılara Karşı Olumsuz Hisler: Avrupa Birliği'ne Üye Olmayan Ülkelerden Gelen Göçle İlgili Kamuoyu Araştırması

### Öz

*Birleşmiş Milletler 2017 Uluslararası Göç Raporu'nun gösterdiği gibi, uluslararası göçmen sayısı son yıllarda artmış, 2010 yılında 220 milyon iken, 2017 yılında 258 milyona ulaşmıştır. Uluslararası göçmenlerin yarısından fazlası (% 60'ından fazlası) Asya (80 milyon) veya Avrupa'da (78 milyon) yaşamaktadır. Avrupalıların, AB üyesi olmayan ülkelere gelen göçe karşı yaklaşımlarını anlamak, barışçıl bir gelecek açısından önemlidir. Standart Eurobarometer veri setini kullanan (Eurobarometer 89, Bahar 2018) bu çalışma, bazı ekonomik ve ekonomik-olmayan unsurların, AB'ye dahil olmayan ülkelere gelen göçe karşı Avrupalıların olumsuz hisleri üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Temel olarak bu çalışma, ekonomik sorunların, demokrasi, refah devleti ve güvenlikle ilgili sorunların yaşanması ve güçlü bir ulus kimliği söz konusu olmasının Avrupa vatandaşlarının yabancılara karşı olumsuz hislerini etkilediği fikrini ortaya koymaktadır. Regresyon analizine göre, gerçek ya da var olduğunu düşündükleri ekonomik sorunlar Avrupalıların AB dışı göçe karşı olumsuz duruş sergilemeleri olasılığını arttırmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, literatür ve konunun teorik çerçevesi hakkında kısa bir tartışma yapıldıktan sonra, yöntem ve ampirik sonuçlar açıklanmakta ve eleştirel bir şekilde analiz edilmektedir.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Uluslararası Göç, Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Dışı Göçmenler, Kamuoyu Yoklaması.

### Introduction

International migration is a reality in the global world, and more than half of international immigrants live in Asia (80 million) and Europe (78 million). (UN Report, 2017) As the UN report shows, in 2017 most of the international immigrants (67 %) continued to live in twenty countries, two of which are European Union member states (Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). The number of international

immigrants (as well as refugees) will continue to rise and it is possible that most of the immigrants will prefer Europe to stay and live.

As the number of immigrants increases, so do the studies that focus on public opinion about immigrants. Considering public opinion about immigration, studies focus mainly on individuals’ attitudes or prejudice towards immigrants. For instance, “Sniderman, Peri, De Figueiredo and Piazza (2000) gave respondents an extensive list of attributes and asked them whether they associated the items with immigrants.” (Azrout et. al., 2010: 5) Their study shows that prejudice is related to “consistency of evaluation, of systematically taking advantage of opportunities to express negative views and feelings about a group.” (Azrout et. al., 2010: 5) It is also seen that as the number of immigrants (outgroup) increase, anti-immigrant attitudes increase as well. (Schneider, 2007: 53) Mainly, perceiving ethnic threat is seen as an important explanatory variable “for a wide set of anti-immigrant attitudes, e.g. resistance to immigrants and refugees...” (Schneider, 2007: 53). Another study uses European Social Survey data dates 2010 and aims to understand how “prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities” affects European citizens’ attitudes toward migrants. It concludes that having prejudice toward non-European minorities causes negative attitudes towards migrants to increase. (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2016: 331).

Unlike Schneider (2007) who shows that perceiving ethnic threat is an important explanatory variable for anti-immigrant attitudes, the Priorities report of Eurobarometer (2018) indicates while 65 percent of the respondents see international migration from other EU Member States as positive (p.35), the majority of respondents have negative feelings towards non-EU migration. (p.37) Since the EU member states continue being host countries for high number of immigrants and refugees, it is important to see reasons of such a negative public approach towards international migration.

Different from the current literature, the study uses a recent data and aims to understand why immigration from non-EU countries evokes negative feelings among the EU public. In this context, it is assumed that there is a close and direct connection between the variables of public negative feelings towards immigration from non-EU countries and national identity and (real or imagined) problems in a country. By using the latest data set of Eurobarometer from the Gesis Data Catalogue of 2018, the study aims to answer several questions and figure out their

possible impact in explaining negative feelings towards immigrants from non-EU countries. Some of the questions are:

*-Do the problems that Europeans point out (related to their country in general and economy, welfare state and security in particular) have any effect on negative feelings towards non-EU migration?*

*-Does national identity/identifying oneself with a nation have an impact on the negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals?*

*-Do several demographic factors (marital status, gender, age, left–right ideological self–placement) have any impact on the negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals?*

### **Theoretical Discussion and Hypotheses**

In the literature, scholars generally focus on several issues to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, such as decrease in quality of education, problems in social welfare systems, unemployment, increase in crime, immigrants as threat to the way of life of people in host countries (Azrout et. al., 2010: 9), scarcity of employment and rights of native citizens (Küpper, Wolf and Zick, 2010: 210). By arguing that reasons of negative feeling toward immigration from non-European countries can be similar with the reasons of anti-immigrant attitudes; this study uses similar issues as proxies to understand their possible impact for explaining EU citizens' negative feeling about immigration flow from non-EU countries. The main issues this study focuses on are national identity, economic factors, welfare state and security, and demographic characters:

#### **1. National Identity**

According to Social identity theory, if one is in favor of a group and attached to it, then he or she rejects others. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, in Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018: 910) By assuming that national identities would cause such an 'us vs. them' relationship, this study focuses on the national identity effect on European citizens' negative feelings towards migration of non-EU nationals.

As Sides and Citrin (2007) show, statistics indicates that individuals' opposition to migration is affected by their approach to cultural and national identity, their economic gains and their knowledge about migration (p. 477).

Similarly, in another study, it is argued that national identity affects anti-immigrant attitudes (Azrout et. al., 2010: 10). By using 1995 data, O’ Rourke and Sinnott (2006) discuss whether non-economic factors affect attitudes towards migration (p. 844). According to their study, anti-immigrant preferences are related to “strong feelings of national identity and an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes that include pride in country, sense of national superiority and, at the extreme, antagonistic attitudes towards those who are not part of the nation” (p. 844). They show that nationalist feeling determines attitudes towards migration; “patriotism and especially chauvinism” increase citizens’ anti-immigrant feelings (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006: 851).

In a more recent study using a data set dates back to 2013, it is seen that if European citizens identify themselves more with Europe, then they are more likely to have low level of prejudice against migrants. (Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018: 916) However, it is hard to come across with studies, which uses more recent data and measures the impact of citizens’ national identity on negative feelings about immigration from non-EU countries, comparatively. Taking it as a starting point, this study aims to understand to what extent national identity has an effect on European citizens’ negative feelings towards migration of non-EU nationals. To operationalize national identity, the question about “identifying oneself with a nation” is used from the data set. In line with Sides and Citrin’s study, it is hypothesized that:

*Hypothesis 1: It is more likely for EU citizens who identify themselves with a nation to have negative feelings towards non-EU migration.*

## **2. Economic Factors**

Material scarcity in a country could aggravate resentment among population living in poor neighborhoods. (Gay, 2006: 984) Similarly, it is possible to encounter anti-immigrant attitudes, prejudice and even negative feelings towards immigrants in countries where citizens perceive real (or imagined) material scarcity. Several scholars focus on economic factors to test their effects on such attitudes. For instance, Hjerm (2009) aims to investigate whether the number of migrants in Swedish municipalities affects anti-immigrant attitudes of citizens (p. 47). He concludes that the economic setting affects anti-immigrant attitudes of

people, especially “in poor municipalities with a large share of immigrants” (p. 47). Similarly, other studies indicate that economic factors are important on attitudes toward immigrants (Mayda, 2006: 511) such as scarcity of jobs in a country (Küpper, Wolf and Zick, 2010: 210). According to Sides and Citrin (2007), individuals’ opposition to migration is affected by their economic gains as well (p. 477). Different from the literature, this study focuses on negative feelings towards immigrants and the role of economic factors, and it expects that real or imaginary problems related to economy (such as individuals’ ideas about unemployment, taxes, inflation) shape EU citizens’ feelings towards immigrants especially from non-EU countries.

*Hypothesis 2: It is more likely for EU citizens who have concerns about economic situation of their country to have negative feelings towards immigration from non-EU countries.*

### **3. Well-Being, Welfare State and Security**

To analyze reasons of anti-immigrant attitudes, scholars use several factors such as problems in welfare system, in security, causes of crime (Azrout et. al., 2010: 9; and Mayda, 2006: 511). Similarly, this study aims to measure the effect of factors related to security, well-being (as in the case of OECD Better Life Index, 2019) and welfare state by expecting that problems related to these issues shape EU citizens’ feelings about immigrants coming from non-EU countries.

*Hypothesis 3: It is more likely for EU citizens who have concerns about welfare system and security in their country to have negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals.*

*Hypothesis 4: It is less likely for EU citizens who are satisfied with their lives in their country, with general situation the country is into, and who are positive about the future of their country to have negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals.*

### **4. Demographics**

Finally, the study uses the following demographics: Gender, Age, Marital Status, Left-Right placement, and type of community. Since women and men have different patterns of judgment that are shaped by their social status (Kalaycıoğlu

1983: 19), gender difference could have an important effect on the negative feelings toward non-EU migration. Secondly, individuals are politically socialized at different periods in time (Kalaycioğlu 1983: 20). Thus, it is crucial to consider the effect of age as well: It is expected that different age categories affect feelings towards non-EU migration differently. Thirdly, it is expected that left–right ideological self–placement shapes negative feelings towards migration of non-EU nationals.

### **Method and the Research Design**

Since 1974, the Standard Eurobarometer surveys led by European Commission aim to observe public opinion, especially in all EU member states. The last standard barometer’s (the EU 89 Standard Barometer) First Results show that immigration is the foremost concern at EU level, with 38 percent of statements (p. 4). To test the discussed hypotheses, the study uses Eurobarometer data, Standard Eurobarometer 89 (2018).

It is a cross-national data (including non-member states); but for the purpose of the study, only the European Member States data (28 European Union Member States) is drawn from the data set. The population of the research is European public, the sample includes 26338 Respondents (6.4 % are missing cases), and the unit of analysis is individuals who are residents in the EU Members and aged 15 years and over. SPSS 25.0 package is used for binary logistic regression and other statistical analyses.

### **Operationalization of Variables**

#### **1. Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable is ‘EU citizen’s negative feelings towards non-EU immigrants.’ To operationalize this variable, the following question is used:

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*“Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU.”\**

The answers are recoded as a binary variable. Those who reply the question as “negative” and “very negative” are recoded as 1 (negative feeling) and those who reply the question as “positive” and “very positive” are recoded as 0. The answers “Don’t know” and “not applicable” are eliminated to have a stronger analysis.

## **2. Independent Variables**

### **a. National Identity**

To measure the effect of identity on EU citizen’s negative feelings towards non-EU immigrants, the question of *“Do you see yourself as...? (Nationality)”* is chosen. The answers are recoded as dummy variables: The answers “(Nationality) First only” is recoded as 1 and ““(Nationality) First and European”, “First European only”” as 0. The ““None”, “Refusal”, and “Don’t Know”” answers are recoded as system missing (excluded).

### **b. Economic problems**

To capture the effect of perceived economic problems on EU citizen’s negative feelings towards non-EU immigrants several survey questions are used. One of them is:

*“How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? -The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy, -The employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY).”*

### **c. Well-Being, Welfare State and Security**

To measure the effect of well-being one of the survey questions that is used:

*“What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to...? -The situation in (OUR COUNTRY).”*

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\* For all of the questions, please check the basic bilingual questionnaire, <https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-special-eb/study-overview/eurobarometer-891-za6963-march-2018/>.



To measure the effect of welfare system the questions of “*How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?*” and “*What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? -Health and Social Security, -the Education system, -Pensions.*” are chosen. Similarly, to measure the effect of security, the question related to personal statements about important issues facing respondents’ country is chosen. Respondents can select two answers among other issues.

Lastly, the question of “*What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? -Immigration.*” is used as a control variable. Participants can select two answers among other issues.

#### **d. Demographics**

The study includes the respondents’ age, gender, marital status, left-right political placement and type of community as demographic variables.

### **Research Results**


#### **1. Descriptive Analysis**

In the Table 1 frequency test results have been presented for non-EU migration opponents and supporters, and all respondents in general. As the Table 1 shows, half of the respondents are in the 55 and older age band and more than half of the respondents, who have negative feeling toward immigration from non-EU countries, are in the same age band. More than half of the respondents are female, and more than half of the non-EU migration opponents are female (slightly different from the supporters). More than 60% of the respondents are married or single with a partner. With respect to political ideologies, there is a slight difference between opponents and supporters: In general, around 35% of the respondents place themselves at the center, and around 40% of them live in small/middle towns.

**Table 1.** Descriptive Results

<b>Demographic Characters</b>	Negative Feeling Toward Immigration from non-EU countries		
<b>Age</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Total Respondents</b>
15-24	10.8%	6.6 %	8.2%
25-39	23%	18.3%	20.1%
40-54	25.1%	24.6%	24.8%
55 and older	41%	50.6%	46.9%
Total	10133 (100%)	16205 (100%)	26338(100%)
	Negative Feeling Toward Immigration from non-EU countries		
<b>Gender</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Total Respondents</b>
Man	47%	45.7%	46.2%
Woman	53%	54.3%	53.8%
	Negative Feeling Toward Immigration from non-EU countries		
<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Total Respondents</b>
Unmarried	20.4%	14.1%	16.5%
Re-Married or Single living with a partner	63%	64%	63.6%
Divorced or separated	7.5%	9.2%	8.5%
Widowed	8.1%	12%	10.5%
Other	0.7%	0.4%	0.5%
Refusal	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%
	Negative Feeling Toward Immigration from non-EU countries		
<b>Left-Right Placement</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Total Respondents</b>
Left	34.2%	20.6%	25.8%
Center	35.0%	36.0%	35.6%
Right	17.0%	24.9%	21.8%
	Negative Feeling Toward Immigration from non-EU countries		
<b>Type of Community</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Total Respondents</b>
Rural area or Village	28.8 %	31.9 %	30.8 %
Small/Middle Town	41.9 %	41.3 %	41.5 %
Large Town	29.3 %	26.8%	27.7 %

The Graph 1 shows frequency distribution of dependent variable. The histogram indicates a moderate tailed distribution and the normal probability plot confirms approximate normality. Thus, as the Graph 1 shows, the normal distribution is a good model for the data and binary regression analysis can be used for the study.



**Graph 1:** Negative Feelings and Immigrants Outside the EU

## 2. Regression Results

According to Omnibus test, the chi-square is highly significant,  $X^2 = 2887,4$   $df=31$ ,  $p<0.000$ . The model explains roughly 15% of the variation in the outcome (about variance,  $R^2$  is between 10,5% and 14,3%): Thus 15 % of the variation in negative feelings variable is explained by the model. Although the research has a large sample size, Hosmer-Lemeshow test has been performed and for the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, p value ( $P=0.486$ ) is insignificant ( $p>0.000$ ). Thus, the model is a good fit to the data. The model with the constant is a statistically significant predictor of the outcome ( $p <.000$ ), and accurate 67 % of the time (with a large sample size, it has predictive power).

The Table 2 reports the results of a binary logistic regression using the question “Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive

or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from outside the EU” as a dependent variable, those who reply the question as “negative” and “very negative” are recoded as 1 (negative feeling) and those who reply the question as “positive” and “very positive” are recoded as 0. The answers “Don’t know” and “not applicable” are eliminated to have a stronger analysis.

**Table 2.** Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>National Identity</b>	See as (Nationality)*	512	030	000	1.669
<b>Economic Problems</b>	Important Issues in Country: Economic Situation	159	061	009	1.173
	Important Issues in Country: Rising Prices, Inflation*	348	060	000	1.416
	Important Issues in Country: Taxation*	357	068	000	1.429
	Important Issues in Country: Unemployment	063	059	287	1.065
	Important Issues in Country: Housing	.196	066	003	.822
	Situation: National Economy*	110	023	000	1.117
	Situation: Employment Country	001	019	951	1.001
	Expectations: Economic Situation	.035	022	117	.966
	Expectations: Employment Country	001	018	941	1.001
<b>Well-Being</b>	Situation: County General*	112	024	000	1.118
	Democratic Satisfaction: *Country	294	019	000	1.342
	Living Conditions: Country	036	019	060	1.037
	Expectations: Country in General *	077	022	000	1.080
	Important Issues in Country: Government Debt	095	066	151	1.100
<b>Welfare State</b>	Situation: Public Services	.003	.018	.858	1.003
	Important Issues in Country: Health and Social Security *	.227	.057	.000	1.255
	Important Issues in Country: Education System	- .026	.064	.681	.974
	Important Issues in Country: Pensions*	.281	.062	.000	1.325
	Important Issues in Country: The Environment	- .183	.066	.006	.833
<b>Security</b>	Important Issues in Country: Crime*	.431	.066	.000	1.539
	Important Issues in Country: Terrorism	.123	.075	.102	1.131

		B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
<b>(Immigration)</b>	Important Issues in Country: Immigration*	.957	.062	.000	2.605
<b>Demographics</b>	Marital Status*	.081	.017	.000	1.084
	Gender	-.024	.028	.381	.976
	Age*	.178	.015	.000	1.195
	Left-Right Placement*	.049	.005	.000	1.050
	Type of Community	-.040	.018	.024	.961
<b>Constant</b>	-----*	-2.329	.140	.000	.097

As the Table 2 shows, the immigration variable is the single most important issue that would make opposing non-EU migration almost 3 times as likely to occur. Thus, seeing immigration as an important problem is related to the negative feeling toward non-EU country immigration. The results support the first hypothesis and show that seeing oneself as a German, for instance, would make EU citizens almost 2 times as likely to have negative feelings toward non-EU migration. The results support the second hypothesis and show that if European citizens would perceive the most important issues in country as inflation and taxation, then they would be almost 2 times as likely to have negative feelings toward non-EU migration. The changes in the level of judging the current situation in national economy from very good to very bad increase the possibility of having negative feelings toward non-EU migration (one time as likely to occur).

About the life satisfaction variable, neither arguing that the most important issues in a country is government debt nor living in satisfactory conditions has significant effect on the issue. However, the changes in the level of judging the current situation in a country in general, and the changes in the level of judging the way democracy works in the country increase the possibility of opposing non-EU country immigration (one time as likely to occur). The variable about the future of the country in general shape the possibility of opposing non-EU migration as well (one time as likely to occur).

About problems related to welfare state and its services, arguing that the most important issues in a country are pensions, health and social security would make EU citizens to oppose to immigration of non-EU nationals (both of them one time as likely to occur). About problems related to security, arguing that the most important issue in the country is crime would make EU citizens almost two times more likely to oppose non-EU migration.

Lastly, the study shows that some of the demographic variables matter: The difference in age and marital status, as well as having different political ideologies (left-right political dimension) have positive effect on having negative feelings towards non-EU migration, but neither gender nor type of community has significant effect on the issue.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

The current literature focuses mostly on the attitude of respondents toward immigrants already living in the European Union member states. Different from the literature, by using a recent EU public opinion survey data, the research aim was to determine the factors that evoke negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals.

As a result of the study, it is argued that European Public sees immigration as an important issue and it is more likely for Europeans, who see immigration as an issue, to have negative feelings towards non-EU migration. The empirical findings of the study show that national identity, economic problems related to the country, welfare state and security shape the non-EU migration opposition. More specifically, if Europeans believe that there are taxation problems and inflation in their countries, then they are more likely to have negative feelings towards non-EU migration. Similar to the literature, arguing that the current situation in national economy is decrepit increases the possibility of having negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals.

About life satisfaction, the changes in the level of judging the current situation in a country in general and the way democracy functions from very good to very bad increase the possibility of opposing non-EU migration. If individuals are pessimistic about the future of the country in general, then it is possible for them to have negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals. Similar to the literature, about problems related to welfare state and security, if EU citizens claim crime, pensions and health and social security are most important problems in their country, and then they are more likely to have negative feelings towards non-EU migration.

When the data is considered in general, it is claimed that the results are very crucial for European Union countries to manage immigration and integration in general. It is usually hard to have high R-square results in social sciences; thus

having  $R^2$  is between 10,5% and 14,3% can be counted as a good result in relationship between dependent and independent variables. The statistical analyses show that economic problems, democracy, welfare state, security issues and national identity are important factors that can shape negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals. Thus, real or perceived problems related to, for instance, economy, or democracy, cause non-EU migration opposition.

One policy implication of these findings could be explaining possible benefits of non-EU migration and discussing the main reasons of economic problems (economic crisis, global economy, capitalism etc.) -if any- more clearly. In addition to that, the language is also important: Using immigrant-friendly language may also help EU citizens not to link immigration to the problems of their countries. Nevertheless, it is suggested that qualitative research could be conducted for detailed analysis about negative feelings towards immigration of non-EU nationals.

### Genişletilmiş Özet

Birleşmiş Milletler 2017 Uluslararası Göç Raporu'na göre uluslararası göçmen sayısı son yıllarda artmış, 2010 yılında 220 milyon iken, 2017 yılında 258 milyona ulaşmıştır. Uluslararası göçmenlerin yarısından fazlası Asya (80 milyon) veya Avrupa kıtalarında (78 milyon) yaşamaktadır. Göçmen hareketinin artış gösterdiği düşünüldüğünde, Avrupalıların, AB üyesi olmayan ülkelerden gelen göçe karşı yaklaşımlarını anlamak, barışçıl bir gelecek açısından önemlidir.

Göçle ilgili olarak kamuoyu araştırmaları ve analizleri dikkate alındığında, çalışmaların temel olarak bireylerin göçmenlere yönelik tutumlarına veya ön yargılarına odaklandığı görülür. Örneğin, Schneider, göçmen sayısı arttıkça göçmen karşıtı tutumların da arttığını gösterir. (Schneider, 2007: 53) Bu durumun sebebi olarak etnik farklılığın tehdit olarak algılanması gibi çeşitli değişkenler öne sürülüp araştırılmıştır. (Schneider, 2007: 53). Ancak, Schneider (2007)'in, etnik tehdidin göçmen karşıtı tutumlar için önemli bir açıklayıcı değişken olduğunu göstermesinden farklı olarak, Eurobarometer Öncelikler Raporu'na göre (2018), katılımcıların yüzde 65'i diğer AB üyesi devletlerden gelen uluslararası göçe olumlu yaklaşmaktadırlar. (s.35). Diğer yandan, katılımcıların çoğu AB dışı göç konusunda olumsuz duygular beslemektedir (s.37).

Mevcut yazından farklı olarak, bu çalışma hem daha yeni bir veri seti kullanmakta hem de AB vatandaşlarının göçe karşı genel ön yargılarını değil AB üyesi olmayan ülkelerden gelen göçe karşı olumsuz hislerinin nedenlerini karşılaştırmalı olarak incelemektedir.

Standart Eurobarometer veri setini kullanan (Eurobarometer 89, Bahar 2018) bu çalışma, bazı ekonomik ve ekonomik-olmayan faktörlerin, AB'ye dahil olmayan ülkelerden gelen göçe karşı Avrupalıların olumsuz hisleri üzerindeki etkisine odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın üzerinde durduğu temel konular, ulusal kimlik, ekonomik unsurlar, sosyal devlet, güvenlik ve demografik karakterlerdir: Örneğin sosyal kimlik kuramına göre, bir kimse kendini bir gruba yakın hissederse ve ona bağlıysa, diğerlerini dışlar. (Tajfel ve Turner, 1979, Visintin, Green ve Sarrasin, 2018: 910) Bu teoriden hareketle çalışma, ulusal kimliklerin de böylesi bir 'biz ve onlar' karşıtlığına sebep olacağını varsayarak ulusal kimliklerin AB üyesi olmayan vatandaşların göçüne yönelik olumsuz duyguların üzerindeki etkisine odaklanmaktadır.

Çalışmanın ampirik analizleri için kullanılan veri seti, AB üye ülkeleri, aday ülkeleri ve üye olmayan bazı ülkeleri de kapsayan bir veri setidir. Ancak çalışmanın amacı doğrultusunda, veri setinden sadece Avrupa üye devletleri verileri (28 Avrupa Birliği üyesi) çekilip, katılımcıların cevapları incelenmiştir. Araştırma popülasyonu Avrupa halkı, örneklem ise 26338 kişidir (%6,4'ü eksik vakalar). Çalışmanın analiz birimi AB ülkelerinde ikamet eden 15 yaş ve üstü kişilerdir. İkili lojistik regresyon ve diğer istatistiksel analizler için SPSS 25.0 paketi kullanılmıştır.

Değişkenler şu şekilde işletimselleştirilmiştir; örneğin, bağımlı değişken "AB vatandaşının AB dışından gelen göçmenlere karşı olumsuz duyguları" dir. Bu değişkeni işletimselleştirmek için kullanılan soru "Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelerin her birinin sizin için olumlu ya da olumsuz bir duygu uyandırıp uyandırmadığını ifade ediniz. İnsanların AB dışından göç etmeleri" şeklindedir. Cevaplar ikili değişken olarak kodlanmıştır.

Regresyon analizine göre, gerçek ya da var olduğunu düşündükleri ekonomik problemler Avrupalıların, AB dışı göçe karşı olumsuz duruş sergilemeleri olasılığını arttırır. Analizler, Avrupa Halkının göçü önemli bir sorun olarak gördüğünü ve bu durumun AB dışı göç konusunda olumsuz duygulara sahip olma ihtimalini arttırdığını göstermektedir. Dahası, çalışmanın bulguları, ulusal kimliğe vurgu yapmanın, ülke ile ilgili ekonomik sorunlar olduğunu beyan



etmenin, sosyal devlet ve güvenlikle ilgili endişelerin AB dışı göç karşıtlığını şekillendirdiğini göstermektedir. Daha spesifik olarak, Avrupalılar ülkelerinde vergilendirme sorunları ve enflasyon olduğuna inanıyorlarsa, AB dışı göç konusunda olumsuz duyguları olma ihtimalleri daha yüksektir. Literatüre benzer şekilde, çalışmaya göre, AB vatandaşlarının ulusal ekonomideki mevcut durumun belirsiz olduğunu düşünmeleri, AB üyesi olmayan vatandaşların göçüne karşı olumsuz duyguları olma olasılığını arttırmaktadır.

Yaşam doyumu değişkenine bakıldığında, ülke genelindeki mevcut durum yargısındaki değişikliklerin ve demokrasinin kötüye doğru gittiğinin düşünülmesinin, AB dışı göçlere karşı çıkma olasılığını arttırdığı görülür. Avrupa vatandaşları, genel olarak ülkenin geleceği hakkında karamsarlarsa, AB vatandaşı olmayanların göç etmelerine olumsuz yaklaşımları mümkündür. Literatüre benzer şekilde, refah devleti (örneğin emeklilik aylıkları hakkında) ve ülkenin güvenliği ile ilgili problemler olduğunun düşünülmesi de AB vatandaşı olmayanların göç etmelerine olumsuz yaklaşımı arttırmaktadır.

Veriler genel olarak değerlendirildiğinde, sonuçların Avrupa Birliği ülkeleri için genel olarak göçü ve entegrasyonu yönetmeleri açısından çok önemli olduğu söylenebilir. Örneğin, ekonomi veya demokrasi ile ilgili gerçek veya algılanan sorunlar, AB dışı göç muhalefetine neden olacaktır. Bu bulguların ışığında, tavsiye edilebilecek politikalardan biri, AB dışı göçün olası faydalarını vatandaşlara açıklamak ve ekonomik sorunların temel nedenlerini (ekonomik kriz, küresel ekonomi, kapitalizm vb.) tartışmak olabilir. Buna ek olarak, kullanılan dil de önemlidir. Göçmen dostu bir dil kullanmak, AB vatandaşlarının göçle ülkelerindeki sorunları ilişkilendirmelerini engellemekte faydalı olabilir. Son olarak, bireylerin AB vatandaşı olmayanların göçlerine ilişkin olumsuz duygularıyla ilgili ayrıntılı analiz için nitel bir araştırma yapılabilir.

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