İktisadi Bilgi Sınırlı Rasyonelliği İyileştirmekte Avantaj Yaratır Mı?

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 35 Sayı: 2, 327 - 341, 29.06.2020

Sibel Can Kamber , Bora Süslü

https://doi.org/10.24988/ije.202035209

Cited By: 2

Öz

Davranışsal iktisat, geleneksel iktisadın tam bilgi ile idealize edilmiş rasyonellik varsayımının yerine sınırlı rasyonelliği koyarak, iktisadi kararların ardındaki psikolojik yasaları bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, karar birimlerinin sahip oldukları iktisadi bilginin rasyonel kararlar için avantaj sağlayıp sağlamadığını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu doğrultuda hipotezimiz, iktisadi bilgi sahibi olmanın sınırlı rasyonaliteyi düzeltemeyeceğidir. Çalışmada nicel yöntem kapsamında anket çalışması gerçekleştirilmiş; bilişsel eğilim ve kısa yollar literatüründen rasyonellik varsayımına doğrudan karşıt olduğu düşünülen on sezgisel konu sınanmıştır. Araştırmanın evreni, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi’nde öğrenim gören İİBF ve Eğitim Fakültesi öğrencilerinden oluşmaktadır. Yapılan çalışmada karar birimlerinin sınırlı rasyonel olduğu ve iktisadi bilginin tercihleri rasyonelleştirmediği sonuçlarına ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rasyonellik, Geleneksel İktisat, Davranışsal İktisat, Sınırlı Rasyonellik, Bilişsel Eğilim ve Kısa Yollar

Teşekkür

Bu çalışma “İktisadi Rasyonalitenin Davranışsal İktisat Çerçevesinde Sorgulanması: Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesindeki Öğrenciler Üzerine Bir Alan Araştırması” (2019) isimli yüksek lisans tezinden hazırlanmıştır.

Does Economic Knowledge Create Advantage in Improving Bounded Rationality?

Öz

Behavioral economics tries to find the psychological laws behind economic decisions by substituting bounded rationality for traditional economics' full assumption of idealized rationality. The aim of this study is to reveal whether the economic knowledge possessed by decision units provides advantages for rational decisions. Accordingly, our hypothesis is that having economic knowledge cannot correct the bounded rationality. In the study, a survey was carried out within the scope of the quantitative method, and ten intuitive topics that are thought to be directly opposed to the rationality assumption from the cognitive bias and heuristics literature. The universe of the research consists of the students of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences and Faculty of Education, studying at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University. In the study, it has been concluded that the decision units are bounded rational and economic knowledge does not rationalize preferences.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rationality, traditional economics, behavioral economics, bounded rationality, cognitive bias and heuristics

Kaynakça

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