Görüngüsel Bilgi ve İmgelem Yeteneği

Yıl 2021, , 79 - 90, 30.12.2021

Tufan Kıymaz

https://doi.org/10.51404/metazihin.1000368

Öz

Bu makalede, görüngüsel bilginin (phenomenal knowledge), imgelem (imagination, hayal, zihinsel canlandırma) yeteneği ile ilişkisini soruşturuyorum. Öncelikle Frank Jackson’ın görüngüsel bilginin kendine haslığından hareketle fizikselciliğin (physicalism) yanlışlığını savunan bilgi argümanına dayanarak iki tür görüngüsel bilgi arasında ayrım yapıyorum. Bunları “doğrudan görüngüsel bilgi” ve “dolaylı görüngüsel bilgi” olarak adlandırıyorum. Makalenin geri kalanında önermesel olmayan doğrudan görüngüsel bilgiye odaklanarak onun da bağımsız ve bağımlı olmak üzere iki türü olduğunu iddia ediyor ve imgelem yeteneğine sahip olmanın yalnızca bağımsız görüngüsel bilgi için gerekli olduğu ve ne bağımsız ne de bağımlı görüngüsel bilgi için yeterli olduğu görüşünü savunuyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler

görüngüsel (fenomenal) bilgi, bilinç, nite, imgelem, yetenek hipotezi, bilgi argümanı

Phenomenal Knowledge and the Imaginative Ability

Öz

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between phenomenal knowledge and the ability to imagine. First, I distinguish between two kinds of phenomenal knowledge, based on Frank Jackson’s anti-physicalist knowledge argument: Direct phenomenal knowledge and indirect phenomenal knowledge. Then I introduce two types of non-propositional direct phenomenal knowledge, namely dependent phenomenal knowledge and independent phenomenal knowledge. I argue that having the ability to imagine is not sufficient for any kind of phenomenal knowledge, and it is only necessary for having independent phenomenal knowledge.

Anahtar Kelimeler

phenomenal knowledge, consciousness, qualia, imagination, ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument

Kaynakça

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