BARIŞÇIL DIŞ POLİTİKA “EVRİMSEL KARARLI”MI?: DEMOKRATİK BARIŞ TEORİSİNİN RASYONALİST PERSPEKTİFTEN BİR ANALİZİ

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 14, 215 - 242, 22.12.2020

Emre Gündoğdu

Öz

Demokratik barış teorisi, demokrasilerin birbirleriyle savaşma eğiliminde olmadıklarını öne sürmektedir. Demokrasi ve barış arasındaki nedensel ilişkiyi sorgulayan kimi çalışmalar ise demokrasilerin savaşa en az demokrasi-dışı rejimler kadar yatkın olduğunu öne sürmektedir. Demokratik barış teorisine yönelik eleştirel çalışmaların aksine, bu çalışma demokrasilerin barışçıl dış politikaya yatkın olduğu argümanını destekleyen bir yaklaşım sunmaktadır. Çalışma demokrasilerin barışçıllığını ‘’oyun-teorik’’ araçların yanı sıra ‘’evrim’’ literatüründe önemli yer tutan bazı kavramlardan da yararlanılan bir metodoloji çerçevesinde tartışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın ilk bölümü iki farklı rejim tipinin (demokrasiler ve demokrasi-dışı rejimler) rasyonalite anlayışına, belirsizlik karşısındaki tutumlarına ve karar-yapımı mekanizmalarının potansiyel hataların giderilmesine ne ölçüde izin verdiğine odaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü ise demokrasilerin demokrasi-dışı rejimler karşısındaki avantajlarına rağmen uluslararası sistemde kendisine alternatif olan rejimler karşısında niçin baskın konumda olamadığını tartışmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda çalışma demokrasi-dışı rejimlerin ortak tehdit algısı, coğrafi uzaklık, statüko memnuniyeti ve her zaman saldırgan bir strateji izlemenin yüksek maliyetlere yol açması gibi çeşitli dışsal sebeplerden dolayı demokrasileri; demokrasilerin ise rakiplerine karşı caydırıcılıklarını sürdürebilmek için demokrasi-dışı rejimleri taklit etmesi konusunu ele almaktadır. Çalışma hem demokrasilerin barışçıllığını sorgulayan yaklaşımlara yanıt niteliğinde bazı ampirik ve teorik karşı-argümanlar öne sürmekte hem de demokratik barış teorisinin geçerliliğini destekleyici nitelikteki argümanları sistematik bir çerçevede gözden geçirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Demokratik Barış Teorisi, Oyun Teorisi, Evrimsel Kararlılık, Rasyonalite, Belirsizlik

IS PEACEFUL FOREIGN POLICY “EVOLUTIONARILYSTABLE”?: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY FROM RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

Öz

Democratic peace theory posits that democracies are not disposed to fight each other. Some critics of democratic peace theory questioning the causal relationship between democracy and peace argue that democracies are as ‘’war-prone’’ as non-democracies. Contrary to criticism of democratic peace theory, this article suggests an approach supporting the argument of predisposition of democracies towards a peaceful foreign policy. The article discusses peacefulness of democracies within the frame of a methodological approach including some guiding concepts borrowed from ‘’evolutionary’’ literature as well as ‘’game-theoretical’’ tools. In this context, first section of the article focuses on two different types of regime’s (democracies and non-democracies) understanding of rationality, their attitude towards ‘’uncertainty’’ and the extent to which their decision-making mechanism enabling potential mistakes to be resolved. Second section of the article discusses why democracies are not able to dominate their alternative regimes in the international system although they have several advantages over non-democracies. The article therefore attempts to address both the issue of non-democracies imitating democracies by reason of various external factors such as common perception of threats, geographical distance, being satisfaction with the status quo and high costs of following an aggressive strategy continuously, as well as democracies imitating non democracies in order to maintain their deterrence against their opponents. The article both suggests some empirical and theoretical counter-arguments in response to approaches that question the peacefulness of democracies, and systematically reviews the arguments that support the validity of democratic peace theory.

Kaynakça

• Aumann R. J. ve Hart, S. (1994). Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. 2. Cilt, Amsterdam: Elsevier B. V.
• Axelrod, R. (1980). ‘’More Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma’’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(3). ss.379-392.
• Aydın, M. ve Atalay, A. H. (2012). Strateji ve Güvenlik. Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları.
• Betts, R. K. (1982). Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
• Birch, J. (1985). ‘’The madman theory of war: a possible application in therapy’’, Journal of Family Therapy, Sayı 7. ss.147-159.
• Boyd, R. ve Richerson, P. J. (2005). The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Büyükbaş H. ve Atıcı, N. (2012). ‘’Liberal Demokratik Barış Kuramı: Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme’’. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Sayı 40. ss.1-19.
• Crawford, T. W. (2009). ‘’The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy’’. T.V. Paul, P. M. Morgan, J. J. Wirtz (Ed.). Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ss.277-303.
• Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., Huth, P. (2014). ‘’Reputation and Status as Motives for War’’. Annual Review of Political Science, Sayı 17. ss.371-393.
• Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Dawkins, R. (1986). The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design. New York and London: Norton&Company.
• Delpech, T. (2012). Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons From the Cold War For a New Era of Strategic Piracy. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.
• Dolman, E. C. (2005). Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age. New York: Taylor & Francis.
• Duelfer, C. A. ve Dyson S. B. (2011). ‘’Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience’’. International Security, 36(1). ss.73-100.
• Ekmekçi, F. (2011). ‘’Demokratik Barış Teorisi: Bir Değerlendirme’’. Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika, 7(26). ss. 107-124.
• Fearon, J. D. (1997). ‘’Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs’’. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1). ss.68-90.
• Fudenberg, D. ve Levine D. K. (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.
• Goldsmith, B. E. (2005). Imitation in International Relations: Observational Learning, Analogies and Foreign Policy in Russia and Ukraine. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Hewer, C. J. ve Lyons, E. (2018). Political Psychology: A Social Psychological Approach. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
• Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
• Jervis, R. (2006). ‘’Understanding Beliefs’’. Political Psychology, 27(5). ss.641-663.
• Kahn, H. (2010). On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
• Kapani, M. (2007). Politika Bilimine Giriş. On Dokuzuncu Basım, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
• Kurizaki, S. (2016). ‘’Signaling and Perception in International Crises: Two Approaches’’. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 28(4). ss.625-654.
• Lake, D. A. (2003). ‘’International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices’’. International Studies Review, 5(4). ss. 81-89.
• Lemke, D. ve Reed, W. (1996). ‘’Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace’’. International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations, 22(2). ss.143-164.
• Levy, J. S. ve Thompson W. R. (2010). Causes of War. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Lieberman, E. (2013). Reconceptualizing Deterrence: Nudging Toward Rationality in Middle Eastern Rivalries. New York: Routledge.
• Maoz, Z. ve Russett B. (1993). ‘’Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,1946-1986’’. The American Political Science Review, 87(3). ss.624-638.
• McKoy, M. K. ve Lake D. A. (2011/12). ‘’Correspondence: Bargaining Theory and Rationalist Explanations for the Iraq War’’. International Security, 36(3). ss.172-178.
• Morgan, P. M. ve Paul, T. V. (2009). ‘’Deterrence among Great Powers in an Era of Globalization’’. T.V. Paul, P. M. Morgan, J. J. Wirtz (Ed.). Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ss.259-276.
• Özdemir, H. (2007). ‘’Demokratik Barış Teorisi’’. Haydar Çakmak (Ed.). Uluslararası İlişkiler: Giriş, Kavram ve Teoriler. Ankara: Platin Yayınları, ss.204-219.
• Paulsen, R. A. (1994). The Role of US Nuclear Weapons in the Post- Cold War Era. Alabama: Air University Press.
• Payne, K. B. (2001). The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.
• Payne, K. B. (2015). Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.
• Perea, A. (2012). Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Reiter, D. (1997). ‘’Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initation by Weaker Powers, by T. V. Paul; Coping with Conflict after the Cold War, by Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger E. Kanet’’. The Journal of Politics, 59(2). ss.640-643.
• Rosati, J. A. (1995). ‘’A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy’’. L. Neack, J. A. K. Hey ve P. J. Haney (Ed.). Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, ss.49-70.
• Rubinstein, A. (1989). ‘’The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under Almost Common Knowledge’’. The American Economic Review, 79(3). ss.385-391.
• Schelling, T. C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Schultz, K. A. (1998). ‘’Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises’’. The American Political Science Review, 92(4). ss.829-844.
• Sent, E. (2007). ‘’Some like it cold: Thomas Schelling as a Cold Warrior’’. Journal of Economic Methodology, 14(4). ss.455-471.
• Simon, H. A. (1997). An Empirically Based Microeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009, Temmuz 19). ‘’Evolutionary Game Theory’’. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/game-evolutionary/, (Erişim Tarihi: 23.05.2020).
• Steff, R. (2016). Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project: From Truman to Obama. London and New York: Routledge.
• Stein, J. G. (2009). ‘’Rational Deterrence against Irrational Adversaries? No Common Knowledge’’. T.V. Paul, P. M. Morgan, J. J. Wirtz (Ed.). Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, ss.58-84.
• Sümer, G. (2011). ‘’Bölgesel Alt Sistemler Karşısında Demokratik Barış’’. Alternatif Politika, 3(2). ss.198-227.
• Tetlock, P. E. (1998). ‘’Social Psychology and World Politics’’. D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, G. Lindsay (Ed.). Handbook of Social Psychology. Fourth Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, ss. 868-912.
• Waever, O. (2008). ‘’The Changing Agenda of Societal Security’’. H. G. Brauch ve U. Oswald (Ed.). Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in the 21st Century. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Cilt 3. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag, ss. 581-594.
• Zagare, F. C. (1987). The Dynamics of Deterrence. London: The University of Chicago Press.
• Zagare, F. C. (1990). ‘’Rationality and Deterrence’’. World Politics, 42(2). ss.238-260.