Türkiye’nin Suriye Politikası: Değişmeyen Hedefler, Değişen Öncelikler

Yıl 2018, , 13 - 36, 28.12.2018

Muhittin Ataman , Çağatay Özdemir

https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.466046

Cited By: 8

Öz

Türkiye’nin dış politika yaklaşımı, 2016
yılında liberal bir çerçeveden ayrılarak realist bir anlayışa sahip olmuştur. Bu
değişimin en net göstergesi ise Suriye iç savaşıdır. Zira Türkiye, Suriye iç
savaşından kaynaklı tehditleri önlemek amacıyla askeri güç kullanımını
öncelemiştir. Bu makale, Suriye krizi karşısında Türkiye’nin hedeflerinin sabit
kaldığını ancak son yıllarda önceliklerinin değiştiğini iddia etmektedir. Nitekim
2011-2016 yılları arasında insani normlar Türkiye’nin Suriye politikasını
belirlerken, 2016 yılı sonrasında bu normlar ikincil öncelikler olmuş ve sert
güç odaklı askeri operasyonlarla yer değiştirmiştir. Makale bu varsayımı
desteklemek amacıyla Suriye krizine karşı Türk Dış Politikası’nın altı temel
amacını merkeze almıştır. Bu amaçlar sırasıyla; Suriye’de ortaya çıkan insani
krizi yönetmek, Esed Rejimi’nin yıkılması, muhalefet güçlerine destek, İran ile
yapılan vekalet savaşı, DAEŞ tehdidini yok etmek ve PYD/YPG’nin hakimiyet alanı
kurmasının engellenmesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Türkiye, Suriye, Dış Politika, İnsani Normlar, Askeri Kararlılık

Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives Shifting Priorities

Öz

Turkey’s foreign
policy approach started to transform from a more liberal and humanitarian foreign
policy to a more realistic and pragmatic one in 2016, which was manifested in
the Syrian civil war. In this period Turkey started to prioritize the use of
hard power in order to prevent the threats resulting from the civil war. This
paper asserts that while Turkey’s objectives in the Syrian crisis have remained
stable, its priorities have changed especially in recent years. So, while from
2011-2016 humanitarian norms dominated Turkey’s Syria policy, after 2016, these
norms became secondary priorities, and were replaced by hard power-based
military assertiveness. To support this hypothesis, six main objectives of
Turkey’s foreign policy are taken into consideration: Managing the humanitarian
crisis, materializing the fall of the Assad regime, aiding the opposition
forces, waging a proxy war with Iran, eliminating the threat of Daesh, and
preventing the PYD/YPG from creating an area of dominance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Turkey, Syria, Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Norms, Military Assertiveness

Kaynakça

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