Araştırma Makalesi
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Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 32 Sayı: 60, 11 - 32, 28.04.2024

Özgün Akduran Erol

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01

Öz

This study examines the situations that arise when regulating a natural monopoly market by focusing on Türkiye’s electricity market. Specifically, this qualitative study investigates the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) in terms of capture theory, drawing on various documentary sources, such as electricity sector regulation legislation (constitutions, sector laws, decree-laws, Plan and Budgeting Committee documents of The Grand National Assembly of Türkiye), EMRA official decisions, newspaper reports from 2001 to 2021, and media interviews. The empirical findings discussed throughout the article reveal numerous instances consistent with the capture theory.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Natural Monopoly Markets Regulatory Authority Capture Electricity Market

Kaynakça

  • Akduran, Ö. & S. Temelli (2015), “Politik iktisadın yeni gözdesi olarak teşvik politikaları: Son dönem içerisinden Türkiye’ye bakış”, in: H. Mıhçı (ed.), Finansallaşma, Devlet ve Politik İktisat (221-250), Ankara: NotaBene Yayınları.
  • Akşam (2011), Babacan ‘Kantarın topuzu Kaçtı’ Dedi. EPDK İki Parçaya Ayrılıyor, <https://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/babacan-kantarin-topuzu-kacti-dedi-epdk-iki-parcaya-ayriliyor--22102h/haber-22102>, 01.09.2021.
  • Bağdadioğlu, N. (2011), “Regulation in the Turkish electricity industry”, in: T. Çetin & F. Oğuz (eds.), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey (123-143), New York: Springer.
  • Bailey, S.J. (1995), Public Sector Economics: Theory, Policy and Practice, UK: Macmillan International Higher Education.
  • Becker, G.S. (1983), “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371-400.
  • Bernstein, M.H. (1955), “Independence, responsibility, and the public interest”, in: Regulating Business by Independent Commission (126-163), NewJersey: Princeton University Press.
  • Böllhoff, D. (2005), “Developments in Regulatory Regimes: Comparison of Telecommunications, Energy and Rail”, in: D. Coen & A. Heritier (eds.), Refining Regulatory Regimes: Utilities in Europe (15-52), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Carpenter, D.P. (2004), “Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator”, The American Political Science Review, 98(4), 613-631.
  • Carpenter, D.P. (2014), “Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation”, in: D. Carpenter & D.A. Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it (152-172), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Carpenter, DP. (1996), “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation”, American Political Science Review, 90(2), 283-302.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Oguz (2007), “The Politics of Regulation in the Turkish Electricity Market”, Energy Policy, 35(3), 1761-1770.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Oğuz (2011), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey, NewYork: Springer Science & Business Media.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Yilmaz (2010), “Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy”, Journal of Economic Issues, 44(2), 393-402.
  • Doğan, A. (2008), “Demokrasi ve Özgür Basını İçine Sindir”, Interviewer: M.A. Birand, Kanal D Haber (Vol 1 Eylül), Hürriyet, İstanbul.
  • Dubash, N.K. (2003), “Revisiting Electricity Reform: The Case for a Sustainable Development Approach”, Utilities Policy, 11(3), 143-154.
  • Durakoğlu, S.M. (2011), “Political Institutions of Electricity Regulation: The Case of Turkey”, Energy Policy, 39(9), 5578-5587.
  • Enerji Günlüğü (2015), Mert: Serbest Tüketici Limiti Sıfırlanmalı, <https://www.enerjigunlugu.net/mert-serbest-tuketici-limiti-sifirlanmali-12823h.htm>, 01.09.2017.
  • EPDK [EMRA] (2021), Electricity Market Sector Report 2020, <https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-24-3/elektrikyillik-sektor-raporu>, 02.03.2022.
  • Erensü, S. (2018), “Powering Neoliberalization: Energy and Politics in the Making of a New Turkey”, Energy Research & Social Science, (41), 148-157.
  • Gilardi, F. et al. (2006), “Regulation in The Age of Globalization: The Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies Across Europe and Latin America”, IBEI Working Papers, Barcelona.
  • Gordon, S.C. & C. Hafer (2014), “Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture: Evidence from coal mine safety regulation”, in: D. Carpenter & D.A. Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it (208-238), Cambridge University Press.
  • Görgün, S. (1993), Kamu Maliyesine Giriş Ders Notları, İstanbul: SBF Yayınları.
  • Haberler (2015), Elektrik Şirketlerinin Bankalara Borcu Türkiye’yi Tehdit Ediyor, <https://www.haberler.com/elektrik-sirketlerinin-bankalara-borcu-turkiye-7668864-haberi/>, 01.09.2017.
  • Hopenhayn, H. & S. Lohmann (1996), “Fire-alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies”, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12(1), 196-213.
  • Kirmanoğlu, H. & M. Kahveci (2016), “Restructuring the Electricity Sector in Turkey: Who are the Beneficiaries?”, in: Handbook of Research on Public Finance in Europe and the MENA Region (429-446), IGI Global.
  • Kirmanoğlu, H. (2009), Kamu Ekonomisi Analizi, İstanbul: Beta.
  • Kleizen, B. et al. (2018), “Structural Reform Histories and Perceptions of Organizational Autonomy: Do Senior Managers Perceive Less Strategic Policy Autonomy When Faced with Frequent and Intense Restructuring?”, Public Administration, 96(2), 349-367.
  • Kumar, S. (2022), “Taking Root: Independent Regulatory Agency Model of Regulation in Indian Electricity Sector”, Energy Policy, (164), 112863.
  • Laffont, J.-J. & J. Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1089-1127.
  • Mahon, R. (1979), “Regulatory Agencies: Captive Agents or Hegemonic Apparatuses”, Studies in Political Economy, 1(1), 162-200.
  • Majone, G. (1996), “Theories of Regulation”, in: G. Majone (ed.), Regulating Europe (28-46), London: Routledge.
  • Majone, G. (1997), Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical and Normative Dimensions, Springer.
  • Mill, J.S. (1848), Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Abridged) Edited, with Introduction, by Stephen Nathanson, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
  • Milliyet (2010), Çalık 15 Milyar TL’lik Teşvik Belgesi Aldı, (Vol. 2021), İstanbul.
  • Özcan, G.B. & U. Gündüz (2015), “Energy Privatisations, Business-Politics Connections and Governance Under Political Islam”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, (33), 1714-1737.
  • Özel, I. & İ. Atiyas (2011), “Regulatory Diffusion in Turkey: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment”, in: T. Çetin & F. Oğuz (eds.), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey (51-73), NewYork: Springer.
  • Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı (2021), 3. Proje Grup Başkanlığı Portföyü, Elektrik Üretim A.Ş., <https://www.oib.gov.tr/3-proje-grup-baskanligi/,%20Eri%C5%9Fim%20Tarihi:%201%20Aral%C4%B1k%202021>, 10.2.2022.
  • Peltzman, S. (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”, The Journal of Law & Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
  • Posner, R.A. (1968), “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation”, Stanford Law Review, (21), 548-643.
  • Rekabet Kurulu (2023), Rekabet Kurulu Kararları, <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr/Kararlar>, 01.01.2024.
  • Sharkey, W.W. (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Sözcü (2016), Çalık’ın Kredisi Sır Oldu, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/ekonomi/calikin-kredisi-sir-oldu-1343034/>, 01.09.2021.
  • Stigler, G.J. & C. Friedland (1962), “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 5, 1-16.
  • Stigler, G.J. (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (2), 3-21.
  • Stiglitz, J.E. (2000), Economics of The Public Sector Third Edition: WW Norton & Company.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2018), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2017 Yılı Sayıştay Düzenlilik ve Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2019), Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı 2018 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/download/372-enerji-ve-tabii-kaynaklar-bakanligi>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2020), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2019 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2021), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2020 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2022), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2021 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • Thatcher, M. (2002), “Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 954-972.
  • TÜSİAD (2008), Enerji Piyasasının Serbestleşmesi ve Arz Güvenliğinin Sağlanması için Öneriler, <https://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar/item/4835-tusiad-enerji-stratejisi-dizisi-no--1---elektrik-piyasasinin-serbestlesmesi-ve-arz-guvenliginin-saglanmasi-icin-oneriler>, 01.12.2021.
  • Üstündağ, B. (2021), “Elektrik Dağıtım Faaliyeti ile Diğer Elektrik Piyasası Faaliyetleri Arasında Yönetim Ayrıştırmasının Uygulanabilirliği”, Yıldırım Beyazıt Hukuk Dergisi, (2), 611-646.
  • Viscusi, W.K. (1992), Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Vogel, S. (1996), Freer Markets, More Rules, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  • Wynen, J. et al. (2020), “Keeping a Watchful Eye in Times of Turmoil? How Repeated Structural Reform Leads to More Attention to Political Signals”, Public Administration, 98(3), 570-590.

Doğal Tekelin Düzenlenmesi: Türkiye Elektrik Piyasası

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 32 Sayı: 60, 11 - 32, 28.04.2024

Özgün Akduran Erol

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01

Öz

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin elektrik piyasası örneğine odaklanarak doğal tekel piyasasının düzenlenmesinde ortaya çıkan durumları incelemektedir. Bunun için Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu’nu (EPDK) elektrik sektörü düzenleme mevzuatı (anayasalar, sektör kanunları, kanun hükmünde kararnameler, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu belgeleri), EPDK resmi kararları, 2001’den 2021’e kadar gazete haberleri ve medya röportajları gibi kaynaklardan yararlanarak) ele geçirme teorisi açısından incelemektedir. Makale boyunca tartışılan ampirik bulgular, ele geçirme teorisiyle tutarlıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Doğal Tekel Piyasaları Düzenleyici Kurum Ele Geçirme Elektrik Piyasası

Kaynakça

  • Akduran, Ö. & S. Temelli (2015), “Politik iktisadın yeni gözdesi olarak teşvik politikaları: Son dönem içerisinden Türkiye’ye bakış”, in: H. Mıhçı (ed.), Finansallaşma, Devlet ve Politik İktisat (221-250), Ankara: NotaBene Yayınları.
  • Akşam (2011), Babacan ‘Kantarın topuzu Kaçtı’ Dedi. EPDK İki Parçaya Ayrılıyor, <https://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/babacan-kantarin-topuzu-kacti-dedi-epdk-iki-parcaya-ayriliyor--22102h/haber-22102>, 01.09.2021.
  • Bağdadioğlu, N. (2011), “Regulation in the Turkish electricity industry”, in: T. Çetin & F. Oğuz (eds.), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey (123-143), New York: Springer.
  • Bailey, S.J. (1995), Public Sector Economics: Theory, Policy and Practice, UK: Macmillan International Higher Education.
  • Becker, G.S. (1983), “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371-400.
  • Bernstein, M.H. (1955), “Independence, responsibility, and the public interest”, in: Regulating Business by Independent Commission (126-163), NewJersey: Princeton University Press.
  • Böllhoff, D. (2005), “Developments in Regulatory Regimes: Comparison of Telecommunications, Energy and Rail”, in: D. Coen & A. Heritier (eds.), Refining Regulatory Regimes: Utilities in Europe (15-52), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Carpenter, D.P. (2004), “Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning Regulator”, The American Political Science Review, 98(4), 613-631.
  • Carpenter, D.P. (2014), “Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation”, in: D. Carpenter & D.A. Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it (152-172), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Carpenter, DP. (1996), “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation”, American Political Science Review, 90(2), 283-302.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Oguz (2007), “The Politics of Regulation in the Turkish Electricity Market”, Energy Policy, 35(3), 1761-1770.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Oğuz (2011), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey, NewYork: Springer Science & Business Media.
  • Çetin, T. & F. Yilmaz (2010), “Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy”, Journal of Economic Issues, 44(2), 393-402.
  • Doğan, A. (2008), “Demokrasi ve Özgür Basını İçine Sindir”, Interviewer: M.A. Birand, Kanal D Haber (Vol 1 Eylül), Hürriyet, İstanbul.
  • Dubash, N.K. (2003), “Revisiting Electricity Reform: The Case for a Sustainable Development Approach”, Utilities Policy, 11(3), 143-154.
  • Durakoğlu, S.M. (2011), “Political Institutions of Electricity Regulation: The Case of Turkey”, Energy Policy, 39(9), 5578-5587.
  • Enerji Günlüğü (2015), Mert: Serbest Tüketici Limiti Sıfırlanmalı, <https://www.enerjigunlugu.net/mert-serbest-tuketici-limiti-sifirlanmali-12823h.htm>, 01.09.2017.
  • EPDK [EMRA] (2021), Electricity Market Sector Report 2020, <https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-24-3/elektrikyillik-sektor-raporu>, 02.03.2022.
  • Erensü, S. (2018), “Powering Neoliberalization: Energy and Politics in the Making of a New Turkey”, Energy Research & Social Science, (41), 148-157.
  • Gilardi, F. et al. (2006), “Regulation in The Age of Globalization: The Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies Across Europe and Latin America”, IBEI Working Papers, Barcelona.
  • Gordon, S.C. & C. Hafer (2014), “Conditional forbearance as an alternative to capture: Evidence from coal mine safety regulation”, in: D. Carpenter & D.A. Moss (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it (208-238), Cambridge University Press.
  • Görgün, S. (1993), Kamu Maliyesine Giriş Ders Notları, İstanbul: SBF Yayınları.
  • Haberler (2015), Elektrik Şirketlerinin Bankalara Borcu Türkiye’yi Tehdit Ediyor, <https://www.haberler.com/elektrik-sirketlerinin-bankalara-borcu-turkiye-7668864-haberi/>, 01.09.2017.
  • Hopenhayn, H. & S. Lohmann (1996), “Fire-alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies”, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 12(1), 196-213.
  • Kirmanoğlu, H. & M. Kahveci (2016), “Restructuring the Electricity Sector in Turkey: Who are the Beneficiaries?”, in: Handbook of Research on Public Finance in Europe and the MENA Region (429-446), IGI Global.
  • Kirmanoğlu, H. (2009), Kamu Ekonomisi Analizi, İstanbul: Beta.
  • Kleizen, B. et al. (2018), “Structural Reform Histories and Perceptions of Organizational Autonomy: Do Senior Managers Perceive Less Strategic Policy Autonomy When Faced with Frequent and Intense Restructuring?”, Public Administration, 96(2), 349-367.
  • Kumar, S. (2022), “Taking Root: Independent Regulatory Agency Model of Regulation in Indian Electricity Sector”, Energy Policy, (164), 112863.
  • Laffont, J.-J. & J. Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1089-1127.
  • Mahon, R. (1979), “Regulatory Agencies: Captive Agents or Hegemonic Apparatuses”, Studies in Political Economy, 1(1), 162-200.
  • Majone, G. (1996), “Theories of Regulation”, in: G. Majone (ed.), Regulating Europe (28-46), London: Routledge.
  • Majone, G. (1997), Independent Agencies and the Delegation Problem: Theoretical and Normative Dimensions, Springer.
  • Mill, J.S. (1848), Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Abridged) Edited, with Introduction, by Stephen Nathanson, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
  • Milliyet (2010), Çalık 15 Milyar TL’lik Teşvik Belgesi Aldı, (Vol. 2021), İstanbul.
  • Özcan, G.B. & U. Gündüz (2015), “Energy Privatisations, Business-Politics Connections and Governance Under Political Islam”, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, (33), 1714-1737.
  • Özel, I. & İ. Atiyas (2011), “Regulatory Diffusion in Turkey: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment”, in: T. Çetin & F. Oğuz (eds.), The Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey (51-73), NewYork: Springer.
  • Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı (2021), 3. Proje Grup Başkanlığı Portföyü, Elektrik Üretim A.Ş., <https://www.oib.gov.tr/3-proje-grup-baskanligi/,%20Eri%C5%9Fim%20Tarihi:%201%20Aral%C4%B1k%202021>, 10.2.2022.
  • Peltzman, S. (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”, The Journal of Law & Economics, 19(2), 211-240.
  • Posner, R.A. (1968), “Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation”, Stanford Law Review, (21), 548-643.
  • Rekabet Kurulu (2023), Rekabet Kurulu Kararları, <https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr/Kararlar>, 01.01.2024.
  • Sharkey, W.W. (1982), The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Sözcü (2016), Çalık’ın Kredisi Sır Oldu, <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/ekonomi/calikin-kredisi-sir-oldu-1343034/>, 01.09.2021.
  • Stigler, G.J. & C. Friedland (1962), “What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 5, 1-16.
  • Stigler, G.J. (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, (2), 3-21.
  • Stiglitz, J.E. (2000), Economics of The Public Sector Third Edition: WW Norton & Company.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2018), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2017 Yılı Sayıştay Düzenlilik ve Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2019), Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanlığı 2018 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/download/372-enerji-ve-tabii-kaynaklar-bakanligi>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2020), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2019 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2021), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2020 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • T.C. Sayıştay Başkanlığı (2022), Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu 2021 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, <https://www.sayistay.gov.tr/reports/NaQ5pqLgqB-enerji-piyasasi-duzenleme-kurumu>, 01.01.2024.
  • Thatcher, M. (2002), “Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 954-972.
  • TÜSİAD (2008), Enerji Piyasasının Serbestleşmesi ve Arz Güvenliğinin Sağlanması için Öneriler, <https://tusiad.org/tr/yayinlar/raporlar/item/4835-tusiad-enerji-stratejisi-dizisi-no--1---elektrik-piyasasinin-serbestlesmesi-ve-arz-guvenliginin-saglanmasi-icin-oneriler>, 01.12.2021.
  • Üstündağ, B. (2021), “Elektrik Dağıtım Faaliyeti ile Diğer Elektrik Piyasası Faaliyetleri Arasında Yönetim Ayrıştırmasının Uygulanabilirliği”, Yıldırım Beyazıt Hukuk Dergisi, (2), 611-646.
  • Viscusi, W.K. (1992), Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk, New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Vogel, S. (1996), Freer Markets, More Rules, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  • Wynen, J. et al. (2020), “Keeping a Watchful Eye in Times of Turmoil? How Repeated Structural Reform Leads to More Attention to Political Signals”, Public Administration, 98(3), 570-590.
Toplam 56 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Ekonomi
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Özgün Akduran Erol 0000-0003-4576-017X

Erken Görünüm Tarihi 28 Nisan 2024
Yayımlanma Tarihi 28 Nisan 2024
Gönderilme Tarihi 12 Temmuz 2022
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2024 Cilt: 32 Sayı: 60

Kaynak Göster

APA Akduran Erol, Ö. (2024). Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market. Sosyoekonomi, 32(60), 11-32. https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01
AMA Akduran Erol Ö. Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market. Sosyoekonomi. Nisan 2024;32(60):11-32. doi:10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01
Chicago Akduran Erol, Özgün. “Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market”. Sosyoekonomi 32, sy. 60 (Nisan 2024): 11-32. https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01.
EndNote Akduran Erol Ö (01 Nisan 2024) Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market. Sosyoekonomi 32 60 11–32.
IEEE Ö. Akduran Erol, “Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market”, Sosyoekonomi, c. 32, sy. 60, ss. 11–32, 2024, doi: 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01.
ISNAD Akduran Erol, Özgün. “Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market”. Sosyoekonomi 32/60 (Nisan 2024), 11-32. https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01.
JAMA Akduran Erol Ö. Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market. Sosyoekonomi. 2024;32:11–32.
MLA Akduran Erol, Özgün. “Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market”. Sosyoekonomi, c. 32, sy. 60, 2024, ss. 11-32, doi:10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2024.02.01.
Vancouver Akduran Erol Ö. Regulation of Natural Monopoly: The Turkish Electricity Market. Sosyoekonomi. 2024;32(60):11-32.
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