

POLITICAL HEGEMONY AND MEDIA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGLE-PARTY GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyse the conditions under which the single-party governments protect their political power through political hegemony by means of media. These conditions were determined as a result of the comparative analysis of three single-party governments in Turkey: Democrat Party (1950-1960), Motherland Party (1983-1994) and Justice and Development Party (2002-). The article argues that the existing political structure, the balance of power between the political actors and the legal framework of media activities determine the way in which political hegemony is constructed through media by the single party governments.

Keywords: political parties, hegemony, Turkish politics, Turkish political parties

SİYASAL HEGEMONYA VE MEDYA: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ TEK PARTİ HÜKÜMETLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı tek parti iktidarlarının hangi koşullarda medya aracılığı ile siyasal güçlerini siyasal hegemonya aracılığı ile koruduklarını saptamaktır. Bu koşullar; Türkiye'de çok partili yaşama geçildikten sonra serbest seçimlerle iktidara gelen üç siyasal parti olan Demokrat Parti, Anavatan Partisi ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin karşılaştırmalı analizi ile saptanmıştır. Analiz sonucunda; mevcut siyasal yapı, siyasal aktörler arasındaki güç dengesi ve medya faaliyetlerinin hukuki çerçevesinin medya üzerinden siyasal hegemonya inşasını şekillendirdiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: siyasal partiler, hegemonya, Türk siyasal hayatı, Türkiye'de siyasal partiler

INTRODUCTION

Political power may be obtained and retained by either coercion or consent. In democratic societies, while the state has the right to legitimate use of means of coercion, the governments need to gain majority consent in order to have the legitimacy to rule and elections are the means of obtaining consent and political power. However, the way in which the majority opinion forms, choices are shaped and consent forms, is an arena of power struggle, to which all actors of competition do not have equal access. Public opinion forms as a result of information flow and having control of which information reaches the public means having control over their opinion and choices. In order to retain their political power, the parties in government may either resort to coercive measures or hegemonic tools and hegemonic tools provide a more legitimate and lasting basis for reproducing public consent and support.

Starting from the assumption that hegemonic control constitutes an integral part of political power, this study aims to analyse the factors that facilitate the establishment of this

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hegemony and to illustrate how this hegemony-building works in practice. The cases chosen for this analysis are the three single party governments established in Turkey after transition to multi-party democracy, namely, Democrat Party government (1950-1960), Motherland Party government (1983-1991) and Justice and Development Party government (2002-). Turkish case was chosen for the fact that the country has become one of the cases where the functioning of democratic institutions is highly debated and the question of whether Turkish democracy has evolved into authoritarian tendencies is on the political agenda. The comparative analysis single-party eras will reveal under which conditions a democratically-elected government can broaden the scope of its political power and establish political hegemony beyond its electoral success.

In the first part of the study, the theoretical framework of the analysis is constructed by using the concept of hegemony borrowed from Antonio Gramsci (1971) and the concept of agenda setting borrowed from the media studies literature. The political background of relations, political actors and their respective powers and the legal framework of media's functioning are the factors that shape the hegemony-building process. In the remaining parts, how these factors work will be shown by the analysis of DP government, MP government and JDP government periods. The last part of the study will provide the comparative analytical framework of understanding conditions necessary for the establishment of political hegemony by governments.

1.A THEORY OF POLITICAL HEGEMONY

Political power is not solely based on domination and coercion. 'There can and must be a political hegemony even before the attainment of government power, and one should not count solely on the power and material force which such position gives in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony' (Gramsci, 1971: 211). In democratic political systems, force and consent need to work together in order to retain political power and 'the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion-newspapers and associations-, which therefore, in certain situations, are artificially multiplied' (Ibid: 248).

The ruling class needs to control economic structures and political and ideological institutions as well as the coercive instruments and through ideological hegemony, it becomes capable of indoctrinating 'the dominance of a certain way of life and thought' (Altheide, 1984: 477), which provides continuation of political hegemony. In other words, media hegemony constitutes one of the essential steps to political hegemony and for this reason, 'the media have become the key arena in which the struggle over symbolic power is played out, particularly over the control of the political agenda' (Block, 2013: 260). Cultural organizations, such as media, constitute an important platform for circulating ideas and they have 'the potential to generate various kinds of power, mainly symbolic, with the capacity to impact on the ways humans construct their reality' (Ibid: 263). Media is the means of systematic engineering of the consent of the masses and serves the function of legitimization of political hegemony. In this process, the key role for the media is the agenda-setting role, by which people's ideas are shaped, political choices available to them are determined and boundaries of the political are drawn.

The invention of the concept of "agenda setting" dates back to Walter Lippmann's (1922) study on "Public Opinion" but it started to be widely used in association with media with the study of McCombs and Shaw (1972), called "The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media". For the purpose of this study, agenda-setting is understood as the instrument for

controlling the ideas offered for public debate, which is necessary for the establishment of political hegemony or gaining and retaining the public consent (Barrett, 1991).

As Althusser (1971) pointed out, the state has two apparatuses: repressive and ideological. Religion, education, legal system and media constitute the ideological apparatuses of state and they are needed by the state for the continuation of the hegemony of the ruling class. In this context, it is possible to argue that the media agenda defines the public agenda and political agenda (Dearing and Rogers, 1996), where the ability of political actors to affect this process varies according to their power. This study argues that three factors shape the ability of political actors to establish political hegemony on the agenda-setting function of the media and on public's agenda. These are the existing political setting, balance of power between the political actors and the legal framework of media's functioning. In order to understand how these conditions lead to different outcomes in terms of hegemonic power, the study conducts a comparative analysis of three single-party government periods in Turkish political history.

2.DEMOCRAT PARTY (DP) PERIOD (1950-1960)

Democrat Party period (1950-1960) in Turkish politics is the first (single-party) government established after transition to multi-party system. Established by the opposition group within the founding and ruling party of the republic, the Republican People's Party (RPP) in 1946, the party established the government in Turkey by taking the majority of the votes in three consecutive elections in 1950, 1954 and 1957. The DP rule ended with the 27 May 1960 military coup, which is an indicator of the success of the party in terms of establishing a political hegemony of its own. However, in order to assess the ideological hegemony of the DP era and its impact on the media, it is firstly necessary to analyse the factors determined in the theoretical part.

The Political Setting

DP took over the government in 1950 elections after 27 years of single party rule of the RPP (1923-1950), which was the founding party of the modern Turkish state. As the incumbent party constructed both the coercive and ideological instruments of the state as the founder of the state, DP government initially did not have a real control over the state instruments. Although DP was founded by the opposition in RPP itself and had a similar approach to the state-society relations (İnan, 2008: 124), the distance and distrust between the party and the state's bureaucratic apparatus, which was still loyal to the RPP, created obstacles for the governing party in terms of establishing its control over state instruments and in controlling the society. In order to establish its hegemony, DP government first had to create its own cadre and its own loyal civilian and military bureaucracy.

However, increasing economic problems of the state in a decade of DP rule (Zürcher, 1993) affected the party's ability to secure its ideological and political control over society. As the public support for the party declined with deepening economic problems, the balance between coercive and ideological instruments shifted towards the instruments of coercion and DP fell short of creating establishing a hegemonic control over agenda-setting and shaping public opinion. Thus, the political setting in which DP government was established did not have a facilitating impact over its ideological hegemony over society. Additionally, the balance of power between the government and the other political actors also created a problem for the DP government in this sense.

Political Actors and Power Relations

When DP government was established, it had a disadvantaged relationship with the civilian and military bureaucracy. The state apparatus and intelligentsia were loyal to the RPP and they formed a power bloc against the new government (Atılğan, 2015; Zürcher, 1993). In order to gain power vis-à-vis this old power bloc, the initial strategy of the DP government was to create public consent by using a religious, conservative, national discourse, which would appeal to the public and help building political hegemony through consent (Atılğan, 2015: 415). By using the discourse based on national will, the government hoped to overcome the resistance and animosity of the power coalition of the previous era. However, the measures adopted by the DP government during its ten-year rule show that DP opted for coercive instruments in dealing with the other political actors and this situation indicates that government was not able to create public consent and to control the reproduction of its ideology.

The main opposition party of the era was RPP, which was the founder of the state's coercive and ideological instruments. Thus, although the party lost governmental power, it retained its institutionalized power to control these instruments with the loyalty of the bureaucratic and intellectual actors. Unable to create its counter-hegemony and its own cadre, DP opted for coercive measures for dissolving the old power bloc, such as banning political campaign of the RPP leader and former president of İsmet İnönü in 1952 (Zürcher, 1993) and confiscating party's all property and assets in 1953 (Ibid).

Same strategy was used against the bureaucracy as well as the DP government tried to take the military and civilian bureaucracy under its control by devaluing their living conditions and social status with low wages and less social rights (Hale, 1993). Towards the end of DP rule, the relations were further strained with the arrest of nine officers with the claim that they were planning a coup towards the government (Zürcher, 1993). DP rule ended with a military coup on 27th May 1960 and this shows that coercive measures of the party on military bureaucracy was not successful in terms of taking them under control and that the party failed to establish its own loyal cadre. The same can be argued for the relations of the DP government with judiciary. The party attempted to create a closer judiciary branch by forcing 16 high court judges for retirement in 1956 (Eroğul, 1990: 119-120) and replacing them with judges closer to DP ideology, which was perceived as a faster route to political control than establishing an ideological hegemony in society first. This strategy is apparent in party's dealings with the interest groups in society during a decade of political rule. Although one of the party's promises during its first election campaign was to grant union and strike rights to the workers (Zürcher, 1993), as government, the party did not give this right and furthermore, it closed down all the workers organizations in 1957 (Eroğul, 1990). Instead of creating its own ideological hegemony by using these organizations or creating new ones to contribute to its political hegemony, DP opted for coercive measures in order to suppress possible opposition.

DP used media (meaning newspaper in the given time period), as a means of controlling the information flow to the masses. The fact that political parties had newspaper organs that time helped to instrumentalize the media to this purpose. For the government, the most important means of controlling the media was through the means of official advertisements. By preferring certain newspapers over the others in giving advertisements, the party made the newspapers financially dependent on government and established control over the news printed, thus, what kind of information would reach the society.

Table 1: The Amount of Official Advertisements Given to Newspapers during DP Rule (1951-1958)

Newspaper	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	Total
Zafer	506.972	711.207	797.207	607.299	700.196	764.697	819.599	709.300	5.616.815
Hürses	164.294	226.865	189.167	238.649	91.841	1.288	-	-	1.021.926
Telgraf	-	6.344	9.033	56.799	63.830	27.528	37.082	19.287	829.876
Medeniye t	-	-	-	5.563	44.868	48.779	81.457	63.743	734.337
Hakimiye t	-	-	-	9.359	44.808	48.732	80.279	61.000	705.054
S. Havadis	-	-	37.961	1.964	7.875	11.128	35.432	16.055	690.418
Ulus	216.353	-	130.422	108.940	-	-	73.845	10.200	539.761

Source: Turkish National Assembly Records, 23 March 1959, pp. 76-95.

According to the records shown in Table 1, the highest amount of official advertisements was given to the government newspaper Zafer during DP rule, while the lowest amount was received by the opposition party RPP's newspaper, Ulus. The advertisements were used as either punishments or rewards for the news made about the government and the party itself. They also served as incentives for other newspapers for setting the tone of their news coverage in a government-friendly manner.

In DP period, the power relations among the actors affected the ability of the single-party government to establish its ideological hegemony over society to a great extent. Most of the political actors that constituted the state institutions or the instruments of hegemony were suspicious and critical towards DP and the party had to transform these institutions or create its own institutional structure before creating its political hegemony. One of the strategies to this end was changing the legal framework of activities of the media.

Legal Framework of Media's Functions

Three laws that were passed by the DP government during its ten-year rule show the way in which the party gradually limited the media's freedom to publish and how the boundaries of censorship increased in Turkey. The first law was the Law of Press, No. 5680 (Official Gazette, 24.7.1950), which stated that "the press is free" in its first article. This law was a product of party's promises for freedoms during its election campaign and it was welcomed by the press as a milestone for press freedom in Turkey (Rado, 1950; Akşin, 2007). However, as the party failed to establish its own hegemonic instruments, coercive measures increased and the level of press freedom started to decay.

The second legislation on press was passed on 17 March 1954 and it contained sanctions against the crimes that would be committed through press and radio. The Law No. 6334 (Official Gazette, 17.03.1954) contained heavy sanctions against defamation and slander of government and state officials without the need to prove such crimes (Alemdar and Uzun, 2013: 187; Lewis, 1961). The law raised great concerns about press freedom in Turkey (Topuz, 2003: 196; Öztin, 1954) and DP government was criticized for changing its attitude towards the press after gaining governmental power (Öztin, 1954). With the new law, the press was banned from making and publishing research on the political and financial issues of the state and the punishment for publishing such news was imprisonment. This was an attempt to prevent anti-government news that would affect the society's attitude towards the DP rule. In order to secure public support in elections, the party preferred to use coercive means and controlled the flow of information to society through censorship.

The last attempt for coercion was establishment of Interrogation Committees in the National Assembly with the Law No. 7468 (Official Gazette, 1960) on 27th April 1960, which had a vast power in terms of interrogation, decision and punishment of crimes against the government by the means of press and radio. These crimes were defined very broadly by the law covering all kinds of criticisms towards the government.

The fact that the legal framework of media's functions became more and more coercive towards the end of DP rule shows that the party failed to establish its political power through ideological hegemony during its term. The lack of ideological power and instruments of the party coupled with the institutionalized power of other political actors and pressured DP as the government. In return, in order to retain its political power and control over public opinion, DP opted for coercive measures, since it failed to establish its own hegemonic instruments.

3.MOTHERLAND PARTY (MP) PERIOD (1983-1991)

After the collapse of DP rule with 27th May 1960 military coup, Turkey was not governed by a single-party until 1983, when Motherland Party won the first free elections held after the 1980 military coup. In other words, the second single-party government in Turkey's democracy experience was a product of post-military coup conditions, where military tutelage was still extensive. The party ruled the country from 1983 to 1991 and lost governmental power with free elections unlike DP and among the three single-party governments of Turkish democratic history; it had the most limited manoeuvre area for establishing ideological hegemony. The political setting and power relations of its time had the most effect on this situation, which also affected the party's ability to change the legal framework for its control over channels of media.

The Political Setting

1980s constitute an important period for Turkish political life as it was the period during which Turkey's integration to the global economic system and neoliberal economic policies of the time took place. As a result of the political turmoil and governmental instability of the 1970s, this was possible by means of a military coup that happened on 12th September 1980 and the political setting was redesigned by the military to fulfil this transformation.

In this period, the military defined the rules, actors of democracy and the boundaries of legitimate political activity. The purpose was to replace the leaders and political parties of the previous two decades with the new and 'clean' ones, who would carry out Turkey's

economic and political transformation under military's political tutelage (Zürcher, 1993). After the military coup, all of the political parties, interest groups and civil society organizations were closed down and civilians and political party leaders were either arrested or banned from politics (Tanör, 2007). By this strategy, military played the gatekeeper role of the political arena. When the decision was made to go back to civilian politics and hold elections, it was the military who decided which political parties could be established and which ones could participate in general elections (Zürcher, 1993).

The military decided that only three of the new political parties could participate in the general elections in 1983. These were the Nationalist Democracy Party, founded by a retired general Turgut Sunalp, People's Party, founded by a bureaucrat Necdet Calp and the Motherland Party, founded by Turgut Özal, who was also bureaucrat in economic apparatus of the state (Ibid). The election campaign of these political parties was under strict military scrutinization and this shows that whatever party held governmental power, it would have to share it with the military.

The political setting of the MP rule decreased the party's opportunities and ability to establish its ideological instruments to retain and reproduce its political power in its relations with the public and the delicate balance of power between the party and the military also disabled the single-party government of MP to become a real political power.

Political Actors and Power Relations

During MP rule, the balance of power between civilian and military actors was in favour of the military. With the ban on all civilian political activity, including the political parties, interest groups and the press, the military had total control on the terms of transition to civilian politics after the military coup. After the transition and establishment of the MP government, military did not cease its control over politics and continued to monitor the political arena by its tutelary powers and through the means of National Security Council (NSC).

As the governing party, the major tasks of MP were to keep good relations with the military and to carry out Turkey's neoliberal economic transformation (Tanör, 2007: 65; Kahraman, 2010: 224-225). The fast transformation of Turkey from a closed and protected economic system to an open and free market economy was led by the state and the new capitalist groups, who benefited from this transformation, became dependent on their close relations with the state and the government in order to protect their newly achieved economic and social status (Ahmad, 1993). The new capitalists soon became owners of media channels, which provided an opening for the government to establish ideological hegemony over society through the organic relations with the new capitalist class (Ibid). However, because of military's strong control over civilian government, MP could not use this opening to its advantage and to establish its ideological hegemony.

During MP rule, until 1987, when the ban on political activities was lifted, the real opposition groups were the military through the NSC and the president Kenan Evren, who was the head of 1980 military coup. The records show that President Evren actively campaigned during the 1983 elections, in order to affect the public opinion and shape the outcome of elections:

'You have heard many promises from the political parties. However, it is very saddening to hear that some parties criticize our Cabinet and National Security Council, which only made right and good decisions for our nation for the past three years. Our public

needs to be careful about these political parties, which wrongly criticize us, even before being elected as they can be dangerous in terms of getting in conflict with the NSC. I strongly believe that, our nation will make the right choice in terms of electing a political party, which will not create instability in country by contradicting with NSC, to government' (President's Speech on 4th November 1983. Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Hürriyet Daily Newspapers, 5.11.1983)

This speech of the president shows that military was determined to oversee and control the outcomes of civilian political processes and more importantly, was ready to re-intervene to politics, if necessary (Tanör, 2007). This strong position of the military counterweighed and even decreased the power of the MP government in real terms as the government needed military's approval in its policies and any attempt to increase its political hegemony would be opposed by the military's tutelary powers.

The lack of civilian opposition actors to MP rule lasted until 1987. With a referendum held in 1987, the political ban on political parties and former politicians was lifted by a majority of %50.2 (TÜİK, 2008) and former politicians established new political parties, which challenged MP's political power (Heper, 1985). Although the MP government took some strategic measures such as bringing an electoral threshold of %10 to cope with this new civilian opposition, in 1987 elections, the party lost its votes from %45 to %36 (TÜİK, 2012), showing that the party was unable to establish an ideological hegemony in the absence of previous political leaders and parties. After 1987 elections, the military tutelage was coupled with a stronger civilian opposition and MP lost its governmental power in 1991 elections as a result.

The absence of institutionalized political parties on the political scene coupled with the state-led liberalization of Turkish economic system, in theory, provided an opportunity for the MP government to establish an ideological hegemony on and through interest groups. As one of the few legitimate channels of political participation, the party provided a safe heaven for different interest groups to raise their political voice (Zürcher, 1993: 412). However, they were also affected by military's pressure and once the political climate started to relax, they returned to their old political loyalties. In other words, as a product of 1980 military coup, MP failed to create its own loyal political base and it provided a temporary home for the political organizations and groups of 1960s and 1970s.

Post-1980 political climate of Turkey provided an opportunity for the MP government in terms of establishing a coalition with the media in terms of creating its own hegemonic instruments. The economic transformation of country in this period also affected the composition of Turkish media as it created the period of media holdings in the country. Media groups owned by the new capitalists of Turkey, who functioned in various economic sectors, became the dominant form of press (Alemdar, Kaya et.al, 1989) and because of their economic interests, these groups needed to have good relations with the state and the government. Added to press in this period, television also became a part of the media and at the time there was only one television channel, which was owned by the state. Due to the state ownership on television, the MP government was able to control the news coverage of political parties. While the ruling MP had an average of 65 minutes of coverage in a week, the average of other political parties were about 10 minutes (Şenkal, 2015), showing the dominance of the ruling party in reaching the public through visual media. However, this was not enough for the party's ideological hegemony, as the balance of power between the military and civilian actors provided a room of manoeuvre for the press as well and being aware of military's control over the MP government, the print media was able to resist the

party's attempts to take the all of the ideological instruments under its control and keep its ideological independence despite the economic dependence of the media owners on state.

The Legal Framework of Media's Activities

The MP government attempted to take press under its control by legal instruments twice. The first attempt was the law on Protecting the Minors from Harmful Press that passed on 6th March 1986 (Kabacalı, 1990: 228). By using the protection of minors, the government tried to put its pressure on press in two ways. Firstly, the concept of "harmful press" was defined very broadly by the law, which could cause the newspapers and magazines pay high fines for a vast form of publications. Secondly, the decision of which news pieces were harmful would be made by a council consisting of government officials (Ibid, p. 229), which was a strategy to strengthen governmental control over media and a means of government censorship.

The second attempt of the government was the legal proposal to punish fabricated news with fines and imprisonment in 1988 (Milliyet, 1988). This was a strategy on government's behalf to control information flow to the public in order to establish its ideological control over public opinion and to manage opposition by the threat of monetary and legal sanctions on the press. However, this attempt was not successful as it was met by a strong resistance from the press, opposition parties and international community. Without the backing of the army, the power of the MP government was not enough to enact such legal change.

On 17th March 1988, all of the newspaper owners in Turkey issued a joint statement against this proposal, condemning it for 'being a threat against democracy, a pretence for preventing criticisms towards the government in the name of protecting personal rights' (Yeni Şafak, 2001) and stating that 'Turkish press would not serve the government's interests and would continue to work for protecting the right of Turkish people's right to learn the truth'(Ibid). Moreover, the International Press Institute also wrote a letter addressed to Prime Minister Turgut Özal, condemning the arrest of journalists, high fines for the press because of their news and the pressures on press freedom in Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 1988). The joint resistance of press and the international pressures made the MP government back down on this proposal and it failed to establish its hegemony through media. However, in 1989, there were a total number of 394 legal cases against 16 newspapers in Turkey, 41 of which were personally opened by the prime minister himself and his close circle (Koçoğlu, 1990), showing the strained relations between the press and the government. The government also tried to take the press under its control, by putting economic pressures on them with constantly increasing the costs of paper and with the compensations for legal damages the newspapers had to pay with court decisions, which could lead to their closure due to economic difficulties.

The economic and political transformation of Turkey after 1980 military coup could provide the MP government the opportunity to establish a lasting ideological and political hegemony in Turkish politics. The new capitalists of Turkey, who were also the new owners of media instruments, relied on their good relations with the government and the state to retain their economic power and resources. However, the MP itself was a product of military's design of Turkish politics in the 1980s and was a temporary coalition of old political actors until the ban on political activities was over. This weak status of the party and its lack of traditional and institutionalized roots with the society prevented MP government

from creating hegemonic means of ideological control over society and strengthening its political power and social roots. As a result, as a single party government, the MP failed to create both hegemonic and coercive means of ideological control with effect of existing balance of power with the military and eventually lost governmental power and demised from the political arena.

4.JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (JDP) PERIOD (2002-)

The last and longest single-party government in Turkey was established by JDP in 2002. The country's political system changed with a referendum in 2017 from a parliamentary system to presidential system and after this transformation, the party continues to hold presidential office and parliamentary majority as well. JDP was founded in 2001 as one of the successors of the right wing, conservative party tradition in Turkey. The political and economic turmoil of the 1990s and the inability of the coalition governments to solve country's problems made JDP a plausible alternative for the voters as the party's prominent figures had a successful history of municipal governance since the beginning of 1990s. In the first elections it participated in 2002, JDP got %34.4 of the votes (YSK, 2002) and since only two parties (JDP itself and RPP) passed the %10 threshold, the party was able to form a single-party government after a decade of coalitions in Turkey. JDP maintained its dominant position in politics with its consecutive election victories and unlike the former single-party governments, the political setting, balance of power among the political actors and the legal framework of media activities all helped the party to create an ideological hegemony on public.

The Political Setting

JDP was elected as government in the aftermath of a major economic crisis period in Turkey. The perceptions of the public about the inability of coalition governments to cope with crisis created a single-party government, which was expected to carry out the economic and political reform agenda. The party's Islamic-conservative heritage created certain suspicions among the military and civilian power blocs in terms of JDP's interactions with the regime and official state ideology. JDP was the product of the repositioning of the Islamist political elites in party politics in a more moderate manner. The moderates of the Islamists portrayed themselves as more pro-system and pro-regime and they reframed their position within the legitimate boundaries of political activity at the time (Mecham, 2004). Thus, in order to keep its political power, JDP either had to remain in these boundaries set under military and bureaucratic tutelage or had to redefine these boundaries by establishing and strengthening its own ideological hegemonic instruments.

The success of the JDP government in terms of economic reforms, political reforms and foreign policy helped the party use public support as a source of legitimacy in changing the political setting to its advantage. Consecutive election victories of JDP served as the mechanism of consent for party's actions and in terms of dissolving the existing power blocks and transforming the political setting, the part used the national will rhetoric to a great extent (Saraçoğlu and Yeşilbağ, 2015: 873).

Table 2: Votes of JDP (Source: High Council for Elections)

ELECTION YEAR	JDP VOTES
2002	%34.3
2007	%46.6
2011	%49.8
2014 (presidential election)	%51.8
2015 (June)	%40.9
2015 (November)	%49.5
2018 (presidential)	%52.6
2018 (parliamentary)	%42.6

As the table shows, the public has shown general support for JDP since the first elections it participated and the party managed to get the consent of people to rule the country for 17 years, showing the characteristics of a dominant party. Thus, with consent mechanisms, the party managed to transform the political setting in a way that would help establishment of hegemonic control. However, the changing balance of power between political actors and the power struggle of the party had a more decisive role in this process.

Political Actors and Power Relations

In its early years, JDP had a similar position with the DP government vis-à-vis the military and civilian bureaucratic elite. Military and judicial tutelage over elected governments was an important state mechanism to control the political elite and the possibilities of military intervention and party closure by the Constitutional Court defined the legitimate boundaries for the governmental policies. Against these actors, in order to preserve its governmental rule and increase its real political power, JDP used the mechanism of elections and national will. Electoral success increased legitimacy of JDP as the governing party, eliminated other alternatives for government and gave the party the public consent it needed to transform the political, economic and cultural structure (Keyman, 2014: 145) to produce and reproduce its ideological hegemony.

Failure of other political parties to offer a plausible government alternative to JDP also helped the party to change the balance of power to its advantage. The public perception that no other political party could be better than JDP for the country (Koç, 2011) provided continuous successful electoral performance and other political parties could not become

power houses in JDP's struggle for hegemony. Thus, the real power struggle was between JDP and the state elite and the party needed to dissolve the old power blocs in order to secure its political position.

The most challenging elite group for the JDP government was the military, as the political developments since the 1980 coup had strengthened army's political position as the guardian of the regime. In other words, it was the military that defined the boundaries of legitimate political activity and that had political hegemony and in order to gain real political power JDP government had to overcome this challenge. As Özbudun and Hale (2009) suggested, JDP-military relations can be analysed in three periods. The first period was a period of "controlled disagreement" (2002-2006), when the army could still put ideological pressure on JDP in terms of legitimate political action. The second period was a "crisis period" that showed itself in presidential elections of 2007, when the army openly opposed to JDP's candidate and in the Ergenekon case, initiated against the military for its illegal activities against government and for preparing for a coup. The third period is the post-2008 period, when the military retreated in terms of its political role and lost its hegemonic superiority in politics. The July 15th 2016 coup attempt against JDP government started a new period for the party's struggle for hegemony as after the failed coup attempt, with the increased public support for the civilian government, JDP could eliminate military and its political hegemony and replace it with its own.

Similar to its struggle with the military elite, JDP could use the July 15th coup attempt as an opportunity to eliminate the existing cadre of civilian state elite, such as the judiciary, and replace it with its own loyal cadre, which was crucial for the party to control the channels of hegemonic discourse in society. The party's experience at the local tier of government provided an advantage in terms of its dealings with interest groups, foundations and civil society organizations (Saraçoğlu and Yeşilbağ, 2015) and while eliminating its rivals at the centre, JDP could also use its local networks to strengthen its hegemony and to reproduce consent at the societal level.

The transformation of media into holdings and private enterprises also helped JDP government increase its power vis-à-vis these actors and enabled it to utilize media actors for establishing its own channels of ideological hegemony. Increasing economic ties between media channels and private holdings helped the government's ideological hegemony in two ways. First of all, government's power to audit holdings and fine them for issues such as tax fraud was a strong weapon to use against media and enabled JDP to create informal channels of pressure on broadcast and publications and to control the flow of information to the public. JDP used this weapon to this end and one example was the 3.8 billion liras of tax fine against Doğan Holding, whose TV channels and newspapers were known to be as pro-opposition (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2015: p.54). Secondly, as a result of the increasing private holding ownership in media, the government was able to change the ownership landscape easily. The state's right to confiscate and re-sell private holdings that are in trouble and in debt through Savings and Insurance Fund, was used to change ownership of media channels and new media groups, which are the strong supporters of government because of the ties of their owners, were created. By this strategy, JDP gradually created its own hegemony on media and then used this media as an instrument to establish its ideological hegemony on society.

During JDP rule, the absence of viable government alternatives among the opposition parties, the party's ability to side-line military and civilian state elite and the changing structure of media created the optimal conditions for establishing governmental hegemony

and JDP was able to create a loyal cadre to reproduce this hegemony and create public consent for power.

The Legal Framework of Media's Activities

JDP government prepared and passed legislation on press that replaced the former press law. According to the new Press Law No. 5187 (Official Gazette, 26.06.2004), although the press is free, press freedom can be limited for protecting others' rights, society's values, national security, public order and unity of the state. This broad scope of grounds for limitations on press freedom provides a powerful tool for the government to control the news reaching to public. Prohibition of broadcast and publication on various issues on grounds of sensitivity, secrecy of investigation or security by court decisions has been the most common way of using this tool in order to shape the public opinion and control the information flow.

In addition to the new Press Law, the Law No. 6112 (2011) dealing with media ownership, also provided a major tool of ideological hegemony for JDP government. According to the new legal arrangements, media ownership by a single individual or enterprise was limited to %30 of the whole market. Accordingly, the media groups, who held more than % 30 shares in the market, had to downsize themselves and media ownership changed hands. In this process, the government played an active role and strengthened and created media groups, who had close ties with the party (Sözeri, 2015). By controlling the changing ownership landscape of the media, JDP secured the channels of its ideological hegemony through the economic networks between the government and businesspeople.

In short, it is possible to argue that, JDP had a great success in terms of establishing political hegemony at both systemic and societal levels as a result of the favouring conditions created by the political setting that brought the party to government in the first place, the changing balance of power between the party and state elite and changing landscape of the media.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to determine under which conditions the political actors can establish control over public opinion by hegemonic means instead of coercive measures. To this end, three single party periods in Turkish democratic history were chosen for analysis. Single party governments were chosen for the fact that, with the greater public support as a result of the election results, these parties have a similar starting point in terms of creating hegemonic control in comparison to smaller parties, who needed to form coalition governments in order to take over political power. Three factors affecting the ability of single party government to establish hegemony were determined. These were the political setting of the party's rule, its power vis-à-vis the other political and state actors and the legal framework of functioning of media channels, which provided the tools of ideological hegemony.

According to the comparative analysis of three single-party periods in Turkey, it can be argued that hegemonic power is established as a result of the favouring conditions that occur as a result of the combination of these three factors or variables. During the DP period although the legal framework of press operations created a window of opportunity for the government to establish political hegemony, the political setting of the government and its power relations with the other political actors prevented its establishments. Consequently, the party had to resort to coercive measures in order to retain its political power. In case of MP period, none of the three variables helped the party's establishment of political authority. The

post-military coup political conditions, high level of military tutelage over civilian power and the legal background of media operations led to a limited coercive power of the single-party government of the 1980s. In comparison to the previous single party governments, JDP has been the only successful party to establish political hegemony as a government. This success was due to the favouring combination of the three variables that enabled the party's hegemonic power. The political setting into which the party entered as the government, the elimination of the competing political actors and the legal framework of media operations enabled JDP government to produce and reproduce political consent without resorting to coercion.

Table 3: Comparison of Single-Party Periods in Turkey

The Party	Political Setting	Balance of Power	Legal Setting	Outcome
DP	Negative effect	Negative effect	Positive effect	COERCION
MP	Negative effect	Negative effect	Negative effect	LIMITED COERCION
JDP	Positive effect	Positive effect	Positive effect	HEGEMONY

The comparative analysis of three single-party governments in Turkish politics after transition to democracy shows that in order to establish a political hegemony, in addition to electoral support, the governments need to have favourable conditions in terms of all three factors. A perfect combination of political setting, power relations and legal setting of hegemony building helps the government to create its own hegemonic power and to reproduce public consent in its own terms without resorting to coercive measures. In the absence of this combination, the government tries to retain its political power through coercion, which can not be stable and lasting without a legitimate basis.

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SİYASAL HEGEMONYA VE MEDYA: TÜRKİYE'DEKİ TEK PARTİ İKTİDARLARININ KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ

Bu çalışmanın amacı tek parti iktidarlarının hangi koşullarda medya aracılığı ile siyasal güçlerini siyasal hegemonya aracılığı ile koruduklarını saptamaktır. Bu koşullar; Türkiye'de çok partili yaşama geçildikten sonra serbest seçimlerle iktidara gelen üç siyasal parti olan Demokrat Parti, Anavatan Partisi ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin karşılaştırmalı analizi ile saptanmıştır. Analiz sonucunda; mevcut siyasal yapı, siyasal aktörler arasındaki güç dengesi ve medya faaliyetlerinin hukuki çerçevesinin medya üzerinden siyasal hegemonya inşasını şekillendirdiği sonucuna varılmıştır.

Siyasal güç zorlama ya da rıza yoluyla kazanılabilir. Demokratik sistemlerde, iktidarların meşruiyeti açısından siyasal gücün rıza yoluyla edinilmesi şarttır. Rıza üretimi sürecinde iktidarlar çeşitli araçlar kullanarak siyasal bir hegemonya inşa etmeye çalışır ve rıza ile siyasal güçlerini korumak için uğraşırlar. Bu çalışmada; Türk siyasal hayatını şekillendiren üç tek parti iktidarının rıza üretimini ve siyasal hegemonyayı nasıl inşa ettiği ve bu süreçte basın/medyanın rolü karşılaştırmalı olarak analiz edilmiştir.

Çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi iki temel kavramdan oluşmuştur. İlk kavram Antonio Gramsci'nin (1971) literatüre kazandırdığı hegemonya kavramıdır. İkinci kavram ise; medya çalışmalarında sıkça karşımıza çıkan gündem belirleme kavramıdır. Siyasal hegemonya inşası iktidarların meşruiyetini koruyabilmesi ve toplumda rıza üretebilmesi için gerekli bir araçtır. Bu inşa sürecinde basın/medya elinde tuttuğu gündem belirleme gücü ile anahtar bir araç haline gelmektedir. Bu sebeple; siyasal iktidar ile medya arasındaki ilişki her zaman önemli bir mücadele alanı olmuştur ve iktidarlar medyayı kontrol altına almak suretiyle toplumun da gündemini belirlemeye çalışmışlardır.

İktidar ile medya arasındaki ilişkiyi ve iktidarın medya üzerinden hegemonya inşa etme gücünü belirleyen üç faktör vardır: medya-iktidar ilişkisinin siyasal arka planı, siyasal aktörler arasındaki güç ilişkileri ve medya/basın faaliyetlerinin hukuki çerçevesi. Türkiye'deki üç tek parti iktidar dönemi olan Demokrat Parti dönemi (1950-1960), Anavatan Partisi dönemi (1983-1991) ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi dönemi (2002-devam) bu faktörler ışığında karşılaştırmalı olarak incelendiğinde şu temel sonuca varılmıştır: Bir siyasi parti iktidarının demokratik sistemlerde meşru bir biçimde medya üzerinden siyasal hegemonya inşa edebilmesi için siyasal gelişmelerin lehine olması, diğer aktörlerle olan güç ilişkilerinde lehine bir denge kurması ve yasal çerçevenin buna elverişli olması gereklidir. Bu üç koşuldun herhangi birinin mevcut olmaması durumunda siyasal güç rıza üretimi yerine baskı ile elde edilmiş olur ve meşru ve kalıcı olmaz.

Tablo: Türkiye'de Tek Parti Dönemlerinin Karşılaştırılması

Parti Adı	Siyasal Arka Plan	Güç Dengesi	Hukuki Çerçeve	Sonuç
DP	Negatif etki	Negatif etki	Pozitif Etki	ZORLAMA
ANAP	Negatif etki	Negatif etki	Negatif etki	SINIRLI ZORLAMA
Ak Parti	Pozitif Etki	Pozitif Etki	Pozitif Etki	HEGEMONYA