YENİ BİR TOPLUM KURAM DİNAMİĞİ: PRATİK-RASYONELLİK

Year 2020, Volume: 22 Issue: 1, 14 - 27, 22.06.2020

Ahmet Yavuz Çamlı

https://doi.org/10.33707/akuiibfd.622982

Cited By: 4

Abstract

Rasyonellik
genel bir tabirle günümüzde toplumsal yapının ve alt sistemlerin üzerine kurulu
olduğu dinamiklerin oluşturduğu temel varsayımlardan biridir. Çıkarılan yasalar,
benimsenen politikalar, ekonomik ve mali yöntemler gibi unsurlara ilişkin tüm
kuramsal ve pratik işleyiş rasyonel ilkelere dayalıdır. Mikro açıdan
bakıldığında ise rasyonellik bireylerin eylemde bulunurken çıkarlarını
maksimize edip hedeflerine en kolay ve en az maliyetle ulaşması demektir.

Max Weber’in geliştirdiği
rasyonellik teorisi çok boyutlu bir yapıya sahiptir. O, Batı toplumlarına
atfettiği rasyonelleşme teorisini iki temel rasyonellik modeli üzerine inşa
eder. Bunlar modern kapitalizmin ortaya çıkışına zemin hazırlayan
pratik-rasyonellik ile olgunlaşması ve kurumsallaşmasını sağlayan
amaçsal-rasyonelliktir. Amaç-rasyonelliğin günümüzde bütün sistemleri domine
etmesi; değer alanlarının ve birey, kurum ve toplumların pratik-rasyonellik
rehberliğinde yeniden dizaynını gerektirir. Bu rasyonellik türü günümüz
insanının maddi çıkarlarını koruyup manevi dünyasını da ideal olana yükselterek
rasyonel toplum özleminin gerçekleştirilmesini sağlayabilir.

Bu bakımdan çalışmada rasyonellik
kavramı, toplumsal eylemin tasnifi ve rasyonellik çeşitleri kısaca izah edilip
Weber’le birlikte Alman düşünce hayatının en önemli isimlerinden Kant’ın
referanslarına başvurularak pratik-rasyonellik olgusu ortaya çıkarılmaya
çalışılacaktır.

Keywords

rasyonellik, Pratik-Rasyonellik, Kapitalizm, Weber, Kant

A NEW SOCIETY THEORY DYNAMICS: PRACTICAL-RATIONALISM

Abstract

In general terms, rationality is one of the basic
assumptions of the dynamics upon which social structure and subsystems are
built. All the theoretical and practical procedures related to the enacted
laws, policies adopted, economic and financial methods are based on rational
principles. From a micro perspective, rationality means that individuals can
maximize their interests while acting and achieve their goals with the easiest
and least cost.

Max Weber's theory of
rationality has a multidimensional structure. He bases his theory of
rationalization on Western societies on two basic models of rationality. These are practical-rationality that prepares the ground
for the emergence of modern capitalism and purposeful-rationalism that enables
it to mature and institutionalize. Purposeful-rationality to dominates
all systems today; it requires redesign of value fields and individuals,
institutions and societies under the guidance of practical-rationality. This type of rationality can ensure the longing of rational society by
protecting the material interests of today's people and raising their spiritual
world to the ideal.

From this perspective, the concept of
rationality, the classification of social action and the types of rationality
will be explained briefly, then referring to Weber’s and Kant’s references to
reveal the phenomenon of practical-rationality in this study.

Keywords

Rationality, Practical-Rationality, Capitalism, Weber, Kant

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