Sahra Arap Demokratik Cumhuriyeti’nin Diplomatik Ontolojisi

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 25 Sayı: 97, 167 - 185, 20.03.2020

Mürsel Bayram

https://doi.org/10.36484/liberal.683428

Cited By: 1

Öz

Bu çalışmada, sınırlı tanıma statüsündeki Sahra Arap Demokratik Cumhuriyeti’nin (SADC) diplomatik var olma biçiminin ve düzeyinin incelenmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Diplomatik tanınma, devletin temel unsurları arasında sayılmamakla birlikte SADC örneğinde görüldüğü üzere devletin en azından “fikir” (idea) olarak varoluşunu destekleyen bir unsurdur. 44 Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi devlet tarafından tanınan ve Afrika Birliği’nin tam üyesi olan SADC, hak iddia ettiği Batı Sahra topraklarının tamamında egemenlik kuramadığı için fizikî ve beşerî varoluşunu temin edememiştir. Bu durum SADC’ın varlığını tartışmalı hale getirse de yokluğunu ispat etmeye de yetmemektedir. SADC’ın elde ettiği diplomatik destek, bu devletin “yarı-varlık” olarak
hayatta kalmasını sağlamaktadır. SADC’ı diplomatik olarak tanıyıp tanımama kararı, aynı zamanda Afrika ve Orta Doğu’daki siyasal rekabetlerde hangi aktörün hangi ittifakta yer aldığını gösteren bir turnusol işlevi görmekte ve SADC’ın araçsallaştırılan bir “diplomatik varlığa” dönüşmesine neden olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Batı Sahra, Diplomatik Ontoloji, Fas, Polisario Cephesi, Orta Doğu

The Diplomatic Ontology of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic

Öz

This paper aims to analyse the way and the extent to which Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) exists diplomatically. Although it is not deemed among the constituent elements of state, diplomatic recognition is a fundamental element that supports the existence of a state at least as an “idea”, as in the case of SADR. SADR is a full member of African Union and recognized by 44 UN member states, but the self-declared Saharawi state has not ensured its anthropic and physical existence due to its incapacity to exercise sovereignty over Western Sahara. This situation makes the existence of SADR problematic, albeit not sufficient to prove its non-existence. The diplomatic support SADR receives helps the Saharawi state survive as a “semi-existence”. States’ decision to recognize or not to recognize SADR also functions as a litmus test for political rivalries in not only Africa but also the Middle East, showing the positions of actors in their respective alliances. Thus SADR turns into an instrumentalised “diplomatic entity”.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Diplomatic Ontology, Western Sahara, Morocco, Africa, Middle East

Kaynakça

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