HALKA AÇIK ANONİM ŞİRKETLERDE BORÇLANMA ARACI SAHİPLERİ KURULU VE KOLEKTİF TEMSİL

Yıl 2022, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 1, 167 - 231, 30.06.2022

M. Aslı Küçükgüngör

https://doi.org/10.32957/hacettepehdf.1070851

Öz

Son yıllarda sermaye piyasasındaki gelişmeler, sermaye piyasası yoluyla fon toplayan ortaklıklarda, borçlanma aracı sahiplerinin menfaat sahipleri içinde önemli bir yere sahip olmasını kaçınılmaz kılmıştır. Buna bağlı olarak borçlanma aracı sahiplerinin menfaatlerinin korunması gerekliliği, gerek “Pay Sahipliği” gerekse “Menfaat Sahipliği” modelinin egemen olduğu sistemlerde bir ihtiyaç olarak kabul görmüştür. Borçlanma aracı sahiplerinin korunması için geliştirilen yöntemler temelde, birlikte hareket edecek borçlanma aracı sahipleri kurulunun oluşturulması (Kolektif Hareket) ve borçlanma aracı sahiplerinin finansal haklarını tek elden takip etmek üzere bir temsilci atanması (Kolektif Temsil) olmak üzere iki kategoriye ayrılmaktadır.
Menfaat sahipliği modelinin uygulama alanı bulduğu Alman hukukunda, borçlanma aracı sahipleri bakımından, borçlanma aracı sahipleri kurulu ve borçlanma aracı temsilcisi müesseseleri borçlanma aracı sahiplerine ilişkin münhasır bir düzenleme aracılığıyla (2009 tarihli Borçlanma Araçları Kanunu, Schuldverschreibungsgesetz) düzenlenmiştir. Pay sahipliği modelinin benimsendiği Amerikan hukukunda kolektif organ konusu özel olarak düzenlenmemiş ancak kolektif temsil konusunda 1939 tarihli Trust Indenture Act (TIA) ile Güvenilen Kişi Müessesesi (Indenture Trustee) getirilmiştir. Türk hukukunda ise 6362 sayılı SPKn’da 2020’de yapılan değişiklikler ile birlikte yeni bir müessese olarak “Borçlanma Aracı Sahipleri Kurulu” hukuken düzenleme konusu olmuş, borçlanma aracı sahipleri bakımından ortak temsilciye de bu kapsamda yer verilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle pay sahipliği ve menfaat sahipliği yaklaşımlarının benimsendiği sistemlerde borçlanma aracı sahiplerini korumada geliştirilen yöntemlerin ne şekilde uygulandığı, her iki yaklaşımın temel temsilcisi olan Amerikan ve Alman hukuku bakımından ele alınmış, ardından Türk Sermaye Piyasası Hukuku’nda Borçlanma Aracı Sahipleri Kurulu (BASK) düzenlemeleri kolektif hareket ve kolektif temsil bakımından incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Borçlanma Araçları Sahipleri Kurulu (BASK), Borçlanma Araçları, Menfaat Sahipliği Yaklaşımı, Kolektif Hareket, Kolektif Temsil.

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