BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster

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Yıl 2013, Cilt: 4 Sayı: 2, 64 - 83, 01.12.2013

Ayşe Arı

Öz

Associating the economics and politics sciences political business cycle models explains the fluctuations of macroeconomic variables with the election periods. According to the opportunistic and partisan political business cycle models, political parties manipulate to the economy with the monetary and fiscal policy instruments before elections so as to get re-elected or implement ideolojical policies. But in recent years it is stated that the increase of international integration and institutional improvements as a result of the globalisation process, limited the manipulation of incumbent party to the economy in the sense of their own interest. The aim of this study is to investigate the validity of opportunustic political business cycle model during the globalisation process for the OECD countries over the period 1995-2010. To this end, dynamic panel data analysis is employed. According to the results there exists opportunistic behaviors but it is at a very limited level

Anahtar Kelimeler

-

Kaynakça

  • Akhmedov, A. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2003). Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting. .CEPR Discussion Paper, No.3855, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research..
  • Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,.102(3), 651-678.
  • Alesina, A. & Roubini, N. (1992). Political Cycles in OECD Economies. Review of Economic Studies,59(4), 663-688.
  • Alesina, A. & Sachs, J. (1988). Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States: 1914-1984. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20(1), 63-82.
  • Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, C. (1981).Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 76(375), 598–606.
  • Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.
  • Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error- Components Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
  • Asher, M. G. & Rajan, R.S. (2001). Globalization and Tax Systems: Implications for Developing Countries with Particular Reference to Southeast Asia. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 18(1), 119-139.
  • Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, Fourth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
  • Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Third Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
  • Berger, H. & Woitek, U. (2000). The German Political Business Cycle: Money Demand Rather Than Monetary Policy.
  • Burkovskaya, Anastasia (2013). Monetary political business cycles: new democracy setting. Quantile, 11,75-90.
  • Carlsen, F. (1997). Counter fiscal Policies and Partisan Politics: Evidence From Industrialized Countries. Applied Economics, 29, 145-151.
  • Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.
  • Choi, C. & Baek, S.G. (2004). Exchange Rate Regimes and International Reserves. Mimeo.
  • Cukierman, A. & Meltzer, A. (1986). A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica,.54(5), 1099-1128.
  • Drazen, A. (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics.Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2007). Foreign Exchange Intervention And The Political Business Cycle. KOF Working Papers, No.159.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2009). Roland Vaubel: “Foreign Exchange Intervention and The Political Business Cycle: A Panel Data Analysis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 755–775.
  • Dreher, A., Sturm, J.E. & Ursprung:, H. (2008). The Impact of Globalization on The Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence From Panel Data. Public Choice, 134,.263–292.
  • Drezner, D.W. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. International Studies Review, 3(1), 53-78.
  • Drukker, D.M. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Dynamic Panel-Data Models Using Stata. Summer North American Stata Users Group Meeting, July 24-25.
  • Edwards, S. (1985). On the Interest Rate Elasticity of the Demand for International Reserves: Some Evidence from Developing Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 4, 287-295.
  • Fernandez-Albertos, J. (2006). Does Internalization Blur Responsibility? Economic Voting and Economic Openness in 15 European Countries. West European Politics, 29 (1), 28-46.
  • Fischer, S. (1995) . Modern Approaches to Central Banking. NBER Working Paper, No.5064, March.
  • Flood, R. & Marion, N. (2002). Holding International Reserves in an Era of High Capital Mobility. IMF Working Paper, No:WP/02/62.
  • Frenkel, J. & Jovanovic, B. (1981). Optimal International Reserves: A Stochastic Framework. Economic Journal, 91, 507–514.
  • Garratt, D. (1998). An Analysis of Political Business Cycle Theory and Its Relationship With The New Political Macroeconomics. Discussion Papers in Economics, No:98/4.
  • Garrett, G. (1995). Capital Mobility, Trade, and The Domestic Politics of Economic Policy. International Organization, 49 (4), 657-687.
  • Garrett, G. & Nickerson, D. (2001). Globalization, Democratization and Government Spending In Middle Income Countries. Yale University, June 2001. (çevrimiçi) http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/politics/depnews/PG_Notices/COURSE%20NOTICES/POL5012Z/Garrett%20and%2 0Nickerson.pdf, 7 Eylül 2012.
  • Genschel, P. (2004). Globalization and the Welfare State: a retrospective. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 613-636.
  • Gonzalez, M. A. (2002). Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico. Review of Development Economics, 6(2), 204-224.
  • Shi, M. & Svensson, J. (2002). Political Budget Cycles In Developed and Developing Countries. (çevrimiçi) http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.8595&rep=rep1&type=pdf
  • Gosselin, M.A & Parent, N. (2005).An Empirical Analysis of Foreign Exchange Reserves in Emerging Asia. Bank of Canada Working Paper, No.2005-38.
  • Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jarsey.
  • Hayo, B. & Hefeker, C. (2002). Reconsidering Central Bank Independence. European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 653–674.
  • Heckelman, J. C. (2002). Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: Theory and Some Evidence. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 35(3), 568-585.
  • Hellwig, T. (2001). Interdependence, Government Constraints and Economic Voting. Journal of Politics, 63(4), 1141-1162.
  • Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007). Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies, 40 (3), 283-306.
  • Hibbs, D.A.J. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.
  • Kaplan, S. B. (2008). From Spendthrifts to Misers: Globalization and Opportunistic Politicians. Annual Meetings of American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28-31.
  • Karakaş, M. (2013). Political Business Cycles in Turkey: A Fiscal Approach. Yönetim ve Ekonomi, 20 (1), 245-262.
  • Keohane, R. O. & Milner, H.V. (1996). Internationalization and Domestic Politics. R. O. Keohane, H. V. Milner (Ed.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An Introduction (s.3-16), Cambridge University Pres.
  • Lane, P. R. & Burke, D. (2001). The Empirics of Foreign Reserves. Open Economies Review,12, 423- 434.
  • Leertouver, E. & Maier, P.(2001) . Who Creates Political Business Cycles?: Should Central Banks be Blamed?. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 445-463.
  • Nordhaus, W. D.(1975). The Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190.
  • Nordhaus, W. D.(1976). Inflation Theory and Policy. The American Economic Review, 66 (2), 59-64.
  • Obstfeld, M. (1998). The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 9-30.
  • Özkan, F. & Tarı, R. (2010). Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası Seçim Dönemlerinin Politik Konjoktürel Dalgalanmaları Teorisi Çerçevesinde Analizi. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi,36, Ağustos-Aralık, 223-238.
  • Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, Switzerland.
  • Potrafke, N. (2009). Did Globalization Restrict Partisan Politics? An Empirical Evaluation of Social Expenditures in a Panel of OECD Countries. Public Choice, 140, 105-124.
  • Potrafke, N. (2010). Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006. MPRA Paper.
  • Quinn, D. (1997). Correlates of Change in Financial Regulation. American Political Science Review, 91(3),531-551.
  • Rodrik, D. (2002). Feasible Globalizations. NBER Working Paper, No. 9129.
  • Rogoff, K. ,& Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16.
  • Rogoff, K. (2003). Globalization and Disinflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Conference, September 10.
  • Root, F. & Ahmed, A.(1979). Empirical Determinants of Manufacturing Direct Foreign Investment Developing Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 27, 751–767.
  • Rose, A. (2007). A Stable International Monetary System Emerges: Inflation Targeting as Bretton Woods, Reversed. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, 663-681.
  • Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries. Public Choice, 102( 1-2),113-128.
  • Spiegel, M. M. (2008). Financial Globalization and Monetary Policy Discipline: A Survey With New Evidence From Financial Remoteness. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series, No.2008- 10, July 18.
  • Swank, D. (1998). Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies. Political Studies, XLVI, 671-692.
  • Taghipour, A. & Mousavi, A. (2011). The Effect of Financial Globalization on Monetary Policy Discipline: The Evidence From 22 Developing Countries.Money and Economy, 6(1),135-150.
  • Tanzi, V. (1998). The Demise of the Nation State?. IMF Working Paper Series, No:98/120, August.
  • Tanzi, V. (2000).Globalization and the Future of Social Protection. IMF Working Paper, No.WP/00/ 12, Washington, January.
  • Telatar, F. (2001). Politik Devresel Dalgalanmalar Teorisi Işığında Demokrasi-Siyaset-Ekonomi İlişkisi Türkiye Örneği. İktisat, İşletme, Finans, 16 (187), 50-66.
  • Treisman, D. & Gimpelson, V. (2001). Political Busıness Cycles and Russian Elections, or The Manipulations of “Chudar”. British Journal of Political Science, 31, 225-46.
  • Tytell, I. & Wei, S.J. (2004). Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic Policies?. IMF Working Paper, October 15.
  • Walsh, J. I. (1994). International Constraints and Domestic Choices: Economic Convergence and Exchange Rate Policy in France and Italy. Political Studies, 42, 243-258.
  • Yerdelen Tatoğlu, F. (2012). İleri Panel Veri Analizi, Stata Uygulamalı, Beta Yayınevi, İstanbul.

Küreselleşme Sürecinde Fırsatçı Politik İş Çevrimi Modelinin Geçerliliği: OECD Ülkeleri Örneği

Yıl 2013, Cilt: 4 Sayı: 2, 64 - 83, 01.12.2013

Ayşe Arı

Öz

Makro ekonomi ve politika bilimini ilişkilendiren politik iş çevrimi modelleri makro ekonomik değişkenlerde gözlenen dalgalanmaların nedenini seçim süreciyle açıklamaktadır. Fırsatçı ve partizan politik iş çevrimi modellerine göre siyasi partiler seçimleri tekrar kazanmak ya da ideolojik politikalar uygulayabilmek amacıyla seçim öncesinde ekonomiye para ve maliye politikası araçlarıyla müdahale etmektedir. Ancak son yıllarda küreselleşme süreciyle birlikte artan uluslararası bütünleşme ve kurumsal gelişmelerin iktidar partisinin çıkarları doğrultusunda ekonomiye müdahalesini kısıtladığı belirtilmektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı da küreselleşme sonrasında fırsatçı modelin geçerliliğini OECD ülkeleri için dinamik panel veri analizi kullanarak sorgulamaktır. 1995-2010 döneminin analiz edildiği çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular, seçim sürecinde fırsatçı davranışların gözlendiği yönündedir. Ancak fırsatçı güdülerle ekonomiye müdahalenin oldukça sınırlı düzeyde olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Politik İş Çevrimleri Disiplin Etkisi Küreselleşme

Kaynakça

  • Akhmedov, A. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2003). Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting. .CEPR Discussion Paper, No.3855, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research..
  • Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,.102(3), 651-678.
  • Alesina, A. & Roubini, N. (1992). Political Cycles in OECD Economies. Review of Economic Studies,59(4), 663-688.
  • Alesina, A. & Sachs, J. (1988). Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States: 1914-1984. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20(1), 63-82.
  • Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, C. (1981).Estimation of Dynamic Models with Error Components. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 76(375), 598–606.
  • Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.
  • Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error- Components Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29-51.
  • Asher, M. G. & Rajan, R.S. (2001). Globalization and Tax Systems: Implications for Developing Countries with Particular Reference to Southeast Asia. ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 18(1), 119-139.
  • Baltagi, B. H. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, Fourth Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
  • Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Third Edition, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.
  • Berger, H. & Woitek, U. (2000). The German Political Business Cycle: Money Demand Rather Than Monetary Policy.
  • Burkovskaya, Anastasia (2013). Monetary political business cycles: new democracy setting. Quantile, 11,75-90.
  • Carlsen, F. (1997). Counter fiscal Policies and Partisan Politics: Evidence From Industrialized Countries. Applied Economics, 29, 145-151.
  • Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.
  • Choi, C. & Baek, S.G. (2004). Exchange Rate Regimes and International Reserves. Mimeo.
  • Cukierman, A. & Meltzer, A. (1986). A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information. Econometrica,.54(5), 1099-1128.
  • Drazen, A. (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics.Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2007). Foreign Exchange Intervention And The Political Business Cycle. KOF Working Papers, No.159.
  • Dreher, A. & Vaubel, R. (2009). Roland Vaubel: “Foreign Exchange Intervention and The Political Business Cycle: A Panel Data Analysis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 755–775.
  • Dreher, A., Sturm, J.E. & Ursprung:, H. (2008). The Impact of Globalization on The Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence From Panel Data. Public Choice, 134,.263–292.
  • Drezner, D.W. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. International Studies Review, 3(1), 53-78.
  • Drukker, D.M. (2008). Econometric Analysis of Dynamic Panel-Data Models Using Stata. Summer North American Stata Users Group Meeting, July 24-25.
  • Edwards, S. (1985). On the Interest Rate Elasticity of the Demand for International Reserves: Some Evidence from Developing Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance, 4, 287-295.
  • Fernandez-Albertos, J. (2006). Does Internalization Blur Responsibility? Economic Voting and Economic Openness in 15 European Countries. West European Politics, 29 (1), 28-46.
  • Fischer, S. (1995) . Modern Approaches to Central Banking. NBER Working Paper, No.5064, March.
  • Flood, R. & Marion, N. (2002). Holding International Reserves in an Era of High Capital Mobility. IMF Working Paper, No:WP/02/62.
  • Frenkel, J. & Jovanovic, B. (1981). Optimal International Reserves: A Stochastic Framework. Economic Journal, 91, 507–514.
  • Garratt, D. (1998). An Analysis of Political Business Cycle Theory and Its Relationship With The New Political Macroeconomics. Discussion Papers in Economics, No:98/4.
  • Garrett, G. (1995). Capital Mobility, Trade, and The Domestic Politics of Economic Policy. International Organization, 49 (4), 657-687.
  • Garrett, G. & Nickerson, D. (2001). Globalization, Democratization and Government Spending In Middle Income Countries. Yale University, June 2001. (çevrimiçi) http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/politics/depnews/PG_Notices/COURSE%20NOTICES/POL5012Z/Garrett%20and%2 0Nickerson.pdf, 7 Eylül 2012.
  • Genschel, P. (2004). Globalization and the Welfare State: a retrospective. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 613-636.
  • Gonzalez, M. A. (2002). Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico. Review of Development Economics, 6(2), 204-224.
  • Shi, M. & Svensson, J. (2002). Political Budget Cycles In Developed and Developing Countries. (çevrimiçi) http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.8595&rep=rep1&type=pdf
  • Gosselin, M.A & Parent, N. (2005).An Empirical Analysis of Foreign Exchange Reserves in Emerging Asia. Bank of Canada Working Paper, No.2005-38.
  • Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jarsey.
  • Hayo, B. & Hefeker, C. (2002). Reconsidering Central Bank Independence. European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 653–674.
  • Heckelman, J. C. (2002). Variable Rational Partisan Business Cycles: Theory and Some Evidence. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 35(3), 568-585.
  • Hellwig, T. (2001). Interdependence, Government Constraints and Economic Voting. Journal of Politics, 63(4), 1141-1162.
  • Hellwig, T. & Samuels, D. (2007). Voting in Open Economies: The Electoral Consequences of Globalization. Comparative Political Studies, 40 (3), 283-306.
  • Hibbs, D.A.J. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.
  • Kaplan, S. B. (2008). From Spendthrifts to Misers: Globalization and Opportunistic Politicians. Annual Meetings of American Political Science Association, Boston, August 28-31.
  • Karakaş, M. (2013). Political Business Cycles in Turkey: A Fiscal Approach. Yönetim ve Ekonomi, 20 (1), 245-262.
  • Keohane, R. O. & Milner, H.V. (1996). Internationalization and Domestic Politics. R. O. Keohane, H. V. Milner (Ed.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics: An Introduction (s.3-16), Cambridge University Pres.
  • Lane, P. R. & Burke, D. (2001). The Empirics of Foreign Reserves. Open Economies Review,12, 423- 434.
  • Leertouver, E. & Maier, P.(2001) . Who Creates Political Business Cycles?: Should Central Banks be Blamed?. European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 445-463.
  • Nordhaus, W. D.(1975). The Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 42(2), 169-190.
  • Nordhaus, W. D.(1976). Inflation Theory and Policy. The American Economic Review, 66 (2), 59-64.
  • Obstfeld, M. (1998). The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 9-30.
  • Özkan, F. & Tarı, R. (2010). Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası Seçim Dönemlerinin Politik Konjoktürel Dalgalanmaları Teorisi Çerçevesinde Analizi. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi,36, Ağustos-Aralık, 223-238.
  • Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, Switzerland.
  • Potrafke, N. (2009). Did Globalization Restrict Partisan Politics? An Empirical Evaluation of Social Expenditures in a Panel of OECD Countries. Public Choice, 140, 105-124.
  • Potrafke, N. (2010). Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006. MPRA Paper.
  • Quinn, D. (1997). Correlates of Change in Financial Regulation. American Political Science Review, 91(3),531-551.
  • Rodrik, D. (2002). Feasible Globalizations. NBER Working Paper, No. 9129.
  • Rogoff, K. ,& Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16.
  • Rogoff, K. (2003). Globalization and Disinflation. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Conference, September 10.
  • Root, F. & Ahmed, A.(1979). Empirical Determinants of Manufacturing Direct Foreign Investment Developing Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 27, 751–767.
  • Rose, A. (2007). A Stable International Monetary System Emerges: Inflation Targeting as Bretton Woods, Reversed. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, 663-681.
  • Schuknecht, L. (2000). Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries. Public Choice, 102( 1-2),113-128.
  • Spiegel, M. M. (2008). Financial Globalization and Monetary Policy Discipline: A Survey With New Evidence From Financial Remoteness. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series, No.2008- 10, July 18.
  • Swank, D. (1998). Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies. Political Studies, XLVI, 671-692.
  • Taghipour, A. & Mousavi, A. (2011). The Effect of Financial Globalization on Monetary Policy Discipline: The Evidence From 22 Developing Countries.Money and Economy, 6(1),135-150.
  • Tanzi, V. (1998). The Demise of the Nation State?. IMF Working Paper Series, No:98/120, August.
  • Tanzi, V. (2000).Globalization and the Future of Social Protection. IMF Working Paper, No.WP/00/ 12, Washington, January.
  • Telatar, F. (2001). Politik Devresel Dalgalanmalar Teorisi Işığında Demokrasi-Siyaset-Ekonomi İlişkisi Türkiye Örneği. İktisat, İşletme, Finans, 16 (187), 50-66.
  • Treisman, D. & Gimpelson, V. (2001). Political Busıness Cycles and Russian Elections, or The Manipulations of “Chudar”. British Journal of Political Science, 31, 225-46.
  • Tytell, I. & Wei, S.J. (2004). Does Financial Globalization Induce Better Macroeconomic Policies?. IMF Working Paper, October 15.
  • Walsh, J. I. (1994). International Constraints and Domestic Choices: Economic Convergence and Exchange Rate Policy in France and Italy. Political Studies, 42, 243-258.
  • Yerdelen Tatoğlu, F. (2012). İleri Panel Veri Analizi, Stata Uygulamalı, Beta Yayınevi, İstanbul.
Toplam 69 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Ayşe Arı

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Aralık 2013
Gönderilme Tarihi 19 Haziran 2015
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2013 Cilt: 4 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Arı, A. (2013). Küreselleşme Sürecinde Fırsatçı Politik İş Çevrimi Modelinin Geçerliliği: OECD Ülkeleri Örneği. Akademik Yaklaşımlar Dergisi, 4(2), 64-83.