İrademiz Özgür Değil: Metafizik Bir Problem Olarak Özgür İrade

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 1, 13 - 40, 30.06.2020

Ferhat Onur

Öz

Felsefe tarihinin en dikkat çekici ve en zorlayıcı birkaç probleminden biri olan özgür irade problemi beyin inceleme tekniklerinin gelişmesiyle birlikte aynı zamanda bilimsel bir problem halini de almış görünüyor. Bilimlerin (psikoloji ve sinirbilim) iradenin özgürlüğü ile ilgili söyledikleri pek iç açıcı değilse de sonuçlar tartışmaları bitirici nitelikte değil. Bununla birlikte, bilimsel bulgularla beraber ele alındığında özgür irade düşüncesinin felsefi açmazları daha da çarpıcı bir şekilde kendini gösteriyor. Öyle görünüyor ki eylemlerimizin yaratıcısı, bedenlerimizin mutlak yöneticisi olduğumuz şeklindeki alışılageldik özgürlük fikri kişiler hakkında ikici bir anlayışı gerektiriyor ancak ikicilik içerdiği metafizik güçlükler sebebiyle isteneni veremiyor. Günümüzde daha çok özellik ikiciliği olarak karşımıza çıkan ikici anlayışlar bilincin beyne etki edebilecek bir güç, vasıta veya ortam olacağı bir bilinç-beyin ilişkisini tesis edemiyorlar ve bu zafiyet bilim insanlarının da zaman zaman iddia ettikleri özgür iradenin olanaklı olmadığı tezinin haklı olma ihtimalini güçlendiriyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler

özgür irade, bilinç, belirlenimcilik, bağdaşırcılık, liberteryenizm, zihinsel nedensellik

Our Will Is Not Free: Free Will as a Metaphysical Problem

Öz

The problem of free will, which is one of the most striking and challenging problems in the history of philosophy, seems to have become a scientific problem with the development of brain examination techniques. Although what sciences (namely, psychology and neuroscience) say about freedom of will isn’t very hopeful, the results are not decisive. However, taken together with scientific findings, philosophical dead ends for the idea of free will manifests itself even more dramatically. It seems that the accustomed idea of freedom that we are the creator of our actions or that we are the absolute ruler of our bodies requires a dualistic understanding of a person, but dualism cannot provide what is desired because of the metaphysical difficulties it contains. The dualistic conceptions, which nowadays we encounter as variants of property dualism, cannot establish a consciousness-brain relationship that will make consciousness some type of force, vehicle or medium to cause the brain, and this makes more likely true the claim, which scientists also sometimes assert, that free will is not possible.

Anahtar Kelimeler

free will, consciousness, determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism, mental causation

Kaynakça

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