Beklenti Teorisinin Dış Politikadaki Uygulamaları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

Yıl 2021, , 601 - 617, 31.12.2021

Sevinc Ozturk

https://doi.org/10.17494/ogusbd.1041550

Öz

Beklenti teorisinin dış politika yapımının açıklanmasına olan büyük katkılarına rağmen, teorinin avantajlarına kıyasla kısıtlılıkları hala tartışmalıdır. Beklenti teorisinin dış politikada karar verme konusuna uygulanabilirliği, deneysel çalışmaların genellenebilirlikten yoksunluğu konusundaki tipik konuların ötesinde de problemlidir. Bu makalede, beklenti teorisinin temel prensipleri dış politika uygulamaları ile taranarak, teorinin dış politikada karar alma süreci üzerine olan uygulamalarındaki güçlü ve zayıf yönleri değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, karar alıcıların referans noktasının belirlenmesinin, çerçevelerinin sınıflandırılmasının ve karar alıcıların çerçevelemesi ile riskli davranışları arasındaki ilişkide nedenselliğin belirlenmesinin bir kesinlik içermeyip tartışmalı olmasının, teorinin uygulamalarındaki güvenilirliğin sorgulanmasına yol açtığı savunulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Beklenti Teorisi, Dış Politika, Çerçeveleme, Referans Noktası, Risk Eğilimi

Kaynakça

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