Devletlerarası İletişimde Caydırıcılık: Uluslararası Sinyalizasyon Stratejileri

Yıl 2024, , 441 - 459, 30.07.2024

Hayati Ünlü

https://doi.org/10.17680/erciyesiletisim.1444923

Öz

Büyük Güçler çağında aktörler için bazen çatışmaya bazen de işbirliğine gitmek daha maliyetli olabilir. Ancak aktörler savaştan kaçınmak istiyorsa ve buna rağmen yine de rakiplerinin kararlarını etkileyip davranışlarını şekillendirmek istiyorsa caydırıcılık önemli bir referans merkezidir. Karşı tarafın savaşma isteğini caydırmak hem savaşa göre daha az maliyetlidir hem de çıkarlarını korumak açısından daha büyük prestij ve itibar sağlar. Devletler, caydırıcı politikaları karşı tarafa iletebilmek adınaysa genellikle sinyal gönderme yöntemine başvururlar. Söz konusu sinyaller bazen açık bazen de kısmi ve belirsiz nitelikler taşıyabilir. Yine sinyaller bazen yalnızca sert bazen de işbirlikçi unsurları bünyesinde barındırabilirler. Uluslararası ilişkilerden siyasal iletişime ve siyasal psikolojiye kadar çok disiplinli bir çalışma literatürüne karşılık gelen bu sinyalizasyon çalışmaları, yoğun bir akademik ilgi alanı olduğu kadar pratikteki aktörler açısından oldukça işlevsel olması sebebiyle de devlet davranışı tartışmalarının her geçen gün biraz daha merkezine oturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada da öncelikle caydırıcılığın tarihsel gelişimi ve farklı caydırıcılık türleri üzerinden güncel caydırıcılık teorisi üzerine odaklanılacaktır. Ardından caydırıcılığın uygulama alanı olan sinyalizasyon tartışmalarına geçilecek ve devletlerin hangi sinyal türleriyle ve nasıl bir motivasyonla karşı tarafla iletişim kurup arzu ettikleri sonuca ulaşmaya çalıştıkları analiz edilecektir. Akabinde ise ele alınan sinyalizasyon literatürü uluslararası politikadaki önemli örneklerle pekiştirilmeye çalışılacaktır. Son olarak da yükselen yeni trendler üzerinden hem caydırıcılığın hem de sinyalizasyon tartışmalarının yeni dönemdeki değişim süreçleri tartışmasıyla çalışma tamamlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Uluslararası Caydırıcılık, Sinyalizasyon Stratejileri, Yeni Trendler.

Deterrence in Inter-State Communication: International Signaling Strategies

Öz

In the era of global Great Powers, it may prove to be more expensive for nations to either participate in conflict or cooperate. Nevertheless, deterrence becomes a significant point of reference for nations desiring to avoid war while also influencing the decisions and behaviors of their rivals. Discouraging an adversary's willingness to fight is not only less expensive than actual warfare, but also provides greater prestige and credibility for safeguarding national interests. In order to communicate deterrence policies to the other side, states often resort to signaling. Sometimes these signals are explicit, sometimes partial and ambiguous. Signaling can also sometimes be exclusively harsh and sometimes cooperative. Signaling studies, which pertain to a multidisciplinary literature spanning international relations to political communication and psychology, are increasingly critical in debates on state behavior. This is not only due to their academic significance but also their practical utility for actors. This study will examine the historical progression of deterrence and current deterrence theories utilizing various types of deterrence. The next section will discuss the use of signaling as a means of deterrence, analyzing the types of signals and the motivation of states to communicate with their adversaries in order to achieve their objectives. Following this, the literature on signaling will be reinforced with significant examples from international politics. Lastly, this study will conclude by discussing the transformative processes of deterrence and signaling debates in the modern era, taking into account emerging trends.

Anahtar Kelimeler

International Deterrence, Signaling Strategies, New Trends.

Kaynakça

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