2013’ten Sonra Mısır’daki Sivil-Askerî Ilişkiler

Yıl 2019, , 655 - 689, 31.12.2019

Özüm Sezin Uzun , Ahmet Elerıan

https://doi.org/10.17752/guvenlikstrtj.668194

Öz

Asker, Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde güçlü ve etkin bir aktör olmuştur. 2011 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır’da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Mursi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeyle asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, ve medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konumlarının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Mısır, asker-sivil ilişkisi, askeri darbe, El Sisi

Civil-Military Relations in Egypt since 2013

Öz

The military has been a powerful and active actor in Egyptian politics since Naser period. By the collapse of the Mobarak regime as a result of the popular demonstrations in 2011, hopes for democratization increased; however, the military coup against Morsi administration once again changed the balance in civil- military relations in favor of the military and led the military to become dominant actor in both Egyptian politics and economics. This article analyzes civil-military relations in Egypt since July 2013 and attempts to understand to what extent the military was empowered by the privileged rights in both politics and economics. Within that framework, given rights and power by the constitution to the military, gained privileged rights at the executive, legislative and judiciary levels, economic power and activities of the military, and its influence over media and civil society were examined. This article argues that on the one hand military has been certainly consolidating its dominancy in Egyptian politics and economics since 2013, on the other hand the military involvement in politics and economics has been deteriorating institutionalism and efficiency of the Army itself.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Egypt, civil-military relations, military coup, El Sisi

Kaynakça

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