Birinci Körfez Krizi’nde Alman Dış Politikası: Dünya Sahnesinde Askeri Güç Olma Tabusunun Aşılması

Yıl 2022, , 1 - 13, 28.04.2022

Murat Tınas

https://doi.org/10.17336/igusbd.707826

Öz

2 Ağustos 1990’da Irak’ın Kuveyt’i işgaline yönelik uluslararası tepki, hızlı ve muazzamdı. Gündemi devam etmekte olan yeniden birleşme müzakereleriyle fazlasıyla meşgul olmasına rağmen, böylesi bir uluslararası bağlam Almanya’nın Birinci Körfez Krizi’ne karşı tepkisiz kalmasını imkânsız hale getirmiştir. Esasında devam eden yeniden birleşme müzakerelerinin dışında, Almanya’yı İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında dünya sahnesinde askeri güç olmaktan alıkoyan iç ve dış politika kurgusu göz önüne alındığında Almanya’nın böylesi bir uluslararası koalisyona katılması daha düşündürücü olmaktadır. Bahse konu çerçevede bu çalışma, Alman dış ve güvenlik politikalarının kapsamı ve araçları konusunda temelden bir yeniden değerlendirmenin zaruriyet haline geldiği 1990’ların başındaki Birinci Körfez Krizi sırasındaki Alman dış politikasını incelemektedir. Bu amaçla makale, dönemin uluslararası bağlamının ve Körfez Savaşı’nın kısa bir tarihsel geçmişinin ele alınmasıyla başlamakta olup sonrasında Alman dış politikası ve onu oluşturan iç ve dış tartışmaların bahse konu krizin üç ayrı safhasındaki analizine odaklanmaktadır. Bunu yaparken bu çalışma, ilgili literatürü değerlendirerek analizinde çoğunlukla ikincil kaynaklara dayanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak makale, göreceli olarak sınırlı olsa da Almanya’nın uluslararası koalisyona katılmasının, basit bir dış politika seçiminden ziyade, Almanya’nın dünya siyasetinde askeri araçlar da dâhil olmak üzere aktif bir uluslararası güç olma tabusunun sorgulanması hasebiyle ülkenin 1990’ların başında ortaya çıkmakta olan yeni uluslararası sistemdeki rolünün yeniden yapılandırılmasına yönelik ve ilerleyen yıllarda daha büyük sonuçları olan stratejik bir karar olduğunu savunmaktadır. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Almanya, Dış Politika, Askeri Güç, Körfez Krizi, Irak

German Foreign Policy During the First Gulf Crisis: Overcoming a Taboo on Being a Military Power on World Stage

Öz

When Iraq attacked Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the international respond was immediate and enormous. In this international context, Germany could not stand irresponsive although its agenda was heavily preoccupied by the ongoing reunification negotiations. Additionally, another challenge for Germany in participating in such an international coalition was its post-World War II settlement which constrained Germany internally and externally from being a military power on world stage. Within this framework, this paper analyses German foreign policy during the First Gulf Crisis when 1990s made a fundamental reassessment about the scope and means of German foreign and security policy a necessity. This paper starts with a brief historical background of the international context and the Gulf War. Then, the paper focuses on the analysis of German foreign policy during the crisis in three periods. In doing so, this study mostly relies on secondary sources in its analysis by reviewing the relevant literature. In conclusion, the paper argues that, though it was comparatively limited, Germany’s participation in the international coalition responding the crisis is not a simple foreign policy choice but a strategic decision about reunified Germany’s role in the newly emerging international system, which will have greater implications as it substantially questioned a taboo on being an active international power including military means in world politics. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Germany, Foreign Policy, Military Power, Gulf Crisis, Iraq

Kaynakça

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