Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets

Year 2014, , 269 - 279, 14.10.2015

Sadettin Çitçi

https://doi.org/10.18657/yecbu.25947

Abstract

We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.

Keywords

transparency; career concern; delegated portfolio management

Finansal Piyasalarda Vekillik ve Şeffaflık

Abstract

Bu çalışmada finansal piyasalardaki şeffaflığın (kamuyu aydınlatmanın) yetkilendirilmiş portföy yönetimi üzerindeki teşvik etkileri analiz edilmiştir. Portföy getirisinin gözlemlenebilir olduğu durumda, portföy kompozisyonunun ifşa edilmesi, portföyün beklenen getirisini düşürmekte ve yatırımcının portföy yöneticisinin gerçek yatırım kabiliyetini de öğrenmesini güçleştirmektedir. Portföy yönetim anlaşmasının yenilenmesinden önce yatırımcının portföy getirisini gözlemlemesi de, portföyün beklenen getirisini düşürmekte, fakat bazı şartlara bağlı olarak yatırımcının portföy yöneticisinin yatırım kabiliyeti hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinmesini sağlamaktadır

Keywords

şeffaflık, kariyer kaygısı, yetkilendirilmiş portföy yönetimi

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