DEVLETLERARASI EKONOMİK İLİŞKİLERİ DÜZENLEYEN ULUSLARARASI ÖRGÜTLERİN POLİTİK EKONOMİSİ: DEVLETLER, ÇIKAR GRUPLARI VE ÖRGÜT BÜROKRASİSİ KISKACINDA KÜRESEL YÖNETİŞİM

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 53, 1 - 35, 28.01.2020

İmran Demir

https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.676405

Cited By: 1

Öz

Uluslararası örgütlerin politik ekonomisi, devletlerin ekonomik çıkarlarını optimize etmek için kurdukları uluslararası örgütlerin kuruluşunu, yapısını ve çıktılarını etkileyen ekonomik ve politik süreçlerin etkileşimini sistematik olarak izah etme çabasındadır. Bu çalışma uluslararası politik ekonominin bir alt dalı olan uluslararası örgütlerin politik ekonomisi üzerine genel bir değerlendirme niteliğindedir. Amaç, bu alanda, geçmişten, günümüze önem arz eden sorular ve tartışmalar üzerinden disiplinin gelişimine ışık tutmak ve güncel konular hakkında bilgi vermektir. Çalışma disiplinin gelişimine paralel olarak üç temel konu üzerinde durmaktadır. Politik ekonomi ve uluslararası politik ekonomi kavramları üzerinden alanın çerçevesi çizildikten sonra devletler arası ekonomik ilişkileri düzenleyen uluslararası kurumların kuruluş nedenleri ve etkinlikleri üzerine yapılan paradigmatik tartışmalara değinilmektedir. Devletlerin neden uluslararası organizasyonlara katıldığı ve neden bu organizasyonların kurallarına uyduğunun kısa bir değerlendirmesini uluslararası örgütlerin yapısını ve dizaynını etkileyen faktörlerin irdelenmesi takip etmektedir. Makale ikinci aşamada, uluslararası kuruluşların kendilerini kuran devletlerden ne kadar bağımsız hareket edebilme kabiliyetine sahip oldukları sorusuna yanıt aramaktadır. Bu bağlamda çeşitli uluslararası ekonomik örgütlerin ürettiği politikaların arkasındaki siyasi etkiler üzerine yapılan tartışmalar incelemektedir. Çıkar grupları ve örgüt bürokrasisinin kurumsal iş birliği süreçlerindeki rolü ve etkinlikleri çalışmanın üçüncü temel sorunsalını oluşturmaktadır. Bürokratik otonomi bağlamında yerel aktörler, siyasetçiler ve uluslararası örgüt bürokrasisinin karşılıklı etkileşimini ve bunun sonucu meydana gelen çıktıları konu alan çalışmalar irdelenmektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Uluslararası İş Birliği, Kolektif Eylem Sorunları, Rasyonel Dizayn, , Enformel Güç, Çıkar Grupları ve Örgüt Bürokrasisi

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN THE GRIP OF STATES, INTEREST GROUPS AND ORGANİZATİONAL BUREAUCRACY

Öz

Political economy of international organizations, a subfield of international political economy, seeks to systematically explain the interaction of economic and political processes that shape the foundation, structure and outputs of international institutions created by states for the maximization of their interests. This study aims at providing an overview of the discipline. The goal is to explore past and present debates and questions that have guided research on the problem of interstate cooperation. The study, in line with the evolution of the discipline, focuses on three major topics. The study, following a conceptual discussion of political economy and international political economy to establish the boundary of the field, explores paradigmatic debates on the role and influence of international institutions. Attention is devoted to the question of why states join international organizations and abide by their rules. This section also explores factors that influence the structure and design of international organizations. The article, in the second place, explores institutional autonomy and the degree of independence enjoyed by international institutions. It examines debates over political factors that influence policy outputs of institutions. The role and impact of interest groups and institutional bureaucracy on the process of institutional cooperation comprise the third concern of the study. The interaction between local actors, national politicians and institutional bureaucracy is explored in relation to the issue of bureaucratic autonomy and its implications.

Anahtar Kelimeler

International Cooperation, Collective Action Problems, Rational Design, Informal Power, Interest Groups and Organizational Bureaucracy

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