A Case against Conceptualism about Perceptual Content: First Perception

Yıl 2018, Cilt: 1 Sayı: 2, 183 - 194, 30.12.2018

Pakize Arıkan Sandıkcıoğlu

Öz

Abstract: There are two major
philosophical positions about the nature of representational content of
perception; conceptualism and nonconceptualism. According to conceptualism,
perceptual content is wholly conceptual, therefore, in order to be in a
contentful perceptual state, a subject needs to possess all concepts that
characterize the content of the experience. Nonconceptualism, on the other
hand, is the view that perceptual content is nonconceptual, and that possessing
relevant concepts is not necessarily required for having a perceptual
experience. In this study, an argument against the conceptualist thesis will be
proposed. The argument will be based on “the Molyneux problem,” and will
present a more radical version of the problem in order to illustrate the
possibility of nonconceptual perception. 

Anahtar Kelimeler

perceptual content, conceptual, conceptualism, perception, Molyneux

Algısal İçerik Kavramsalcılığına Karşı bir Durum: İlk Algı

Öz

Öz: Algının temsil edici içeriği
hakkında iki temel felsefi duruş vardır; kavramsalcılık ve kavram-dışsalcılık.
Kavramsalcılığa göre, algısal içerik tamamen kavramsaldır bu nedenle içerikli
bir algı deneyimine sahip olabilmek için öznenin algı içeriğini tanımlayan tüm
kavramlara sahip olması gerekir. Öte yandan kavram-dışsalcılık, algısal
içeriğin kavramsal olmadığı ve algısal deneyim için kavramlara sahip olmanın
gerekli olmadığı görüşüdür. Bu çalışmada kavramsalcı teze karşı bir argüman
sunulacaktır. Argüman “Molyneux problemine” dayanmakta ve bu problemin daha
radikal bir versiyonunu sunarak kavramsal olmayan algıyı örneklemeyi
hedeflemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

algı, algısal içerik, kavramsal, kavramsalcılık, Molyneux

Kaynakça

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