Special Interest Groups and Economic Growth Nexus: The OECD Example
Year 2017,
Volume: 24 Issue: 3, 803 - 813, 27.12.2017
- -
İbrahim Bakırtaş
,
Mümin Atalay Çetin
Abstract
This
study aims to revisit the approach which claims special interest groups (SIGs)
has a negative impact on economic growth in the long run. In this study, the
long run relationship between economic growth and SIGs is examined by panel
data techniques for OECD countries during 1990-2011. According to empirical
findings, the long run relationship is found between economic growth and the
SIGs for OECD sample. In addition, the long run elasticity results of OECD
panel states that SIGs have a disruptive impact on economic growth. On the
other hand, the long run elasticity results of individual countries indicate
that an U-shaped relationship between economic growth and SIGs exists in 28% of
the sample.
References
- Bentley, A. F. (1908). The Process of Government. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Coates, D. & Heckelman, J. C. (2003). Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of the Olson Hypothesis. Public Choice, 117, 333-340.
- Coates, D., Heckelman, J. C. & Wilson, B. (2011). Special-interest Groups and Growth. Public Choice, 147, 439-457.
- Cole, I. M. (2015). Interest Group Activity and Economic Growth: Some New Evidence from the US States. Applied Economics Letters, 22(10), 825-829.
- Heckelman, J. C. (2000). Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth. Public Choice, 104(3/4), 319-327.
- Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), 281-312.
- Horgos, D. & Zimmermann, K. W. (2009). Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence. Public Choice, 138, 301-315.
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288.
- Knack, S. (2003). Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses. Public Choice, 117(3/4), 341-355.
- Latham, E. (1952). The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory. American Political Science Review, 46, 376-397.
- McCallum, J. & Blais, A. (1987). Government, Special Interest Groups, and Economic Growth. Public Choice, 54, 3-18.
- Mitchell, W. C. & Munger, M. C. (1991). Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 512-546.
- Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Special Issue 0305-9049.
- Pedroni, P. (2000). Fully Modified OLS For Heterogeneous Cointegrated Panels. Advances in Econometrics, 15, 93-130.
- Pedroni, P. (2001). Purchasing Power Parity Tests in Cointegrated Panels. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(4), 727-731.
- Pedroni, P. (2004). Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled Time Series Tests with an Application to the PPP Hypothesis. Economic Theory, 20, 597-625.
- Pesaran, H. M. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests For Cross Section Dependence in Panels. CESifo Working Paper 1229. Munich, Germany.
- Pesaran, H. M. (2007). A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross Section Dependence. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(2), 265-312.
- Phillips, P. C. B. & Hansen, B. E. (1990). Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables Regression with (1) Processes. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 99-125.
- Phillips, P. C. B. & Moon, H. R. (1999). Linear Regression Limit Theory for Nonstationary Panel Data. Econometrica, 67(5), 1057-1111.
- Soytas, U., Sari, R. & Ewing, B. T. (2007). Energy Consumption, Income, and Carbon emissions in the United States. Ecological Economics, 62, 482-489..
Özel Çıkar Grupları ile Ekonomik Büyüme Arasındaki İlişki: OECD Örneği
Year 2017,
Volume: 24 Issue: 3, 803 - 813, 27.12.2017
- -
İbrahim Bakırtaş
,
Mümin Atalay Çetin
Abstract
Bu
çalışma, özel çıkar gruplarının (SIGs) uzun dönem ekonomik büyüme üzerinde
negatif bir etkisi olduğunu ileri süren iktisadi görüşü test etmek amacındadır.
Bu bağlamda SIGs ve ekonomik büyüme arasındaki uzun dönemli ilişki OECD
ülkeleri için 1990 ve 2011 yılları arasında panel veri teknikleri yardımıyla
incelenmiştir. OECD örneklemine ilişkin araştırma bulguları, SIGs ile ekonomik
büyüme arasında uzun dönemli bir ilişki olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca OECD
paneline ilişkin uzun dönem esneklik sonuçlarından hareketle, özel çıkar
gruplarının ekonomik büyüme üzerinde bozucu bir etkisi olduğu tespit
edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak her bir ülkeye ilişkin uzun dönem esneklik sonuçları
ise, örneklem grubunun %28’nin özel çıkar grupları ile ekonomik büyüme arasında
ters U şeklinde bir ilişkinin varlığını desteklediğini ortaya koymuştur.
References
- Bentley, A. F. (1908). The Process of Government. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Coates, D. & Heckelman, J. C. (2003). Interest Groups and Investment: A Further Test of the Olson Hypothesis. Public Choice, 117, 333-340.
- Coates, D., Heckelman, J. C. & Wilson, B. (2011). Special-interest Groups and Growth. Public Choice, 147, 439-457.
- Cole, I. M. (2015). Interest Group Activity and Economic Growth: Some New Evidence from the US States. Applied Economics Letters, 22(10), 825-829.
- Heckelman, J. C. (2000). Consistent Estimates of the Impact of Special Interest Groups on Economic Growth. Public Choice, 104(3/4), 319-327.
- Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional Dependence. The Stata Journal, 7(3), 281-312.
- Horgos, D. & Zimmermann, K. W. (2009). Interest Groups and Economic Performance: Some New Evidence. Public Choice, 138, 301-315.
Knack, S. & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have An Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288.
- Knack, S. (2003). Groups, Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses. Public Choice, 117(3/4), 341-355.
- Latham, E. (1952). The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory. American Political Science Review, 46, 376-397.
- McCallum, J. & Blais, A. (1987). Government, Special Interest Groups, and Economic Growth. Public Choice, 54, 3-18.
- Mitchell, W. C. & Munger, M. C. (1991). Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey. American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 512-546.
- Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pedroni, P. (1999). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Special Issue 0305-9049.
- Pedroni, P. (2000). Fully Modified OLS For Heterogeneous Cointegrated Panels. Advances in Econometrics, 15, 93-130.
- Pedroni, P. (2001). Purchasing Power Parity Tests in Cointegrated Panels. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(4), 727-731.
- Pedroni, P. (2004). Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled Time Series Tests with an Application to the PPP Hypothesis. Economic Theory, 20, 597-625.
- Pesaran, H. M. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests For Cross Section Dependence in Panels. CESifo Working Paper 1229. Munich, Germany.
- Pesaran, H. M. (2007). A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross Section Dependence. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(2), 265-312.
- Phillips, P. C. B. & Hansen, B. E. (1990). Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables Regression with (1) Processes. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 99-125.
- Phillips, P. C. B. & Moon, H. R. (1999). Linear Regression Limit Theory for Nonstationary Panel Data. Econometrica, 67(5), 1057-1111.
- Soytas, U., Sari, R. & Ewing, B. T. (2007). Energy Consumption, Income, and Carbon emissions in the United States. Ecological Economics, 62, 482-489..